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Why do armed groups uproot civilians in wartime? This dissertation identifies variation
across civil wars in three population displacement strategies – cleansing, depopulation,
and forced relocation – and tests different explanations for their use. I develop a new
“assortative” theory of displacement, which argues that while some strategies (cleansing)
aim to expel undesirable or disloyal populations, others (forced relocation, and perhaps
depopulation) seek to identify the undesirables or the disloyal in the first place. When
combatants lack information about opponents’ identities and civilians’ loyalties, they can
use human mobility to infer wartime sympathies through “guilt by location.” Triggering
displacement forces people to send costly and visible signals of loyalty based on whether,
andwhere, they flee. Thismakes communitiesmore “legible,” enabling combatants to use
people’s movements as a continuous indicator of affiliation and allegiance; and to extract
rents and recruits from the population. I therefore show that in some cases, displacement
is attractive because it offers unique solutions to information and resource problems in
civil wars by acting as a sorting mechanism and a force multiplier.
To evaluate my theory, I adopt a multi-method, multi-level research design that
focuses on displacement by state actors, the primary perpetrators of these methods.
I introduce a new dataset of population displacement strategies in 160 civil wars
(1945–2008), disaggregated by type, and conduct a series of quantitative tests. The
data show that strategic displacement has been much more common in wartime
than previously thought. I also find that, consistent with my expectations, different
displacement strategies occur in different contexts and appear to follow different logics.
Cleansing is more likely in conventional wars, where territorial conquest takes primacy,
and when counterinsurgents have access to group-level identifiers that link civilians
to an armed group. Forced relocation – the most common displacement strategy – is
more likely in irregular wars, where identification problems are most acute, and when
counterinsurgents lack access to other group-level heuristics for inferring civilian loyalties.
The evidence indicates that cleansing follows a logic of punishment. The results for
relocation, however, are consistent with the implications of my assortative logic: it is
more likely to be employed by resource-constrained incumbents fighting insurgencies in
2“illegible” areas – rural, peripheral territories – and it correlates strongly with state efforts
to mobilize the population into civilian defense forces.
While the cross-national analysis lends indirect support for my arguments, a
series of case studies provide direct evidence for the assortative logic. Two in-depth case
studies, of civil wars in Uganda and Syria, are based on extensive field research conducted
between 2016 and 2019, including hundreds of interviews with perpetrators and victims
of displacement. An additional chapter features three shorter case studies of conflicts in
Burundi, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
As the most comprehensive study of strategic wartime displacement to date, this
dissertation challenges some core assumptions about a devastating feature of modern
conflict and an increasingly salient issue in world politics. My findings have important
implications for research on forced displacement, civil war, and political violence, and
can inform policy efforts to prevent, mitigate, and better respond to wartime migrations
and their myriad consequences.
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Introduction
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
“Massive displacement of people within countries and across borders
has become a defining feature of the post-cold war world.”
-Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, 20091
“Forced displacement often functions as a central strategy in civil wars and,
as such, can be considered in the political as well as humanitarian realm.”
-Sarah Kenyon Lischer, 20142
In northern Uganda, gentle hills occasionally punctuate a vast savannah
teeming with crops of cassava and sorghum. During the 1990s and early 2000s,
stampedes of frightened villagers frequently trampled the tall, dry grasses scattered
across this landscape. A roaming, predatory band of insurgents called the Lord’s
Resistance Army terrorized the countryside, and residents had become accustomed
to the prospect of fleeing their homes at a moment’s notice. One day in 1996, people
ran towards the village of eight-year-old Alex Olango, screaming that the rebels were
coming. Olango remembers it vividly: “We ran away. All of us took refuge in the house
of the local councilor. We stayed there the entire day but nothing happened. [So] we
returned home in the evening.”3 Such spontaneous population displacement, where
individuals opt to move in anticipation of violence – for days, for weeks, even for years
– is a common occurrence in war. But in northern Uganda, many people did not flee on
their own volition. Instead, they were ordered to leave their villages by the government
and relocate to designated camps as part of a deliberate military strategy; camps where
conditions often bordered on the grotesque. Olango recalls this as well:
“We left for one of the camps in northern Uganda. My mother carried my little
sister. I carried clothes and blankets while my brother carried maize and cooking
utensils...When we reached the camp, we found several hundred people already
there. I had never seen so many people. From a homestead of about 20 people,
I suddenly found myself in a place with over 800. It was like a small town. The
hygiene was horrific. We built our own bolo, a small hut made of reed and grass.
The government was encouraging more people to move to the camps. When some
people refused to cooperate, a couple of curfews were implemented. This involved
beating up people, setting ablaze homesteads that were uncooperative and even
killing stubborn heads of families.”4
The story of northern Uganda, told through the eyes of one of hundreds
of thousands of victims, is not unique. In other countries convulsed by civil wars –
1 Cohen and Deng 2009, 15.
2 Lischer 2014, 320.
3 Olango 2016, 4.
4 Olango 2016, 5-6.
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including those currently raging in Burma, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan,
South Sudan, and Syria – armed groups have routinely and intentionally uprooted
civilians for strategic and tactical purposes. But how common is the use of population
displacement as a weapon of war? How do we characterize and explain these strategies?
And what are the conditions under which combatants are most likely to “make”
migrations? Answering these questions is the core aim of this dissertation.
1.1 Purpose and Relevance
Wars are killing fewer people today on average, but they are displacing more
of them. A staggering 68 million individuals are currently uprooted by conflict and
violence worldwide, the highest recorded since the Second World War (see Table 1.1).5
This uptick in global displacement in recent decades is perplexing – and disturbing
– given a general and oft-celebrated decline in the incidence and lethality of armed
conflict.6 Wartime displacement has therefore become one of the most pressing issues
facing humanity today. Flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
have dire consequences for international security, as they have been linked to an array
of threats – including conflict contagion,7 refugee militarization8, border disputes,9
terrorism and transnational crime,10 the spread of infectious disease,11 food insecurity,12
and state breakdown.13 These forced population movements also create humanitarian
disasters that have increasingly strained the global aid system and undermined
prospects for post-conflict peace and development.14 The political repercussions of
displacement are also increasingly evident, as refugees have become a salient election
issue in the United States and Europe; potentially contributing to the rise of populism in
Western countries.15
For many analysts, population displacement is worth observing but not
explaining. This stems from a common belief that migration in wartime is an
inadvertent (and perhaps inevitable) byproduct of violence and instability. Fighting
erupts. People flee. But scholars and policymakers have increasingly recognized that
5 UNHCR 2018.
6 Dupuy and Rustad 2018; Szayna et al. 2017; Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011.
7 Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Bohnet et al. 2018; Fisk 2018; Onoma 2013; Böhmelt et al. 2019; Miller and
Ritter 2014.
8 Zolberg et al. 1992; Stedman and Tanner 2004; Lischer 2005.
9 Salehyan 2008.
10 Adamson 2006; Betts and Loescher 2011; Milton et al. 2013; Choi and Piazza 2016.
11 Kalipeni and Oppong 1998.
12 Cohen and Deng 2009; Maystadt and Verwimp 2014.
13 Lischer 2014.
14 Christensen and Harild 2009; Shilue and Fagen 2014.
15 Inglehart and Norris 2016.
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civilian displacement is a strategy of warfare, not just a consequence of it.16 Generating
civilian flight may therefore be integral rather than incidental to the tactics and practices
of armed groups.
Table 1.1: Forced Displacement, 1965-2018
Sources: Marshall 2008; Dupuy and Rustad 2018; UNHCR
Strikingly, however, there has been little systematic research on population
displacement strategies in wartime. When combatants intentionally displace civilians,
there is a widespread tendency – in the media, among policymakers, and even by
scholars – to characterize these events as ethnic cleansing. As such, the orchestrated
expulsion of members of ethnic, religious, and other identity groups has been
the subject of considerable academic research.17 But these studies only focus on
one type of strategic displacement and thus do not account for the full range of
displacement strategies employed in civil war. Scholars have made few efforts to gather
comprehensive cross-national data on different forms of strategic displacement or look
systematically across conflicts to examine where and why they are employed. As a
result, according to one recent review of the conflict literature, “we know relatively
little” about the use of these measures.18
16 See, for example, Greenhill (2008), Steele (2017), Zhukov (2015), Hägerdal (2019), Lischer (2014), and
Valentino (2013).
17 E.g., Hägerdal (2019), Bulutgil (2016, 2015), Weidmann (2011), Valentino (2013), and Mann (2005).
18 Berman and Matanock 2015, 456.
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This dissertation is an investigation into how, where, and why armed groups
intentionally drive civilians from their homes. It introduces new data on population
displacement strategies in civil wars and identifies variation within and across conflicts
in the use of three types: the cleansing of political or ethnic groups, the depopulation
of designated areas, and the forced relocation of civilians into new dwellings. Using
multiple research methods and sources – including an original cross-national dataset
and in-depth case studies of conflicts in Uganda and Syria based on extensive fieldwork
– I systematically examine different explanations for displacement by state actors, who
I find are the predominant perpetrators. I also advance a new theory of displacement to
explain forced relocation, the most common type. In this introductory chapter, I describe
several puzzles that motivate this research, briefly present my arguments, define key
terms and the scope conditions of the study, and outline existing theories and their
weaknesses. I conclude by providing a roadmap for the rest of the dissertation.
Given the tremendous human and financial costs of population displacement,
it is vital to understand its underlying drivers. Doing so, however, requires examining
not only why people elect to flee conflict, but also why conflict parties force them to
flee. Investigating the different ways combatants orchestrate and manipulate civilian
flight – and identifying the conditions that motivate these measures – is therefore
critical not only for advancing our knowledge of wartime migrations, but also for
improving policy efforts to prevent, mitigate, and better respond to them. This research
is particularly relevant in light of the surging scale of forced displacement, along
with the suggestion from some analysts that the weaponization of displacement has
become more prevalent.19 The issue of displacement is also central to untangling conflict
dynamics. While modern wars kill thousands but displace millions, far more ink has
been spilled analyzing and explaining lethal violence than on displacement – which
according to one United Nations (U.N.) report was a “defining feature of conflict in
2017.”20
Three Puzzles
This dissertation explores three key puzzles about the strategic displacement of
civilians in war, which existing theories and research have not yet sufficiently addressed.
Puzzle 1: Displacement Is Costly
The deportation, transfer, and resettlement of populations has been a feature of
territorial acquisition, military domination, and colonial settlement since antiquity.21 Yet
19 Crisp 2003; Orchard 2010. Kaldor (1999) has also argued that civilian displacement has become a
strategic goal of the “new wars” of the post-Cold War era.
20 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2018 (14 May), 4/18.
21 As Aristide Zolberg has observed, the formation of modern nation-states was itself a
“refugee-generating process” (Zolberg 1983).
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in spite of the obsolescence of imperialism and wars of conquest, political and military
actors have continued to employ displacement as a strategic tool. Within the context of
civil wars – particularly those waged in the modern era – uprooting civilians is costly.
Implementing policies of population displacement can be expensive and cumbersome
to coordinate.22 Driving people from their homes often spawns humanitarian crises that
cripple local economies, stoke social grievances, and invite international opprobrium.23
Indeed, according to the World Bank, “displacement has negative developmental
impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, [and] poverty reduction.”24
Moreover, by antagonizing the target population, displacement – like other repertoires
of mass violence – risks galvanizing support for the opposing side.
The historical record is replete with cautionary tales. During the reign of
Louis XIV in seventeenth-century France, royal authorities, when facing an armed
rebellion in the region of Languedoc, “thought that it might be necessary to depopulate
a number of parishes located in the most inaccessible areas.”25 But officials quickly
determined that the plan was “impractical” as “it would ruin the agriculture of the
region by taking people away from their farms” and “general commerce would suffer
terribly,” plus “there was no place to send [so] many refugees without risking a ‘great
embarrassment.’”26 Or take instances where population displacement was actually
implemented, such as Hyderabad, India, in 1951, where military authorities herded
civilians into centers with “a paucity of food grains, water and other bare necessities of
life.” Consequently, “as a counterinsurgency measure, forced relocation was in many
ways counterproductive... [affected communities] were seething with unrest with
no tangible advantage to the Government.”27 Similarly, the concentration of Chinese
civilians into strategic hamlets by Japanese counterinsurgents in 1930s Manchuria
“caused much distress and often drove the masses closer to the guerrillas morally and
spiritually.”28
Given the burdens and potential consequences of displacing populations, why
have combatants continued to employ these measures?
Puzzle 2: Strategic Displacement Often Fails to ‘’Drain the Sea”
The logic of why armed actors – especially state actors – would orchestrate
displacement in civil war may seem obvious and simple: it physically separates
insurgents from the local population, a basic precept of successful counterinsurgency.
According to Mao Zedong’s famous analogy, rebels tend to swim among civilians
22 Kalyvas 2006, 222.
23 Cohen and Deng 2009; Paul et al. 2010; Downes and Greenhill 2015.
24 Jennings and Chesnutt 2014, 1.
25 McCullough 2007, 164.
26 McCullough 2007, 164, 218-19.
27 Kennedy and Purushotham 2012, 839.
28 Lee 1967, v-vii.
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like fish in water, relying on them for material and moral support.29 To uproot the
population, then, is to “drain the sea” in order to starve the fish. Yet displacement
strategies seem to have a poor track record of effectively “draining the sea.” According
to research by Alexander Downes and Kelly Greenhill, population resettlement schemes
in counterinsurgency operations “frequently fail to sever ties between insurgents and the
population.”30 A separate study by the RAND Corporation draws the same conclusion,
and consequently characterizes civilian resettlement as a “poor” counterinsurgency
practice.31 This is because perpetrators often relocate civilians to places within the
conflict-affected area, rather than simply moving people from zones of insurgent control
to zones of incumbent control. In Vietnam, for example, relocation sites known as
“strategic hamlets” were often established “in areas where no real security existed, and
the vulnerable settlements were quickly overrun or infiltrated by the [Vietcong].”32 In
colonial Mozambique, the Portuguese “did not even come close to at least maintaining
the illusion that they were able to ensure the security of the [resettlement] villages”
many of which “were not guarded due to shortage of staff and means.”33
While we should not confuse outcomes with intent, this dubious track record
deepens the first puzzle described above. If strategies of displacement present high costs
to combatants, and are not very effective at “draining the sea,” then why have armed
groups continued to employ them? An adequate answer to this question requires a
theory that focuses on the functions that uprooting populations serves beyond “draining
the sea.” If, as I argue in this dissertation, displacement offers a broader set of benefits to
perpetrators – ones that other violent strategies, such as mass killing, do not – then it can
help resolve this puzzle.
Puzzle 3: Strategic Displacement Takes Different Forms
As noted above, intentional civilian displacement during military contests
tends to be characterized as ethnic cleansing. But cleansing is only one type of strategic
displacement, and it is not a particularly common one: while combatants uprooted
civilians in more than 60 percent of major civil wars between 1945 and 2008, cleansing
accounted for just one-third of cases.34 Government and rebel forces have also employed
strategies of depopulation and forced relocation – the latter being the most prevalent,
as illustrated in Figure 1.1. These trends suggest that while displacement has been
frequently employed as a tool of modern warfare, it has taken different forms.
What accounts for this variation? Do different wartime displacement strategies
serve the same purpose or have similar causes? No study has systematically captured
29 Mao 2000.
30 Downes and Greenhill 2015, 3.
31 Paul et al. 2010.
32 Herring 1979, 107-108.
33 Stucki 2018, 322.
34 I describe this cross-national data on wartime displacement strategies in more detail in Chapter 4.
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and compared the use of different types of strategic displacement across civil wars.35
This is crucial for testing and refining different theories for why combatants displace.
Figure 1.1: Frequency of Strategic Wartime Displacement by Perpetrator (1945–2008)
1.2 The Argument in Brief
I argue that combatants often use displacement to sort the civilian population,
not to get rid of it. The prevailing preoccupation with ethnic cleansing promotes the
perception that the primary function of strategic displacement is to expel or eliminate
“undesirable” groups. Yet when combatants uproot civilians, they regularly attempt
not only to “push” people out of an area, but also to “pull” them into their domain. As
I showed in the previous section, armed actors are actually more inclined to relocate
rather than expel noncombatant populations. The burning question is whether these
two population displacement strategies can be explained by the same factors – that is,
35 Recent work by Stanton (2016) comes close, but she lumps non-cleansing strategies (e.g., depopulation
and forced relocation) together with other military tactics.
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whether they both operate under a single logic, as some scholars have suggested.36
I challenge this conflation and contend that different displacement strategies
serve different functions. While cleansing aims to remove undesirable or disloyal
populations, forced relocation seeks to identify the undesirables or the disloyal in the
first place. Civil wars entail a high degree of uncertainty. To identify and coerce their
enemies and deter civilian support for them, combatants need information about the
affiliations and allegiances of the local population.37 Since this information is often
lacking, armed groups rely on simplifying heuristics, or clues, to infer opponents’
identities and civilians’ loyalties. Previous research has shown that cleansing can be
a consequence of this practice: if combatants use heuristics such as ethnic identity or
political party affiliation to distinguish enemies from allies, they will collectively target
members of these groups and seek their expulsion.38
But what if such heuristics are unavailable – because, for instance, opposing
forces do not claim a distinct ethnic identity – or unhelpful, because a population
is either too homogenous or too heterogeneous for ethnicity to be a meaningful
distinguishing trait? In these contexts, instead of engaging in ethnic or racial profiling,
information-starved and resource-constrained combatants may resort to spatial
profiling. Civil wars are characterized by a fragmentation of domestic sovereignty,
and civilian collaboration with armed actors both shapes, and is shaped by, their
control over territory.39 This often causes political identities to become territorialized,
or what Sebastian Schutte describes as “the association of places with loyalties.”40 As a
consequence, people’s physical locations and movements can provide clues regarding
their loyalties and affiliations.
Combatants, then, can use human mobility to infer wartime sympathies through
what I call “guilt by location.” Triggering displacement forces people to send costly and
visible signals of association and allegiance based on whether, and to where, they flee.
Civilians, since they exercise agency in war, are made to pick a side by fleeing to the
perpetrator’s territories or defecting by remaining in – or moving to – those controlled
by its opponent. This also makes communities more accessible and “legible,” which
enables armed groups to (1) use people’s movements and locations as a continuous
indicator of affiliation; and (2) extract rents and recruits from a larger segment of the
population, while signaling legitimacy to domestic and international audiences. I
therefore show that in some cases, displacement is attractive because it offers unique
solutions to information and resource problems in civil wars by acting as a sorting
mechanism and a force multiplier.
36 Zhukov 2015; Valentino 2013; Balcells and Steele 2016. Kalyvas (2006, 156), in contrast, draws a
distinction between displacement strategies that are meant to eliminate a population and those that
aim to coerce or control it, yet it is not entirely clear which strategies fall within each category.
37 Kalyvas 2006, Steele 2017, Belge 2016, 278.
38 Steele 2017; Fjelde and Hultman 2014; Balcells and Steele 2016; Hägerdal 2019.
39 Kalyvas 2006.
40 Schutte 2017, 385.
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Thus while some displacement strategies (cleansing) are an outcome of
combatants identifying potential enemies through collective profiling ex-ante, others
(forced relocation, and perhaps depopulation) are a process that combatants use to
profile the population ex-post in order to help them distinguish friend from foe. To be
clear: civilians’ movement decisions may not always reflect their actual loyalties, just
as ethnic or religious identity may be poor indicators of people’s political allegiances.
But combatants typically perceive the actions of civilians to be political in wartime, even
when they are not intended to be. My “assortative” argument draws on a core insight
from the study of conflict – that violence in civil wars is often shaped by the level of
information available to armed actors – to deepen our understanding of the logic of
forced displacement, one of the most consequential features of modern warfare. While
I concur with prior research claiming that information problems drive combatants to
displace, I show that different types of strategic displacement reflect different responses
to these problems. Cleansing aims to get rid of the undesirable or the disloyal, and is
more likely where combatants have access to group-level identifiers that link civilians
to subversive groups. Forced relocation, however, is intended to figure out who the
undesirables or the disloyal are, and is more likely when combatants seek information
but lack group-level identifiers. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, my
argument implies that displacement is used not just to demobilize or immobilize
noncombatants, but also to mobilize them for military purposes.
Overall, the assortative logic of displacement has been largely overlooked in
previous research. Population displacement is a complex phenomenon, and none of the
arguments considered in this dissertation – including my own – can explain all wartime
migrations, even those that are engineered by armed groups for strategic purposes. But
this dissertation provides direct and indirect evidence of the assortative logic, through
both cross-national and case study analysis. While this logic is not the only or even the
most important factor in every case, I demonstrate that it can account for variation in
strategic displacement as well or better than rival arguments. These results challenge
common explanations by showing that combatants often displace civilians not to drain
the sea, but to map it, which has important academic and policy implications. Scholars
and practitioners need to give greater attention to the politics of civilian flight in order
to explain wartime displacement and to develop effective interventions that address its
myriad consequences.
1.3 Definitions
Displacement as a Distinct Strategy of War
In recent years, scholars have demonstrated that displacement is a distinctive
strategy of war – not just an auxiliary outcome of other conflict processes – and therefore
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requires an explanation within itself.41 While the conflict literature has been dominated
by the study of homicides, scholars have increasingly called for analyzing different
strategies of non-lethal violence separately from lethal violence, the dominant focus
in the literature.42 Given this, and the fact that wars uproot far more people than they
kill, examining wartime displacement in isolation is essential.43 I define strategic wartime
displacement as the deliberate, systematic, and coercive movement of noncombatants
by armed groups in intrastate conflicts. This is based on the criminal definition of
displacement promulgated by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which includes
the “forced removal of people from one country” or “from one area to another within
the same state.”44
Strategic displacement is a subset of forced displacement, which others define
as “civilian migration that is provoked, directly or indirectly, by one or several armed
groups”45 Forced displacement occurs in most conflicts, but it can be classified
as collateral damage, opportunistic, or strategic. Collateral displacement refers to
displacement that is not deliberate, but rather is a consequence of military battles or
people pre-emptively electing to flee areas affected by military activity.46 Opportunistic
displacement describes displacement that is deliberate but not systematic, and is usually
the spontaneous result of group interactions or individual preferences, such as looting
or property theft.47 The distinction between strategic and non-strategic displacement has
often been noted by conflict analysts, as in the following reports:
“In contexts where civilians are suffering from generalized violence triggered by
conflict, rather than displacement being a planned strategy by the belligerents,
41 Greenhill 2010; Steele 2017; Zhukov 2015; Balcells and Steele 2016.
42 Boyle 2012; Cohen 2016.
43 For example, between 1964 and 2008, conflicts killed an average of 2,161 to 9,035 people per year, while
the annual average stock of people displaced by conflict exceeded six million, including an average
of 2,097,390 refugees and 3,969,380 IDPs (figures based on data from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and
Marshall (2008). According to UNHCR’s Population Statistics, for conflicts between 1990 and 2008, the
median annual battle deaths in a given conflict was 770, while the median number of IDPs and refugees
was 681,042).
44 See the ICC Rome Statute, Articles 7 and 8.
45 Steele 2017; Balcells 2018.
46 Schon 2015 Ana María Ibáñez calls this “preventive” displacementIbánez 2008, 13.
47 Opportunistic displacement is likely to be motivated by bottom-up, rather than top-down, processes,
and may be a consequence of organizational pathologies, social pressure, individual interests, or poor
training (as described to explain other forms of opportunistic or predatory violence – see, for example,
Humphreys and Weinstein (2006), Leiby (2009), Hoover Green (2016), Wood (2009), and Manekin
(2013)). At the individual level, the expulsion of local civilians may be particularly appealing for two
reasons. First, it facilitates the looting of property and other private assets, which may be attractive
for fighters who are inadequately compensated. Second, because displacement during wartime is
often pervasive and elective, armed actors can maintain plausible deniability. As a result, combatants
operating in areas that lack the presence of unit commanders should be more likely to pursue these
tactics.
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populations may spontaneously flee...”48
“In Turkey and Burma, governments have deliberately uprooted people in order to
destroy their possible links to insurgency movements. In Algeria, displacement is
a byproduct of conflict, primarily between the government and Islamist insurgent
groups.”49
Displacement becomes strategic when it is orchestrated by combatants as a
matter of organizational policy; one carried out through explicit threats, evacuation
orders, or the destruction of property.50 The coercive or involuntary nature of
displacement can become muddled when perpetrators use other acts of persecution –
depriving people of employment or education, for example – to pressure individuals to
leave a territory. I therefore follow the approach of other scholars by only categorizing
an event as strategic displacement if it involves the threat or use of physical violence.51
Such displacements are explicitly prohibited under international law, under both the
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Convention.52
Verdicts delivered by international tribunals have further established that forced
displacement can be a war crime. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia concluded that the way in which Serbian forces forcibly
evacuated Muslim communities during military campaigns in Bosnia “proves...that the
transfer was carried out in furtherance of a well-organized policy whose purpose was
to expel the Bosnian Muslim population from the enclave. The evacuation itself was the
goal.”53
The criminal definition of displacement stipulates that displacement must
be committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack” against the civilian
population. Since this definition encompasses displacement related to an armed conflict,
48 Stepputat 1999, 12.
49 Cohen 1999, 6.
50 The key difference between displacement as a strategy and as opportunism is the degree of
institutionalization: whether the imperative to uproot civilians is the result of organizational policy
or the indulgences of individual combatants. The distinction is often evident in the level of scale:
deliberate displacement that reaches a level of being systematic and sustained usually indicates a
strategic or tactical logic.
51 Bulutgil 2016, 6. This definition is more restrictive than the ICC’s, which considers forced displacement
to encompass “the full range of coercive pressures on people to flee their homes, including death
threats, destruction of their homes, and other acts of persecution such as depriving members of a group
of employment, denying them access to schools, and forcing them to wear a symbol of their religious
identity” (Triffterer 1999, 162).
52 See Article 17 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions. According to the Hague
Convention, forced displacement can be lawful where “the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand.” In such cases, all possible measures must be taken to provide
civilians with satisfactory shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition (see Article 8.2(e)(viii)). This is
rarely done in practice.
53 Qtd. in Buck (2017).
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it excludes expulsions or planned resettlements in response to natural disasters or
infrastructure projects that render an area uninhabitable, such as the building of dams
or transportation corridors.54 Displacement is distinct from mass killing, since the
former seeks to remove civilians while the latter aims to destroy them.55 Displacement
can be used to help commit genocide, but it deserves to be treated as a separate category.
To recap: strategic displacement is intentional, systematic displacement against
civilians that is directed or encouraged by government or rebel group leadership. To
say that displacement is strategic is not to claim that it is fully formed or carefully
calculated well in advance through conscious planning and control. Some cases –
such as organized civilian resettlements by the British army in Malaya or under the
Strategic Hamlets Program in Vietnam – do indeed fit this mold. But in other instances
the strategic dimension of displacement is both reactive and proactive, and it evolves
over time. Still, in such instances I consider displacement strategic (as opposed to
opportunistic) in the sense that it is deliberate; organized (even if haphazardly),
coordinated, recurring, and systematic; and serves a broader political or military logic.
54 The ICC definition also requires that victims “were lawfully present in the area from which they were
deported or transferred”; therefore my definition excludes the movement or eviction of squatters, illegal
immigrants, or refugees.
55 See Bell (1999, 1), Hägerdal (2019) and Steele (2017).
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Types of Strategic Displacement
In order to explain strategic displacement in wartime, we first need to
distinguish different forms of it.56 Building on the existing literature, I identify three
types of strategic displacement: cleansing, depopulation, and forced relocation. These
strategies differ in the targeting of displacement, its intended duration, and its general
orientation.57
Cleansing
Cleansing is the deliberate expulsion of members of a political, ethnic, or
social group. I follow other researchers in conceptualizing “ethnic” cleansing as a
subset of a broader category that describes the collective, permanent expulsion of
people who belong to a particular group due to their membership in that group.58
This form of displacement is defined by three criteria. The first is that expulsion is
carried out through collective targeting: victims are subjected to removal on the basis
of some shared group-level characteristic such as ethnicity, religion, or political party
membership.59 The second criteria is that displacement is intended to be permanent. In
many cases, this is evidenced by perpetrators refusing to allow the displaced to return or
repopulating evacuated areas with the perpetrator’s co-ethnics or other allied group.60
The third characteristic of cleansing is that it has an outward or “push” orientation,
meaning that it focuses on removing the population from the perpetrator’s territory or
deporting it from the country altogether.
A paradigmatic case of cleansing, and one of the most studied, is the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia (1991–95), where Croats and Bosniaks “were forced at gunpoint
by Serbian forces to board buses leaving the country.”61 Cleansing along ethnic lines
has also been employed during wars in Cyprus (1963–67, 1974), Lebanon (1975–90), and
56 My typology seeks to improve upon previous conceptual frameworks (Greenhill 2008) by breaking
strategic displacement down into categories based on the core features of each sub-type, rather than
the purported motivations behind their use. In addition to avoiding conflation of different sub-types,
this approach stands to maximize the typology’s explanatory leverage by using the dimensions along
which strategic displacements vary to infer their underlying motivations – instead of simply assuming
them.
57 Other scholars have made similar analytical distinctions between the types of displacement strategies I
propose, though they have used different names. Kalyvas (2006, 126), for example, suggests a distinction
between displacement that is intended to eliminate a population (which he refers to as ethnic cleansing)
and displacement that is intended to control it (what he calls “forced population removal”). Similarly,
Zhukov (2015) and Steele (2017) distinguishes between “civilian flight” and “resettlement,” while
Stanton (2016) separates “high-casualty cleansing” from “low-casualty cleansing” (what I call forced
relocation). Finally, Valentino (2013, 202-203) draws a distinction between “ethnic cleansing” and
“population resettlement.”
58 Bell 1999; Steele 2017; Balcells and Steele 2016.
59 Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017; Steele 2009.
60 Kalyvas 2006; Bulutgil 2016; Steele 2017.
61 Lawyers Committee 1991.
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the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–97). Political cleansing – in which members
of opposition political parties, rather than specific ethnic groups, were targeted for
expulsion – was a feature of civil wars in Colombia (1978–) and Spain (1936–39).62
Some cases of collective expulsion, such as Slobodan Milosevic’s deportation of
Albanian civilians from Kosovo, may constitute what Greenhill has called “coercive
engineered migrations” – the deliberate release of refugee flows targeting foreign
policy rivals.63 Perpetrators of cleansing often make little effort to resettle the targeted
population.64 If they do, victims are transferred far from the conflict zone, as when
Soviet counterinsurgents forcibly moved ethnic Ukrainians and Chechens to distant
regions of the USSR (including Siberia and Central Asia) while combating violent
nationalist uprisings following World War II (1945–50).
Depopulation
Depopulation is similar to cleansing in its outward orientation, but it differs in
two ways. First, it is carried out through indiscriminate, rather than collective, targeting,
so that everyone in a village or town is subject to removal, with little effort to determine
guilt or affiliation. The distinction between cleansing and depopulation builds on recent
work that has differentiated large-scale identity-based targeting from indiscriminate
violence.65 Second, depopulation is not necessarily intended to be permanent: once
a rebellion is defeated or a conflict ends, the uprooted are often permitted to return
to their homes. Russia, for example, pursued “pacification by depopulation” through
its indiscriminate bombing of Grozny during the Chechen wars (1994–96; 1999–2009),
which mimicked the “rubbleization” strategy utilized by the Soviet Union during the
Soviet-Afghan war (1979–92). While the discriminatory nature of cleansing means
it is typically carried out through direct violence – violence perpetuated with light
weaponry (e.g., guns, knives, clubs) in “face-to-face” interactions – depopulation is often
provoked by indirect violence such as shelling and airstrikes.66
Forced Relocation
Forced relocation describes displacement with an inward or “pull” orientation.
The perpetrator, rather than pushing people out of its territory, seeks to bring the
population into its domain. This means that while cleansing and depopulation tend
to disperse the targeted population or dispatch it to distant areas, relocation typically
concentrates people within the conflict zone or sends them to a nearby location –
62 Balcells and Steele 2016.
63 Greenhill 2010.
64 Downes and Greenhill 2015.
65 Steele (2017), Straus (2015), and Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017). “Population” displacement implies
non-selective targeting, such as when armed groups evict or deport specific political rivals. Steele refers
to this as “individual escape” (Steele 2017).
66 Balcells 2011. As the author argues, direct violence enables armed groups to target more selectively.
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whether a makeshift camp, planned settlement, or urban area.67 Thus compared to other
displacement strategies, forced relocation involves a more concerted effort to move the
uprooted to designated locales; ones that are geographically closer to the victims’ places
of origin.
Forced relocation can be employed through collective or indiscriminate
targeting, and like depopulation, it is often meant to be temporary at the time it is
enacted.68 Examples of this strategy include the use of “model villages” in Bangladesh
(1974–97), Burma (1960–95) and Guatemala (1978–94); “regroupment centers” in
Burundi (1991 –) and Rwanda (1996–2002); “protected settlements” in Indonesia
(1999–2005); and “strategic hamlets” in Vietnam (1960–75) and Peru (1980–96). More
recently, in 2017 the Nigerian government began corralling rural residents of Borno
State into fortified “garrison towns” as part of its strategy to defeat the Boko Haram
insurgency.69
Figure 1.3: A Typology of Strategic Wartime Displacement
Orientation







Figure 1.3 summarizes the analytical distinctions between these population
displacement strategies based on three primary criteria: targeting, duration, and
orientation. These strategies are not mutually exclusive. An armed actor may use
multiple types of displacement in the same conflict, though as I show in Chapter 4, such
cases are empirically uncommon. While my conceptualization of these strategies and
their analytic differences build on previous research, they can be contested. Thus when
operationalizing these concepts in subsequent chapters, I attempt to address possible
challenges to my definitions in my discussion. I also provide alternative codings for
ambiguous or borderline cases in order to ensure that my findings are not driven by a
small number of cases.
67 Downes and Greenhill 2015, 9.
68 To the extent that targeting for forced relocation is collective, it is often based on geography rather than
political or ethnic affiliation.
69 Carsten and Lanre, 2017 (1 December).
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1.4 Scope Conditions
Civil Wars
Conflict remains the greatest generator of forced displacement worldwide.70
This project focuses only on a particular form of conflict – major civil wars in the
modern period (1945–2008) – for several reasons.71 First, most modern wars are
civil wars. Second, major civil wars, in which 1,000 people are killed in at least one
calendar year of the conflict, have been the major producers of wartime casualties
and displacement. Scholars tend to attribute the rise in global displacement following
World War II to the shift in global conflict from interstate to intrastate, which are
typically waged within civilian population centers and thus carry a far greater risk of
displacement. Third, deliberately displacing another country’s population in a war
with another state is far less risky and costly than uprooting one’s own civilians. Thus
while the arguments developed in this dissertation could possibly apply to population
displacement strategies in interstate conflicts, I have limited my analysis to intrastate
ones. Decoupling civil wars from interstate wars follows standard practice in the study
of conflict in international relations, and in the broader social science literature on
political violence.72
My focus on civil war displacement distinguishes this research from work on
mass deportation,73 ethnic cleansing during interstate conflict,74 or as part of nation-state
building.75 It also excludes organized displacement during communal or electoral
violence, such as “violent gerrymandering” during elections in Kenya from 2007–08.76
I confine my analysis to contemporary conflicts because they are particularly puzzling,
given key shifts in the international system that have seemingly reduced the benefits
and raised the costs of uprooting civilians. These include the (near) demise of colonial
rule and territorial conquest, the rise of human rights norms, and the proliferation
of global efforts to prevent and address forced migration. Focusing on the modern
period is also advantageous for identifying cases of strategic displacement. The
development and expansion of the international refugee rights regime post-1950 made
70 Moore and Shellman 2004.
71 I use a standard definition of civil war drawn from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Kalyvas and Balcells
(2010), in which four criteria must be met: (1) there was fighting within a state between agents of (or
claimants to) that state and organized non-state groups who sought to take control of a government,
take power in a region, or use violence to change government policies; (2) there were more than 1,000
war-related deaths during the entire war and in at least one single year of the war; (3) at least 100 were
killed on each side, and (4) the rebels were able to mount an organized military opposition to the state.
72 Kalyvas 2006.
73 Greenhill 2010.
74 Bulutgil 2016. Bulutgil shows that in these contexts, ethnic cleansing is often the purpose of the war, as
opposed to being a tactic within it, which is my focus.
75 Mann 2005; Mylonas 2013.
76 See Kasara (2014).
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displacement an issue of global concern, and provided international organizations,
domestic governments and local advocacy groups with the motivations and resources
to publicize the causes and consequences of forced population movements.77 This has
made it increasingly difficult for political actors to hide these movements or conceal
their role in facilitating them.
State versus Non-State Perpetrators
My definition of strategic wartime displacement covers displacement by armed
groups, including state agents (military, police, and paramilitary organizations) and
non-state actors (rebel groups or independent militias). This study, however, principally
focuses on displacement by state agents for several reasons. First, civil war incumbents
are much more likely to employ these methods than insurgents. According to the
cross-national data I have collected for this study – which I introduce in detail in the
next chapter – state actors have employed strategic displacement in nearly 60 percent of
civil wars, while rebels have only displaced strategically in 15 percent of conflicts. This
is likely because states tend to possess the firepower, organizational capabilities, and
logistical resources needed to facilitate mass population movements. Non-state actors
typically have fewer resources and are therefore less likely to engage in these practices.
Moreover, the use of some displacement strategies, namely forced relocation – in which
civilians are moved to a designated area – presupposes that the perpetrator controls
some territory. State actors meet this criterion by definition. Insurgents, however, often
do not: of 569 rebel groups active in civil wars between 1946 and 2010, nearly two-thirds
(63.5%) did not effectively control any territory.78
Second, most of the theories tested in this study stem from research on
state-induced displacement and may apply mainly, if not exclusively, to government
combatants. For example, some arguments – including my own – purport that
strategic displacement is motivated by identification problems. This would make
these strategies more appealing to counterinsurgents, because rebels often claim a
comparative advantage in information in civil wars, while the state tends to be at an
informational disadvantage.79 As Kalyvas argues, rebels can still face identification
problems in wartime, but in most cases they tend to be less acute than those faced by
state combatants.80
In sum, given differences in the strategic incentives and organizational resources
available to state and non-state actors, civil war incumbents will be more likely to
engage in strategic displacement. While insurgents could uproot local populations, they
will need to possess strong organizational capabilities and control territory. Research
77 On the evolution and influence of the refugee rights regime in global politics, see Betts and Loescher
(2011) and Betts (2011).
78 According to the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013).
79 Particularly in irregular wars, as I discuss below.
80 Kalyvas 2006, 90.
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on insurgent violence suggests that, since rebel groups are more likely to engage in
predation, most civilian displacement they cause will be opportunistic or occur as a
byproduct of looting.81
1.5 What We Know About Wartime Displacement
This dissertation sits at the intersection of two academic literatures, neither
of which has given adequate attention to the phenomenon of strategic displacement.
The first is the literature on forced migration, which tends to treat displacement as an
inadvertent byproduct of warfare. The second is scholarship on civil war and political
violence, which has primarily focused on the use of lethal violence in armed conflicts. I
briefly review each of these literatures below.
Past Research on Forced Migration
In the forced migration literature, research on the causes of wartime
displacement has focused on people’s decisions to flee violence. Scholars have either
examined macro-level trends in refugee and IDP flows82 or they have conducted
micro-level studies that draw on traditional migration theories83 to show that different
“push” and “pull” factors influence whether and to where civilians in conflict zones
flee. Departure and destination decisions are often a function of both incentives,
such as security or livelihoods84 and political preferences.85 Other work examines
the consequences of wartime displacement, particularly on spreading conflict across
borders86 or within them.87
This literature has established a clear link between violence and displacement
and uncovered different structural and agential factors that can influence wartime flight.
It has also been instrumental in demonstrating that, since individuals exercise agency in
wartime, even “forced” migration involves an interplay between compulsion and choice.
However, since these studies typically see displacement as an unintended consequence
of war,88 they have paid little attention to how combatants engineer or manipulate
displacement as a political or military tactic. Yet fully understanding wartime migration
81 Mkandawire 2002; Weinstein 2006; Wood 2014; Koren and Bagozzi 2017.
82 Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006; Melander and Öberg 2006, 2007;
Schon 2015.
83 Petersen 1958.
84 Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009; Lindley 2010; Adhikari 2013.
85 Steele 2009, 2017; Balcells and Steele 2016; Balcells 2018; Steele 2018.
86 Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Lischer 2005; Salehyan 2008; Miller and Ritter 2014; Fisk 2018; Onoma
2013; Böhmelt et al. 2019.
87 Bohnet et al. 2018; Choi and Piazza 2016.
88 See, for example, Rotberg (2010) and Betts and Loescher (2011).
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requires examining not only why people elect to flee, but also why armed actors force
them to flee.
Past Research on Armed Conflict and Political Violence
The broader literature on conflict and political violence addresses more directly
the strategic and tactical dimensions of civilian displacement in civil wars. Much of this
scholarship explores the use of violence against civilians generally, and offers crucial
insights into combatants’ behavior and strategic calculations.89 Two subsets of this
literature have focused specifically on displacement: one that emphasizes ideology, and
one that emphasizes information.
The first is research on ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering. These
studies attribute strategic displacement to ideologies of ethnic nationalism and elite
aspirations to remove “undesirable” social groups and create homogenous territories.90
For some scholars, ethnic cleansing is a method of extermination, and can thus be
explained by theories of genocide and other forms of large-scale lethal violence. Scott
Straus, for example, argues that group-selective, state-sponsored killings are often the
consequence of political leaders crafting “founding narratives” that elevate one social
identity group and create a secondary class of citizens who are largely excluded from
state power.91
Yet as I have argued above, ethnic cleansing is only one type of strategic
displacement. These explanations therefore cannot account for displacement that does
not target a particular ethno-nationalist group. Moreover, scholars have increasingly
questioned whether social cleavages and ethnic nationalism adequately explain patterns
of violence in conflict settings,92 including ethnic cleansing.93
A second strand of relevant research comes from the literature on
counterinsurgency. Drawing on new frameworks for explaining wartime violence,
these studies depart from both macro- and micro-level approaches to displacement
and instead recast forced population movements as the result of an interaction between
civilians and armed actors.94 They contend that displacement is a rational response
to a central problem combatants face in civil wars: a lack of information about the
identities of opposing fighters and their supporters,95 which prevents armed groups
from coercing and deterring support for the other side.96 Yet the mechanisms linking
89 Azam and Hoeﬄer 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006; Downes 2008;
Wood 2009; Balcells 2010, 2017; Fjelde and Hultman 2014.
90 Bookman 1997; Walling 2000; Mann 2005; Weidmann 2011, Valentino 2013, 152.
91 Straus 2015.
92 Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2003.
93 Gagnon Jr 2006; Bulutgil 2016.
94 Steele 2017.
95 Steele 2017; Zhukov 2015; Balcells and Steele 2016; Hägerdal 2019.
96 Kalyvas 2006.
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this “identification problem”97 to forced displacement remain underspecified, as
scholars have proposed multiple possible logics. Some suggest a logic of denial. In this
view, since combatants cannot distinguish allies from enemies, they remove the entire
population from an area in order to deprive enemy fighters of resources supplied by the
local population.98 As reflected in the “draining the sea” metaphor described in section
, denial-by-displacement is particularly attractive to state actors due to rebels’ typical
reliance on civilians for food, recruits, and other supplies.
Another information-based logic proposes that displacement amounts to a
form of punishment. When armed groups lack information about individual loyalties,
they turn to group-level indicators, such as ethnic or political affiliation, to identify
and expel potential adversaries.99 In Lebanon, Nils Hägerdal finds that non-coethnic
enclaves were susceptible to ethnic cleansing because combatants had little choice but
to use ethnicity as a proxy for political loyalty.100 Steele, and Balcells and Steele, show
that even non-ethnic conflicts can produce political cleansing when combatants use
election results to infer support for rivals.101 These studies suggest similarities between
ethnic and non-ethnic cleansing, though other research indicates that ethnic cleansing is
unique due to ethnicity’s distinct territoriality.102
Despite the viability of these arguments, they largely derive from studies
of specific conflicts – with an overwhelming focus on post-war Europe, colonial
counterinsurgency campaigns, and the civil war in Yugoslavia – and have yet to be
tested more broadly, limiting their generalizability. Moreover, several concerns limit the
explanatory reach. First, like theories of ethnic cleansing, they mostly account for the
logic of expulsion. But global trends in forced displacement suggests that the deliberate
expulsion of people outside state borders has become less prevalent than the uprooting
of civilians within their countries as internally displaced persons (IDPs), who now make
up roughly two-thirds of the globally displaced population (Table 1.1).103 In 2017, for
example, UNHCR reported 11.8 million new conflict-induced IDPs, compared to 4.4
million newly displaced refugees and asylum-seekers.104
Second, these explanations grant little agency to the civilian population. The
notion that displacement is a “brute force” method that denies choices to targeted
97 Kalyvas 2006.
98 Azam and Hoeﬄer 2002; Zhukov 2015; Downes and Greenhill 2015, Valentino 2013, 202-03.
99 The salience of pre-war socio-political cleavages or the radicalization of different groups during the
conflict may make combatants more likely to view some individuals or populations as potential enemies
(Straus 2015; Bulutgil 2015; Balcells 2017).
100 Hägerdal 2019.
101 Steele 2017; Balcells and Steele 2016.
102 Bulutgil 2016. Assessing whether ethnic and non-ethnic cleansing have the same causes is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, and should be a subject of future research.
103 This trend has continued despite fluctuations in the total number of conflicts worldwide and a relative
decline in the average number of battle deaths these conflicts produce.
104 UNHCR 2018.
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individuals105 conflicts with a growing consensus in the forced migration literature
that people exercise agency in deciding whether or not to flee violence.106 As David
Turton argues, “even at the most ‘reactive’ or ‘involuntary’ end of the continuum,
people probably have a lot more choice than we might think...choices not only about
whether but also about when, where and how to move.”107 A broader range of studies
demonstrate that while civilians operate under significant constraints during armed
conflicts, they still select from a broad repertoire of possible actions.108 Even passive acts
such as compliance entail agency.
The “brute force” characterization also reflects a potential misunderstanding of
how strategies of displacement are implemented – and the degree of control exercised
by those who orchestrate them. As I demonstrate in Chapter 2, which invokes a range
of empirical examples from different civil wars, even the most well-organized and
overly coercive displacement campaigns leave some room for subjects to comply
or to defect. For instance, when the Portuguese enacted a large-scale villagization
program in colonial Mozambique, many civilians “resisted being villagised from the
outset...whole communities fled and allegedly joined the rebels.”109 If displacement,
like other forms of civil war violence, is jointly produced by combatants and civilians,110
then theoretical models must take the agency of both parties into consideration. This
evokes the common critique that research on forced displacement, in the words of one
scholar, “rarely examines the displaced themselves as actors in or agents of history.”111
Third, these arguments shed little light on why combatants elect displacement
over other methods. The logic of “draining the sea” has also been used to explain mass
killing of civilians in counterinsurgency wars.112 What, then, is the utility of uprooting
people versus massacring them? The relationship between strategies of mass killing
and mass displacement is unclear, as some studies treat them as complements,113
while others claim that displacement is a more palatable and deniable alternative to
killing civilians.114 But there is little empirical evidence to support the assertion that
displacement is merely a substitute for lethal violence. Such arguments also overlook
the fact that, as with mass killing, displacing civilians can have significant reputational
costs for perpetrators. The creation and expansion of the international refugee regime
after World War II, along with (1) the prohibition against population expulsion and
forced resettlement under international law, and (2) the establishment of dedicated legal
and institutional frameworks to advocate for, and protect, IDPs have created strong
105 Zhukov 2015.
106 Moore and Shellman 2004; Adhikari 2013.
107 Turton 2003, 10.
108 Jose and Medie 2015; Finkel 2017; Suarez 2017; Barter 2016.
109 Borges 1993, 289.
110 Kalyvas 2006.
111 Todd 2010, 50.
112 Valentino et al. 2004; Valentino 2013.
113 Valentino 2013.
114 Azam and Hoeﬄer 2002; Steele 2017; Balcells 2018.
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norms against inducing displacement. Armed groups have routinely faced criticism
from human rights organizations, humanitarian agencies, and other members of the
international community for forcing people to flee. Yet as Steele observes, prohibitions
against forced displacement have not seemed to change the propensity of combatants to
engage in these practices.115
One could argue, in fact, that displacing civilians instead of killing them
actually poses a greater risk to combatants. While the dead do not rebel – Josef Stalin
famously quipped that “death solves all problems: no man, no problem” – people
driven from their homes may become a future threat to armed groups, particularly
if their displacement motivates them to defect to the opposing side. In terms of
international consequences, large-scale massacres can be covered up by, for example,
disposing victims in mass graves. It is much more difficult to hide scores of displaced
civilians, who tend to attract significant attention from journalists, diplomats, and
human rights groups.
Moreover, displacement carries a high risk of spillover, as forced population
movements can spread conflict to other parts of a country and even internationalize a
civil war by generating large cross-border refugee flows. This can imperil the security of
other governments and invite external actors to take actions that jeopardize an armed
group’s objectives. According to Gil Loescher, “large-scale population movements
across national frontiers can, in certain circumstances...be perceived as so destabilizing
that they constitute a threat to international peace and security, and therefore warrant
military intervention by external forces.”116 Indeed, concerns over the potential for
refugee flows to export instability helped motivate unilateral and multilateral military
interventions in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Uganda in the 1970s; Afghanistan and Sri
Lanka in the 1980s; and Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1990s; along with
Libya (2011) and Syria (2016).117 President Ronald Reagan justified U.S. interventions in
Central America in the 1980s by claiming that they would prevent population outflows
to the United States.118 Writing in the mid-1990s, Loescher and Alan Dowty argued that
refugee spillovers “is becoming a norm, in theory and in practice, that is increasingly
accepted as grounds for international action, including armed intervention, against the
state generating the refugee flow.”119 Perpetrators of forced displacement in the modern
era have therefore faced a significant risk of domestic and international backlash.
A final weakness of denial- and punishment-based arguments is that, while they
115 Steele 2017, 54.
116 Loescher 1992, 3.
117 Beehner 2012, Dowty and Loescher 1996, 44-45. Ahlborn (2010) argues that the U.N. Security Council
“has increasingly used situations related to international refugee protection to declare a threat to
international peace and security, triggering measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.”
118 Teitelbaum 1984, 434.
119 Dowty and Loescher 1996, 44-45. The authors recount the fact that on the eve of World War II, the
League of Nations invoked the growing scores of German refugees and the threat they posed to
European peace and security as a pretext for intervening in Germany and halting the persecution of
minorities.
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attribute displacement to identification and information problems, they fail to explain
whether – and how – displacement actually helps resolve them. Instead, displacement
is either an alternative to solving these problems (denial), or it is an outcome of
perpetrators making an ex ante presumption about who is guilty (punishment). After
all, draining the sea of water to starve the fish presumes one can distinguish between the
water and the fish in the first place. But the link between information and displacement
must be explained, not assumed. If counterinsurgents’ aim in triggering displacement
is to control a population rather than to eliminate it, addressing this ambiguity is
crucial because, as Daniel Magruder argues, resolving the identification problem
“comes logically prior” to establishing control.120 How, exactly, does uprooting civilians
accomplish this?
In summary, existing research on forced migration, armed conflict, and political
violence has largely neglected strategic displacement beyond cases of ethnic or political
cleansing. Recent efforts to correct this have struggled to account for the specificity of
displacement, remain vague about the underlying mechanisms, and tend to rely on
studies of individual cases. In this dissertation, I seek to link and build on insights
from these literatures to address their weaknesses and examine how different types of
strategic displacement fit into the logic of violence in civil wars.
1.6 Research Design
This chapter has defined strategic wartime displacement, distinguished it from
other types of population movements and state strategies, and disaggregated these
measures by sub-type, showing that they vary in orientation, targeting, and intended
duration. In addition, I have outlined three primary theoretical accounts for strategic
displacement in civil wars – ethnic nationalism, denial, and punishment – and discussed
their shortcomings. I also discussed three core puzzles that these accounts have not yet
sufficiently answered, which help motivate this study.
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the main
theoretical argument: an “assortative” theory of displacement. I posit that some
displacement strategies – forced relocation, and potentially depopulation – act as a
mechanism for sorting and capturing the local population in wartime. The sorting
component of the argument focuses on how the territorialization of political identity
in civil wars and the tendency for combatants to utilize informational shortcuts impels
them to use displacement to identify opponents through guilt by location. The capturing
component emphasizes how displacement helps create “zones of appropriation” that
facilitate the conversion of the population into material and symbolic assets for the
war effort, without requiring combatants to invest in resource-intensive methods of
territorial occupation.
120 Magruder Jr 2017, 13.
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In the first part of the chapter, I address each aspect of the theory separately and
derive several hypotheses, outlining the conditions under which combatants are likely
to adopt different displacement strategies. To demonstrate the logic and plausibility of
each aspect of my argument and illustrate its central causal claims, I provide empirical
examples from a wide range of civil wars, including Angola (1975–2002), Burma
(1960–95), Bangladesh (1974–97), El Salvador (1979–92), Ethiopia (1974–91), Guatemala
(1978–94), India (1989–), Nicaragua (1981–90), Peru (1980–96), the Philippines (1972–),
Rwanda (1996–2002), and Sri Lanka (2003–09). The second part of the chapter proposes
hypotheses for three alternative explanations for strategic displacement, which I briefly
described earlier in this chapter: ethnic nationalism, denial, and punishment.
To assess my assortative theory alongside other arguments, this dissertation
examines a variety of evidence and employs a multi-method research design. Testing
the theory poses considerable challenges. Inherent in observational research, there are
potential selection biases in this work, which I seek to ameliorate by examining a diverse
set of observable implications and by conducting both quantitative and qualitative
research using a diverse set of macro- and micro-level data.
Chapter 3 tests my arguments in a case study from Uganda, which offers a
unique opportunity to examine strategic displacement due to a high degree of internal
variation and an unusual openness about this subject among government officials,
military veterans, and citizens. The Ugandan government faced a series of armed
rebellions throughout the country from 1986–2006, and it forcibly relocated civilians
while fighting some rebel groups – including the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA,
1988–2006) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, 1996–2002) – but not others. The time
that has elapsed since the conflicts in question occurred, along with the use of blanket
amnesties for rebels, mass demobilization of combatants, and a generally peaceful and
open political environment have all made it possible for former fighters, civilians, and
officials to recount their experiences with candor. Since my theory generates detailed
hypotheses, during six months of fieldwork in 2016 and 2017, I collected a wealth of
information about how, when, where, and why authorities carried out displacement.
Drawing on original data – including archival materials, sub-national violence and
displacement data, and hundreds of interviews with perpetrators and victims – I trace
the decision by Ugandan counterinsurgents to employ forced relocation and examine
the observable implications of my “assortative” theory. I also show that alternative
logics of ethnic nationalism, denial, and punishment are insufficient to explain variation
in this case. I leverage within-case variation in the location and timing of strategic
displacement to conduct a structured comparative analysis and control for potential
confounding variables.
Chapter 4 evaluates my claims more broadly through a cross-national
analysis of strategic displacement. The first part of the chapter introduces new
data on population displacement strategies in 160 civil wars between 1945 and
2008. The Strategic Displacement in Civil Conflict (SDCC) dataset provides the
most comprehensive and disaggregated information on cross-national variation in
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displacement strategies to date. The data show that strategic displacement has been
much more common in civil wars than previously thought, and reveal important
patterns in how, where, and when these strategies have been employed – which
can be leveraged to explain why they occur. In the second section of the chapter, I
conduct statistical tests of four primary explanations for strategic displacement: ethnic
nationalism, denial, punishment, and my assortative logic, based on the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 2. As I explained above, my analysis focuses on displacement
by state combatants. The quantitative evidence is advantageous because it answers
important questions about how frequent strategic displacement is in civil wars, what
actors employ it, and what forms are more and less common. Moreover, it identifies
patterns in state-induced displacement, including where different strategies tend to
occur and particular factors that are associated with their use across conflicts.
The results show that, consistent with my expectations, different displacement
strategies occur in different contexts and appear to follow different logics. Cleansing
is more likely in conventional civil wars, where territorial conquest takes primacy,
while forced relocation is more likely in irregular or “guerrilla” wars, where
information and identification problems are most acute. The evidence indicates
that cleansing follows a logic of punishment. The results for relocation, however,
are consistent with the implications of my assortative theory: it is more likely to be
employed by resource-constrained incumbents fighting insurgencies in “illegible”
areas – rural, peripheral territories – and it correlates strongly with state efforts to
mobilize the population into civilian defense forces. The findings also cast doubt on
alternative explanations. To ensure the robustness of the results, I use a series of model
specifications and test alternative codings of my dependent and independent variables.
I also consider three additional alternative arguments for strategic displacement –
opportunism, desperation, and normative pressures – and find little support for them
in my analysis.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze additional case studies to further explore the external
validity of my theory. While the results of cross-national tests lend indirect support for
my arguments, the case studies offer direct evidence for my theoretical mechanism and
compensate for several important weaknesses in the quantitative analysis. Chapter 5
examines three civil wars from the SDCC dataset that experienced forced relocation –
Burundi (1991–2005), Vietnam (1960–75), and Indonesia (1999–2005) – to gauge whether
the core mechanisms of my theory can account for the empirical associations found in
Chapter 4. Burundi and Indonesia are two “least likely” cases for my theory: both are
ethnic wars, and the former has a history of ethnic cleansing and genocidal violence,
while the latter was waged by a secessionist rebellion. We would therefore expect any
displacement by state forces in these conflicts to take the form of cleansing – which
in the case of Burundi, it actually did early on, before the state turned to a strategy of
forced “regroupment.” Vietnam, meanwhile, is an “influential” case, as the Strategic
Hamlet Program enacted by South Vietnamese and American officials is one of the
most notable instances of forced relocation in the history of modern counterinsurgency
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campaigns.
All three case studies rely on a mechanism-centered approach based on process
tracing, which has been advocated by Rachel Schwartz and Scott Straus to help uncover
the logics underlying violence against civilians.121 This is appropriate since quantitative
data from war zones, especially on population displacement, is usually difficult if
not impossible to collect.122 If my theory is correct, in the case studies we should
find that perpetrators behave in ways that are consistent with the assortative logic of
displacement. In Burundi, Vietnam, and Indonesia, perpetrators used forced relocation
to overcome identification problems posed by guerrilla insurgencies, specifically by
drawing inferences about the identities and allegiances of the local population based
on civilian flight patterns and physical locations. Political and military authorities also
used relocation to extract economic and military resources, notably recruits, from the
displaced, which in some instances helped fill critical resource gaps. The evidence from
these cases suggests that my theory is generalizable beyond Uganda and travels to other
diverse contexts.
In Chapter 6 I extend my analysis to a difficult out-of-sample case by examining
the civil war in Syria (2011–present). Displacement has been a core feature of the
Syrian government’s military strategy. As a result, the conflict has unleashed the
largest displacement crisis in a generation: half of Syria’s pre-war population has been
uprooted within or outside the country. Strategic displacement in this case has primarily
taken the form of depopulation. Since there are too few cases of depopulation in the
SDCC dataset to draw reliable conclusions from the cross-national analysis, Syria
offers an opportunity to assess whether the assortative logic of displacement applies
to this particular type of displacement. Beyond probing the scope conditions of my
theory in a “hard” case – since the Syrian conflict is a conventional war – this case
study exhibits within-case variation in the use of two different types of displacement
by pro-government forces: cleansing and depopulation. I am therefore able to examine
the use of multiple displacement strategies by the same actor in the same conflict. This
chapter analyzes quantitative and qualitative data from a range of sources, including
media reports, human rights records, data on violence and displacement collected by
NGOs, and interviews with activists, journalists, combatants, and regime defectors that I
conducted in Syria and Turkey.
I find that government strategies of cleansing and depopulation in Syria
were employed in particular places and under certain conditions. Pro-regime forces
pursued cleansing early in the conflict in religiously mixed and non-cosectarian
enclaves, and when they were acquiring or consolidating control over a given territory.
Rather than sectarian animosity, collective targeting often stemmed from the use
of sect as a proxy for political loyalty, which is consistent with the findings of my
cross-national analysis. Yet most displacement provoked by the Syrian regime has
121 Schwartz and Straus 2018.
122 Bennett and Checkel 2014.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 28
taken the form of indiscriminate depopulation – a method that the regime and its
allies increasingly adopted as they faced acute information and resource problems,
in line with what my theory would predict. While cleansing by Syrian forces seemed
designed to get rid of people, there is evidence that the regime’s depopulation methods
had an assortative element. Authorities made assumptions about people’s political
associations based on whether they fled areas targeted for displacement, and whether
they moved to regime or rebel-held territory. They treated the displaced as military and
political assets, forcibly conscripting dislocated civilians to help reinforce the depleted
Syrian army while hailing the arrival of the displaced as evidence of the regime’s
legitimacy. Consequently, population displacement has actually increased the social
heterogeneity of some areas, particularly government strongholds. This runs counter
to the expectations of observers who have characterized all state-induced displacement
in Syria as sectarian cleansing – and challenges the notion that these tactics have been
intended solely, or even primarily, to achieve demographic change.
I conclude, in Chapter 7, with the implications of this study for research on
forced migration and displacement, conflict, and political violence, and for policy efforts
to manage and respond to forced population movements. As the most comprehensive
analysis of strategic wartime displacement to date, my findings challenge some core
assumptions about these tactics and demonstrate that conventional explanations for
a particularly destructive weapon of war are incomplete. Population displacement
strategies vary in form and in function. I elucidate and test several plausible logics
underlying strategic displacement, and my results suggest that different ones apply
to different types, and that different kinds of conflict environments incentivize armed
groups to use displacement in different ways. To explain the weaponization of
displacement as “draining the sea” is to ignore how combatants and civilians alike
interpret moving and staying in war to be a political act. Seen from this perspective,
displacement is, at its core, an inherently political and often contested process that
can have widespread social and political consequences during and after conflict. This
has profound implications for our understanding of the dynamics and consequences
of refugee and IDP flows and can offer lessons for policymakers, practitioners,
and advocates. In light of the strain being placed on aid agencies by rising global
displacement, the growing hostility towards refugees in Western nations, and the
realization that mass population movements can exacerbate violence, spread conflict,
and hinder post-conflict peace and development, preventing and mitigating wartime
displacement is both urgent and timely.
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“the dumbfuckers in the sampan
who wouldn’t get off the canal after curfew
you and me both know they’re out there
for one reason
so we hovered overhead and sunk their ass.”
-Perry Oldham, “Red Madonna,” 1976
“Le vagabond est par définition un suspect.”
(The vagabond is by definition a suspect.)
-Daniel Nordman, “Sauf-conduits et passeports, en France, à la Renaissance,” 1987
This chapter outlines my theory of strategic displacement and generates a series
of theoretical propositions. I build on insights from the civil war, political violence,
and migration literatures to develop a framework that (1) grants more agency to the
civilian population, including the displaced; (2) accounts for the dynamic and iterative
process of displacement; and (3) places civilian flight more centrally into the production
of wartime violence. My theory derives from two core insights. First, the physical
distribution and locations of local populations can significantly influence civil war
dynamics.1 Second, while an essential feature of civil war is the breakdown of the state’s
monopoly of violence, the fragmentation of domestic sovereignty also erodes what
John Torpey calls the state’s “monopolization of the legitimate means of movement.”2
This is manifest in the proliferation of checkpoints and other border technologies within
countries affected by war, which not only reflect territorial fragmentation, but also the
importance combatants place on monitoring and regulating civilians’ movements.3
Like other scholars, I see displacement as a strategic response to a central
problem that combatants, particularly counterinsurgents, face in civil wars: the inability
to selectively identify enemy fighters and disloyal civilians.4 But unlike them, I argue
that uprooting civilians is not only a reaction to ex ante information about their identities
and loyalties. It is also a way to infer their identities and loyalties ex post. Existing
explanations largely treat displacement as an outcome of armed groups identifying
potential opposition supporters through collective profiling – targeting the enemy’s
co-ethnics5 or political constituents.6 This logic may apply to ethnic, religious, or
political cleansing, which by definition indicates an ex ante categorization of the
population by certain identity characteristics.
1 Kocher 2004; Kalyvas 2006.
2 Torpey 1998. While the author stresses the state’s regulation of cross-border movement, I emphasize
how the fragmentation of sovereignty breaks down monopolies over the legitimate means of movement
inside the state and spawns more localized means of managing domestic population movements.
3 Schon 2016.
4 Steele 2017; Zhukov 2015; Balcells and Steele 2016; Hägerdal 2019.
5 Hägerdal 2019.
6 As revealed by local election results. See Balcells and Steele (2016) and Steele (2017).
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But I argue that for other types of strategic displacement, particularly forced
relocation, displacement is a process that combatants use to distinguish allies from
enemies. Orchestrating civilian flight forces people to send costly and highly visible
signals of loyalty and affiliation based on whether, and where, they flee. This also
renders communities more “legible,” which allows armed groups to use people’s
movements and locations as a continuous indicator of allegiance, extract rents and
recruits from the population, and demonstrate legitimacy to domestic and international
audiences. Here, displacement provides unique solutions to information and resource
problems by acting as a mechanism for sorting and capturing the population.
This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first two present each component of
my “assortative” theory and outlines a set of testable hypotheses. I draw on empirical
evidence from a wide range of civil wars to illustrate my theoretical claims and
demonstrate their plausibility. The first section outlines the sorting logic of the theory,
which is predicated on the signaling effects of displacement and focuses on how
people’s movements in wartime (or lack thereof) are interpreted by combatants through
what I term guilt by location. This suggests that forced relocation should be employed
where information and identification problems are most acute for counterinsurgents:
in irregular or “guerrilla” wars waged in rural, peripheral territories. Cleansing, by
contrast, should be more common in conventional civil wars, where rebel identification
is less of a challenge and territorial conquest takes primacy. Moreover, while cleansing
is more likely when group-level information about wartime loyalties is available
to combatants – offering a basis for forced expulsion through collective targeting –
relocation is more likely when combatants lack this information, and must therefore
revert to spatial profiling rather than profiling along ethnic, racial, or religious lines.
In the second section, I outline the capturing logic of my theory, which
emphasizes how and why displacement is used not just to “push” civilians out of an
area, but also to “pull” them into an armed group’s ambit. In many cases, such efforts
seek to concentrate the population in camps that serve as incubators of mobilization.
This suggests that forced relocation acts as an alternative to territorial occupation and
is more likely to occur when incumbents’ resources are overstretched, likely due to
fighting multiple groups or being engaged across diffuse battlefronts. Relocation should
also correlate with state efforts to instrumentalize the civilian population for the war
effort – specifically, by mobilizing people into local defense forces.
In the third section of the chapter, I present several alternative arguments about
strategic displacement – which were briefly introduced in Chapter 1 – to derive a series
of competing hypotheses. Like those corresponding to my theory, these hypotheses
focus on displacement induced by state combatants (i.e., counterinsurgents). I split these
arguments into three categories: ethnic nationalism, denial, and punishment. They do
not comprise an exhaustive list of proposed explanations for strategic displacement,
but rather the most salient and testable theories proposed in the existing literature. My
purpose in this dissertation is to determine which explanations garner the most support
across cases. Given that these arguments have yet to be scaled up and tested at the
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macro level, gauging their generalizability is crucial for advancing our understanding
of where, when, and why combatants uproot civilians in wartime. At the end of the
chapter, I provide a visual summary of the arguments and hypotheses tested in this
dissertation.
2.1 The Sorting Logic of Strategic Displacement
In order to root out enemies and consolidate control over territory, civil war
combatants require the collaboration of civilians. They therefore use different strategies,
including violence, to reward cooperation and deter defection.7 But this requires
information not only on the identities of enemy fighters and their active supporters,
but also on the loyalties of the broader population.8 Asymmetric information about
individuals’ identities and loyalties creates what Stathis Kalyvas calls the “identification
problem,” or the inability to tell allies from adversaries.9 In this section I describe
how displacement is used as a method of, rather than an alternative to, resolving this
fundamental challenge of civil war – particularly by counterinsurgents, who tend to
be at an informational disadvantage in domestic conflicts.10 As Kalyvas argues, “if
the ‘guilty’ cannot be identified and arrested, then violence ought to target innocent
people that are somehow associated with them.”11 I contend that combatants use guilt
by physical association, not just ethnic, religious, or political affiliation, to target their
opponents. This insight is crucial to understanding the strategic logic of displacement.
Guilt by Location
My argument starts from the observation that when combatants cannot observe
the identities and loyalties of the local population directly, they resort to simplifying
heuristics, or clues, to infer them.12 Previous research has focused on the use of
heuristics like political membership or ascriptive traits such as ethnic identity, but armed
actors may also rely on costly signals to reduce information asymmetries.13 Building
on these insights, I contend that one common, yet heretofore overlooked, profiling
criterion for wartime sympathies is people’s physical locations and movements. Scholars
have recognized that practices of identification are often related to territory,14 and
within the context of civil wars, the well-established link between territorial control and
7 Kalyvas 2006.
8 Steele 2011, Steele 2017, Belge 2016, 278.
9 Kalyvas 2006.
10 Some explanations for strategic displacement imply that combatants resort to displacement as a
substitute for resolving information problems (e.g., Zhukov 2015).
11 Kalyvas 2006, 150.
12 Fjelde and Hultman 2014; Hägerdal 2019; Steele 2017.
13 Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001.
14 Jansen and Löfving 2009, 5.
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civilian collaboration in civil war suggests a potential and oft-perceived overlap between
physical space and political affiliation.15 Descriptions from conflicts in Guatemala and
Angola convey this dynamic:
“[Political] polarization turned into a spatialized dichotomy between those in the
village and those in the wilderness, el monte...In the conflict areas there was no space
left for neutrality. These areas became divided between 1) the villages, a space under
army control, inhabited by presumed army supporters; and 2) el monte, a space
which was beyond army control and inhabited by presumed guerrilla supporters.”16
“People, including those who were unconnected with any political movement, began
to associate zones of Angola with a particular movement...As a consequence of this
territorialization, people found themselves labeled as ‘belonging’ to one or another
movement regardless of what views they might have held. [The government],
particularly the military, labeled people on the basis of their location in a way that
restricted the possibility of individual political choice. Political identity in one sense
was assigned on the basis of where one was.”17
An implication of the territorialization of political identity is that population
movements can provide signals of association and allegiance in contested spaces.
Individuals exercise agency in armed conflicts, and even “forced” displacement entails
strategic choices, however constrained, about whether, when, and where to flee.18 Thus
in his study of civilian strategies in civil wars, Shane Barter argues that the flight of
noncombatants to a particular armed actor can amount to an act of support for that
actor.19 Likewise, fleeing from an armed group is a form of defection, according to
Kalyvas.20 This evokes the concept of “protest migration,” or the idea, based on the work
of Albert Hirschman,21 that people manifest their discontent with a political community
by leaving it.22 Combatants, in turn, may therefore consider the act of moving to be a
political one. This was the perception of army officials in Guatemala, for example, who
held that “the act of fleeing is an admission of guilt.”23
If leaving is akin to defection, then staying behind can be a form of passive
collaboration – or at least, it can be perceived as such. This explains why in many
modern conflicts, “civilians who did not flee combat areas were considered suspect
15 Kalyvas 2006.
16 Stepputat 1999, 63, 66.
17 Pearce 2012, 451-52, 455.
18 Moore and Shellman 2004; Adhikari 2013.
19 Barter 2016.
20 Kalyvas 2006, 104.
21 Hirschman 1970.
22 Herbst (1990), for example, has shown that in colonial Africa, people responded to their dissatisfaction
with European rulers by migrating to places outside the control of colonial authorities.
23 Manz 1988, 59.
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and often killed by warring parties.”24 During revenge killings after the Rwandan
genocide, soldiers from the Rwandan Patriotic Front “often did not distinguish Tutsi
from Hutu...seeming to assume that the remaining Tutsi were ‘collaborators’ of those
who perpetuated the genocide.”25 A special name was given to these Tutsi, rescapes,
because they “chose to stay in the country even during the massacres” and thus became
“objects of suspicion by Tutsi who had felt compelled to flee.”26 When the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized parts of Syria and Iraq in 2014, many civilians who fled
immediately were accepted by authorities in areas where they sought sanctuary and
not deemed a security threat.27 But those who escaped later were denied access on
suspicion of being collaborators because they “stayed, in the eyes of local authorities,
too long in areas under Islamic State control.”28 Ben Taub reports that after ISIS was
driven out of the city of Mosul in 2017, members of the Iraqi security forces were wary
of civilians who had not fled ISIS rule, as such individuals continue to “be defined by
their [physical] proximity to ISIS.”29
The political implications of flight are not lost on civilians. In the Peruvian civil
war, displaced people avoided being identified “for fear that they would be suspected
by both the army and the armed opposition as deserters who had joined the other
side.”30 Similarly, Mozambican men uprooted by violence between government troops
and rebels from Renamo were often “afraid of being suspected of collaboration with
one side or the other if found unattached to a definite village.”31 In Burma, displaced
civilians who fled to the forest instead of to “peace villages” established by the military
feared being branded as “jungle fugitives” because their flight was perceived as “taking
refuge” with insurgents.32
These examples exemplify what I call guilt by location: the tendency for
political and military actors to treat fleeing and staying in wartime as indicators of
collaboration or defection.33 This can help explain the strategic logic of orchestrating
civilian displacement in order to help overcome identification problems. By creating
overwhelming incentives to flee, and where to flee, armed groups can use displacement
patterns to draw inferences about civilians’ affiliations and loyalties.
24 Leaning 2011, 447.
25 Prunier 2008, 19.
26 Minear and Kent 1998, 64.
27 Some of the displaced were even asked by Kurdish and Iraqi intelligence authorities to inform on
members of their communities who had assisted or potentially joined ISIS. See Taub (2018).
28 Soguel 2014.
29 Taub 2018.
30 Stavropoulou 1998, 469.
31 Andersson 2016, 96.
32 Scott 2010, 102.
33 This is consistent with Steele (2018), who finds that displaced civilians in Colombia were collectively
targeted for violence by paramilitary groups because where they were from and when they left
indicated their loyalties.
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The Signaling Effects of Displacement
Civilians tend to be opportunistic in wartime34 and decisions to flee violence
are typically driven by concerns over security and survival.35 Thus in the eyes of
combatants, sympathetic or neutral civilians should, all else equal, respond to incentives
and move as ordered. When the government of Thailand enacted a relocation policy for
hill tribes affected by a communist insurgency, “many hill tribe villagers, who wanted
to make it quite clear that they were on the government’s side” acquiesced and left their
homes.36 As the work of Hirschman broadly suggests, when a situation deteriorates, the
politically uncommitted tend to depart while the loyalists remain.37
Yet as indicated above, even when combatants trigger displacement through
brute force methods, civilians do have options, albeit constrained ones. Rather than
complying with orders to flee, they can engage in one of three acts of defection:
noncompliance (refusing to move), switching sides (moving to rival territory) or exit
(leaving a contested area or the country).38
Noncompliance is risky and, as such, sends a costly signal of disloyalty. In
Ethiopia, when the government directed residents of areas infiltrated by the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) to relocate to new villages, officials announced that “anyone who
does not want to move into the new village only desires to feed the rebels.”39 While this
was broadcast in part to coerce compliance, one NGO reported that the military actually
“suspected that any who refused [to relocate] were OLF.”40 During the post-genocide
Hutu insurgency in Rwanda, RPF soldiers “had difficulty distinguishing civilians
from the insurgents, many of whom do not wear uniforms.”41 They therefore forced
villagers into relocation camps, and “those who do not want to move...are generally
considered insurgents.”42 The RPF took a similar approach in 1996 when it attacked
camps of Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire to root out the perpetrators of the
1994 genocide. According the U.N., “it is clear that one of the objectives [of the attack]
was to force the refugee population to return to Rwandan territory,” yet those who failed
to return and instead fled deeper into Zaire were targeted for elimination by the RPF.43
Breaking up the camps, then:
“in effect separated the ‘good’ Hutus from the bad: those who had little involvement
34 Kalyvas 2006; Petersen 2001.
35 Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009; Ibáñez and Moya 2016; Adhikari 2013, 2012.
36 Kesmanee 1988.
37 Hirschman 1993, 197.
38 This draws on Kalyvas (2006)’s typology of civilian defection and Barter (2016)’s work on civilian
wartime strategies.
39 Steingraber 1987.
40 “For Their Own Good: Ethiopia’s Villagisation Programme” 1988, 34.
41 U.S. State Department 1999b.
42 Human Rights Watch 2001b, 42-43. HRW also found that the RPF “generally treated persons caught
outside the camps without authorization as enemies, subject to be shot on sight.”
43 OHCHR 2010, 283.
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in the 1994 genocide against Tutsis had returned and those who fled rather than
return were those who had participated in or supported the genocide...any Hutu
still present in Zaire must necessarily be a perpetrator of genocide, since the ‘real’
refugees had already returned to Rwanda.”44
Similarly, in response to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
insurgency in El Salvador, the army ordered residents of contested villages to move
to cities and camps under the logic that “civilians who don’t want to cooperate [with
insurgents] will leave the area and those who remain are collaborating.”45 When French
forces “regrouped” civilians during the Algerian war of independence, anyone found
in evacuated villages “was presumed guilty of rebel ties.”46 During the Korean Civil
War, the South Korean government herded people into “collective villages” after which
“anyone remaining...was considered suspect and liable to arrest and detention if not
outright death.”47 And after the regime of Milton Obote relocated residents of the
Luwero Triangle to dilapidated camps during the Bush War in Uganda (1981–86), those
caught outside camps “were presumed to be guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers and
were treated accordingly.”48
Civilians who are incapable of fleeing, such as the elderly or the infirm, may be
exempted from this process since they are both less threatening to combatants and less
useful for their adversaries. Or they may be considered expendable and punished along
with others who remain behind. Expendability appears to have been the mentality of Sri
Lankan forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After engaging in the
strategic depopulation of the war zone and attempting to lure civilians to its areas, the
government “treated most civilians who had been living in the LTTE-controlled areas as
LTTE members in disguise or collaborators.”49 For combatants, what is most important
is that displacement indicates the identities and loyalties of the most concerning
segments of the population: the young and able-bodied. Other ascriptive traits that
may be used to infer people’s identities and loyalties, or convey the potential threat they
pose – including gender, age, and ethnicity – can therefore have mitigating effects on
the extent to which individuals or groups are considered guilty by location. This was
evident during village evacuations in Guatemala50 and Mozambique51, when women
were sometimes given greater leeway than men.
Yet noncompliance often becomes untenable as time goes on, since being
subjected to persistent violence makes people more likely to choose a side.52 For the
44 OHCHR 2010, 281,283.
45 Quoted in Montgomery 2018, 152
46 Heggoy 1972, 183.
47 Birtle 2006, 97.
48 Museveni and Kanyogonya 1997.
49 Ruaudel 2013, 34.
50 Stepputat 1999, 66.
51 Andersson 2016, 96.
52 Kalyvas and Kocher 2007.
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uprooted, this means either settling in one group’s territory or physically defecting to
its opponent. The second form of defection, switching sides, sends the strongest signal
of disloyalty because one is not simply unable or unwilling to comply; she is actively
seeking to affiliate with the opposing side. The logic of guilt by location is that seeking
greater proximity to enemy fighters is itself grounds for suspicion, particularly if it
contravenes orders to be elsewhere. This is evidenced in the observation of human
rights monitors in Mozambique: “As a general rule, the greater the distance from a
military center, the less the civilians’ loyalty to either side.”53 Or consider Guatemala,
where the army burned villages in areas of “high guerrilla activity,” effectively “forcing
their inhabitants to choose between fleeing to remote mountainous regions of the
country” – purported rebel territory – or “agreeing to relocate to government-controlled
areas.”54 When the Peruvian military commanded peasants to concentrate in designated
hamlets during the war against Sendero Luminoso, those caught fleeing in the direction
of rebel-held areas “were, according to various witnesses, regarded by the [military]
as terrucos [terrorists] trying to escape to their comrades” and subject to execution.55
There is evidence that insurgents also draw inferences from people’s movements. In
Angola, after the government ordered civilians out of the countryside, UNITA rebels
“prevent[ed] people from returning to their fields to gather food, attacking them –
punishing them for having ‘chosen’ the government side – or laying mines on paths to
fields.”56
The final form of defection, exit, may be less concerning for combatants if
it implies that civilians have left the battlefield. But for the displaced, it still risks
indicating disloyalty.57 As such, those who are able or willing to leave the country
and become refugees may be held just as liable for fleeing as those uprooted within
the country as internally displaced persons (IDPs). This was the case for Salvadoran
refugees who opted to flee to neighboring Honduras instead of to government areas.
When the refugees returned to their villages, officials treated them with suspicion and
were “quick to accuse them of collaborating with guerrilla forces.”58 People who fled
Guatemala had an analogous experience, as the Guatemalan army “viewed returning
refugees as guerrilla collaborators” because they “ had been unwilling to submit
themselves” to government rule.59 Evading combatants has a similar effect. When the
Burmese military forcibly relocated villagers in Karen State, those who hid in the jungle
were “targeted and subjected to human rights abuses...on suspicion of being rebel
53 Africa Watch 1992, 71.
54 Valentino 2013, 213.
55 Fumerton 2001, 11-12.
56 Frontières 2001, 2.
57 Arjona (2017) characterizes civilian flight as neither cooperation (obedience) nor non-cooperation
(resistance) with a non-state armed group, but instead a last resort for civilians when neutrality is
no longer possible. But if an armed group orders displacement, then flight itself becomes an act of
obedience or resistance.
58 Lawyers Committee 1989.
59 Human Rights Watch 1996.
CHAPTER 2. THEORY 38
supporters.”60 In general, those who are capable and willing to select exit will either
leave the country or move to safer and more prosperous government-controlled areas
within it, usually cities.61 For counterinsurgents, the latter scenario is acceptable because
it brings people under the state’s dominion.62
These examples illustrate that even when combatants employ displacement
through brute force, civilians can and do engage in defection. Heterogeneous factors
may influence these decisions. Hirschman claims that “deep personal commitments”
can make exit from a political situation unthinkable,63 and in the context of civil war,
scholars have argued that resisting displacement has acted as a form of civil resistance.64
For example, Elisabeth Wood finds that “pleasure in agency” encouraged some peasants
to remain with the FMLN rebels in El Salvador despite the dangers.65 In an ethnography
of displacement during the Salvadoran conflict, Molly Todd reports that peasants who
had mobilized in favor of the rebels tended to remain in contested regions, while those
less sympathetic to the FMLN abandoned the areas.66 Yet even for those who fled,
refusing to resettle in places controlled by the state “indicates a level of resistance –
opposition even – to the soldiers and the government” as “individuals and groups
made tactical decisions about flight in an effort not only to survive but also to continue
challenging the authority and legitimacy of the state.”67
Staffan Löfving observed a similar dynamic among displaced Guatemalans,
who claimed that their movement “had a political purpose: they were continuing on the
road to freedom and not coming back.”68 Likewise, in Angola some villagers ordered
to flee the countryside reported that they avoided displacement camps because “‘there,
we will have to cooperate with the government.’”69 Many Tigrayan peasants in Ethiopia
resisted orders to relocate for the same reasons, opting instead “to walk for four to six
weeks across the Sudanese border, rather than seek relief in government held towns, two
or three hours away.”70
Social pressures, economic needs, high risk tolerance, and historical experiences
can also lead individuals and communities to defect.71 In El Salvador, some peasants
remained in their war-torn villages because they wanted to safeguard their homes,
60 Saunders 2005, 47.
61 Jardine 2012.
62 Steele 2017, 49.
63 Hirschman 1970.
64 Masullo Jimenez 2015; Steele 2009.
65 Wood 2003.
66 Todd 2010, 55.
67 Todd 2010, 52-52.
68 Lofving 2009, 151.
69 Birkeland and Gomes 2001, 26.
70 Macrae and Zwi 1994, 16.
71 Moore and Shellman 2004; Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009; Adhikari 2013, 2012; Edwards 2009; Barter 2016;
Harpviken 2009.
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land, and other belongings, or remain close to the graves of their loved ones.72 Place
attachment is another important factor, especially for rural populations, whose identities
and livelihoods are often inextricably tied to their land.73
A Sorting Mechanism
All three forms of defection outlined in the previous section meet the two
primary criteria for efficacious signals. First, they are costly. Second, they are public and
visible – and hence easy for combatants to observe.74 Since armed groups are principally
concerned with identifying the disloyal, the more overwhelming the incentives to move,
the more costly defection becomes – and thus the stronger the signal it sends.
However, since my theory focuses on how people’s locations and movements
are interpreted by armed groups, it makes no underlying assumptions about the actual
preferences of the population. As indicated above, civilians’ movements may not always
reflect their true loyalties, just as ethnic identity may be a poor indicator of political
affiliation. But combatants often perceive civilians’ actions in wartime to be political
even when they are not intended to be.75 If political identities and preferences have an
impact on movement decisions and reflect people “voting with their feet”76 – as studies
of wartime resettlement in Colombia and Spain have found77 – then orchestrating
displacement helps publicly reveal these preferences. If not, then it still forces civilians
to undertake an observable act of obedience or defection for combatants who, as Kalyvas
argues, are more concerned about eliciting passive compliance from civilians than
attempting to find and cultivate true believers.78
Therefore, for combatants and authorities looking for informational shortcuts,
displacement can provide an efficient and highly visible, if crude and imperfect,
means of sorting the population and resolving the identification problem. Spatial
distinctions become proxies for political ones. During the Revolt of the Camisards in
eighteenth-century France, military advisors to King Louis XIV proposed relocating
inhabitants of the countryside to fortified towns – which would “have the advantage of
immediately revealing who was guilty because [those who] resist the idea demonstrate
their complicity with the rebels and their desire to provide them with supplies.”79
72 Todd 2010, 60. The author emphasizes that “although the war destroyed hundreds of towns across
the northern borderlands and dozens more stood only as ghost towns, the northern border region was
never fully depopulated during the war.” See also Wood 2003, 113-115.
73 Sorensen 1998, 82-83.
74 For a review of the broader literature on signaling theory, see Connelly et al. (2011).
75 Steele 2017, 208. Research on signaling indicates that signals may be interpreted differently by different
recipients (Kertzer et al. 2017).
76 Tiebout 1956.
77 Steele (2018) and Balcells (2018) show that IDPs tended to resettle in places where they found others
who share their political and/or ethnic identity.
78 Kalyvas 2006, 102-103.
79 McCullough 2007, 218-219.
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More recently, a former MPLA soldier in Angola, when asked how the military was
able to identify rebels after it drove residents from the countryside, explained that,
“[t]hose who are with the [government] are in the environs of the city – beyond that
is the bush – anyone there is the enemy. Even if he doesn’t have a gun, he’s one of the
enemy.”80 A government minister in northeast India invoked a similar rationale upon
the congregation of peasants into roadside camps in response to a Maoist insurgency:
“those in the camps are with the government and those in the forests are with the
Maoists.”81
Uprooting the population, then, effectively forces people to choose sides. Civil
war incites polarization,82 and combatants crave this “with us or against us” distinction.
This is evinced in David Stoll’s analysis of the Guatemalan civil war, where “neutrality
was no more acceptable to the guerrillas than to the army.”83 Radically simplifying
the identification process through displacement provides two primary benefits for
perpetrators. First, the ostensible removal of all loyal or neutral civilians transforms
contested areas into free-fire zones, making military operations logistically easier. A
Filipino general expressed this sentiment in describing the utility of strategic hamlets
in the rebellious region of Mindanao: “when we go on operations...we will know that
any movement in the field is enemy.”84 The creation of “Consolidated and Protected
Villages” by the Rhodesian army in territories roamed by guerrillas gave incumbent
forces a similar advantage, since “after forced relocation, any trace of human movement
could be presumed to be made by insurgent activity.”85 And in Burma, following
village evacuations by counterinsurgents in areas of limited government control, army
officers privately admitted that all civilians in those areas “are regarded as potential
insurgents.”86
Second, forcing the population to sort itself through displacement provides
combatants a plausible basis for denying responsibility for civilian casualties. Peasants
killed by government forces in El Salvador were implicated for failing to heed orders
to relocate to state-controlled areas; a U.S. embassy cable described the victims as
“something other than innocent civilian bystanders” because they “live in close
proximity of,” and sometimes intermingled with, the FMLN.87 Likewise, in Sri Lanka
the government often “tried to justify attacks on civilians by arguing that people
remaining in war zones were LTTE sympathizers and therefore legitimate targets.”88
Of course, there is little to prevent disloyal civilians or even enemy combatants
80 Quoted in Pearce 2012, 453.
81 Balagopal 2006.
82 Kalyvas 2006, 38.
83 Stoll 1993, 120.
84 Martin 1982, 1.
85 Cilliers 2015, 83.
86 Smith et al. 1994, 46.
87 Preston 2013, 64.
88 Human Rights Watch 2010, 348.
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from complying with displacement orders and relocating with the rest of the
population. But wartime displacement is a dynamic phenomenon, and therefore using
it to sort the population is not a one-off event but an iterative process. While initial
departures can reveal the most credibly disloyal, moving to destinations dictated by
the perpetrator is necessary, but not sufficient, to cast off suspicion. By triggering
displacement at t1, an armed group can then monitor the locations and movements
of civilians – particularly those who relocate to its territories – for further signals of
loyalty and affiliation at t2. In other words, displacement enables the sorting of the
population not just through the initial process of flight, but also by rendering those who
relocate within an armed group’s purview more accessible and “legible,”89 facilitating
the further detection of the disloyal.
Legibility
Compared to other conflict strategies, civilian relocation helps combatants
rapidly achieve the physical concentration of the populace into regimented units,
rendering even the most unruly or inaccessible communities “legible,” in the words of
James Scott.90 Forced migration scholars have shown that the external appearance of
displacement camps as chaotic and messy often belies a regimented order that increases
the visibility and legibility of its occupants.91 Thus the “villagization” programs pressed
upon rebel-affected populations in Ethiopia beginning in the 1970s – whose main
goal, according to state officials, was not economic development but “securing the
countryside from guerrillas”92 – sought “to regroup the scattered homesteads, small
hamlets and traditional villages of the countryside into a completely new pattern of
grid-plan villages.”93 According to Ariel Ahram, the depopulation of the Iraqi marshes
during the Shi’a uprisings of 1991 was an attempt by the government to transform an
“impenetrable” physical and human terrain into “a well-ordered, well-governed and
productive space.”94 The Guatemalan army seemed to have a similar idea. Its forcible
relocation of rural peasants into “model” villages accompanied broader efforts to “turn
the [countryside] into a readable map” by, for example, “writing the names of the
villages with white stones on the hillsides.”95
Improving physical proximity between armed actors and civilians makes it
easier to gather intelligence and screen people for opposition ties, while increasing the
concentration of the population makes it harder for individuals to hide their preferences
89 Scott 1998.
90 Scott 1998. As Belge (2016, 278) argues, state efforts to render populations legible “are central to patterns
of violence during civil war” because they “introduce layers of arbitrariness into who is targeted.”
91 Harrell-Bond 1986; Malkki 1995, 8.
92 Giorgis 1989.
93 De Waal 1991, 231.
94 Ahram 2015.
95 Stepputat 1999, 75.
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and actions. Civilians can easily report on each other. In the words of counterinsurgency
theorist David Galuala, “as long as there is no privacy, as long as every unusual move
or event is reported and checked, how can contacts be made, ideas spread, recruiting
accomplished?”96 An account of the Kenyan government’s forced villagization strategy,
enacted during the Shifta War against Somali insurgents in the 1960s, typifies this logic:
“The major problem for the Kenyan government was...how to effectively
distinguish between so-called ‘loyal’ civilians in northern Kenya and shifta and their
sympathizers. It was argued by the supporters of villagization that this provided a
solution to the problem. As [Member of Parliament Geoffrey Gitahi] Kariuki stated
to Parliament...‘let loyal Somalis come out and show us their loyalty. Let them be
put in a camp where we can scrutinize them and know who [amongst them] are
good.”97
The use of displacement to impose legibility is exemplified by measures enacted
to help combatants better “see” the population in relocation sites. This is particularly
important for state forces since, as Magruder points out, potential insurgents are
typically those who are undocumented, unregistered, or resistant to being identified.98
Thus the Kenyan government required that all encamped Somalis were immediately
registered and provided with identification papers.99 Similar measures were undertaken
by the British on resettled civilians in Malaya and Kenya;100 by the French on regrouped
Algerians;101 and by the Japanese on hamletted Chinese in Manchuria.102 For the
Portuguese in Mozambique, the use of aldeamentos (relocation villages) by the colonial
army facilitated census operations.103 And when the Indian military herded civilians
into “grouping centres” in Nagaland and Mizoram, each inhabitant was given an
identity number. The number was conspicuously displayed on a seal fastened to a
person’s arm or forehead.104
While these techniques provide combatants with critical information on the
local population, they do more than encourage civilian collaboration and facilitate
96 Galula 2006, 19.
97 Whittaker 2012, 347, 349, 361.
98 Magruder Jr 2017, 21.
99 Whittaker 2012, 350.
100 Garlock 1991, 19.
101 Garlock 1991, 13.
102 According to Lee (1967, 38), registration of hamlet occupants and issuance of certificates “made it
possible to identify residents and therefore it was more difficult for alien elements to infiltrate the
towns and villages...those without a resident’s certificate or travel permit automatically became
suspect.”
103 As recounted by Borges (1993, 228), “everyone living in the aldeameoto was to be registered and hold
specially detailed identity cards” while “Roads and houses inside the aldeameoto were to be named and
numbered.”
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control.105 They reify the territorialization of political identity and provide a basis for
continuing to monitor and use people’s locations and movements as an indicator of
loyalty and disloyalty. This is evidenced in the following descriptions of French tactics
in the Cameroon war of independence and of strategic hamletting in the Philippines:
“entire villages were moved down to roadside locations surrounded by stockades,
French and Cameroonian patrols flushed guerrillas from the emptied hills. In
the stockade villages a list of occupants of each house was posted on the door,
and impromptu roll calls were made usually at night. Individuals who were
unaccounted for were considered to have joined the rebels and their families and
villages punished accordingly. Similarly, any individual who happened to be in the
wrong house was considered a rebel infiltrator and treated as such.”106
“each [Filipino] family has to post a list of occupants in front of the house. After
curfew, if any extra persons are present in the house or if any persons are missing,
it is a cause to suspect subversive activity.”107
According to the internal guidelines of the Philippine armed forces, soldiers
looking to identify “dissident terrorists” in hamletted areas needed to look for “unusual
or increased travel of adult residents into remote or isolated areas” and “unexplained
disappearance of the youth and able-bodied residents.”108 In many cases of forced
relocation, leaving the camp or village is restricted, and identity cards or special
passes help clear those who need to travel regularly.109 Those who leave without
authorization risk incriminating themselves, as in Guatemala, where peasants fleeing
the army’s model villages “were considered, by definition, subversivos” and often injured
or killed.110 As one official in Mozambique explained when asked why residents of
state-run “communal villages” were prevented from leaving during the war: “why
would they want to? To support the enemy.”111
In making the citizenry more legible, relocating and concentrating the
population gives combatants opportunities not only to utilize tools of selective coercion,
but also to conduct campaigns of persuasion and indoctrination. As expressed by
a UNICEF official interviewed by Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich: “IDP camps
are places where people are regrouped and propaganda can be conducted quite
105 Kalyvas 2006.
106 Atangana 2010, 64-65.
107 Martin 1982, 1.
108 UNICEF 2008, 36.
109 For examples, see the use of “cluster villages” during the civil war in Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill
Tracts Commission 1991, 44-45) and forced relocation in East Timor (CAVR 2013, 231) and Aceh
(Human Rights Watch 2003) in Indonesia.
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easily.”112 This evokes the genealogy of so-called “concentration” camps. Despite their
murderous connotation due to the etymological link to the Holocaust, concentration
camps primarily served as a tool of colonial warfare; one that evolved, according
to Sibylle Scheipers, from institutions aimed at punishing insurgent supporters to
ones “focused on the ‘rehabilitation’ of the inhabitants.”113 Thus the French saw
regroupment in Algeria as part of “a program of psychological warfare” that aimed “to
organize and reeducate” the population.114 So too did the Portuguese, whose practice of
resettling civilians into aldeamentos during revolutionary wars in Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea-Bissau “provided the government with an opportunity to deliver its
message to the population.”115 These efforts at co-option can be reinforced by material
inducements, to the extent that encampment eases the delivery of services and makes
civilians more dependent on authorities than they were previously. The aldeamentos, for
instance, facilitated Portugal’s efforts “to bring medical care, education, and food to the
people.”116 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw argue that Britain’s relocation of Kikuyu
villages during the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya also improved social service provision and
“government-civilian relations.”117
The use of encampment to co-opt the population is not unique to colonial
powers. A Rhodesian government document listing the advantages of its Consolidated
and Protected Villages included “the opportunity (of) having a captive audience, to
mobilize the masses on government’s side.”118 It is not surprising, then, that political
and military actors sometimes seek to make relocation permanent even after it has
outlived its utility as a war strategy. A Filipino general alluded to this when asked when
residents of strategic hamlets would be allowed to go home:
“It will be up to the people. But as they find the advantages of being together, not
only for security but in the services we can provide them, I think they will find it
advantageous to stay in those communities. Families should learn to live together
with other families, as communities.”119
It is no surprise, then, that forced relocation often facilitates or accelerates
urbanization in countries plagued by civil war. Consider Angola. Before its civil war
in the 1970s, urban settlements accounted for approximately 15 percent of the country’s
population; by the end of the conflict in 1991, they accounted for nearly half of it.120
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Theoretical Implications
This sorting logic suggests that, contrary to claims made by other scholars,121
different types of displacement will occur in different kinds of conflicts. In irregular
or “guerrilla” wars, rebels are militarily weaker than the state and therefore tend to
avoid direct engagement with incumbent forces. Rebels instead prefer to hide among the
population, which intensifies identification problems for counterinsurgents and strongly
encourages combatants to adopt simplifying heuristics.122 We see this, for example, in
David Kellogg’s vivid description of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam:
“For the soldier in the field facing a possible guerrilla in every enemy national he
meets, with no way of reading another person’s heart and mind and seconds in
which to decide whether or not to shoot, that uniform and weapon are his only
reliable decision criteria. In the absence of these, he is forced to make other less clear
distinctions on the order of: anyone running away from a chopper, or anyone out
late at night, or anyone remaining in a free fire zone, or any woman left in a village
which has been deserted by the draft age men, or any kid walking deliberately
towards [him] with something that might be a weapon in his hand, is a probable
[guerrilla].”123
Moreover, in irregular wars civilians tend to reside in contested areas where
control is fragmented between belligerents,124 which under the territorial logic of
political identity makes their loyalties ambiguous. It follows, then, that the use of
relocation will be more attractive in irregular conflicts.
By contrast, in conventional civil wars – where two sides with symmetric
military capabilities confront each other directly along clear frontlines – identification
problems are less severe.125 Since military success in irregular wars depends on civilians,
detecting disloyalty in the local population is of paramount concern to combatants.
But success in conventional conflicts hinges on firepower and traditional military
capabilities, with civilians playing a far less pivotal role. In these contexts, cleansing will
be more attractive than relocation for two main reasons.
First, conventional wars mimic interstate conflicts, where capturing or annexing
territory is more important than identifying enemies or eliciting compliance from
noncombatants. Conquest, in turn, is made easier by expelling or homogenizing the
local population.126 Indeed, expulsions of ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks by the Taliban
121 Balcells and Steele show that pro-government forces have employed the same types of strategic
displacement in both conventional and irregular wars (Balcells and Steele 2016).
122 Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010. As Schutte (2017, 385) argues, in asymmetric conflicts not
only is it difficult to distinguish combatants from civilians, but often only a small number of truly
committed insurgents exist, making the identification of enemies that much harder.
123 Kellogg 1997.
124 Krcmaric 2018.
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126 Downes 2008; Balcells 2010; Bulutgil 2016; Stanton 2016.
CHAPTER 2. THEORY 46
during the Afghan civil war (1996–2001) were usually reported in “areas newly occupied
by the Taliban,”127 just as the cleansing of non-Serbian populations in Bosnia typically
followed the occupation of new territories by Serbian fighters.128 In the war over the
disputed Nagorno-Karabakh (1992–94), Armenian forces intentionally drove Azerbaijani
residents from their homes only after they captured towns such as Fuzuli, Cabrayil,
Qubadli, and Zangilan.129 One may wonder why perpetrators in these situations do
not attempt to resettle the displaced population. This is likely because once people are
pushed across a military frontline they no longer pose an imminent threat, being beyond
the territory an armed group seeks to control.130
Second, in conventional conflicts civilians reside not in disputed areas but under
the control of one side. Combatants will therefore be more likely to perceive those living
under the adversary as disloyal through guilt by location and seek to expel them. In
Sri Lanka, for example, “towards the end of the conflict, the government treated most
civilians who had been living in the LTTE-controlled areas as LTTE members in disguise
or collaborators.”131 I expect, then, that cleansing will be more common in conventional
civil wars.
Hypothesis 1a: Irregular wars are associated with a higher likelihood of state-induced
relocation, while conventional wars are associated with a higher
likelihood of state-induced cleansing.
My assortative theory also suggests that forced relocation will be more likely
in conflicts waged in “illegible” areas: namely rural, peripheral territories. While many
insurgencies emerge in isolated regions,132 fighting often spreads to other parts of the
country, and higher proportions of military battles and violence against civilians in
wartime occur in urban settings.133 When it comes to strategic displacement, major cities
– including Beirut, Bujumbura, Dushanbe, Kigali, Kinshasa, Mogadishu, Nicosia, and
Sarajevo – have frequently been the site of ethnic or political cleansing. Urban areas
are more geographically concentrated, which makes them easier to cordon, and their
populations are more heterogeneous, which enables and may even encourage the use of
collective targeting. During the civil war in Iraq (2003–11), sectarian cleansing largely
occurred in mixed neighborhoods in cities like Baghdad and Basra.134 Or consider
this dispatch from the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–97), where pro-government forces
expelled residents of ethnically distinct neighborhoods:
127 U.S. State Department 1998, 1999a.
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“the crumbling mud walls of roofless houses in many Gharmi and Pamiri
neighborhoods formed a stark contrast to the untouched Kulobi neighborhoods
nearby and bore testimony to the selectivity of destruction and the exile of specific
populations.”135
Forced relocation, however, is more attractive when contested areas lie in
the rural periphery for several reasons. First, government forces lack mobilizational
capacity far from political and military hubs. This complicates intelligence gathering,
further encouraging incumbents to adopt informational shortcuts and to capture
and utilize local residents, who usually constitute the best sources of information
in an area.136 Relatedly, rural localities, particularly in the hinterland, tend to be the
most underutilized and illegible to counterinsurgents, having historically served as
sanctuaries for “state-evading peoples.”137 Populations are more homogeneous than
in urban settings, precluding combatants from using ascriptive identifiers such as
ethnicity to differentiate between friendly and hostile communities. Residents usually
live in scattered settlements across inaccessible terrain, sometimes outside the reach of
the state.138 As a result, state forces are less likely to possess local knowledge or have
access to alternative means of identifying the population, such as reliable census data,
registration records, or identification documents. In El Salvador, for example, many
peasants living in areas affected by the FMLN lacked identity cards because they were
never issued or because their births were never registered.139 Identity cards have often
been used to facilitate collective targeting, including ethnic cleansing campaigns in
Rwanda, Georgia, and Lebanon.140
The “human ecology” of these territories also makes it “impossible to occupy
every place where people live continuously.”141 Counterinsurgents are therefore likely
to consider the use of simplifying heuristics to be particularly appropriate, and find it
more advantageous to cluster their resources and bring people to them than to scatter
units throughout the countryside and risk overextension.142 Finally, displacement will
have less of an impact on a country’s infrastructure in outlying areas, since they tend to
be less developed and economically productive than other parts of the country, and their
relative isolation minimizes spillover effects.
Hypothesis 1b: Forced relocation by state actors is more likely to be employed against
135 McLean and Greene 1998, 326.
136 Zhukov 2015. Buhaug (2010) also finds that state military capacity diminishes with geographic
distance.
137 Scott 2010, 127.
138 Herbst 2014; Kocher 2004.
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rural, peripheral insurgencies.
Anecdotal evidence suggests the plausibility of this hypothesis. France’s
regroupment strategy in Algeria targeted “people from scattered villages and hamlets,
focusing on the more remote...areas first.”143 When moving people into “cluster villages”
during the Shanti Bahini insurgency in Bangladesh, the military cited the challenges
of accessing the population in the highly dispersed settlements of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, where one village’s land could cover an area of more than five square miles.144 A
similar rationale accompanied the forced relocation of hill tribes in rebel-affected parts
of Thailand. Communities were ordered to move if they lived “in scattered hamlets
rather than proper villages” that were “difficult for government officials to reach”;145
a census of the hill tribes was not completed until the mid-1980s, after the war had
ended.146 Relocating civilians in Nicaragua, according to one official, gave the state
“an opportunity to reorder the population, which has been very dispersed” in the
countryside.147 In East Timor, displacement orchestrated by the Indonesian army had a
similar effect, as “the previous pattern of dispersed mountain settlement was forcibly
changed to a predominately coastal population concentrated at towns along major
roads.”148 David Vines’ description of the government’s use of communal villages in
Mozambique effectively captures the state-building logic of these measures:
“[The villages] appeared to be the easiest method for bringing the peasantry (90%)
under direct state control. In many areas of Mozambique this would be the first
experience of a modern centralized State, Portuguese colonialism having remained a
remote experience for many.”149
A comparison of British counterinsurgency methods in Malaya, Kenya, and
Cyprus provides an apt illustration of how human ecology can encourage or discourage
the use of population relocation. While British forces enacted relocation in Malaya
(1950–60) and Kenya (1952–56), they avoided it in Cyprus (1954–59). Hoffman and Taw
attribute this in part to the size of insurgents’ civilian constituency – which represented
a majority of the island’s population – but also to the fact that “fighting occurred not
only in remote areas but in the middle of congested urban centers.”150 As a result,
“tactics used successfully in Malaya and Kenya were less appropriate and less effective
in Cyprus, where a different kind of response had to be developed.”151
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Finally, as noted at the start of this chapter, previous studies have found that in
the absence of information about individual loyalties, combatants turn to group-level
indicators of ethnic or political affiliation to identify and expel potential adversaries.
Under this punishment-based logic, cleansing by counterinsurgents is hypothesized
to be more likely where states have access to group-level information about wartime
loyalties. Such information can be revealed through election results (which divulge
a community’s political preferences)152 or through an insurgency’s claim to fight for
a particular ethnic or religious group (which creates a link between ethno-sectarian
identity and political affiliation).153 If my argument is correct, however, strategies of
forced relocation should be more likely in the absence of such group-level identifiers.
Lacking the means to profile communities along political or ethnic lines, combatants
will be inclined to use alternative heuristics – namely, spatial profiling – in order to
identify potential enemies and their sympathizers.
Hypothesis 1c: Cleansing is more likely when group-level information for inferring
wartime loyalties is available; forced relocation is more likely in the
absence of such information.
2.2 The Capturing Logic of Strategic Displacement
Strategies of cleansing typically aim to get rid of the displaced population. But
for armed groups, civilians are potential assets in wartime, not just burdens or threats,
since they provide information and other services. Uprooting people can therefore
seek not to “push” them out of an armed group’s ambit but to “pull” them into it. As
Scott argues, a principle purpose of arranging the population to make it more legible
is to simplify some of the core tasks of state-making and war-fighting, namely taxation
and conscription.154 Thus besides providing armed actors with the information and
organization necessary to detect civilian loyalties directly – and to infer them indirectly
through guilt by location – capturing the population through displacement offers two
additional benefits. First, it allows combatants to extract resources from noncombatants,
namely economic rents and military recruits. Second, it provides propaganda fodder
and signals legitimacy to domestic and international audiences. All of these contribute
to fulfilling combatants’ primary objective in the short-term – territorial consolidation –
while also serving the longer-term imperatives of state-building.
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The Material Benefits of Capture
The idleness and uncertainty that displacement engenders, along with the
dependency it cultivates on services provided at relocation sites, facilitates recruitment
into perpetrators’ informant networks, military ranks, and labor pool. Ethnographic
work reveals that displacement produces radical and protracted uncertainty that
can be manipulated by enterprising actors.155 Rana Khoury, for example, finds that
life for Syrians in Jordanian refugee camps is characterized by “utter boredom” that
serves as “an unmistakable source of anguish.”156 While poverty and lack of education
have been found to predict individual participation in civil war,157 a distinct body of
research shows that displacement camps are particularly vulnerable to militarization
and exploitation, and are often used by armed groups as sources of supplies and
recruitment.158 By enlisting locally displaced civilians, combatants can exploit their
knowledge of the surrounding terrain and its communities, which further helps
armed groups address the identification problem.159 The relative regimentation and
accessibility of the population in relocation sites makes it easier to identify recruits and
laborers and monitor their work, offering a cheaper method of engaging insurgents,
protecting communities, and bolstering resources for military operations.160
Indeed, in a variety of conflicts the mobilization of uprooted populations for the
war effort appears to have been not an ancillary byproduct of strategic displacement,
but an important factor motivating it. Consider the following description of strategic
hamlets in the Philippines:
“The rationale for the hamletting, as explained by [Philippine] military officials at a
later dialogue with church representatives, was to make it easier for the government
to protect the people, to provide them with services, and to get the people to ‘protect
themselves’ (i.e., to organize them into government-sponsored militia units).”161
In Algeria, the French used inhabitants of its regroupment camps to form
harkis, or self-defense units, whose ranks swelled to some 60,000 fighters.162 Likewise,
in Ethiopia villagization was conceived as a “means for enabling the rural masses...to
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safeguard local peace and security”163 that made it easier, according to government
officials, to conscript soldiers and collect taxes.164 As one reporter observed:
“Resettlement and villagization...are tools of militarization...these newly created
communities are used as military infrastructures and provide recruits for the army
as well as for special militia forces responsible for locating and punishing suspected
rebel collaborators...Members of the militia receive slightly higher apportionments
of food – an enticement to potential recruits. Food is also used to create a class of
informers within the camp population.”165
These do not appear to be isolated cases. During the civil war in Peru,
after evacuating peasants from remote mountains to new settlements, the military
began “almost immediately” to press the displaced into militias.166 The Nicaraguan
government engaged in a similar practice, forcing relocated civilians “to arm themselves
for ‘self-defense.’”167 Because the Contra rebels in Nicaragua received significant
support from external sources – including the U.S. government – denying them access
to the local population through displacement, according to James McCarl, was “not
sufficient. To win the rural battle, the [government] needed a significant force, located
in the rural areas, to threaten and destroy the Contras.”168 In Guatemala, participation in
Civil Defense Patrols was compulsory for residents of the “model villages,” in which
hundreds of thousands of displaced residents served as militiamen, informants, and
laborers.169 According to a Guatemalan army journal, “in twenty-four hours, it is
possible to assemble 3,000 or more voluntary workers to undertake the construction of
a road, a school, irrigation projects...any project no matter how large.”170
Similar trends have been observed in other parts of the world. In Manchuria,
the Japanese army established “collective hamlets” against Chinese insurgents “with
the objective of strengthening the self-defense capability of the peasants...every young
man in the hamlet shall be trained.”171 Relocation sites for civilians uprooted by
counterinsurgency forces in the rebel-laden frontiers of Burma have become “zones of
hyper-appropriation” where occupants “provide a ready pool of laborers” and have
their land and crops assessed “for the purpose of military taxation and requisitions.”172
In Rwanda, during the RPF’s villagization of civilians in response to Hutu rebels,
human rights groups reported that “local defense forces (LDFs)...are envisaged as part
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of the program of villagization” and “will receive military training and weapons.”173
While LDFs were principally responsible for “guarding each [villagization] site,” some
were dispatched to fight alongside the RPF in the Second Congo War (1998–2001).174
In East Timor, Indonesian soldiers overseeing government-created relocation
camps were instructed to “appoint an informant for every 10-15 families...who is able to
follow, in secrecy, the activities of these 10-15 families.”175 The army also “mobilized civil
defense forces and pressed men and boys into providing logistics support for combat
troops.”176 Civilians “grouped” during counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland
and Mizoram in northeast India were forced to work as military porters; according to
one observer, compulsory labor was “one of the active reasons the army used to justify
grouping, albeit under the euphemism of ‘gainful employment.’”177 Regroupment
camps also became “recruitment havens” for pro-government forces.178 In 2008, for
instance, during the Naxalite rebellion in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh, Human
Rights Watch reported that local police “recruited camp residents, including children,
as special police officers” and deployed them “with other paramilitary police on joint
anti-Naxalite combing operations.”179
Rebel groups have also used forced relocation to exploit civilians’ labor and
augment their forces. In Angola, UNITA forced thousands of villagers to flee to its
territories and either work on its farms or join its fighters. According to one estimate,
the displaced supplied some 30 percent of UNITA’s 63,000 troops.180 Renamo in
Mozambique similarly drove noncombatants into areas under rebel control, where they
were “used for portering and recruited into the rebels’ forces.”181 In Cambodia, Khmer
Rouge insurgents pursued a comparable strategy:
“entire villages were moved by the Khmer Rouge not only to its areas but to remote
mountain and jungle regions where the relocated villagers were forced to work
in cooperatives of 30-40 families who farmed the land in a collective manner...the
Khmer Rouge attacked villages to collect people and displaced them to forests...all
men between the ages of 18 and 40 were conscripted by the rebel forces once they
were displaced to forests.”182
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In sum, forced relocation provides combatants with opportunities to involve
more people in the war effort, while giving civilians incentives to participate.
The Symbolic Benefits of Capture
If displacement can send credible signals to combatants, it can also help
send credible signals about them to domestic and international audiences. Displaced
populations have long served as tools of foreign policy propaganda. Refugee and
asylum policies in many states have been based on the notion that refugee outflows
can be exploited to discredit adversary governments.183 According to Adam Roberts,
in World War II refugees fleeing Nazi-controlled Europe “played an important symbolic
role as legitimizers of the Allied effort” and served as tangible evidence of Germany’s
relative unpopularity.184 Likewise, during the Cold War citizens fleeing communist
countries helped legitimize pro-Western viewpoints, as their “very presence exposed the
faults of communist systems and the comparative merits of the West.”185 These refugees
became an important ideological weapon of the Cold War, with their flight portrayed as
political defection – even though many of them left due to poor economic conditions in
their countries, not because of their political opposition to communism.186
Population movements in domestic conflicts can be similarly portrayed as
foot-voting, used by each side to communicate their popularity or potency. As Barter
argues, during civil wars “leaving can be a symbolic act, especially the flight of entire
communities from armed groups which claim to represent them.”187 The same applies
to civilian flight to a particular group, which can cultivate an image of sanctuary for the
recipient. Since both governments and rebel groups use symbolic processes to bolster
their sovereign claims,188 they can use the appearance of the population abandoning a
rival and seeking shelter in their territories as evidence of their legitimacy. Even after a
conflict ends, according to Finn Stepputat, the return and resettlement of refugees and
IDPs often become “public spectacles” broadcast with the intent of “showing off the
strength and crafts of the state, its public support and legitimacy.”189
These dynamics are evidenced in the portrayal of IDPs in the Nicaraguan
civil war, where the government described those they relocated as “‘displaced
peasant families’ who mobilized themselves in response to [rebel] attacks, seeking
Sandinista government protection.”190 In Liberia, the rebel group Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) prevented civilians from fleeing and relocated
183 Teitelbaum 1984, 439.
184 Roberts 2011, 215.
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IDPs into its territories to help “prove that [LURD] held the north of Lofa” in the
northern region of the country.191 Barter describes how the flight of civilians to areas
controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines “reinforced
rebel popularity and legitimacy.”192 In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge forcibly returned
civilians who had sought refuge along the border with Thailand because Khmer leaders
“needed a civilian population to support their internationally recognized claim that they
were Cambodia’s legitimate government.”193
More recently in Syria and Iraq, ISIS made a concerted attempt to exploit
displacement for propaganda purposes. The group posted videos online that featured
civilians describing how ISIS cared for those displaced by the Syrian government,
implying that it offers a more credible refuge than other armed groups.194 Generally, ISIS
leaders have pointed to migration into its territories as evidence that people recognize
the Caliphate and desire to live under its rule.195
Theoretical Implications
While existing explanations suggest that wartime displacement is intended to
demobilize or immobilize noncombatants, I posit that it can also be used to mobilize
them for the war effort. The capturing component of my theory suggests that forced
relocation should be associated with attempts to instrumentalize the civilian population
for military purposes. This can be observed through the raising of civilian defense
forces (CDFs), a “sedentary form of militia that governments often use to harness the
participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign.”196 The empirical
examples presented above illustrate that organizing communities into CDFs has been a
feature of – and even a justification for – various counterinsurgent relocation campaigns.
This proposition, if true, would not only provide evidence for my theory; it would also
go against punishment-related explanations. If the motive for displacing civilians is
largely punitive, it is unlikely that perpetrators would arm and train the displaced.
Hypothesis 2a: Civilian defense forces will be mobilized more frequently in conflicts
where incumbents employ forced relocation.
While H2a identifies a proximate correlate of capture to illuminate a potential
function of displacement, a final hypothesis describes the conditions under which
capture will be more valuable to the state, particularly within irregular wars. For
counterinsurgents faced with limited information, there are potentially alternative
191 Jezequel 2004, 171.
192 Barter 2016, 63.
193 Kamm 1998, 107-108.
194 Islamic State 2015; The Islamic State 2015.
195 Islamic State 2015; The Islamic State 2015.
196 Clayton and Thomson 2016.
CHAPTER 2. THEORY 55
methods of identifying enemies and weeding out the disloyal, such as paying
informants or engaging in selective interrogations. Yet implementing these tactics
typically requires territorial occupation by state forces, in which they conduct
cordon-and-search operations, combing every village and performing house-to-house
searches to collect intelligence and identify collaborators. This is often referred to as
the “clear, hold, and build” approach to counterinsurgency. Morocco adopted these
methods in Western Sahara (1975–91) to clear contested territories of Polisario Front
rebels, which included constructing 1,000 miles of defensive sand berms.197 Similarly,
in the separatist province of Casamance (1989–99), Senegal sent its security forces to
“ratisser” (rake) each village and perform mass arrests198 as part of a strategy that
sought “to occupy the terrain, to allow for no space to maneuver.”199 In some cases,
these approaches entail laying siege to village or towns, during which combatants
typically try to prevent residents from leaving instead of forcing them to flee. This has
been a feature of the Algerian military’s “Let Them Rot” strategy during its war against
the Armed Islamic Group (1992–).
Yet occupying rural, peripheral areas and conducting methodical search
operations is resource-intensive. When incumbents have limited coercive capacity or
find themselves overstretched due to multiple military commitments, relocating or
concentrating the population offers a more expedient strategy than those that require
the state to penetrate its frontiers. Just as limited force capabilities compel insurgents to,
according Mary Kaldor, “aim less at the physical control of territory through military
advance than at the political control of the population,”200 a regime facing resource
constraints may find dominion over people, rather than geography, to be a more viable
means of combating rebel threats.201 A lack of manpower can also provide an impetus
to organize and mobilize the population to fight or work on the state’s behalf, as civilian
militias offer governments a less resource-intensive method of engaging insurgents.202
I therefore hypothesize that within irregular wars, incumbents tend to engage
in civilian relocation not when they have a preponderance of resources, but when
they do not have enough of them. While scholars have argued previously that limited
capacity can lead armed groups to victimize civilians,203 when it comes to strategies of
population relocation, researchers tend to assume that these measures require extensive
197 Paul et al. 2013, 396, Zunes and Mundy 2010
198 Marut 1995, 163-65; Amnesty International 1998.
199 Casamance military governor General Amadou Abdoulaye Dieng quoted in Straus (2015, 219).
200 Kaldor 1999, 7-8.
201 As Paul Staniland argues, there is “no reason to assume that all states at all times are willing to incur
massive costs to establish their presence throughout their territories” (Staniland 2012, 244, 255).
He shows that civil war incumbents often prioritize strategies to manage violence, such as informal
bargains with rivals, because they are much less onerous than building a ubiquitous monopoly of
violence.
202 Carey et al. 2013.
203 Valentino et al. 2004; Downes 2008.
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assets to employ, and are thus more likely under wealthier, stronger incumbents.204
In contrast, I contend that, though a certain level of capacity is undoubtedly needed
to enact these strategies, if manpower and resource constraints limit an incumbent’s
ability to occupy a contested area, it will incentivize counterinsurgents to relocate the
population instead. This is particularly likely when a government is fighting a parallel
conflict, whether another domestic insurgency or a conflict with another state.
Hypothesis 2b: Within irregular wars, forced relocation by state actors is more likely
when incumbents are engaged in multiple conflicts.
This suggests that while population cleansing serves as a tool of territorial
occupation, population relocation acts as a strategic substitute for it. For instance,
Thomas Young claims that the forced movement of civilians into “communal villages”
in Mozambique reflected the fact that the state sought “to capture populations rather
than hold territory.”205 Like other forms of large-scale, group-selective violence, such
as genocide,206 cleansing typically requires a significant degree of territorial control.
Hence the tendency for these measures to be employed in the aftermath of conquest, as
illustrated in the examples described in section 2.1. But civilian relocation is often meant
to compensate for the inability of perpetrators to saturate a contested area. This may
further explain why state actors are prone to these practices: because unlike non-state
actors, they are responsible for managing violence throughout an entire country.
The empirical record suggests a potential link between resource shortages,
forced relocation strategies, and population capture. In Malaya, Britain’s method of
corralling ethnic Chinese into “New Villages” included training and arming tens of
thousands of them to serve as Home Guards. Britain’s participation in the Korean War,
along with the rise of armed independence movements in its other colonies, limited the
number of troops available for Malaya207 and forced the British “to capitalize as much as
possible on all available local resources.”208 The Home Guard – which expanded from
17,000 to 99,000 resettled Chinese in the first three years of the program209 – “removed a
manpower burden from government forces”210 and “allowed the release of thousands
of armed forces and police personnel for other assignments.”211 Similarly, Portugal
used aldeamentos to help accelerate the formation of self-defense militias in Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, where simultaneous military engagements “created
204 Kalyvas 2006, 222, Zhukov 2015, 1155.
205 Young 1997, 144.
206 Straus 2015, 18.
207 Sepp 1992, 56.
208 Komer 1972, 15.
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considerable strain on Portugal’s resources”212 and “badly overextended” its forces.213
After the aldeamentos were established, the percentage of local recruits in Portugal’s
colonial army grew from 36 to 54 percent in Mozambique, and from 25 to 42 percent in
Angola.214
During the civil war in Greece, the Greek army, which according to Edgar
O’Ballance was “much too small to be everywhere it was needed at once” also forcibly
relocated and armed residents of mountainous villages.215 In Peru, “severe economic
limitations” limited the resources available to the state for counterinsurgency, also
forcing authorities to rely on civilian defense units (rondas) mobilized in part through
forced relocation.216 The rondas proved “to be an effective instrument” in controlling
the rebels, “particularly given the budgetary and logistical problems faced by the
military.”217 And in Burma, army units have attempted to quell various border
insurgencies while “being told by their financially strapped commanders that they
must provision themselves locally.”218 As Scott explains, in order to “find the labor,
cash, building material, and foodstuffs to sustain themselves in a rugged and hostile
environment,” soldiers have routinely relocated local villages, “essentially capturing and
concentrating a substantial civilian population...which becomes their valuable pool of
manpower, grain, and revenue.”219
Some Clarifications
My argument challenges the conventional wisdom that civilian relocation
requires extensive material resources and is more likely under stronger, wealthier
regimes.220 A keen reader may note, however, that previous research has claimed that
resource constraints can lead armed actors to commit violence against civilians.221
Yet these other works emphasize a fundamentally different logic: one of desperation.
They posit that incumbents facing a particularly strong rebellion, or those at risk of
losing a war, are most likely to engage in civilian victimization.222 I would not expect
combatants facing an existential threat to employ forced relocation, since sorting the
local population is far less expedient than getting rid of it, and the potential danger
212 According to Henriksen (1976, 398), “the three simultaneous wars were sufficient to drain the human
and material resources of Portugal, to impose an increasingly financial burden on an authoritarian
regime whose revenues declined for civilian programs at home.”
213 Henriksen 1976, 398.
214 Cann 1997.
215 O’Ballance 1966, 129.
216 Mauceri 1997, 170.
217 Mauceri 1997, 170.
218 Scott 2010, 94.
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posed by noncombatants will likely overshadow the potential benefits they offer.
Moreover, while even weak armed groups can engage in mass killing, I contend that a
certain degree of capacity is still required to engage in civilian relocation. My argument
therefore differs from these other explanations in important ways. Still, I do test the
desperation hypothesis as part of my empirical analysis in Chapter 4.
One may also feel that my theory does not fully address one of the core puzzles
described in Chapter 1: that strategic displacement in general, and forced relocation
in particular, is so costly. While expelling populations from a territory may be cheaper
than other military strategies,223 relocating and sustaining communities in new locations
often requires considerable resources. So why would combatants – especially those
with limited capabilities or overstretched assets – be able and willing to engage in these
practices?
First, it is clear that many of the features of population relocation that make it
a disaster from a humanitarian standpoint are also those that make it attractive from a
military one. Crowding together previously-dispersed communities, restricting their
movements and access to land, stripping them of privacy and self-sufficiency, and
fostering idle dependency – all of this facilitates population sorting and capture for
the reasons I describe above. But it also creates conditions conducive to the spread of
infectious disease, malnutrition, poverty, and social breakdown.
Second, the costs of establishing, managing, and supplying displacement camps
or new settlements are often borne by external actors, not domestic ones. Perpetrators
of displacement have benefitted from the assistance of Cold War superpowers,
international donors, and humanitarian organizations. American aid funded forced
relocations during civil wars in Greece (1944–49) and Vietnam (1960–75).224 According
to William McNeill’s account of the Greek Civil War:
“The main form of economic aid [from the U.S.] was relief for refugees who
swarmed in from the countryside, seeking a more secure life in towns. By October
1947, the Greek government announced that 300,000 refugees were dependent on
such relief; and at the height of the war their number swelled to 700,000, nearly
one tenth of the entire population of the country. Providing even the rudiments of
shelter, and the necessary minimum of food and clothing, to such a larger number of
people constituted the main burden upon American economic aid...Actually many
refugees left their villages and farms unwillingly, compelled to do so by the army. To
clear out the population from all the hill villages that lay within reach became a fixed
military policy.”225
223 Greenhill 2008.
224 Nearly a quarter of Greece’s budget in 1949, much of it American aid, was committed to assisting
civilians deliberately relocated by the military (Sepp 1992, 40).
225 McNeill 1957, 40.
CHAPTER 2. THEORY 59
Likewise, Meo villagers displaced by counterinsurgents in Laos in the 1960s
were “entirely dependent” on air drops of rice and commodities from the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, which would also provide funds for their relocation.226 Guatemalan
officials “counted heavily on foreign assistance” for their model villages program, as
the U.S. Agency for International Development constructed schools, roads, and water
facilitates for the settlements.227 And the “cluster villages” used in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts in Bangladesh were built with funds from the Asian Development Bank – and
sustained through “massive” donor aid allotments.228
Since the creation of the U.N. Refugee Agency in 1950 (UNHCR), humanitarian
agencies have taken primary responsibility for sheltering and assisting populations
displaced by conflict, including refugees and IDPs.229 The international community
has substantially increased its foreign aid to displaced populations since the 1970s,230
as overall humanitarian and development assistance grew steadily during the Cold War
and expanded rapidly in the 1990s, when donors made aid to conflict-affected countries
a high priority (see Appendix A).231 This has often eased the burden of uprooting and
resettling civilians. During the conflict between the government of Sudan and the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), civilians were displaced into state-run
“peace camps” where “international relief was conditionally provided to lure people
from the SPLA.”232 As a result, aid operations “tended to facilitate government attempts
to depopulate” contested areas.233 Some humanitarian groups have even been accused
of criminal complicity in forced displacement, as conveyed in the following dispatches
from Mozambique and Ethiopia:
“The government relied on the numerous international aid organizations operating
in Mozambique to take care of the war displaced by asking them to provide
between $150-200 million a year in food, medicines, clothes, blankets and sometimes
temporary shelter...Thus, in effect, the international aid agencies helped the
[government] to pursue its policy of forced relocation as a counterinsurgency
tool...Without international aid [the relocation camps] could not be maintained.”234
“the [Ethiopian] government used the promise of relief distributions to encourage
226 McClintock 1992, 142.
227 Black 1985.
228 Arens 1997, 1811; Chakma 2013, 143.
229 Braithwaite et al. 2019, 6.
230 Fearon 2008.
231 Collier 2003.
232 Human Rights Watch 1998.
233 Keen and Wilson 1994, 212-13.
234 Africa Watch 1992, 72, 116. Keen and Wilson (1994, 212-13) also argues that “international aid played
a key role in expanding government military control” in Mozambique because it “made it possible
for large populations to live in government-held areas; it encouraged depopulation of rebel zones; it
helped establish government legitimacy by facilitating the provision of government services.”
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peasants from insurgent-controlled areas to cross military lines and enter towns
under its control.”235
“the relief aid generously provided to the Ethiopian government and the
humanitarian agencies working alongside it was a boon to the government’s war
plans. A particularly insidious element in the government’s policy of relocation was
its repeated attempts to obtain finance from the international community to carry
it out. These attempts were partly successful – had they been more so, doubtless
villagization would have proceeded more quickly.”236
Although there is little evidence that external aid has been a primary factor
motivating the use of population displacement strategies in wartime, it has often
made these measures possible. This echoes other research that shows humanitarian
interventions in civil war can contribute to or exacerbate violence due to the moral
hazards they produce.237 While combatants would otherwise eschew relocating
civilians due to the massive costs of sustaining new settlements, moving communities
to designated encampments serves a critical purpose for aid agencies. As David Keen
argues:
“[I]nternational relief aid is dependent on the visibility of aid provision in the
media and on logistical access to concentrations of people...Thus, whilst agencies
may disagree with the brutality of roundups of refugees and the displacement of
people in war zones, these actions nevertheless provide them with the context for
their work, and they may therefore share a macabre and indirect common interest in
creating camps.”238
2.3 Alternative Explanations for Strategic Displacement
In this section I outline several alternative explanations for strategic wartime
displacement and derive a separate set of testable hypotheses. I organize these
explanations, which were briefly discussed in Chapter 1, into three primary categories:
ethnic nationalism, denial, and punishment. These categories do not encompass all
potential arguments about the causes of intentional civilian displacement in wartime.
They instead represent the most prominent explanations for these strategies in the
235 Hendrie 1994, 129.
236 De Waal 1991, 11-12, 88. UNHCR assistance to Ethiopia skyrocketed from $100,000 in 1979 to $7.3
million in 1981. Ethiopia also benefitted from $13 billion in military assistance provided by the Soviet
Union between 1977 and 1990 (Keller 1992, 615).
237 Kuperman 2008; Wood and Sullivan 2015; Kydd and Straus 2013.
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existing literature, and each one offers distinct theoretical implications that can be tested
at different levels of analysis.
Ethnic Nationalism
The notion that strategic displacement is driven by ethnic nationalism features
prominently in the literature on ethnic cleansing. In his influential work on “murderous
cleansing,” Michael Mann argues that practices of collective expulsion are a product
of “organic” or “essentialist” nationalism, rooted in the ideal of the homogenous
nation-state and a desire to purge a territory of ethnic, religious, or racial out-groups.239
As a form of demographic engineering, displacement tends to be employed when
regimes become “ethnicized,” and associated with a dominant socio-cultural identity,
causing leaders to exclude minority groups to prevent them from weakening the
nation. A canonical case is the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, where Serbian
campaigns to rid territories of Croats and Bosnian Muslims have been attributed to the
ethno-nationalist views of Slobodan Milosevic and other Serbian leaders.
Mann’s argument is part of a much broader literature that expects displacement,
along with other forms of extreme violence, in ethnic wars. These scholars suggest that
either ethnic hatred240 or security dilemmas faced by intermingled ethnic groups,241 lead
to escalations in violence that often culminate in one group forcibly expelling members
of another as a survival strategy. The impulse for “demographic separation” becomes so
entrenched that one author goes so far as to propose ethnic partition as the best – and in
some cases, perhaps the only – solution to ethnic conflict.242 A more nuanced argument
is made by Straus, who contends that “founding narratives,” or ideologies related to
how leaders “make” their nations, incline some countries and governments towards
large-scale mass violence.243 These arguments generate two predictions: strategic
displacement should occur primarily in ethnic wars, and it should be employed by
regimes that harbor exclusionary ideologies.
Hypothesis 3a: Strategic displacement is employed primarily in ethnic wars.
Hypothesis 3b: Strategic displacement is associated with exclusionary elite ideologies.
Denial
A second category of alternative explanations for strategic displacement stems
from the same theoretical starting point as the assortative logic proposed in this chapter:
239 Mann 2005.
240 Horowitz 2001.
241 Posen 1993; Kaufmann 1996.
242 Kaufmann 1998.
243 Straus 2015. Other implications of the author’s argument are also tested in the empirical chapters.
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armed groups displace in response to information and identification problems. One
set of arguments suggests that displacement is a form of denial. In this view, since
counterinsurgents cannot distinguish friend from foe, they remove the entire population
from an area in order to “drain the sea” of water (civilians) to suffocate the fish (rebels),
pursuant to Chairman Mao’s famous dictum.244 This deprives an insurgency of its
civilian resource base and reduces its fighting efficacy.245
Resource deprivation is commonly invoked to explain population displacement
strategies in counterinsurgency wars. In Nicaragua, for example, one observer described
the military’s use of strategic hamlets as “designed to deprive the guerrilla columns of
any logistical support they could have received from the rural population.”246 Tactics
of civilian displacement in Burma have been similarly described as part of efforts “to
drain the sea, in order to kill the fish.”247 During the American counterinsurgency
campaign in the Philippines at the end of the 19th century, U.S. commanders “grasped
that the most effective way to defeat the guerrillas was to disrupt their food supplies.
The food-denial campaign led inevitably to plans to relocate the rural population.”248
The forced expulsion of Kurds in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s, at the height of
the insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was also characterized as an
“attempt to drain the PKK of logistic support.”249 If this logic is the primary motivating
factor behind strategic displacement, then we should observe these measures against
rebel groups that are particularly dependent on the local population for logistical
support, such as food, shelter, and recruits.
Hypothesis 4a: Strategic displacement is more likely in wars where rebels are
particularly embedded in, or reliant on resources provided by,
the local population.
A variation of the denial argument, proposed by Jessica Stanton, contends that
the smaller and more geographically concentrated a rebel group’s civilian base, the
more desirable and attainable it is for governments to sever opponents’ ties through
displacement.250
Hypothesis 4b: Strategic displacement is more likely when rebels draw support
from a small, geographically concentrated civilian base.
244 Mao 2000.
245 Azam and Hoeﬄer 2002; Zhukov 2015; Downes and Greenhill 2015.
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Punishment
A third argument claims that strategic displacement amounts to a method of
collective punishment. Populations deemed disloyal are expelled or incarcerated en
mass in order to inflict pain and raise the costs of their (presumed) resistance.251 As
discussed in section 2.2, H1c includes the proposition that a logic of punishment can
explain strategies of cleansing. Moreover, for this argument to be true, H2a should be
negative, because if the motive for displacing civilians is largely punitive, it is unlikely
that perpetrators would arm and train their victims. Indeed, during the Revolt of the
Camisards in France, such concerns actually discouraged royal officials from forcibly
relocating peasants to towns in some parishes. According to Roy McCullough, fortifying
the towns in these areas would have required arming the peasants, but authorities felt
that “it would be madness to place arms in the hands of a rebellious populace.”252
Table 2.1: Arguments and Hypotheses for Strategic Wartime Displacement
Argument Hypothesis
Assortative (Sorting)
H1a: Irregular war→ Forced relocation
Conventional war→ Cleansing
H1b: Rural, peripheral insurgency→ Forced relocation
H1c: Group-level information unavailable→ Forced relocation
Group-level information available→ Cleansing
Assortative (Capturing)
H2a: Civilian defense forces↔ Forced relocation
H2b: State fighting multiple conflicts→
Forced relocation
Ethnic Nationalism
H3a: Ethnic war→ Strategic displacement
H3b: Exclusionary elites→ Strategic displacement
Denial
H4a: Rebel embeddedness→ Strategic displacement
H4b: Small, concentrated rebel constituency→
Strategic displacement
Punishment H5: Mass killing→ (More/less) Strategic displacement
251 For a description of denial and punishment as distinct strategies of civil war, see Toft and Zhukov
(2012).
252 McCullough 2007, 218-219.
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Punishment-related arguments also suggest a potential relationship between
strategic displacement and lethal violence. On the one hand, displacement may be
more likely in conflicts with higher levels of civilian victimization, since massacres
are sometimes used to orchestrate civilian flight. On the other hand, displacement
may serve as a substitute for – and therefore correlate negatively with – mass killing
because it offers combatants plausible deniability: they can claim people moved on
their own volition, potentially avoiding the condemnation that comes with killing
civilians.253 Thus strategic displacement should correlate either positively or negatively
with state-led mass violence against civilians in civil wars.
Hypothesis 5: Strategic displacement is correlated with state-led mass killing.
Each of these arguments and their resulting hypotheses, which I test in
subsequent chapters, are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has specified a new theory of strategic wartime displacement
and developed a series of testable hypotheses. I argue that while some displacement
strategies aim to expel undesirable populations, others seek to identify the undesirables
in the first place, and to appropriate – rather than punish or eliminate – targeted
communities. This assortative logic has two components. First, displacement helps
combatants distinguish potential allies from adversaries by forcing people to send costly
and easily observable signals of loyalty and affiliation based on whether they leave
and where they go, and by imposing legibility on obscure or unorganized populations.
Second, displacement facilitates the extraction of material and symbolic resources from
noncombatants. Uprooting civilians can therefore serve broader purposes than getting
rid of the population or controlling it through brute force. It can provide a mechanism
for inferring people’s allegiances through what I call “guilt by location” while also
acting as a force multiplier.
I am not claiming that civilians’ movements in wartime actually reflect
their political preferences. Instead, my theory focuses on how these movements
are interpreted by others. Spatial profiling, like profiling based on other criteria –
ethnicity, religion, race, party affiliation – will not correctly distinguish combatant from
noncombatant, or loyal civilians from disloyal ones, in every case. All heuristics are
prone to error, and given the existential stress and information scarcity that combatants
face in war, they are bound to make mistakes. But limited intelligence, resource
constraints, and time pressures often compel armed actors to rely on informational
shortcuts. Displacing civilians offers a particularly alluring one because of how it can
help sort the population in a quick, visible, and relatively cheap way.
253 Steele 2011, 2017.
CHAPTER 2. THEORY 65
Since my theory presumes a concerted effort by combatants to influence the
destinations of the local population – and not just trigger its departure – and because it
emphasizes the benefits of physical concentration and spatial reorganization, I expect
it to apply to cases of wartime relocation, but not cleansing. It may also extend to
instances of depopulation, at least those that entail attempts to lure the uprooted to the
perpetrator’s territories. The case study of the Syrian civil war in Chapter 6 is expressly
intended to examine this possibility.
Generally, the assortative logic of displacement anticipates particular strategies
in particular contexts. Forced relocation will tend to be employed by incumbents
fighting irregular wars, where rebels hide among civilians and as a result, the primary
challenge for state forces is to identify opponents and their supporters. In contrast,
cleansing will typically occur in conventional wars, where rebels confront the state more
directly and each side is primarily concerned with conquering territory. I also expect
relocation to be more attractive when both individual- and group-level information
about wartime loyalties is unavailable. This is more likely in conflicts fought in areas
“illegible” to the state: rural, peripheral territories, and where counterinsurgents lack
access to other group-level identifiers that they can use to infer loyalties. Moreover, the
capturing component of my theory suggests that forced relocation should be associated
with the mobilization of civilian defense forces, and is more likely to be employed by
incumbents that are engaged in multiple conflicts, which limits the resources available
for territorial occupation.
In order to motivate different aspects of my theory – and to demonstrate the
plausibility of its underlying logic and theoretical implications – I have drawn on a range
of empirical examples from contemporary civil wars. I have also discussed competing
arguments, which I separate into three categories: ethnic nationalism, denial, and
punishment. Like my theory, some of these explanations see displacement as a strategic
response to asymmetric information. But they follow different logics and suggest that
displacement serves different objectives; therefore, they have separate and distinct
theoretical implications. In the next chapter, I evaluate these arguments in an in-depth
analysis of strategic displacement in Uganda, before testing them in a broader sample of
civil wars in Chapter 5.
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“The old pumpkin in the courtyard shall not be uprooted.”
-Acholi proverb
Chapter 2 developed an assortative theory of strategic displacement in civil
wars and provided broad comparative evidence as a plausibility test. I contend that
certain displacement strategies are employed not to get rid of a local population, but
rather to sort, capture, and convert it into compliant, useful assets. This chapter provides
a more rigorous test of the argument by examining a specific context in-depth. To
evaluate evidence for the assortative mechanism, I conduct a detailed case study of
forced relocation in Uganda.
Uganda offers an ideal laboratory for examining the strategic use of
displacement in wartime for two main reasons. First, this case exhibits a high degree
of variation in the dependent variable. The Ugandan government, led by President
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), has faced a series of armed
rebellions since it took power in 1986. Yet it forcibly relocated civilians during wars
against some rebel groups – including the Lord’s Resistance Army (1988–2006), the
Allied Democratic Forces (1996–2002), and the Uganda People’s Army (1988–92) – but
not others. This presents a puzzle: why did the state engage in forced relocation in
certain areas, against certain rebels, and at certain periods? By exploiting within-case
variation in the use of displacement across different conflicts by the same government,
I am able to conduct a structured, controlled comparative analysis, as potential
confounding factors related to the country and the regime are held constant.1
Unlike prior studies – which have mostly explored subnational variation in strategic
displacement within a single conflict – I am able to examine variation in the dependent
variable across multiple rebellions.
Second, Uganda provides a unique setting for researching civil war dynamics
and retracing the use of population displacement due to an unusual openness about
this subject among government officials and citizens. Investigating these topics
can be logistically difficult and politically sensitive. But the time that has elapsed
since these conflicts occurred, along with the use of blanket amnesties for rebels, the
mass demobilization of combatants, and the generally peaceful and open political
environment all made it possible for former fighters, authorities, and civilians to recount
their experiences with candor. Conducting extensive fieldwork was therefore not only
feasible, but fruitful. I traversed the country to interview hundreds of perpetrators and
victims of displacement, which brought me from cavernous government offices in the
bustling capital, Kampala, to the dusty villages of Acholiland, to the verdant mountains
straddling the Uganda’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beyond
explaining strategic displacement in Uganda, this chapter offers an important corrective
1 George and Bennett (2005, 80) note that such structured comparisons are “one of the most effective
comparative research designs.”
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to the historical record: while the Ugandan government’s policy of uprooting civilians
during the LRA war has been well documented, this study is to my knowledge the first
to reveal in detail the use of similar methods by counterinsurgency forces during the
ADF insurgency.
The chapter proceeds as follows. After providing some background on
rebellions in Uganda since 1986 and an overview of displacement patterns, I summarize
the data sources used in my analysis. I then employ both qualitative and quantitative
data to explore the theoretical predictions of my assortative theory. Part of this
entails chronicling the decision to employ displacement by Ugandan authorities and
identifying the factors that shaped these decisions, using process tracing.2 As my
argument would predict, the Ugandan government employed forced relocation against
insurgents that utilized guerrilla tactics, but not conventional ones; it focused on rural,
peripheral areas that lacked “legibility”; and it used displacement (1) as a means of
overcoming information and identification problems against both ethnic and non-ethnic
insurgencies, and (2) to help organize and mobilize local populations into the war effort.
The case study also briefly highlights how rebel groups may also use civilian flight and
resettlement, even if heavily coerced or incentivized by its opponent, to make inferences
about the allegiances of local communities. Finally, I show that alternative arguments for
strategic displacement – including denial, punishment, and ethnic nationalism – cannot
fully account for variation in state-induced displacement in Uganda.
3.1 Rebellions in Uganda, 1986–2006
The North: the UPDA and HSM (1986–1988)
In 1986, after Museveni’s NRM overthrew the governments of Milton Obote and
Tito Okello, members of the former national army, comprised largely of the Acholi tribe,
began mobilizing an armed resistance in northern Uganda. These ex-soldiers created the
Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and battled the NRM until the government
brokered a peace accord in 1988. A separate group, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM),
also formed in the Acholi region in 1986 and collaborated with the UPDA before waging
its own insurgency. Led by Alice Lakwena, the HSM mobilized a diverse group of
followers by using spiritual appeals and imposing strict discipline on its members. The
HSM proved to be a formidable force, fighting its way through much of Uganda and
coming within 100 kilometers of Kampala before being defeated in November 1987.
According to Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, the UPDA and HSM “were similar in that
they tried to mobilize popular grievances in a struggle against the new government.
Although the former was more about capturing political power and the latter more
2 Collier 2011; Bennett and Checkel 2014.
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about rejuvenating Acholi society, they both articulated reasons for rebellion with which
most Acholi sympathized at the time.”3
The East: the UPA (1988–1992)
Meanwhile, in the eastern region of Teso, a separate group of ex-soldiers formed
the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) in late 1987, which recruited primarily among the
Iteso people. The UPA moved throughout the countryside, launching surprise attacks
on UPDF barracks and convoys and raiding villages for food and cattle.4 Compared
to the UPDA and HSM, the UPA perpetuated more violence against the local civilian
population. In 1988 and 1989, government and military authorities ordered between
120,000 and 200,000 villagers in the Kumi and Soroti districts of Teso to move to
settlement camps near trading centers and towns.5 The U.S. State Department confirmed
that government policy in eastern Uganda was to “intentionally displace civilians.”6
State officials appealed for assistance from international humanitarian organizations
to help feed and shelter people in the camps, which were sustained until 1991. As
people were slowly allowed to return to their villages, a commission of politicians from
Teso helped forge a peace agreement between the UPA and NRM in 1992, ending the
rebellion.
The North: the LRA (1988–2006)
Back in Acholiland, as the UPDA reached a settlement with the government,
a cousin of Alice Lakwena named Joseph Kony launched the next iteration of the
northern rebellion. Kony formed the Lord’s Army in 1988 – later renamed the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) – whose fighters claimed to be messengers from God sent
to liberate the Acholi by overthrowing Museveni. Operating out of rural areas in the
north, the LRA ambushed government targets and began using violence against local
residents to root out informants and gain recruits and supplies, stealing food and other
provisions and undertaking mass abductions, especially of children. As the LRA’s
brutality diminished its support among the population, in the fall of 1988 the Ugandan
army escalated its operations against the insurgency. This included ordering villagers
in the northern district of Gulu to leave their homes and relocate to makeshift camps
near trading centers and army barracks.7 The relocation order was communicated
verbally and through leaflets dropped by army helicopters.8 By the spring of 1990,
media outlets reported that 200,000-300,000 civilians had been displaced, and that some
3 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 11.
4 Epelu-Opio 2009.
5 Epelu-Opio 2009.
6 U.S. State Department 1989, 1990.
7 Amnesty International 1989.
8 Lamwaka 2016, 206.
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were dying due to inadequate food and medical care in the camps – suggesting that the
displacement strategy “may be counterproductive to the government” because it was
“causing more resentment.”9
After peace talks between the NRM and LRA collapsed in 1994, the rebels
retreated into Sudan, where they began receiving food and weapons caches from
the Sudanese government. This support was ostensibly Khartoum’s retribution for
Museveni aiding the southern secessionist rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA).10 After the rebels resumed raids in the Acholi region, in 1995 the army – newly
christened the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) – began encouraging and
then forcing civilians to move from remote villages into trading centers, sub-county
headquarters, and near UPDF barracks. In April 1996, officials in Gulu made a radio
announcement:
“The government of Uganda has resolved to move everybody away from places
far from soldiers to nearby trading centres guarded by the army. We are doing this
for your security and it must be done within 48 hours. It is a directive from the
army...Failure to follow these instructions means you will be treated as a ‘wrong
person.’”11
In a speech to the Ugandan Parliament in September 1996, Museveni formally
announced the establishment of internally displaced person (IDP) camps throughout the
rebel-affected areas of the north, which the government called “protected villages.”12
Authorities promised water, food, healthcare, and other services in the IDP camps,
and those who refused to move were often beaten or had their villages shelled.13 The
consequences of these relocations were apparent by October 1996, when local journalists
reported that Gulu was “losing more lives through secondary effects of the [LRA] war
than the war itself” due in part to the poor humanitarian conditions of the camps.14 As
in previous instances, the government appealed to international aid agencies for help,
which provided shelter, food, and medical assistance to IDPs.
Despite the humanitarian ramifications, the UPDF sustained and eventually
expanded its policy of forced displacement in northern Uganda. In 2002, the army
received permission from Khartoum to cross the border into Sudan and pursue the LRA,
and in October, authorities issued another displacement order, advising “all law-abiding
9 “Uganda Forcibly Displaces 200,000 to Counter Rebels” 1990 (6 March).
10 The SPLA and NRM signed an agreement in 1989, which committed Kampala to provide the SPLA with
equipment and training (Tripp 2010, 159).
11 Radio announcement from LC5 Chairman Col. Walter Ochora Odoch, Gulu District, Radio FM Gulu, 20
April 1996. Radio FM Archives (Gulu).
12 Amnesty International (1999) reported that “some UPDF units were already moving people out of
their homes a number of weeks before the top-level decision to create camps was communicated to
[parliament].”
13 Finnström 2008, 141.
14 “12 Die in UPDF Protected Villages” 1996 (30 October).
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citizens...in the abandoned villages of Gulu, Pader, and Kitgum districts [in Acholiland]
to vacate with immediate effect” and come to the IDP camps.15 Both international
organizations and local civil society groups responded by condemning the policy and
strongly criticizing the Ugandan government. Human Rights Watch, for example, issued
a report stating:
“The government remains responsible for many of the hardships and abuses
endured by the displaced population. Since 1996 the government has used the
army to undertake a massive forced displacement of the population in the north
and imposed severe restrictions on freedom of movement. While justifying the
displacements on grounds of security, the government has forcibly displaced people
without a lawful basis under international law and then has failed to provide the
promised security.”16
The report then called on the United Nations to “urge the Ugandan government
to act in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, particularly
with respect to camp security and freedom of movement for internally displaced
persons outside of displaced persons camps.”17 By 2006 – when the LRA and NRM
finally agreed to a ceasefire – some 1.8 million people, or 85 percent of the Acholi
population, resided in IDP camps, prompting the United Nations to call the situation
“the world’s most underreported humanitarian crisis.”18
The West: the ADF (1996–2002)
In 1996, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – an Islamist insurgency comprised
of various remnants of previous Ugandan rebellions – entered western Uganda from
bases in eastern Zaire (now the DRC). The rebels received military supplies and training
from both the Sudanese government and Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, who
perceived the ADF as a “counter-force” to joint efforts by Uganda and Rwanda to
overthrow Mobutu’s regime.19 The ADF operated in the rugged Rwenzori mountains
along the Uganda-DRC border, from which they launched frequent raids on police posts
and local villages in the western districts of Bundibugyo, Kabarole, and Kasese. Similar
to the LRA, the ADF resorted to brutal and indiscriminate attacks against civilians,
including mutilations and forced abductions, generating pervasive fear and insecurity
and eroding local civilian support.
Beginning in late 1996 and intensifying in 1997, the UPDF and local government
officials encouraged residents of the mountains to flee their villages to IDP camps
15 Human Rights Focus 2002, 23.
16 Moorehead and Rone 2005.
17 Moorehead and Rone 2005.
18 Moorehead and Rone 2005, 4,18.
19 Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012, 159.
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in nearby trading centers and to towns down in the valley. Like in the north, these
evacuations were enforced by the UPDF through coercive measures – resulting in the
displacement of some 200,000 people in 84 camps – and were sustained for years despite
reports that the camps lacked adequate services and supplies.20 In 1998, the UPDF
became embroiled in the conflict in the DRC, in part so it could dismantle the ADF’s
base of operations. After years of fighting, the UPDF eventually defeated the ADF in
2002, and civilians were allowed to return to their homes.
Overall Patterns of Displacement
Since the LRA rebellion lasted much longer than the UPA and ADF insurgencies
– and covered a much larger territory and population – the scale of displacement
in the north was far greater than in the west or the east. Figure 3.1 shows annual
conflict-induced displacement trends in Uganda, according to the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (IDMC). While some of the displaced crossed into the DRC or
Sudan and became refugees, a vast majority of people were uprooted within the
country. Not all displacement was the direct result of UPDF directives: according to
a report by Amnesty International, in the north “many people have moved to camps
‘spontaneously,’ fleeing from the LRA. Others feel that the authorities gave them no
choice about leaving...Yet others were physically forced by government soldiers.”21
However, the spikes in the number of IDPs in Figure 3.1 correspond to the
three major rounds of state-issued displacement orders in 1988, 1996-1997, and 2002.
Some IDPs were able to escape the conflict zones and seek sanctuary in Kampala or
other cities, but a vast majority of the displaced remained confined in the very areas
affected by violence.22 Under international law, forced displacement can be lawful where
“the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand.” In
such cases, all possible measures must be taken to provide civilians with satisfactory
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. This was clearly not done in Uganda. The
humanitarian consequences of these measures in the north, west, and east – which, as I
describe above, became apparent soon after they were enacted – deepens the puzzle of
why the Ugandan government repeatedly resorted to civilian displacement to combat
these rebellions.
20 African Rights Group 2001; Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012.
21 Amnesty International 1999.
22 See, for example, Whyte et al. (2012, 288).
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Figure 3.1: Internal Displacement in Uganda (1987–2008)
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
3.2 Methods and Data Sources
This case study relies on original data collected through six months of fieldwork
throughout Uganda in 2016 and 2017, including 230 in-depth interviews, 85 focus group
discussions, surveys, and archival research. In exploring the motivations and logics
underlying the government’s use of forced relocation, I focus on the LRA and ADF
conflicts. The UPA disbanded more than a decade before the LRA and ADF, which
made it difficult for me to locate individuals who could reliably recall the events in
question. There is also a paucity of primary and secondary source material on the UPA
rebellion, particularly compared to the detailed information available on the wars in
northern and western Uganda.
Interviews
Most existing research on forced displacement in Uganda – particularly during
the LRA war – is told from the perspectives of victims and observers. The perspective of
perpetrators is often lacking, and motivations for relocating civilians have been assumed
either from victims’ testimonies or from brief public comments made by high-level
officials. I therefore join other scholars who have relied on interviews with perpetrators
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to identify and evaluate the logic underlying wartime violence.23 Of course, there is a
risk to this approach. People’s accounts could suffer from retrospective bias, and it is
possible that motivations claimed by perpetrators are simply ex-post rationalizations. I
took several precautions to guard against these biases.
First, to identify and recruit respondents I relied on snowball sampling
using multiple points of insertion. In addition to going through formal channels
to access high-ranking government officials, I tapped into community networks
through my research assistants, other scholars and researchers, journalists, civil society
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Refugee Law Project
at Makerere University, where I served as an affiliate during my time in Uganda.
Utilizing a mix of formal and informal channels to generate referrals helped ensure
that I interviewed people with diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and experiences.
Potential biases are mitigated in part by the diversity of my respondents.24 Although
they are not representative, I conducted a total of 230 interviews, which included senior
state officials, military commanders, rank-and-file soldiers, members of civilian militias,
human rights activists, journalists, NGO officials, and local government, tribal, and
religious leaders. Many were men, though there were some women.
Second, in interviews I was never explicit about the topic of my study – only
that it was about the history of the war in each region, Ugandan counterinsurgency,
or military strategy. I told people that I was interested in speaking with current or
former officials, soldiers, and other participants and observers about their experiences
during these wars. The interviews were semi-structured. Their primary purpose was
to understand how displacement fit into the state’s repertoire of political and military
strategies, tactics, and practices; identify the benefits and costs of uprooting civilians;
and explore the circumstances on the ground leading up to the enactment of these
measures. I sought to explore the perspectives that gave rise to evacuation orders and
examine elite decision-making, threat perception, and the implementation process.
I refrained from asking directly about state-induced displacement; usually I would
ask about strategies and tactics, or how people being displaced affected fighting the
war, and it was common for subjects to broach the topic. If the subject did so, I asked
follow-up questions.25
Finally, I compared observations and accounts across interviewees to ensure
consistency. I also cross-checked the responses with other sources of data collected
during the conflicts in question – including news articles, human rights reports,
ethnographies, government records, and oral and written local histories. Some of
these sources include public records of government proceedings, such as minutes
from sessions of the Ugandan Parliament, and official correspondence between
government and military authorities, such as local security reports. I obtained these
23 See Wood (2003), Weinstein (2006), Stanton (2016), Cohen (2016), and Straus (2015, 2006).
24 See Appendix B for a list of interviewees.
25 All interviews were conducted with just me and, where necessary, a translator, though many
respondents – especially high-ranking officials – spoke fluent English.
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documents, along with old newspaper articles, internal government reports, and radio
transcripts, from archives in Entebbe, Kampala, Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Kabarole, Kasese,
and Bundibugyo.
Focus Groups and Surveys
While most of my in-depth interviewees were perpetrators of displacement
– including both military and government officials, along with other key observers –
I also sought to capture the perspectives and experiences of victims. Unfortunately,
fine-grained data on displacement and detailed maps of IDP camps in Uganda are only
available for the period 2003-2008. Local census data is intermittent and ultimately
unreliable. Given the sensitivities of this topic and the lack of a reliable sampling
frame, I therefore did not attempt to construct a representative sample of war-affected
communities. Rather, I sought to maximize the diversity of the respondent pool and
ensure broad geographical coverage.
With the assistance of a local research team, I selected a total of 42 sub-counties
in the 12 districts affected by insurgency in northern and western Uganda. We sought
to ensure broad coverage in terms of geography, location (urban vs. rural), population
size, severity of violence, and the extent of displacement. Once sub-counties were
selected, we randomly selected two parishes in each sub-county. Parishes were stratified
by population and distance from the sub-county headquarters. Once parishes were
selected, we visited local tribal and government officials to introduce ourselves and
obtain permission to conduct research, as is customary in Uganda. After receiving
permission, the research team used multiple sources – local council officials, youth
mobilizers, tribal leaders, and civil society groups – to identify and recruit potential
participants.26
We conducted two, and sometimes three, interview sessions in each parish.
For each session I sought to interview 8–10 people, although in practice the number
ranged from 9–12, with some growing up to 15 people. Participants were diverse in
terms of age, gender, background, and position in the local community. We relied on a
focus group format, asking open-ended questions concerning local conditions during
displacement; the local history of the war and displacement, including violence by both
rebels and government forces; the strength and popularity of local rebel groups, how
state-ordered displacements were carried out; and the circumstances on the ground
leading up to their implementation. We then conducted a survey with each participant,
using a structured questionnaire with close-ended questions, which provided an
opportunity for anonymous responses and allowed us to triangulate answers to specific
questions.
There are, admittedly, potential issues regarding respondents’ memories. But
due to the lack of reliable, detailed records of state-induced displacement, these oral
26 We wanted to avoid having local authorities handpick our respondents.
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Figure 3.2: Map of Field Research Sites in Uganda
testimonies provide an essential wellspring of information. Moreover, triangulating
responses in focus groups and surveys with other primary and secondary sources on
war and displacement in Uganda helped mitigate potential measurement problems and
increase the validity of my inferences.27 In total, 85 focus group discussions were held,
and 1,247 respondents were surveyed across 42 sub-counties (26 in the north, and 16
in the west). Figure 3.2 depicts the locations of the field sites, and Appendix C lists the
name of each sub-county. In order to protect respondents’ privacy, I do not provide the
names of the specific parishes where research was conducted.
Using this data, I examine a series of observable implications of my assortative
theory of strategic displacement. These implications largely correspond to the
hypotheses specified in the previous chapter. The first two provide necessary but not
sufficient evidence for the argument, since they are also plausibly consistent with other
logics that emphasize identification and information problems; hence they amount to
27 See Stoker, “Triangulation” in Badie et al. (2011).
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“hoop tests” for my claims.28 I therefore focus the case study on the third, fourth, and
fifth implications, which are more unique to my theory.
3.3 Evidence for the Assortative Logic of Displacement
Adui yuk wadi? [Where are the rebels?]
The first observable implication of my argument (H1a) is that relocation should
be used against rebel groups that employ guerrilla tactics and create identification
problems for state forces. In northern Uganda, the NRM refrained from uprooting
civilians during its campaigns against the LRA’s predecessors – the UPDA and HSM
– even though these groups possessed more fighters and posed a greater existential
threat to the regime than Kony’s rebels. The UPDA, for example, “controlled extensive
portions of the countryside”29 while the LRA “failed to win victories or hold territory.”30
Yet both the UPDA and HSM largely engaged in conventional warfare, confronting
the Ugandan army in direct combat while donning uniforms or religious symbols that
made combatants easily identifiable.31 For example, Lakwena’s instructions for her HSM
soldiers included “never taking cover against enemy fire, but marching straight toward
the enemy.”32
Breaking with its predecessors, the LRA utilized evasive methods, hiding deep
in the bush or within local villages to avoid detection by state forces. According to
Lawrence Cline, LRA fighters “rarely engaged in direct battles with the UPDF” and
“developed proficiency in avoiding governmental forces.”33 Both the ADF and UPA
relied on similar guerrilla tactics. As a result, according to interviews and focus groups,
identifying insurgents became the primary challenge for Ugandan forces fighting these
rebellions. In 1988, a reporter for Uganda’s New Vision newspaper quoted a senior
military official in the north lamenting that “soldiers can’t identify who is and who
is not [a rebel] and are therefore in a difficult situation.”34 Another official explained
“we would fly over villages and see wanainchi [ordinary citizens]...but when we got
information from the ground...we found they are the enemy.”35 As one Acholi woman
noted, “it was so difficult for [the UPDF] to differentiate between the rebels and the
civilians when people [were] all mixed up in the villages.”36 Similarly, a UPDF veteran
28 Bennett and Checkel 2012.
29 Gersony 1997, 26.
30 Branch 2011, 75.
31 See Behrend (2000, 56-62, 67) and Behrend (1998, 113): “the [HSM] did not fight a guerrilla war, but a
more or less conventional war.”
32 Gersony 1997, 27.
33 Cline 2013, 32, 34.
34 Lamwaka 2016, 163.
35 Lamwaka 2016, 216.
36 Focus group respondent, Amuru District, Uganda, November 2016.
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of the ADF war described in an interview that “the rebels had no uniforms; they would
just put on civilian clothes. So differentiating between civilians and rebels was very
difficult.”37 In the east, the southern-dominated Ugandan army faced a linguistic
barrier while combating the UPA insurgency; one that it would eventually remedy by
nationalizing its recruitment efforts in subsequent years:
“Whenever the [NRM] troops went on patrol, they would ask people: ‘Adui yuko
wadi’? in Kiswahili, meaning ‘Where are the rebels?’ Most of the soldiers did not
speak Ateso. So they would ask questions in Kiswahili, which unfortunately most
villagers did not understand.”38
Since rebels and civilians were intermixed in the villages, uprooting village
residents provided a way to unmix them. This can account for why Ugandan
counterinsurgents employed forced relocation against the LRA, ADF, and UPA, but
not against other rebel groups, despite variation in the size, popularity, and external
sponsorship of these groups (see Table 3.1). The “negative cases” of forced relocation
include the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebellion, which took up arms against the
NRM in 1996 in northwest Uganda. According to two senior military officials who I
interviewed, the use of IDP camps against the WNBF was not considered because the
group relied on “more conventional tactics” and as a result, the army “knew more or
less who they were.”39 It was only when the WNBF splintered and one of its factions,
the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), adopted guerilla tactics that the military
considered introducing a system of “protected villages” in the northwest region of West
Nile.40
Moreover, in 2003, during the late stage of the LRA conflict, the rebels expanded
their activities eastward to Teso. While the UPDF continued to herd civilians into
IDP camps in the Acholi and neighboring Lango regions, there were few reports of
state-induced displacement in the east.41 The Teso region, however, happened to be the
one area that precluded the effective use of guerrilla maneuvers by the LRA. Unlike
the UPA, whose members were native sons of Teso, the mostly Acholi fighters of the
LRA were outsiders who struggled to blend in with locals. As described in one study of
the LRA war, “unlike in Acholiland...[counterinsurgents] did not face an identification
problem in Teso. The rebels had no command of Ateso, the local language, which
37 Interviewee 171, UPDF intelligence officer, Kasese District, April 2017.
38 Epelu-Opio 2009, 73.
39 Interviewee 2, male military general and deputy prime minister, November 2016; Interviewee 53, male
ex-UPDF Chief of Defense Forces, October 2016. According to Refugee Law Project (2014, 122), “attacks
by the WNBF were primarily aimed at the UPDF, and as such the number of victims among the general
population was generally small.”
40 Awekofua, 1997 (12 August). It appears that the system was never actually implemented in West
Nile, likely because the UNRF staged relatively few attacks and posed a very minor threat to both the
government and the civilian population.
41 Though many civilians did spontaneously flee rebel attacks and military battles.
CHAPTER 3. UGANDA 79
Table 3.1: Insurgencies in Uganda (1986–2006)





HSM (1986-87) Acholi (N) 6,000-10,000 Conventional High Low No
UPDA (1986-88) Acholi (N) 5,000-15,000 Conventional Medium Medium No
UPA (1988-92) Teso (E) 1,000-2,000 Guerrilla Medium Medium Yes
LRA (1988-06) Acholi/Lango (N) 3,000-4,000 Guerrilla Low High Yes
WNBF (1996-98) West Nile (NW) 1,000-2,000 Conventional Low Medium No
UNRF (1997-02) West Nile (NW) 2,000-3,000 Guerrilla Low Medium Proposed
ADF (1996-02) Rwenzori (W) 1,500-2,000 Guerrilla Low High Yes
implies that they could not intermingle with the population as they were used to in
Acholiland.”42
A second implication of the assortative argument (H1b) is that forced relocation
should target rural, peripheral areas inhabited by remote and obscure populations.
The Acholi and Teso regions covered a vast hinterland with highly dispersed villages.
Likewise, the ADF operated in the “difficult forested mountain terrain” of the
Rwenzoris along Uganda’s border with the DRC.43 Interviews revealed that the army’s
inability or unwillingness to occupy these frontiers and reach their scattered inhabitants
helped motivate its civilian relocation campaigns. According to one UPDF officer, “just
delivering information to people when they were scattered in villages was not easy.
Roads were few. When we went places, we walked.”44 Villagers lacked radios and
phones, and even if they spotted a rebel, “they had no way to communicate this to the
army or government unless they come by foot.”45
In each conflict, displacement orders were broadly applied and eventually
covered all rebel-affected districts in the regions of Acholi (Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader),
Lango (Lira), Teso (Kumi and Soroti) and Rwenzori (Bundibugyo, Kabarole, and
Kasese).46 The UPDF targeted the most rural villages first and told occupants to
42 Castelein 2008, 63.
43 “ADF Abducts 365 Inmates” 1999 (10 December).
44 Interviewee 59, male UPDF commander, November 2016.
45 Interviewee 57, male former senior UPDF commander, November 2016. In a public speech in 1987,
Museveni also acknowledged that “it is not easy to follow bandits in a very open area like the northern
region, because soldiers walk and they get tired”(Yoweri Museveni, “President’s address to the nation
on the 25th anniversary of Uganda independence,” 9 October 1987, Centre for Basic Research Archives,
Kampala).
46 As CSOPNU (2004, 7) reported in the north, the government’s forced displacements “were blanket
orders with no clearly communicated attempt made to minimize scale or impact of the process.”
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move to trading centers, sub-county headquarters, and towns.47 For instance, in the
west, according to one local activist, “it was a military strategy to have people in the
camps...all those on the mountain were ordered to leave and come down.”48 In some
instances, people had already fled their homes spontaneously to seek refuge in these
locations before they were designated IDP camps.
Not everyone complied with the military’s directives, however. One study of
displacement in the north found that some people who were ordered to relocate “opted
to remain in their villages and ‘play a game of hide and seek with the rebels.’”49 Even
those who fled were not necessarily willing to remain in the IDP camps. According to
Adam Branch, “many displaced people preferred the relative safety and security of their
homes and were leaving the ‘protected villages’ spontaneously, willing to stand up to
the threat of government violence in their villages.”50 For the Acholi, land equates not
only to livelihood, but also to history, heritage, belonging, rights, and relationships;
being uprooted therefore threatened to “erode the very roots of Acholi culture.”51 In
some instances, the UPDF shelled villages after the evacuation orders, and over time
many residents – though not all – fled to the camps, at least temporarily.52
Spatial Profiling
A third observable implication – which pertains to how displacement can
help overcome the problem of rebel identification – is that people should be treated
differently based on their movements and physical locations, not just their ethnic
identities and political affiliations. The LRA, UPA, and ADF shared similar tactics and
aims. The LRA and UPA, however, were “sons of the soil” insurgencies that claimed to
fight for specific ethnic groups (the Acholi and Iteso), while the ADF was a multi-ethnic
religious rebellion. Yet in all three conflicts, after government forces ordered people to
IDP camps, it was geography, not ethnicity or religion, that became the key delineator of
those with potential insurgent ties.
It is important to note here that the IDP camps were located within contested
territories, mere miles from evacuated villages. For example, according to the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, most people in Acholiland were displaced “only a few
kilometers” from their homes.53 Forced relocation did not, therefore, simply remove
people from the conflict zone. Yet people in the north “who remained in the villages
47 For example, the 1996 radio announcement in Gulu stated that “people from Kilak County can go to
Pabbo, Atiak, Amuru and Awer centers, while people of Omoro can to go to Lalogi, Bobi, Palenga, Opit
and Odek trading centers” (Radio announcement from LC5 Chairman Col. Walter Ochora Odoch, Gulu
District, Radio FM Gulu, 20 April 1996. Radio FM Archives (Gulu).)
48 Interviewee 164, male human rights activist, Kasese District, February 2016.
49 Omach 2002.
50 Branch 2011, 93-94.
51 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 39.
52 Dolan 2013, 110.
53 IDMC 2005, 163.
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would be considered rebels or rebel sympathizers.”54 Similar reports followed forced
relocation in Teso during the UPA war, where “those found outside the [displacement]
camps were assumed to be hostile to the government and were shot dead on sight.”55
And in the west, the Refugee Law Project found that “anyone who remained [in the
villages] was assumed to be a [rebel] sympathizer, and moving to the camps became
proof of not being an informer or collaborator.”56 Indeed, a local government official in
Kasese confirmed to me in an interview that people discovered by Ugandan forces in the
evacuated mountains “were considered rebels and so would be attacked instantly.”57 In
focus groups, members of targeted communities reported that the longer people took to
move to the camps, the more they were treated with suspicion once they did relocate. A
government minister confirmed this in an interview, telling me that “people [who] did
not come until later, we were suspicious of them. Why did you stay behind for so long, if
you really were a [good] person?”58
Therefore, in orchestrating displacement, as one former IDP explained to me,
“the government wanted to know which side civilians were on.”59 According to another
victim I spoke to, instead of pursuing rebels deep into the bush, the army tried “to sort
out who is a rebel among the civilian population.”60 Dispatches from the ground during
displacement seem to confirm this logic. Uprooted villagers in Acholiland reported
to journalists “that the army had told them to choose between staying with the rebels
in the villages or coming to town.”61 A local official in Kitgum District echoed this
sentiment, explaining to me in an interview that people “had to make their own choice.
But when everyone was in the camp and you are alone [the UPDF] would ask what you
are still doing in the villages. Could you be planted [by the LRA] as an informant?”62
Displacement, in effect, forced people to choose sides. Whether or not
individuals complied did not necessarily reflect their true political allegiances. But
war had, according to one report on the north, “created an environment in which
there is little neutral territory, and in which the actions of civilians are constantly
misinterpreted.”63 Thus as the government enacted its relocation policies, it became
increasingly clear to one civil society group that the “distinction between combatants
and civilians no longer depends on whether or not you are actively engaged in armed
conflict, but on your geographical location.”64 An activist from the Rwenzori region
recounted the consequences to me:
54 Lamwaka 2016, 206.
55 De Berry 2004, 72.
56 Hovil 2003, 6.
57 Interviewee 136, Male LC1 and former LDU political commissar, Kasese District, April 2017.
58 Interviewee 1, female ex-Minister of Northern Uganda, October 2016.
59 Focus group respondent, Ntororo District, Uganda, May 2017.
60 Focus group respondent, Amuru District, Uganda, February 2016
61 Lamwaka 2016, 207.
62 Interviewee 28, female local council official, May 2017.
63 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 50.
64 CSOPNU 2004, 80-81.
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“As long as a community was in the vulnerable area that the ADF could access,
people were ordered to move [to IDP camps]. People [who did not] would be
accused of being rebels or collaborators. There were two people I knew – one an
older woman – who were killed by the government because they refused to leave.
Soldiers found them in their compounds, and said ‘these people are associates’ [of
the rebels], so they were killed.” 65
In interviews, UPDF commanders and rank-and-file soldiers alike consistently
emphasized that relocating the population made it easier to differentiate friend
from enemy simply based on where one was. The similarities in the responses of my
interviewees, which included veterans of military campaigns in both northern and
western Uganda, was striking:
“The good people were in the camps. Anyone found out of the camp was seen as a
rebel or collaborator automatically.”66
“When we found a person outside the camp, there was no need even asking if he
was a civilian because civilians were warned to stay inside camps. The only thing to
do was to put that person out of action.”67
“Identifying who is a rebel and who is a civilian became very easy [in the camps].
But before, when people were scattered and the rebels were mixed with civilians, it
was difficult to know who to shoot and who not to shoot.”68
“Some people did not want [to go to the] camp...But anybody who resisted was
labeled a collaborator. This made it easier to know who was a rebel and who was
not. The moment we declared it a war zone, all of you come. You had no chance if
you remain. You are labeled [a rebel] immediately.”69
A town chairman and UPDF veteran of the ADF war in Kasese District was kind
enough to sketch out for me the logic underlying the government’s forced relocation
policy. The sketch is shown in Figure 3.3. In it, the chairman drew a demarcation line
that separated the scattered homesteads of the Rwenzoris – which became territory
presumably occupied only by ADF fighters and supporters – from the valley, where
seemingly innocent civilians had congregated in camps. Circling the area above the
demarcation line, the chairman explained that “since all people had been evacuated,
65 Interviewee 163, Male human rights activist, Kasese District, April 2017.
66 Interviewee 105, male UPDF veteran, May 30, 2017.
67 Interviewee 63, male ex-auxiliary commander, November 2016.
68 Interviewee 7, male internal security officer, April 2017.
69 Interviewee 173, former vigilante, Kasese District, April 2017.
CHAPTER 3. UGANDA 83
whoever was found there would be attacked as a rebel without question unless [he]
surrenders.”70
Figure 3.3: Sketched Logic of IDP Policy
Note: Sketch by Interviewee 172, town chairman and
UPDF veteran, Kasese, Uganda, April 2017.
Civilian observers also noted that, as one man told me in Lira, “it was
impossible to differentiate between who is a rebel and who is a civilian” and thus
“the camps were very important [because] anybody who is now found in the bush
is assumed to be a rebel.”71 Indeed, after they issued the order to relocate, the UPDF
treated any activity in rural villages, unless sanctioned by authorities, as rebel activity.
One former IDP camp leader in Bundibugyo told me “since civilians were ordered to
go to IDP camps, if you saw smoke from a fire, you knew it was a rebel because you
would not expect people to be in those areas.”72 As a result, according to a sub-county
70 Interviewee 172, Town chairman and UPDF veteran, Kasese District, April 2017.
71 Interviewee 44, male former UPA fighter, Lira District, April 2017.
72 Interviewee 130, male ex-IDP camp leader, Bungibugyo District, May 2017.
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official, “the army was free to shoot anyone found in the evacuated areas.”73 This
was validated by a former government fighter: “whoever we saw we just shot unless
that person surrendered.”74 Human rights monitors confirmed that civilians caught
outside the camps were often victimized by the Ugandan military,75 and a UPDF veteran
acknowledged in an interview that “some people [outside the camps] were mistaken to
be rebels and killed.”76
Such casualties were often a direct consequence of the fact that Ugandan forces
routinely drew a link between civilians’ movements and support for insurgents. As
one UPDF officer who fought the LRA recounted to me, “when the conflict began,
civilians began cooperating with the rebels, but then later, the civilians came to our side
by coming to the IDP camps” [emphasis added].77 Those who failed to move were thus
considered guilty by location. Civil society groups in the north reported that UPDF
officers “indicated that if a civilian is seen cultivating crops outside the [camp] zone that
it will automatically be assumed that they are growing food specifically for the rebels.”78
The risks associated with remaining behind provided credible grounds for suspicion,
according to a government official: “in those [evacuated] areas, you are only supposed
to [see] rebels or UPDF. What would you be doing there, if you really were innocent?”79
It is therefore clear that counterinsurgents made inferences about people’s
identities and loyalties based on their (im)mobility. While many civilians eventually
complied with orders to move, even in the IDP camps, authorities tracked their
movements, and those who disappeared without permission became suspects. Due to
inadequate food in many camps, curfews were imposed allowing occupants to return
and cultivate their fields during set days and times, sometimes with military escorts.
According to one former commander, once people went to cultivate, “if they wanted to
join the rebels, it would have been impossible to stop.”80 The curfews, then, amounted
to more than just tools of control; they provided temporal markers of differentiation
between rebel and civilian activity, just as the camps provided spatial ones. Thus
leaving camps outside designated hours was considered risky and sent a costly signal
of potential rebel affiliation:
“People knew that moving outside the camp was a risk. Why should someone you
are trying to protect sneak and move out? What makes him move out so frequently?
73 Interviewee 150, male local council official, Kasese District, April 2017.
74 Interviewee 195, male ex-homeguard, Kasese District, May 2017.
75 Moorehead and Rone 2005.
76 Interviewee 77, male UPDF veteran, April 2017. In an ethnography on the LRA war, Dolan (2013,
111,146) also describes multiple incidents where men and women strayed from the camps and were
shot by soldiers.
77 Interviewee 91, male UPDF officer, April 2017.
78 CSOPNU 2004, 79.
79 Interviewee 1, female ex-Minister of Northern Uganda, October 2016.
80 Interviewee 57, male former senior UPDF commander, November 2016.
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This was the basis for following people’s movements, so we could identify exactly
who they are.”81
Mapping the Frontiers
Concentrating the population therefore enabled the government to impose
“legibility” on insurgent-affected communities, as congestion and lack of privacy were
critical features of the IDP camps. State authorities estimated that the average IDP camp
covered just 2.5 square kilometers (one square mile) and contained 15,000 people.82 For
example, in one of the largest camps, Pabbo, “there were 42,000 people from over 120
villages, settled into eight zones of 2 square kilometers...Huts were tightly packed, often
with little more than one meter between each.”83 Figure shows an image of settlement
patterns in Palaro sub-county in northern Uganda based on satellite data. The change in
residence locations between 1969, well before the LRA war, and 2003, around the height
of the insurgency, illustrates the extent of population concentration in the area due to
displacement during the conflict.
Figure 3.4: Settlement Patterns in Northern Uganda
Source: Joireman et al. 2012
In these compact settlements, occupants could monitor each other and rapidly
report suspicious activities to the government, which found plenty of idle civilians
to serve as operatives for its Popular Intelligence Network (PIN). As Janet Lewis has
shown, since the NRM took power in 1986, it has depended heavily on a deep network
81 Interview with UPDF 4th Division Commander, Gulu District, November 2016.
82 Salim Saleh, Concept: Security and Production Programme (SPP) (Kampala: May 2003): p. 6. The author
thanks Sverker Finnström for sharing these materials.
83 Dolan 2013, 113.
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of informants to suppress and combat rebellions throughout the country.84 One parish
official told me that before encampment, “the villages were so far apart so it was really
difficult to bring information to the UPDF...when we gather[ed] in the IDP camps
collecting information became much easier.”85 A security officer in Kitgum explained
the government’s approach:
“We have informants, we recruit them. And they come to us quietly, usually in the
night, and give us intelligence. This was a time [during the war] when phones were
very few.”86
In addition to the presence of PIN informants among the camp population,
each settlement possessed a hierarchy of civilian leaders who were “incorporated as
surveillance tools” by staffing a “myriad of committees dedicated to the collection of
information.”87 As one local official described to me, “the camp leaders would monitor
people’s behaviors in the camps and report anyone suspicious to the army.”88 In short,
encampment centralized and streamlined intelligence collection and dissemination.
Camp leaders also registered all camp inhabitants, many of whom had previously
resided in areas largely outside the reach of the state.89 Interviews confirmed that
registration lists were used to plan food distributions but also to identify suspected
rebels and collaborators. IDPs were often given cards or letters that identified them as
residents of the camps – documents of belonging many lacked when they lived in their
villages (see Figure 3.5 for an example). Camp leaders would also conduct regular roll
calls of residents to identify the missing, another tool for detecting guilt on the basis of
location:
“There were no secrets in this world [in the camp]. You cannot do something today
without it being known tomorrow. When everybody is together and registered, if
someone disappears for four days, people will know. If someone sneaked into the
camp, it would be easy to identify him. Everyone would see there is this strange
person there.”90
“IDP camps had one advantage: people were concentrated together, they talked,
they had no privacy. So you could easily know, who moves out of the camp at night?
Who comes back late?”91
84 Lewis 2014.
85 Interviewee 30, male LC 1, Amuru District, May 2017.
86 Interviewee 5, Internal Security Officer, Kitgum Municipality, April 2017.
87 Branch 2011, 102.
88 Interviewee 19, female LCI, Lira District, April 2017.
89 Finnström (2008) also notes that people in IDP camps were registered and observed in various ways by
the government, army, and aid agencies.
90 Interviewee 5, male government security officer, April 2017.
91 Interviewee 3, male ex-UPDF Chief of Military Intelligence, November 2016.
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Figure 3.5: IDP Camp Identification Letter
Note: Obtained by author in Gulu District.
That these arrangements were motivated by a desire to enhance the legibility
of the local population was further evidenced in efforts by the government to make
displacement permanent. In 1999 and 2003, Salim Saleh, Museveni’s half-brother and
the former head of UPDF operations in Gulu, oversaw the development of proposals
to transform the IDP camps in northern Uganda into militarized farms called Security
and Production Units (SPUs). Each SPU would contain 2,500 households guarded
by 736 civil defense personnel, and cover 800,000 IDPs in the north.92 By formalizing
the displacement camps, the stated benefits of the SPUs included increased food
production, better planning and provision of social services, and making it “easy to
detect strangers and suspicious elements in the settlement.”93 In 2005, the World Bank
considered a similar government proposal to develop some of the larger IDP camps
in Acholiland into urban centers.94 As with Saleh’s plan, local community leaders
dismissed the proposal and accused authorities of scheming to seize depopulated land.
92 Saleh, SPP (2003): p. 10.
93 Saleh, 2003, p. 4.
94 Whyte et al. 2012.
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Yet even after the LRA was pushed out of Uganda, many IDPs remained in or near
displacement camps due to the services and business opportunities they provided, and
some camps became small towns.95 Likewise, in the west, as one former camp leader
explained:
“Most of the trading centers you see in Bundibugyo today, they are results of IDP
camps. Because some of the people had to put up different shops in camps, and they
started constructing, so they could be able to work and make money. And so some
of those people stayed, and those areas where there were camps are now booming as
towns.”96
These consequences may not have been fully intended by Ugandan authorities.
But they reflect the broader state-building logic underlying the government’s forced
relocation policies. Indeed, as scholars have observed in other conflicts,97 population
displacement in Uganda was more than an expedient counterinsurgency tactic; it served
as an instrument for transforming restive territories and populations into better ordered
and more easily exploitable spaces.98
Flight, then Fight
A fourth implication of my assortative theory is that displacement should
facilitate the extraction of recruits and labor from the local population. In Uganda,
the state’s relocation policies were inextricably linked to its broader efforts to
instrumentalize civilians for the war effort. According to one UPDF general, a core
aspect of the NRM’s approach to combating insecurity has been “to organize the local
population for defense.”99 This doctrine stems from the NRM’s origins as a rebel army
that embraced a Maoist strategy of “total people’s war” and depended on the active
participation of civilians to successfully topple the regime of Milton Obote.100 After
taking power, the NRM continued to promote the idea of people’s war and emphasize,
in the words of one Ugandan legislator, “the fact that the civilian population has got a
95 Whyte et al. (2012). In a study of resettlement patterns in the north, Joireman et al. (2012) found that
people were living closer together than they had previously, and observed “the establishment of homes
closer to major roads” in areas most affected by violence and displacement.
96 Interviewee 130, Male, IDP camp leader, Bundibugyo District, May 2017.
97 Scott 1998; Ahram 2015; Van Etten et al. 2008; Peluso and Vandergeest 2011.
98 In other words, displacement coupled security imperatives with development ones. This is suggested in
Caroline Lamwaka’s reporting on the LRA war, when she recounts flying over Acholiland with Salim
Saleh early in the conflict: “From high above the landscape and vegetation, we could see that large
portions of these areas were devoid of population or any kind of settlement activities...Now and then,
we could see some homesteads, but there were no people...‘What do you think of this unpopulated
place?’ Saleh asked. ‘Couldn’t it be utilized for growing cash crops and ranching to improve our
economy, being such a fertile area?’ We agreed that it could” (Lamwaka 2016, 162).
99 Interviewee 52, male UPDF General, October 2016.
100 Bell 2016.
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role to play in ending insurgency in this country.”101 As a former UPDF commander
told me, “our focus was to equip the people to liberate themselves...because when he
[Museveni] was an insurgent, he used that [method] of using civilians...so you should
make people own their war and fight.”102 Civilians were therefore seen not as innocent
bystanders or mere constituents needed to be won over, but as tactical assets that could
be actively utilized to wage counterinsurgency.
As a result, in 1988 the government began recruiting, training, and equipping
Local Defense Units (LDUs) to secure rural areas and fend off rebel threats throughout
the country. According to journalist Caroline Lamwaka, “it was not unusual for the
[NRM] to entrust local security entirely to LDU forces.”103 But mobilizing these units
could prove difficult since tribal and religious leaders resisted the militarization of their
communities, due to concerns that LDUs were not properly equipped and could use
their weapons to commit robbery and other crimes.104 Village life also complicated
recruitment and oversight. As one former LDU commander explained, “when people
were in their villages, young people would run and hide in the bush because they
were busy with work or afraid to join the military.”105 After the LRA escalated attacks
in northern Uganda in 1995, the army attempted to dispatch LDUs only to discover
that many had deserted and returned to their villages, which commanders had
deliberately not reported so they could steal their salaries.106 Yet countering the evasive
guerrilla tactics employed by groups like the LRA and the ADF required considerable
manpower. According to members of the Ugandan parliament, the army needed “a
labor intensive strategy rather than a capital intensive strategy. You will not need tanks,
rocket launchers, or helicopters to pursue five or ten [rebels]...All we need is popular
vigilance.”107 But as Saleh wrote in his proposal to make displacement permanent,
ensuring “collective civil defense...becomes faster because of quicker mobilization of
the population” when people are “living in one community. Defending organized
settlements is also easy because it is simple to apportion responsibility of securing
specific areas by specific people.”108
Thus forming the IDP camps helped the UPDF replenish and augment its forces
by aiding the recruitment of LDUs and volunteer fighters known as Homeguards and
101 Hansard [Uganda] 23 September 2003 (M. Amuriat), “Security Situation in the Country”: 7688.
102 Interviewee 179, male UPDF platoon commander, May 2017.
103 Lamwaka 2016, 123.
104 Interviewee 42, male Acholi religious leader, March 2017.
105 Interviewee 66, ex-LDU Commander, November 2016.
106 This was part of a much larger “ghost soldier” corruption scandal that plagued the UPDF in the 1990s
and early 2000s. For example, the government’s inspector general estimated that from 1996-1997,
hundreds of thousands of dollars was stolen from the military’s anti-LRA operational budget each
month. See Espeland and Petersen (2010).
107 Hansard [Uganda] 5th Sept 2000: 10559.
108 Saleh, 2003, p. 4. He also wrote that the SPUs were aimed at “reducing the workload of the UPDF” by
“beefing up local defense using community youth volunteers who are recruited and trained specifically
to secure the production areas in which they live” (Saleh, 2003, p. 1.)
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Vigilantes. For example, local leaders in Labuje IDP camp, Gulu District, reported to
an NGO “that the UPDF is training and arming members of the IDP camp...in order
to create a local militia to improve security.”109 In a separate meeting with district
authorities, an IDP camp leader from Opit demanded “to know why [recruitment into
the army] is still going on in the camps.”110 These were not isolated incidents. While
official figures are not available, human rights reports suggest that recruitment of
auxiliary forces in IDP camps was pervasive.111 In my survey of LRA- and ADF-affected
communities, 55 percent of respondents reported that they or someone in their
household were recruited in the IDP camps (see Table 3.2). Moreover, 71 percent
of respondents reported that recruitment of LDUs, Homeguards, and Vigilantes
“increased” or became more prevalent after their communities were forcibly relocated,
19 percent reported that recruitment “decreased” or became less prevalent, while 10
percent reported that recruitment levels stayed the same as when people still lived in
their villages.
Table 3.2: Survey Responses of Members of War-Affected Communities
Were you or anyone from your household recruited into LDUs, vigilantes,
or homeguards while you were in IDP camps?
Yes No Total
Northern Respondents 434 (60%) 292 (40%) 726 (58%)
Western Respondents 255 (49%) 266 (51%) 521 (42%)
Total Respondents 689 (55%) 558 (45%) 1,247 (100%)
After people moved into IDP camps, did you perceive that recruitment into
LDUs increased, decreased, or stayed the same, compared to in the villages?
Increased Decreased The Same Total
Northern Respondents 485 (67%) 148 (20%) 93 (13%) 726 (58%)
Western Respondents 423 (81%) 69 (13%) 29 (6%) 521 (42%)
Total Respondents 908 (73%) 217 (17%) 122 (10%) 1,247 (100%)
Registering camp residents allowed authorities to identify potential recruits.
109 Emry, 2004 (July), 13. An army commander reportedly told residents that “there [is a] need to mobilize
the youth to join the militia.”
110 Stephen Ogik, Camp Leader, Opit IDP Camp, Kacoke Madit 2000, “Meeting the Challenges of Building
Sustainable Peace in Northern Uganda,” 24 November 2000, Nairobi, Kenya.)
111 Moorehead and Rone 2005; Muggah 2006.
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According to one UPDF officer, “we knew the number of people staying in each camp,
so if we want to look for people to help us fight, we had information about how many
able-bodied men, and their ages.”112 Camp authorities would provide introduction
letters for potential recruits to avoid including rebels or collaborators in the militias.113
In interviews, military officials and other observers consistently emphasized how
displacement helped the government “mobilize” the population:114
“Before IDP camps people had a lot of work [in the fields] that fully engaged them
and met their daily needs. But in the camp such work was not there, so joining the
LDUs or home guards was the only alternative.”115
“It was considered an advantage to be recruited. When people were living in their
villages, the army had to force people to mobilize by threatening them. But once
they came to the camps, LDUs started attaining some form of power over the people
they guarded, so people started to see it as a privilege.”116
“The LDUs in the villages were unreliable. But the LDUs in camps were more
reliable, because they were more dependent on the government, and we had
constant interaction with them. So it was much easier to recruit and mobilize people
in the camps.”117
“Congregating people into camps meant their agency was diminished. You have
nothing to do. You have nothing to sell. You are living a redundant life. So if we
[UPDF] are looking for homeguards, you should volunteer so you have a weapon,
training, and a salary.”118
Former militia members acknowledged that the conditions that characterized
the IDP camps – “dependency, idleness, and debilitating uncertainty” – encouraged
people to enlist.119 One ex-LDU told me that “many were inspired [to join] by the
112 Interviewee 55, male UPDF public relations officer, October 2016.
113 Interviewee 14, former IDP Camp leader, Lira District, April 2017.
114 Government ministers echoed this sentiment, with one declaring to parliament in 2004 that “the people
are easy to mobilize, they are already available in the camps” (Hansard [Uganda] 6 July 2004: 9873).
115 Interviewee 59, male UPDF commander, November 10, 2016. Another UPDF officer reported that
“recruiting LDUs was not easy [outside the camps]. Why? Because our settlement pattern in the
northern region is scattered everywhere. And it would have given us a very difficult time in mobilizing
them. Because even delivering information to the population when they were still scattered in the
village was not very easy” (Interviewee 58, male UPDF intelligence officer, November 2016.)
116 Interviewee 163, male human rights activist, April 2017.
117 Interviewee 90, male UPDF public relations officer, 5th Division, April 2017.
118 Interviewee 48, UPDF colonel, November 2016.
119 Weeks 2002, 4. In his ethnography on the war in northern Uganda, Sverker Finnström described the
appeal of joining the militias, particularly for young people: “Instead of a life of uncertainty and
idleness in displacement camps, where primary schooling is in adequate if it functions at all, recruits
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suffering within the camps: little food, no work, the rebels would come and attack. So
of course we decided to defend our families.”120 Another man remarked: “there was
no digging [for crops], and as a man it was common to just sit redundantly so most
men started to join [the LDUs].”121 Yet another recruit cited the same motivations,
and observed that recruitment was also made easier because “the government was
able to find everyone in one place.”122 According to a local journalist who reported
on the LRA war, when people were displaced, “they had the anger, the purpose, for
joining...And they had to make sure that these people were defeated. And that is why
they volunteered to participate in the war.”123 In his ethnographic research, Dolan
found a similar link “between individuals’ frustrated aspirations and decisions to join
armed groups.”124 This reportedly included children as young as ten years old.125 The
displaced were eager to return to their villages, and as one tribal leader explained, “the
message from the government was if they don’t volunteer to help fight the rebels, they
would not be able to go back home.”126
These auxiliary forces helped protect displaced communities, deployed with the
UPDF on patrol, and even supplemented its forces in the DRC and other places where
Uganda was engaged in active military operations.127 The army increasingly relied on
what it called “integrated security,” with units comprised of a combination of enlisted
soldiers, LDUs, and other volunteers. IDPs unable or unwilling to fight were often made
to serve as scouts, porters, or to cut brush around camps to help the UPDF spot rebel
incursions.128 In the west, as the UPDF established temporary detaches in the Rwenzoris
to combat the ADF, IDPs became a key link in the military’s supply chain, ferrying food
and ammunition from the valley up the mountain. In my survey of formerly displaced
communities, 72 percent of respondents reported being subjected to forced labor at least
once while living in the IDP camps; 61 percent reported it happening more than once
(Table 3.3).
into local defense groups are offered a uniform, a weapon, and a small salary” (Finnström 2008, 91).
120 Interviewee 111, male ex-LDU, Lira District, April 2017.
121 Focus group respondent, Kitgum District, Uganda, April 2017.
122 Interviewee 143, male LC1 and ex-homeguard, Kasese District, May 2017.
123 Interviewee 45, male journalist, April 2017.
124 Dolan 2013, 210-11.
125 According to a report from the Ugandan parliament, “the appalling situation in the IDP camps
contribute to conditional recruitment of children in the Army because it is seen to be the most and
only viable source of employment” (Hansard [Uganda] 19 April 2007, “Report on Children in Northern
Uganda”: 2220).
126 Interviewee 132, male tribal leader, May 2017. Another former IDP described volunteering for LDUs
as “a commitment by civilians to...show that they wanted to be back in their villages” (Focus group
respondent, Bundibugyo District, May 2017).
127 UPDF commanders would, according to multiple interviewees and reports, informally deploy auxiliary
force members to Congo and Sudan.
128 In the north, as one woman explained, “when soldiers saw that grasses were growing tall and could
be used to hide the rebels, they forced us to cut the grass near camps and near roads” (Focus group
participant, Amuru District, Uganda, February 2016).
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Table 3.3: Survey Responses of Members of War-Affected Communities
Were you subjected to forced labor, other than serving in an LDU or militia, while
living in the IDP camps?
Yes, More
Than Once Yes, Once No Total
Northern Respondents 532 (73%) 71 (10%) 122 (17%) 725 (58%)
Western Respondents 201 (39%) 73 (14%) 247 (47%) 521 (42%)
Total Respondents 733 (59%) 144 (12%) 369 (29%) 1,246 (100%)
Robert Muggah estimates that by 2004, in northern Uganda alone, LDUs and
other auxiliaries increased UPDF force strength by nearly two-thirds.129 The auxiliaries
were critical because they spoke the local languages and were intimately familiar with
the local terrain. Virtually everyone I interviewed emphasized the crucial role this
mass mobilization played in helping the UPDF defeat the LRA and ADF. A district
official in Kasese, for example, concluded that “the population is the biggest weapon
the government used to fight the ADF.”130 But according to one official, this mass
mobilization may not have occurred to the extent it did without displacement:
“It was only really after we removed people from the mountains that they decided to
fight for us. I don’t know if they would have volunteered if they hadn’t been forced to leave
their homes [emphasis added].”131
A Force Multiplier
A fifth and final implication of the assortative logic is that relocation is likely
to be employed when resource constraints limit an incumbent’s ability to occupy
contested areas. This may help explain the timing of the army’s displacement orders
in Uganda. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, the UPDF tended to relocate villagers when it
was overstretched because of donor-mandated budget cuts and force commitments
to multiple battlefronts, including domestic insurgencies and cross-border operations
in Congo, Sudan, and Rwanda. In 1988, when communities in Acholi and Teso were
first ordered to relocate, Museveni’s fledging regime faced some ten armed rebellions
throughout the country. The UPDF was still transitioning from a guerrilla army into a
national, professionalized military. Uganda’s police force – which the NRM found to be
“demoralized, corrupt, and inefficient” when it took power – had been reduced from
129 Muggah 2006, 99.
130 Interviewee 128, District Administrative Secretary, Kasese District, April 2017.
131 Interviewee 103, male local council official, April 2017.
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10,000 officers to a mere 3,000 by 1988, creating a “serious shortage of manpower.”132
This shortage was particularly acute in the north, where the war against the LRA, as
reported by Lamwaka, “had become difficult because [the government] was fighting
many fronts, against multiple guerrilla factions.”133
Figure 3.6: UPDF Personnel and Rebel Groups (1987–2008)
Source: Singer et al. (1972).
Yet by 1991, the Ugandan security forces had ballooned to approximately
100,000 soldiers, plus 15,000 to 20,000 police, while several rebellions (including the
UPA) had either been defeated or entered peace negotiations with the government.134
Intent on fully eradicating the LRA, in March of that year the military launched a
massive assault on Acholiland called Operation North. Equipped with sufficient
manpower, and with fewer insurgent threats diverting its resources, the army did not
attempt to herd civilians into camps. Instead, it implemented a cordon-and-search
policy, spreading soldiers throughout the countryside to occupy rural areas and conduct
screening exercises. According to data on one-sided violence collected by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), large-scale massacres of civilians by Ugandan forces
132 Uganda 2000, 186.
133 Lamwaka 2016, 120.
134 Uganda 2000, 238.
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occurred only around this period.135 Villages were searched and potential rebel suspects
rounded up, interrogated, and imprisoned as part of a practice called panda gari, or “get
on the lorry” in Swahili.136 Panda gari seems to have served as an alternative method of
combing the population for rebels and collaborators. Sverker Finnström describes how
the practice worked:
“The military arrived early in the morning, and everyone in the neighborhood,
including priests, children, and women, was arrested and taken to a large field just
outside town. All morning I saw army patrols arriving with groups of people, the
great majority young men, who had been arrested in the nearby villages. About five
thousand people were netted.”137
As the UPDF used forced relocation in rural areas to identify potential foes,
in towns such as Gulu, Kitgum, and Lira, where residents were not uprooted, panda
gari continued to be used as a screening tool. Indeed, it is telling that, according to
interviews and focus groups, panda gari rarely occurred in IDP camps. This suggests
that the practice acted as a substitute strategy for forced relocation. As one human rights
activist in Gulu told me, “panda gari was common before displacement, when [the army]
would come into the villages and towns and bring everyone to the stadium, and one by
one they would screen them...but people in the IDP camps were not affected by these
operations.”138
Therefore, in northern Uganda in the early 1990s, the military was able and
willing to employ tactics of territorial occupation. But by 1996 it reverted back to a
policy of forced displacement. This second phase of relocating civilians occurred as a
pair of new rebellions (the ADF and WNBF) joined the LRA in challenging Museveni’s
regime, just as the government finished demobilizing 36,000 troops per the austerity
requirements of development loans provided by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund.139 Around the same time, Uganda became involved in the civil war in
the DRC, which resulted in a “massive diversion of military resources and troops.”140 By
the government’s own admission, between 1997 and 2003 the Congo conflict took away
18 battalions from northern and western Uganda.141 According to one former member
of parliament, the military “was investing more in its regional adventures...[but] we
didn’t have the resources to run so many wars at the same time.”142 All of this hindered
135 Allansson et al. 2017. One-sided violence is the use of armed force against civilians that results in at
least 25 deaths. UCDP recorded 80 fatalities by Ugandan forces in 1990 and 59 fatalities in 1991. No
incidents of one-sided violence by the government were reported in subsequent years of these conflicts.
136 Branch 2011, 72.
137 Finnstrøm 2009, 135.
138 Interviewee 36, Male human rights activist, March 2016.
139 Uganda Veterans Assistance Board, 31 December 1999, 1.
140 Branch 2011, 78.
141 Saleh, 2003, p. 2.
142 Interviewee 8, former MP (Gulu) April 2017.
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the counterinsurgency capabilities of the UPDF. According to one parliamentary report
from 1997:
“It was [once] possible to strategically deploy and sustain zonal forces in virtually
all the sub-counties of the insurgency areas to curb and contain rebel movements
and operations...However, the demobilization or reduction in force policy which
government implemented greatly reduced the number of troops. The policy, though
well-intended, was carried out at the wrong time...the reduction in force therefore
caused the army to have fewer forces patrolling the vast expanse of northern
Uganda.”143
Even politicians from northern Uganda, who were deeply critical of Museveni’s
handling of the LRA war, acknowledged that the government was overstretched. As one
former member of parliament remarked in an interview, at the time “over one-third of
Uganda was in a state of war” and “there was no way the military could protect all the
villages.”144 Another former lawmaker told me the UPDF “had to deal with the north,
had to deal with WBNF, had to deal with UNRF II, had to deal with ADF, and at the
same time protect the borders...It was draining the resources of the government.”145
Occupying the vast expanses of Acholiland or the mountainous terrain of the Rwenzori
region to root out rebels was seemingly impractical and even counterproductive. The
government confronted a similar problem in 2002, when it issued its third blanket
displacement order. After having replenished the UPDF with more troops (see Figure
4.2), in the early 2000s the NRM faced further demands from donors to downsize the
army. The demands came soon after the government diverted part of the UPDF to
eastern Uganda to help disarm 20,000 Karamojong cattle rustlers.
These imposed force reductions – and the need to combat several insurgencies
simultaneously – created significant manpower problems that the military could not
fully address through formal recruitment. Not only did the government require a less
resource-intensive method for identifying and eliminating rebels; it also needed to
find an effective way to fill the army’s “acute deployment gaps.”146 The solution lay
within the local population. During a parliamentary session in June 1997, legislators
called “on every leadership in this country...[to] mobilize the population on matters
of security so that we do not spend a lot of money on managing the security of the
state.”147 According to former UPDF Chief Gen. Edward Wamula:
“The fact that we were facing multiple rebellions at the same time really affected our
manpower and strained our resources...We were forced to reduce our force to half,
143 Uganda 1997, 24.
144 Interviewee 10, male ex-MP (Lira), April 2017.
145 Interviewee 11, ex-UPDF commander and MP (Teso), April 2017.
146 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 53.
147 Hansard [Uganda] 4 June 1997 (Okumu Ringa): 1816.
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and then we were engaged in multiple operations. So what we found logical at that
time was to create auxiliary forces to fit into our restricted budget, which provided
a way to increase our force level without going back to the IMF and World Bank and
ask to increase the budget.”148
As I explained earlier in this section, the IDP camps were instrumental in
facilitating the mobilization of the population in contested areas. One commanding
officer told me that while the UPDF “had to recruit all able-bodied people to come
and contribute [to the war effort],” this “mostly happened after people were in IDP
camps.”149 By operating in small, mobile groups, both the LRA and ADF sought to
overextend the army. But according to one intelligence officer, military leaders were
cognizant that “if you try to be everywhere, you end up being nowhere.”150 Relocating
the population therefore offered the UPDF a cost-effective method of detecting its
enemies and bolstering its fighting capabilities. Commenting on the LRA conflict, a
northern politician observed that “it seems the government thought that this strategy
[of creating IDP camps] was an economical way to fight the war.”151 Museveni himself
seemed to acknowledge as much in his 2006 State of the Nation address:
“We advised people: ‘Please, instead of dying, go to the trading centers which
were turned into IDP [camps] so that you save your lives.’ When Amin was killing
people here, my wife and I fled to Tanzania. Fleeing is common sense if there
is a killer...Somebody wants to kill you - what do you do? Your friend will say:
‘Please, run away.’ That is what we told people...Of course the Army could not be
everywhere! That is why we said: ‘Since we cannot be everywhere ...you go to where
we can protect you...Some people were opposing that; it was the same as telling me
that I should not run to Tanzania, I should stay here and be killed...But I was not
stagnant, I was moving!”152
The recruitment of auxiliary fighters that forced civilian relocation helped
facilitate proved to be a boon to Uganda’s security forces even after the LRA and ADF
were expelled from the country. Interviews and focus groups revealed that thousands
of LDUs, Homeguards, and Vigilantes joined the military after these wars concluded.
Some were even reportedly deployed as part of UPDF assistance to an African Union
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Others entered the Ugandan police force or became
informal “crime preventers” tasked with helping maintain law and order in their
communities.153 Moreover, the government registered all demobilized recruits and
148 Interviewee 4, ex-UPDF Chief of Defense Forces, October 2016.
149 Interviewee 99, UPDF commanding officer, May 2017.
150 Interviewee 94, male UPDF intelligence officer, April 2017.
151 Interviewee 8, male ex-MP (Gulu), April 2017.
152 Yoweri Museveni, “State of the Nation Address”, Kampala: Parliament of Uganda (8 June 2006): 17-18.
153 See Tapscott (2016).
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told them that, in the event that rebels return or a new threat emerges, they could be
called up again to serve as a reserve force for the army. Though records are classified,
both military officers and civilians made it clear in interviews that many informants
recruited in the displacement camps continued to operate as intelligence assets even
after they returned to their villages. As one former vigilante told me, “we were told to
keep ready because if anything happened we could be called for further support.”154
Another explained that “even up to now, those of us who demobilized, we still are ready
to serve as a reserve force and in case of any emergency we can be called to provide
backup [for the Ugandan army].”155
3.4 Alternative Explanations
Denial
The LRA and ADF – and to a lesser extent, the UPA – scoured rural villages for
foodstuffs and abducted civilians to fill their ranks. Kony’s rebels became particularly
infamous for kidnapping children in northern Uganda. One 2004 report estimated
that up to 90 percent of the LRA’s 3,000 fighters were abducted civilians.156 Therefore,
a desire to deprive these insurgencies access to the local population undoubtedly
contributed to the government’s decision to employ forced relocation: as one military
spokesman publically declared during the ADF rebellion, “the camps are a military
strategy...designed to deny the rebels manpower and other resources.”157 But the denial
logic is insufficient to fully explain these measures for at least four reasons.
First, the LRA and ADF had access to operational bases in Sudan and Congo,
and both groups received most of their resources from external, as opposed to local,
sources. This was well known by the Ugandan government. Even before the UPDF
ordered displacement in the north, the government broke off diplomatic relations
with Sudan because, as one senior military commander told a local newspaper, “we
have clear evidence that [the LRA] is kept, fed, and armed by Sudan.”158 In fact, the
UPDF did not implement its displacement policy until after the LRA began receiving
assistance from Sudan – where the group maintained “strong supply lines” and received
“sophisticated weapons and landmines” from Khartoum.159 According to Cline, this
external support was a “key factor” in the LRA’s survival.160 Sudan played such a pivotal
154 Interviewee 203, Former LDU, Kabarole District, May 2017.
155 Interviewee 183, ex-vigilante, Bundibugyo District, May 2017.
156 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 22.
157 Quoted in Hovil 2003, 36.
158 “Museveni could reap from ‘political manure’ in Acholi” 1995 (17 December).
159 Omach 2002, 10.
160 Cline 2013, 142.
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role, in fact, that Gen. James Kazini, a top UPDF official, remarked in a 1997 media
interview that “the real enemy is Sudan, not the rebels.”161
Second, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the UPDF did not relocate
communities in the north during its operations against the LRA’s predecessors, the
UPDA and HSM – groups that lacked external support and were arguably more reliant
on civilians for resources. For example, according to Heike Behrend, although the
HSM “did not conduct a classic guerrilla war” it was substantially dependent upon
support from the population.162 So too was the UPDA, for whom “most recruits joined
voluntarily, and civilians shared food, livestock, intelligence and other support with
these forces.”163 One could point to the fact that both the LRA and ADF engaged in
forced recruitment as evidence in support of denial arguments. Yet this would not
explain the army’s use of relocation against the UPA – whose recruits joined “of their
own volition and motivation” rather than being forcibly conscripted.164
Third, after evacuating rural villages, the UPDF made little effort to secure
them. The logic of denial-by-displacement is that removing the local population should
help combatants generate control over territories where their rivals operate. But in
Acholiland, one local journalist reported that Ugandan forces actually “removed their
detaches from the villages and allowed the rebels to infiltrate [them],” turning them
“into sanctuaries for rebels” replete with “fields of cassava, simsim, rice, millet, and
sunflowers.”165 In 1996, the northern population was ordered to flee just before the
harvest season, meaning that “abandoned cassava and other crops were available in
abundance in the fields for use by LRA forces.”166 Because the UPDF continued to allow
IDPs to cultivate crops, albeit under restricted days and times, rebels maintained access
to food supplies that they could dig up once people returned to camps. Thus rather
than using displacement to enhance government control over rebel-affected areas,
according to one analyst, “by depopulating large areas of the countryside, the military
is, de facto, turning the land over to the rebels.”167 Military leaders I interviewed placed
little tactical importance on conquering these territories. For instance, the UPDF Chief
of Doctrine told me that “for us, taking territory is not that important...the ground is the
ground, why should I die to capture it? We were more concerned about the people.”168
Uprooting the population, then, seemed to be less about expanding military control
over the countryside and more about imposing a clear spatial distinction between
government and rebel sides.
Finally, forced relocation did not prevent abductions or reduce rebel violence
161 “Ex-LRA Rebels Reveal Kony’s Plans” 1997 (2 August).
162 Behrend 2000, 68,71.
163 Gersony 1997, 26.
164 De Berry 2004, 68.
165 Lamwaka 2016, 207-208.
166 Gersony 1997, 60.
167 Feldman 2008, 48.
168 Interviewee 2, Male UPDF Chief of Doctrine, October 2016.
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against civilians. It actually had the opposite effect: concentrating people into large,
crowded sites made them easy targets. In both the north and the west, it is clear that
the “protected villages” were, in fact, not well protected at all.169 The government often
withdrew soldiers and police from the camps and entrusted them to auxiliaries,170
despite appeals from local officials and residents for more troops.171 For example, civil
society groups in northern Uganda reported that “in most camps the absolute maximum
detachment appears to be around 60 soldiers, and in most cases they are tasked with the
responsibility of protecting populations well in excess of 10,000.”172
As a consequence, rebels frequently raided the settlements to loot food and
supplies, and to kill and kidnap en mass. In my survey, 79 percent of respondents
reported that rebels attacked their camp at least once, including 54 percent who
reported raids on three or more occasions. In a security report from a camp in Amuru
District in the north, for instance, a local councilman wrote “there is frequent infiltration
of the rebels in the camps.”173 According to another report from the north, between
June and September 2002 alone, the LRA attacked 16 of 35 existing IDP camps in Gulu,
Kitgum and Pader and “continues to do so persistently.”174 As one woman told Lomo
and Hovil, “people are not safe in the camps. They are crowded and close together
which makes it easy for the rebels to abduct them and steal food. When people were
in their homes, they were far apart and could easily hide.”175 In a memoir of the
war, a former child soldier expresses similar sentiment, writing that “every night the
rebels would sneak in...the bush was a safer place to spend sleepless nights than [the
IDP camps.]”176 And in the west, human rights monitors also found that “the ADF
has managed to invade [IDP] camps repeatedly,”177 as “despite having moved into
what the government called ‘protected villages,’ inadequate protection meant that
civilians continued to be attacked by the rebels: the killing, abductions, and looting
169 Branch 2011; Hovil 2003; Dolan 2013; Cline 2013; Finnström 2008.
170 Branch 2011, 77.
171 For example, the chairman of Aceh IDP Camp in Gulu requested that district officials “contact the 4th
Division Commander to redeploy more soldiers to protect IDPs in the camp” (Letter from the Office
of the Camp Chairman, Aceh IDP Camp to RDC, Gulu District, 29 March 2000, Gulu District Archives
CR/1002/3). In 1998, officials from Pajule sent a similar appeal to district officials in Kitgum: “we beg
your good office to let more soldiers be sent to Pajule Trading Centre... we have a big camp that can
not be guarded properly by a few soldiers who are camping in Pajule Army Detach” (Letter from H.
Okello, SCC Pajule, to RDC Kitgum, “RE: Insecurity in Pajule Division,” 16 February 1998, Kitgum
District Archives).
172 CSOPNU 2004, 46. Cline (2013, 76) also writes that government security provision in the north was
“skimpy” in the camps.
173 Letter from Okiya Santo to Gulu District Council, “RE: Security Report: Amuru District”, 26 January
1999, Gulu District Archives CR/213/4.
174 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 38. A group of local leaders claimed that the UPDF responded to only 33 out of
456 LRA attacks between June and December 2002 (Cline 2013, 76).
175 Woman in Kitgum quoted in Lomo and Hovil (2004, 38).
176 Olango 2016, 6-7.
177 African Rights Group 2001, 22.
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continued.”178
Thus even as encampment allowed Ugandan forces to better monitor and extract
resources from the population, it was not simply a straightforward method of bringing
communities from rebel-controlled zones to areas dominated by counterinsurgents. This
is clear from Finnström’s research in northern Uganda in 2002:
“[the LRA] outnumbered the Ugandan military in the rural areas...typically they
would arrive in the [IDP] camps in the morning hours, when people were typically
more relaxed than usual after the uncertainty of the night. Frequently the Ugandan
army withdrew after only a brief encounter with the rebels. The rebels would then
address the displaced people, allowing them a week or so to leave the camps before
they attacked. After a week the rebels would come back to carry out the threat.
Hundreds of huts could be set on fire within a few minutes.”179
Violent events data from Uganda confirms that LRA and ADF violence against
civilians increased following the government’s displacement orders in each region.
I analyzed geo-referenced data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED), which is largely based on media reports of military battles,
civilian massacres, and other episodes of political violence.180 Since the ACLED data
only goes back to 1997, I supplement it with original data on conflict events that I
collected from local newspaper archives in Uganda for the years 1990-1996. Like
ACLED, I distinguished rebel or government attacks on civilians from battles between
government and rebel forces. For many events, I was able to triangulate dates, locations,
and numbers of fatalities from multiple media sources.
Time trends in these events, which are plotted in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, indicate
that rebel attacks on civilians by both the LRA (Figure 3.7) and the ADF (Figure 3.8)
increased after the government forced people to relocate into camps in northern and
western Uganda. This is consistent with the qualitative evidence described above.
Yet during the LRA insurgency in particular, both the number of battles between
UPDF and rebel forces, and the number of reported rebel fatalities, also multiplied
after displacement orders were issued. These patterns generally hold when the data is
disaggregated by district (see plots in Appendix D).181
These results suggest that population displacement in Uganda did help
counterinsurgents better identify and engage rebels in combat – even as it failed to
reduce rebel violence against civilians or prevent rebels from accessing them. In other
words, forced relocation seemed to be effective at sorting the local population, but
not at cutting it off from insurgent groups. I found similar trends when examining an
178 Hovil and Werker 2005, 19.
179 Finnström 2008, 136.
180 Raleigh et al. 2010.
181 As the plots in the appendix indicate, Apac District in the north and Kasese District in the west may be
exceptions to a certain degree.
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Figure 3.7: LRA Violence in Uganda (1990–2008)
Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) and Author
alternative source of violent events data, the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED),
which covers the years 1989-2006 but is far less comprehensive than ACLED. Plots using
the UCDP data are provided in Appendix D.
The post-displacement escalations in rebel violence illustrated in the figures
above have been described by the LRA and ADF as collective punishment for civilians
moving to camps, which rebels interpreted as tacit support for the government. This
offers further evidence of the signaling effects of displacement. For instance, in a
radio interview, Vincent Otti, second in command of the LRA, declared that IDP
camps were inhabited by “government agents” who had “betrayed” the rebels.182
According to a former ADF fighter, the ADF also “became angry and started killing
people indiscriminately” when Rwenzori communities fled to camps, because they “felt
182 Radio FM interview with LRA commander Vincent Otti, December 10, 2003. In a 2005 report, the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre similarly reported that the LRA, “suspecting the inhabitants
[of IDP camps] of tacitly supporting the government, reacted with attacks on these camps” (IDMC,
2005 (August), 8).
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Figure 3.8: ADF Violence in Uganda (1995–2003)
Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) and Author
that people had let them down by moving to [be with] the government.”183 Likewise,
according to accounts of the UPA war in Teso, rebels attacked concentrated settlements
as retaliation “against villagers who had shown apparent allegiance for the [NRM] by
moving into the camp.”184 The LRA even issued an edict prohibiting civilians from
riding bicycles “under the assumption that it meant you were taking information to
the government.”185 Consequently, encampment resulted in more indiscriminate rebel
violence against civilians, including – crucially – in areas outside government control.
183 Interviewee 4, male ex-ADF fighter, May 2017.
184 De Berry 2004, 90-91.
185 Dolan 2013, 83.
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According to one report:
“A number of IDPs indicated that prior to their movement into camps...that if they
had met the LRA in the bush, they would generally be allowed to continue with
their business, perhaps having been forced to give food or other resources to the
rebels. Since the displacement however, they found that the LRA is now less tolerant
of those civilians who are found out in the fields or collecting resources ...the LRA
reportedly consider those Acholi now living in camps to be complicit with the
[government]...As a result, many IDPs now believe that the LRA seeks to punish
them.”186
These findings indicate that changes in rebel targeting of civilians is not sufficiently
explained by shifts in territorial control.
Abductions by rebels also increased following forced relocation. In Acholiland,
the number of civilians kidnapped by the LRA peaked in 2003-2004, after the third
displacement order in the north, and when roughly 85-90 percent of the population
resided in IDP camps (Figure 3.9).187 One local activist therefore likened the camps to
“a supermarket” for the rebels where “they found everything they needed: young boys
[to abduct], food, supplies.”188 In his study of northern Uganda, Branch also concludes
that “the formation of the camps made resource acquisition, if anything, easier for the
rebels.”189 Interviews with ex-LRA and ADF fighters indicated that both rebel groups
were indeed able to continue to obtain food and supplies following displacement –
including from their external patrons190 – and according to the founder of the UPA,
“the rebels’ ability to conduct the war was...not affected by the [government’s] so-called
isolation policy.”191
It is possible, of course, that these outcomes simply reflect poor implementation
of the government’s displacement strategy. What is perplexing, however, is that despite
the failure of forced relocation to deny rebels resources, authorities sustained these
186 CSOPNU 2004, 78.
187 According to CSOPNU (2004, 76), in northern Uganda “NGO workers specializing in the reception
and rehabilitation of formerly abducted children indicate that rates of abduction did not changed
appreciably after forced displacement took place in late 2002, and while the rate of attacks since the end
of July 2004 did appear to decrease following the UPDF attack near Juba, informal surveys from across
the region indicate that attacks on camps that lead to violence and coercion intensified in Kitgum and
Pader in September and October 2004.”
188 Interviewee 36, male human rights activist, Gulu District, March 2016. A civil society report similarly
argued that “IDP camps now provide the LRA with ‘one-stop shops’ in which they can achieve all of
their objectives quickly, easily and with much greater impact than was ever possible when civilians
were living in villages” (CSOPNU 2004, 82).
189 Branch (2011, 77) writes that “there was so little protection and the rebels would loot and abduct so
easily that some Acholi suggested giving food and medicine to the rebels so they would stop looting.”
190 Interviewee 49, male ex-LRA fighter, April 2017; Interviewee 167, male ex-ADF commander, April 2017.
191 Okurut, 127.
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Figure 3.9: Abductions in Uganda (1992–2006)
Source: Pham et al. 2007, 4.
measures for years, and even expanded them. This suggests that displacement offered
other strategic benefits.
Punishment/Ethnic Nationalism
Another potential explanation for forced relocation in Uganda is that it served
as a form of collective punishment. This argument is often invoked in describing the
state’s use of IDP camps during the LRA war. As the Refugee Law Project noted in
a 2004 report, “there is a broadly held belief that the government has deliberately
created displacement as a form of punishment for the Acholi people.”192 Some observers
have even characterized the policy as intentional group destruction by deprivation,
tantamount to genocide.193 Such claims demonstrate that the Ugandan government
maintained its displacement policies even as it faced strong criticism and normative
pressure from domestic and international actors. It is plausible that these policies
were collective retaliation for political disloyalty, given that two of the three rounds of
relocation orders in the north – in 1996 and 2002, respectively – were issued shortly after
192 Lomo and Hovil 2004, 40.
193 Otunnu 2006.
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national elections in Uganda. Consistent with this logic, President Museveni received
just 15 percent of the vote share in Acholiland in 1996 and 17 percent in 2001. Yet the fact
that the ADF-affected districts of western Uganda collectively cast 97 percent of their
votes for the NRM in 1996 did not spare them from displacement (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: NRM Vote Share in Presidential Elections, by District
Region District
1996 2001
Total Votes Vote Share Total Votes Vote Share
North
(Acholi/Lango)
Apac 35,532 21% 37,133 22%
Gulu 10,473 8% 15,320 12%
Kitgum 13,213 10% 14,077 21%
Pader N/A N/A 8,918 13%
Lira 26,076 13% 40,767 20%
West
(Rwenzori)
Bundibugyo 51,255 95% 39,676 92%
Kabrole 258,475 96% 93,414 89%
Kasese 112,609 91% 90,620 68%
East
(Teso)
Kumi 38,772 40% 50,472 52%
Soroti 89,617 56% 62,977 54%
Source: Uganda Presidential Election Results, http://www.ec.or.ug.
In a January 1997 letter to local officials – around the time the UPDF began
ordering civilians to relocate – the commissioner for the western district of Bundibugyo
commended his constituents’ “support to NRM government” since they gave Museveni
“one of the highest percentage of votes” of any district in the election.194 It is unlikely
that the government would inflict punishment on such a bastion of support. It also
seems improbable that the UPDF would train, arm, and fight alongside the very people
they intend to subjugate – which they did by recruiting IDPs to serve as LDUs and
other auxiliary force members. Beyond displacement, according to Andrew Bell,
counterinsurgency campaigns waged by the NRM in the north have generally been
marked by a high degree of “discipline and restraint” and “limited violence” against
noncombatants, with the UPDF “largely eschewing the wholesale violence against
194 RDC Gabbriel Luzira, “Re-Guideline how to Mobilize During Peace and Crisis Time,” 21 January 1997
(Bundibugyo District Archives, CR/001/K15/1/6).
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civilians that had come to mark Uganda’s civil wars.”195
That civilians were deliberately uprooted in the western districts of Uganda
in addition to the north also questions accusations that displacement was principally
motivated by ethnic enmity against the northern Acholi by Museveni, an ethnic
Banyankole from the southwest.196 Moreover, a logic of ethnic nationalism would
likely result in greater ethnic homogenization of conflict-affected territories – perhaps
through the wholesale expulsion of specific tribes – yet forced relocation in northern
and western Uganda facilitated the intermingling of different communities and
seemed to produce greater ethnic heterogeneity in the local population. Military and
political authorities even highlighted ethnic intermixing as one of the benefits of the
government’s displacement policies. In an interview, one UPDF commander deployed
to the north said that “when we changed the settlement patterns from scattered to
everyone being in one area, they [civilians] became cosmopolitan, developmental.”197
A local council official in Bundibugyo echoed this sentiment, telling me that in the
IDP camps, “before a person used to stay in his home alone, but in camps, people
came together with different characters and from different groups, and they became
mixed.”198
Finally, the Uganda case demonstrates that while foreign aid can play an
important role in helping facilitate or sustain strategies of population displacement,
it cannot explain when, where, and why combatants resort to these methods. In
Acholiland, after each relocation order, Ugandan authorities immediately appealed
to the international community for assistance in providing food relief, distributing
construction materials, and administering IDP camps.199 The World Food Program’s
in-country expenditures more than doubled from 1996 to 1997, from $14 million to $31
million,200 and quadrupled between 2002 and 2003, from $23 million to $80.7 million.201
195 Bell 2016, 489, 501.
196 This is suggested by observers such as Branch (2011, 64), who points out that the NRM “reflected its
southern base” while the Acholi “were generally excluded from political power.”
197 Interviewee 59, male UPDF senior commander, November 2016.
198 Interviewee 151, Male LC1, Bundibugyo District, May 2017.
199 For instance, in June 1988, after the first displacement order, the government requested and received
$772,000 in food aid from the U.N. to assist encamped civilians (“Ugandan President Appeals for
Emergency Relief” 1988 (11 June); “Refugees and Drought Victims to Receive Emergency Food Aid”
1988 (28 July)). In December 1996 – soon after the NRM initiated its second round of evacuations –
the U.N. noted in an assessment of the north that “whether or not protected villages develop over
the coming weeks will...depend on the ability of aid agencies to provide the services that are lacking,
and certainly beyond the means of the local authorities” (Humanitarian Situation Report on Uganda
1996 (4 December)). And immediately after the displacement policy was reenacted in 2002, the
Ugandan Ministry for Refugee Affairs requested food aid for 1.2 million people in the north. Foreign
governments responded with nearly $75 million in donations. By 2003, over one hundred organizations
were involved in relief distribution, and the NRM had “abdicated virtually all responsibility” for IDPs
to the international community, according to Tripp (2010, 162).
200 World Food Program 1999.
201 “Rights: War-Driven Famine Stalks a Million in Northern Uganda” 1998 (26 February).
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Branch therefore argues that in the north:
“The [IDP] camps were able to be created only because humanitarian agencies
moved in at their conception to supply them with relief aid – in particular food
– and that they have been sustained only through the government’s further
instrumentalization of material and symbolic humanitarian resources...by
supporting the creation and continued existence of the camps, humanitarian aid
agencies have enabled the government’s policy of forced displacement.”202
Yet even Branch argues that when the Ugandan government first initiated
its displacement policy, “it does not seem to have foreseen the facilitating function
which humanitarian aid would soon play.”203 Moreover, while external assistance also
contributed to the viability of state-induced relocation in western Uganda – where some
displaced people became similarly “dependent on international relief aid”204 – the role
of humanitarian agencies in the ADF conflict appeared to be much less pronounced than
during the LRA war. I found no evidence that the promise of aid was a primary factor
behind the government’s displacement policies in the west.
3.5 Conclusion
Policies of forced displacement enacted during counterinsurgency campaigns
in Uganda did not simply seek to orchestrate the departure of local communities from
rebel-affected areas. Authorities were equally concerned with influencing people’s
destinations. The evidence suggests that variation in these strategies over space
and time is better explained by an assortative logic than those emphasizing denial,
punishment, or ethnic nationalism. For the Ugandan government, forcibly relocating
civilians served a much broader purpose than denying insurgents resources: it helped
state forces sort and capture local populations when and where information and
resource deficiencies demanded it.
This chapter has therefore shown that the overarching patterns and underlying
motivations of state-induced displacement in Uganda is consistent with the empirical
implications of my assortative theory. Uprooting rural residents helped Ugandan
forces make inferences about their identities and loyalties and impose legibility on
frontier communities when rebels tactics made it difficult to differentiate friend from
foe. Moreover, in a context where the government saw the population as its “biggest
weapon to fight the rebels,”205 displacement was used not only to deter defection and
202 Branch 2008, 154.
203 Branch 2011, 154.
204 African Rights Group 2001, 21.
205 Interviewee 128, male district official and UPDF operative, April 2017.
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“demobilize” noncombatants – as claimed by other observers of Uganda’s wars206 – but
also to mobilize them.
In demonstrating the assortative logic of strategic displacement during the LRA,
UPA, and ADF rebellions, I find that the guerrilla methods employed by insurgents, the
remote terrain, the relative inaccessibility of scattered local populations, and the lack
of sufficient manpower to fight multiple groups simultaneously seemed to motivate
the state’s use of forced relocation. The UPDF tended to uproot civilians when a lack of
manpower and multiple military commitments required the army to pursue alternative
strategies to occupying contested territories. In contrast, the fact that other groups
preferred conventional military tactics, and counterinsurgents faced fewer demands on
their coercive capabilities, resulted in less acute information and resource problems, and
no strategic displacement occurred.
But rural displacement was not simply a means of bringing the local population
under the state’s control through overwhelming force. By carefully tracing the
mechanisms underlying these strategies, I show that their primary utility was to initiate
and reify a process for determining guilt on the basis of physical association, while
arranging local populations in a way that was amenable to extracting the resources
needed from them to effectively combat insurgency. Indeed, IDP camps often did not
reflect distinct zones of government control, but rather artificial demarcations that
delineated who among the citizenry was reliably disloyal and “belonged” to each
side. As a result, instead of physically separating the entire population from rebels – a
virtually impossible task – encampment provided a continuous and easily observable
heuristic for sorting people based on their affiliations and potential allegiances. This
can explain why Ugandan authorities continued to revert to these methods despite the
fact that they did not help “drain the sea” and, if anything, actually facilitated greater
rebel predation and violence against civilians. State-induced displacement in Uganda, in
other words, sought to “map” and “filter” the sea rather than simply “draining” it.
206 Day and Reno 2014.
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In this chapter I test my arguments at the macro-level by examining
cross-national variation in strategic wartime displacement since World War II. The
first section presents an original dataset that measures the incidence of population
displacement strategies by government and rebel combatants in civil wars between
1945 and 2008. I map variation in the use of different types of displacement across
conflicts, regions, and over time. As with the rest of this study, the analysis focuses on
displacement by state actors. The descriptive data demonstrate that these strategies have
been more common than previously thought, and challenge some core assumptions
about where and when they are employed – strategic displacement is not, for example,
unique to ethnic or secessionist conflicts.
After demonstrating this variation, I present the independent variables used
to proxy for the four primary explanations for strategic displacement at the macro
level: ethnic nationalism, denial, punishment, and my assortative logic. These variables
correspond to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. In the second section, I discuss
the results of a series of quantitative tests of these propositions. I evaluate whether
statistically significant associations exist between the incidence of each displacement
strategy and proxies for each explanation. Some logics are potentially complementary,
while some – assortative and punishment theories, for example – offer competing logics.
I therefore test the four arguments separately and in joint models in order to ascertain
which explanation, or combination of explanations, seem to best account for the use of
strategic displacement in wartime. Because the number of cases of depopulation in my
dataset is too small to draw reliable conclusions, I concentrate the analysis on strategies
of cleansing and forced relocation.
The main finding is that different population displacement strategies are
employed in different contexts and appear to follow different logics. Government
cleansing is more likely in conventional wars, and where counterinsurgents have access
to group-level identifiers that link civilians to an armed group. This strategy also
strongly correlates with state-induced mass killing in wartime. Taken together, these
results are consistent with the proposition that cleansing follows a logic of punishment.
Government forced relocation, meanwhile, seem to follow an assortative logic: it is more
likely in irregular wars waged in “illegible” territories, and where counterinsurgents
lack access to other group-level heuristics for inferring civilian loyalties. Relocation
strategies also tend to be employed by under-resourced incumbents engaged in multiple
conflicts, and alongside state efforts to mobilize the population into civilian defense
forces. These empirics are consistent with the propositions advanced in Chapter 2, and
lend support to both the sorting and capturing components of my theory.
The macro-level analysis lacks the detail and precision needed to test some of
my arguments directly. Therefore, in the third section I conduct a battery of additional
tests to ensure the robustness of the results and to rule out other confounding factors.
Since my coding process and operationalization of key concepts can be contested,
I use a series of alternative measures and variables to check the reliability of the
findings. I also consider three other potential explanations for strategic displacement
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in wartime: opportunism, desperation, and normative pressures. While the analysis in
this chapter cannot determine causality, it provides compelling indirect evidence for my
assortative theory of strategic displacement. Equally important, the results question the
extent to which existing explanations can account for variation in the use of particular
displacement strategies – namely, forced relocation – across civil wars.
4.1 Data and Measurement
Existing data sources on conflict migration, such as UNHCR’s population
statistics, record annual refugee and IDP flows at the country level.1 But this count
data is of questionable quality – as described in a 2017 issue of the journal Nature –
and provides no information about whether displacement was deliberately induced by
armed groups.2 Several scholars have therefore attempted to compile lists of strategic
wartime displacements.3 While these efforts have provided a wealth of useful data,
they are neither comprehensive nor do they systematically collect data on all types
of displacement employed in civil war. Appendix E lists the cases included in five
previous studies and details the differences between these datasets and my own dataset.
Moreover, there are a number of existing case studies of both cleansing4 and forced
relocation.5 Yet many of these studies focus on a limited number of European cases, such
as ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, or on population relocation by Western
imperial powers, such as the Malayan Emergency, the French-Algerian war, and the Mau
Mau rebellion in Kenya.
Strategic Displacement in Civil Conflict (SDCC)
I therefore created the Strategic Displacement in Civil Conflict (SDCC) dataset,
which covers 160 civil wars between 1945–2008. SDCC includes 147 conflicts identified
by Kalyvas and Balcells,6 plus an additional 13 that meet the following definitional
criteria of civil war: (1) fighting between state actors and non-state groups that were
able to mount an organized military challenge for control over a government or region;
and (2) at least 1,000 battle deaths in at least one year of the conflict.7 Since I assume that
1 UNHCR Population Statistics, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview. Also see Marshall (2008).
2 According to “Data on movements of refugees and migrants are flawed” (2017), “misinterpretation
and misrepresentation of data on population movements is rife...Numbers are both diplomatically and
economically sensitive – influencing, for example, distribution of aid – and so reported data can be
vulnerable to political influence. Subjectivity also enters the equation – different countries often have
different definitions of refugees and varying assessment procedures.”
3 Orchard 2010; Zhukov 2015; Downes and Greenhill 2015; Stanton 2016; Bulutgil 2016.
4 Mann 2005; Naimark 2002.
5 Jundanian 1974; Sutton 1977; Garlock 1991; Sepp 1992; Catton 1999; Markel 2006; Whittaker 2012.
6 Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.
7 The additional 13 conflicts were taken from Kalyvas and Balcells’ PRIO100 dataset (Balcells and Kalyvas
2014). These included France v. Vietnam (1945-54); France v. Cameroon (1955-60); Portugal v. Guinea
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combatants are unlikely to consider displacing civilians unless a conflict has reached a
certain level of intensity, I selected this universe of cases over those that use lower battle
death thresholds (e.g., UCDP/PRIO).8 While Kalyvas and Balcells exclude colonial wars
from their dataset, I include them because they constitute important contexts in which
displacement was (or could have) been used, and as mentioned above, some have been
the subject of extensive case study research.9 However, later in the chapter I remove
these conflicts from the sample as a robustness check.
With the assistance of a research team, I coded whether strategic displacement
was employed in each conflict using previous case studies of wartime cleansing and
forced relocation, individual conflict histories, and annual and country reports from
UNHCR, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the U.S. State Department,
Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. These human rights sources have
been utilized by other researchers to assemble cross-national datasets on violence
against civilians in civil wars.10 My unit of analysis is conflict-perpetrator-type.
For each conflict, the research team examined patterns and descriptions of
displacement, violence, and human rights violations to determine if the displacement
of civilian populations was at least partly due to state or non-state actors deliberately
triggering their flight. Following the conceptual discussion in the introductory chapter,
several criteria must be met for an instance of civilian displacement to qualify as
strategic wartime displacement. First, displacement must be related to the conflict.
This excludes planned population movements due to natural disasters or development
projects, and evictions of urban squatters or other civilians that occur outside the
conflict zone. Second, following Greenhill’s approach to coding strategic engineered
migration,11 there must be evidence of orchestration and intent to displace. As the
previous chapters make clear, not all war-related displacement qualifies as strategic
displacement. Orchestration means that civilian flight was promoted or executed
by armed actors, whether through explicit threats, evacuation orders, sustained
destruction of property, or the physical removal and/or resettlement of residents by
bus, truck, or train. Displacement must also be intentional, in that sources indicate that
displacement due to government or rebel actions was deliberate. I therefore do not
include instances of displacement as collateral damage, in which civilians spontaneously
Bissau (1962-74); Portugal v. Angola (1961-75); Portugal v. Mozambique (1962-75); France v. Tunisia
(1952-54); U.K. v. Kenya (Mau Mau, 1952-56); U.K. v. Malaya (1950-60); France v. Algeria (1954-62);
Rwanda v. ALiR (1996-2002); India v. MNF (1966-68); India v. NNC (1955-62); Pakistan v. TTP (2007-).
8 Most scholars use thresholds of 1,000 battle deaths to define a civil war and thresholds of 25 deaths to
characterize minor civil or political violence (Allansson et al. 2017).
9 These cases were not selected on the dependent variable, however, as some colonial wars excluded from
the dataset (due to the low death threshold) included instances of strategic displacement (e.g., U.K. v.
Aden/Yemen, 1963-67; U.K. vs. Cyprus/EOKA, 1954-59; U.K. v. Shifta, 1945-52) and instances where it
was not employed (e.g., France v. Morocco; France v. Madagascar; Netherlands v. Indonesia).
10 Stanton 2016; Cohen 2016.
11 Greenhill 2010.
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 114
flee in anticipation of, or during, battles between warring parties.12
Finally, the International Criminal Court defines criminal displacement as
that committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack” against civilians.13 This
implies a certain scale and incidence for a case to qualify as strategic displacement.
In coding cases the research team focused on general patterns of violence and
displacement, as opposed to estimates of the number of civilians uprooted (which
can be wildly inaccurate). This made it less likely that we overlooked incidents where
displacement figures were poorly documented. But as a general guide, we used a
threshold of at least 1,000 civilians targeted for displacement for a period of at least one
month, metrics that align with previous research on systematic violence.14 Generally,
displacement that was based on the selective targeting of specific individuals or
households – the eviction or deportation of particular political adversaries, for example
– was not included in the dataset.
Once a case of strategic displacement was identified, we coded the perpetrator,
victim (if a particular group was targeted), location, and timing of displacement, where
possible. We also coded the type of displacement employed. If there was evidence
that victims were members of an identifiable group, that they were targeted due to
this affiliation, and that displacement was intended to be permanent, a case was coded
as cleansing.15 If displacement was temporary and perpetrators made little effort to
differentiate between particular groups – hence targeting was indiscriminate – or
to resettle the displaced, it was coded as depopulation. If perpetrators did not just
expel the population but sought to concentrate it by drawing people into designated
settlements within the conflict zone or a nearby location, it was coded as forced
relocation. Appendix E provides additional details on the coding procedure and
sources.16 Conflicts coded as “0” (no strategic displacement, or “none”) included
both those that experienced little to no civilian displacement at all, and those that
experienced collateral, spontaneous, or opportunistic displacement that was not
systematically ordered by combatants as an organizational policy.17
12 Reports that fighting or military operations “led to displacement” or “displaced” a certain number of
people may indicate orchestration, but they do not within themselves constitute evidence of intent. Such
cases were therefore investigated further.
13 See the ICC Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(d).
14 Ulfelder and Valentino 2008.
15 Indicators of permanence include perpetrators preventing the displaced from returning and/or
encouraging co-ethics or political supporters to resettle in evacuated areas.
16 Descriptions of coding decisions for each conflict are available upon request from the author.
17 While conflicts where strategic displacement was employed tended to produce more IDPs and refugees,
the average annual number of displaced people was not a significant predictor of cleansing or forced
relocation, according to displacement data from Marshall (2008). This suggests that factors that explain
strategic displacement are not necessarily the same ones that explain the magnitude of wartime
displacement generally.
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Limitations
Several limitations to the SDCC dataset are worth noting. First, the unit of
analysis is the conflict. While I was able to identify the year of onset in 75 percent of
cases of strategic displacement, the empirical record was not always clear about when
displacement started or ended. Moreover, coding the use of these measures accurately
at the dyad level was not possible because, when state actors engaged in displacement,
sources were not always specific about which rebel group(s) it was intended to combat.
A second limitation is the possibility of omitted cases. Lack of access to conflict
zones by foreign observers or variation in the volume and quality of sources could have
led to cases of strategic displacement being overlooked, biasing the results. However,
focusing on contemporary conflicts should somewhat mitigate these concerns. The
development of the post-war refugee regime has made displacement a global issue, and
provided international organizations and advocacy groups with the motivations and
resources to publicize the causes and consequences of forced population movements.
This has made it difficult for armed actors to hide these incidents or conceal their role in
them.
Finally, there may be inconsistent interest in, or reports of, strategic
displacement over time. For example, the issue of internal displacement did not receive
widespread attention until the 1990s, which may have increased the focus of human
rights organizations on IDPs. These concerns are alloyed by the fact that, as I show
below, the proportion of civil wars experiencing strategic displacement is relatively
consistent over time. Moreover, as a robustness check I include a control for pre- and
post-Cold War conflicts to help account for temporal factors.
I also took two measures to ensure the reliability of the data. First, I
cross-referenced my coding with four existing lists of wartime cleansings and
relocations and found there is close agreement, though I discovered a number of
missing cases (see Appendix E). Second, I included a precision ranking that reflects
the degree of certainty that a case constitutes strategic displacement based on available
evidence and/or the results of cross-referencing with other data collection efforts. In
many instances, the strategic dimension of displacement was unambiguous: armed
groups publically issued evacuation orders, defended their plans to uproot or relocate
communities, and dispatched combatants to threaten or round up residents. In
other cases, the intentionality of displacement, and armed groups’ complicity in it, is
detectable through overt action: troops or rebels engage in the systematic burning and
destruction of entire villages to drive people out, and prevent them from returning.
Yet there are instances where either the extent to which displacement was deliberately
induced, or the type of displacement strategy, was unclear. To address this ambiguity, I
used the precision ranking outlined in Table 4.1.
In coding the type of displacement strategy, I found four borderline cases.
Civil wars in Iran (1979–84) and Iraq (1991–93) could be classified as experiencing
state-induced depopulation or cleansing, as the method of targeting and intended
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Table 4.1: Precision Ranking for Cases of Strategic Wartime Displacement
Rank Description
3 High confidence
Strong evidence of both orchestration and intent.
Confident about the type of displacement employed.
2 Medium confidence
Strong evidence of both orchestration and intent.
Type of displacement was ambiguous.
1 Low confidence
Limited or ambiguous evidence of orchestration and/or intent.
permanence of displacement were ambiguous.18 Likewise, it is clear that temporary,
indiscriminate displacement was employed by government forces in both Indonesia
(1956–60) and Sri Lanka (1983–2002), yet these cases could be coded as forced relocation
or depopulation. I classified these four cases based on the type for which there was
the strongest evidence, but included the second type as an alternative coding for my
analysis.
Another potential borderline case is the mass displacement of Kurdish
populations during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq under Saddam Hussein
(1974–75; 1985–96). According to the U.S. State Department, government forces moved
“large numbers” of Kurds from military zones in northern Iraq to “distant areas,” often
in the south:
“Most of the forcibly relocated have been allowed to return subsequently, although
not to their original villages. Most have been resettled in government-built centers.
In addition to dispersing Kurds throughout Iraq, there have been various attempts
to dilute their geographic majority in the north by moving in ethnic Arabs. Persons
may avoid expulsion if they relinquish their Kurdish, Turkoman, or Assyrian identity
and register as Arabs.”19
Even though the Kurdish population was resettled, this case resembles cleansing more
than forced relocation because victims were moved far from the conflict zone, and there
18 In both cases, specific subnational groups were displaced (Kurds in Iran and Shi’a Muslims in Iraq)
but it is unclear whether they were targeted as a group or whether they were victimized because they
happened to reside in a particular conflict-affected area. There were also conflicting reports regarding
the extent to which perpetrators intended, and eventually allowed, victims to return to their homes.
19 U.S. State Department 1983.
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was a concerted effort by the perpetrator to permanently move its co-ethnics into the
depopulated areas. Displacement here was clearly part of the government’s program of
“Arabization” and reflected an attempt at demographic engineering.
In summary, SDCC is the most systematic effort to collect cross-national data
on strategic displacement in contemporary civil wars and capture key information
about each case. In addition to providing the most disaggregated measure of strategic
displacement to date, SDCC is more comprehensive than previous data collection
attempts because it (1) encompasses instances of ethnic or political cleansing and forced
relocation, (2) covers both conventional and irregular wars, and (3) includes cases
omitted from existing datasets. It is therefore a critical step towards identifying and
examining variation in population displacement strategies across conflicts.
Variation Across Conflicts
Perpetrators
State actors employed strategic displacement in 58 percent of civil wars from
1945–2008, indicating that these measures have been more common in modern conflicts
than previous research suggests.20 Of the wars that did experience state-induced
displacement, cleansing was used in 34 percent of cases (or 20 percent of all conflicts),
depopulation 13 percent (8 percent of all conflicts), and relocation 58 percent (33
percent of all conflicts).21 Incumbents used multiple displacement strategies in
only four conflicts: Burundi (1991–, cleansing and relocation); Sudan (1963–72 and
1983–2002, depopulation and relocation); and Myanmar/Burma (1960–95, cleansing
and relocation). By contrast, rebel groups orchestrated displacement in only 15 percent
of civil wars. Of these, cleansing was used in 54 percent of cases, and forced relocation
in 46 percent (see Figure 4.1).22 These results confirm that states are the most common
architects of strategic displacement.
Variation by Region
Strategic displacement occurred in all world regions, though less than one
quarter of cases were employed in Europe or by European imperial powers. This
20 For example, Zhukov (2015) estimates that displacement was employed in one-third of
counterinsurgency campaigns from 1945–2006.
21 60 percent of cleansings were carried out by pro-government militias, while a vast majority of
depopulations (73 percent) and forced relocations (93 percent) were perpetuated by the state’s military
or police forces.
22 Rebel perpetrators included UNITA (Angola), Shanti Bahini (Bangladesh), the Khmer Rouge
(Cambodia), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Colombia), the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL, DR Congo), the Muslim United Front
(India/Kashmir), The Free Aceh Movement (GAM, Indonesia), The United Liberation Movement of
Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO, Liberia), Renamo (Mozambique), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF,
Sierra Leone), Sendero Luminoso (Peru), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Sri Lanka).
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underscores the importance of examining the use of these practices in a broader range
of cases. Europe has, however, experienced more state-induced wartime cleansings than
any other region, claiming 39 percent of cases in my sample (twelve conflicts), followed
by sub-Saharan Africa (32 percent, or ten conflicts), the Middle East and North Africa
(16 percent, or five conflicts), Asia (10 percent, or three conflicts), and Latin America
(one conflict). This is particularly striking given that only eleven percent of conflicts
between 1945 and 2008 occurred in Europe, meaning that two-thirds of all civil wars
in the region featured the use of cleansing by state actors. For each of the other world
regions, cleansing occurred in less than one-quarter of all wars.
Figure 4.1: Frequency of Strategic Wartime Displacement by Perpetrator (1945–2008)
Of the 55 conflicts in which incumbents employed forced relocation, 43 percent
(or 23 wars) were located in Asia, 43 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, eight percent in
Latin America (four wars), four percent in the Middle East and North Africa (two),
and two percent in Europe (one). As a proportion of civil wars in the region, relocation
was more prominent in Asia (50 percent of all conflicts) than in Africa (39 percent). The
twelve wars that experienced depopulation were moderately distributed across regions,
though the highest number occurred in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (33 percent, or
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four conflicts each). These patterns demonstrate that cleansing has been relatively rare
outside of Europe, while forced relocation has been most common in Africa and Asia.
Variation by War Type
As shown in Table 4.2, nearly all instances of state-induced expulsion (both
cleansing and depopulation) have occurred in ethnic wars.23 Yet forced relocation has
actually occurred in a higher proportion of non-ethnic wars (41 percent) than ethnic
wars (29 percent). The results were similar when I ran the analysis on an alternative
measure of ethnic war based on James Fearon’s three-level variable, in which 0 indicates
a non-ethnic war, 2 an ethnic war, and 1 indicates that the war was ambiguous or
mixed.24
Table 4.2: Strategic Displacement in Ethnic Wars, 1945–2008 (State Perpetrators)
Non-Ethnic War Ethnic War Total
No Cleansing 98% (53) 71% (76) 80% (128)
Cleansing 2% (1) 29% (30) 66% (32)
Total 34% (54) 66% (106) 100% (160)
χ2 = 16.02, p=0.00***
No Depopulation 98% (53) 90% (95) 92% (148)
Depopulation 2% (1) 10% (11) 8% (12)
Total 34% (54) 66% (106) 100% (160)
χ2 = 3.75, p=0.06**
No Forced Relocation 59% (32) 71% (75) 67% (107)
Forced Relocation 41% (22) 29% (31) 33% (53)
Total 34% (54) 66% (106) 100% (160)
χ2 = 2.13, p=0.16
I also explored whether the incidence and type of strategic displacement varied
depending on the aim of the conflict. Fearon categorizes civil wars as having one of
three basic aims: rebels sought to take over the central state, rebels attempted to succeed
23 According to Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)’s coding of ethnic war.
24 Fearon 2004.
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from the state, or the goals of the rebels were mixed or ambiguous.25 Of the 31 wars in
my study where incumbents employed cleansing, 29 percent (or nine conflicts) were
aimed at government takeover, 55 percent (17) were secessionist, and 16 percent (five)
were mixed or ambiguous. For those that experienced forced relocation, 45 percent of
wars (24) sought government takeover, while 49 percent aimed for succession.
Figure 4.2: Prevalence of State-induced Displacement Strategies
Variation by Time Period
Figure 4.2 tracks time trends in each displacement strategy by decade (state
perpetrators only). The prevalence of forced relocation in civil wars peaked in the
1980s – even after the 1977 amendment to the Geneva Conventions prohibited “the
forced movement of civilians” under international law – before declining after the Cold
War.26 While cleansing and depopulation have occurred in a smaller proportion of wars,
they increased in frequency in the 1990s and 2000s. This is likely attributable in part to
post-Cold War shifts in the nature of intrastate conflict from irregular to conventional
warfare, which I discuss below.27 Overall, the proportion of conflicts experiencing
some form of strategic displacement has remained relatively consistent since the 1960s,
25 Fearon 2004.
26 See Article 17, 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions.
27 Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 423.
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despite a steady increase in the number of people reportedly uprooted by violence and
persecution globally (as shown in Chapter 1). This should somewhat assuage concerns
that any increased interest in, or better reporting on, wartime displacement over time is
biasing the data.
Dependent Variable
Because my unit of analysis is the conflict, in order to construct the dependent
variable I need to determine how to treat the four conflicts in SDCC that experienced
multiple types of state-induced displacement. For example, during the civil war
in Burundi (1991–2005) state forces committed cleansing against Hutu residents of
Bujumbura in 1993 and then engaged in the forced relocation of rural populations from
1996–2003. While fighting various insurgencies from 1960 to 1995, the government of
Myanmar (Burma) employed cleansing against Rohingya Muslims in Arakan State
and in other regions forcibly relocated Karen, Kachin, Mon, and Shan populations. For
these cases, I coded the dependent variable based on the primary type of displacement
employed in the conflict, in terms of intensity, duration, and scope. As a robustness
check I used the secondary type of displacement as the outcome variable. The results
were not substantively different than those presented below.
Independent Variables
Chapter 2 develops a series of hypotheses for different explanations for strategic
wartime displacement. Again, the focus of this study is on displacement induced by
state actors. The independent variables in my analysis correspond to the macro-level
implications of each argument, and are outlined in Table 4.4. In some cases I use
multiple measures to proxy for the concept in question, and in the last part of this
chapter I re-run the analysis using alternative variables to check the sensitivity of the
results.
Assortative Variables
For H1a, I set a dichotomous variable equal to one if a conflict was an irregular
war and zero if it was a symmetric war, which covers both conventional and symmetric
non-conventional (SNC) conflicts. This measure is based on Kalyvas and Balcells’ coding
of military technologies of rebellion at the onset of a civil war.28
To proxy for rural, peripheral insurgencies (H1b), I use two separate but related
measures. The first is a dichotomous measure of border conflict (bordconf ) set equal
to one if the conflict zone (a) falls outside the capital city, (b) abuts an international
28 Kalyvas and Balcells 2010. In ten conflicts (6 percent), technologies of rebellion change during the war,
but the results are robust to using these alternative measures.
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or coastal border, and (c) has a significant rural component. While wars in distant
borderlands tend to be waged in the countryside, there are several exceptions where
fighting primarily occurred in urban areas, such as India (1984–93), Algeria (1992–),
and Chechnya (1999–2009). Data for (a) and (b) were taken from Halvard Buhaug,
Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, who use Geographic Information System (GIS) data
to measure the geography of civil wars between 1945 and 2003.29 For (c), I relied on
multiple qualitative and quantitative classifications of rural and urban insurgencies,
since geo-coded datasets such as ACLED and UCDP GED are too limited in country and
temporal scope.30
As a second measure I use distance, in kilometers (logged), between the capital
and the conflict zone.31 Since distance is influenced by country size, when analyzing this
variable I include a control for the land area (logged) of the host state. Both measures
were drawn from Buhaug, Gates and Lujala.32 While previous research has attributed
some of these factors at the country level to civil war onset,33 subsequent studies have
found that the geographical characteristics of conflict zones tend to differ from those of
the host countries.34
H1c contends that cleansing is more likely where group-level information about
wartime loyalties is readily available, while forced relocation is less likely. As noted in
Chapter 2, such information is typically revealed in one of two ways. The first is when
elections occur during (or preceding) a conflict, which reveal the political preferences of
each community. I therefore use elections, a dichotomous variable indicating whether at
least one round of competitive national or local elections occurred during the conflict
or within five years prior, according to data compiled by Abbey Steele and Livia
29 Buhaug et al. 2009. Note that this is a conservative coding procedure, and may actually underestimate
the effect of border conflict on the incidence of forced relocation. Because of how the authors use GIS,
their variable only captures areas adjacent to a border with another state. This means that several
wars in island nations are not coded even though the insurgencies were concentrated in regions along
the country’s coastal periphery – including Aceh and Timor in Indonesia, Bougainville in Papua
New Guinea, Jaffa in Sri Lanka, and Mindanao in the Philippines. Several of these cases have also
experienced the strategic use of forced relocation.
30 I first examined classifications of rural and urban insurgences by Calluzzo (2010). Calluzzo looked at
overall insurgent strategy, relative emphasis of counterinsurgent activity, relative tactical emphasis
of insurgent activity, and location of bases of support to determine whether an insurgency primarily
focused on urban areas, primarily focused on rural areas, or focused equally on both rural and urban
areas. A classification of rural or mixed insurgency indicated that the conflict zone had a significant
rural component. To cross-check this coding, I consulted a RAND study of counterinsurgency
campaigns (Paul et al. 2010) – which includes an indicator for whether a campaign was “primarily
urban” – along with qualitative classifications of urban and rural insurgencies described by Staniland
(2010) and Hoffman and Taw (1991).
31 Zhukov 2015.
32 Buhaug et al. 2009. For distance, I filled in missing data using capital-conflict zone distance from Lyall
and Wilson (2009). Excluding this data does not significantly change the results.
33 Fearon and Laitin 2003.
34 Buhaug and Lujala 2005.
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Schubiger.35 This coding actually biases in favor of the punishment argument, since it
does not account for the possibility that elections may have been held after displacement
was first employed in a conflict.
A second way in which group-level information about civilian loyalties can
be revealed is when a rebel group claims to fight on behalf of a particular ethnic or
religious group. This will encourage perpetrators to treat group membership as a
proxy for support for insurgents. footnoteThis proposition differs from H4b in that
it emphasizes the existence of an ethnic constituency that rebels claim to represent,
whereas H4b focuses on how small and concentrated that constituency is. To measure
this, I use the variable rebclaim from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, which indicates
whether insurgents made an exclusive claim to fight on behalf of a specific ethnic
group.36
For the hypothesis on civilian instrumentalization (H2a), I use a dichotomous
variable, CDF, that denotes whether civilian defense forces were mobilized during the
war, according to Goran Peic.37 CDFs are defined as a type of pro-government militia
that (1) is comprised mainly of civilians; (2) is raised, armed, or supported by the state;
(3) operates in the neighborhood, village, or region where they were recruited; and (4)
undertakes defensive roles against insurgents. Examples include the Rondas Campesinas
in Peru, the Thai Village Defense Volunteers, and the Sandinista People’s Militia in
Nicaragua. Table 4.3 displays a cross tabulation between the primary type of strategic
displacement employed in each conflict and CDF mobilization. The table shows that
incumbents raised these civilian forces in 37 percent of civil wars from 1945–2008.
Table 4.3: Strategic Displacement and Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), 1945–2008
No CDF CDF Total
No Strategic Displacement 58% (25) 15% (5) 42% (67)
Cleansing 25% (25) 8% (5) 19% (30)
Depopulation 7% (7) 5% (3) 6% (10)
Forced Relocation 11% (11) 72% (42) 33% (53)
Total 63% (101) 37% (59) 100% (160)
χ2 = 62.21, p = 0.00***
35 Steele and Schubiger 2018. The authors identified competitive national elections (presidential or
legislative) in all civil wars from 1945–2004 based on NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012), and local
elections based on a World Bank database (Beck et al. 2001). Non-competitive elections were not
included.
36 Cederman et al. 2010.
37 Peic 2014 To fill in missing data I use Clayton and Thomson (2016).
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Finally, for H2b, I use an indicator for whether an incumbent was fighting a
parallel conflict (parconf ), according to UCDP.38 This included both military conflicts
with another state and other domestic insurgencies.
Other Variables
To proxy for ethnic nationalism, I use Fearon’s three-level variable for ethnic
war (H3a)39 and a measure of exclusionary ideology (exclusionary) from the Center for
Systemic Peace (H3b).40 Since the data for the latter only goes back to 1955, in order
to code earlier cases I adopt a similar approach to Daniel Krcmaric and code “strict
variants of communism and sharia law” as exclusionary ideologies.41
For denial arguments, two dichotomous variables serve as proxies for rebel
“embeddedness” in the civilian population (H4a). The first, rebextsupp, indicates
whether rebels received troops, supplies, money, or sanctuary from a foreign sponsor,42
which weakens the interdependence between insurgents and the local population.43 In
her study on rebel governance, Reyko Huang finds that externally-funded rebels are five
times less likely to “systematically rely on civilians” compared to those that lack foreign
supporters.44 The second variable, rebel forced recruitment (rebel FR), indicates a group’s
reliance on civilians for manpower and is based on data collected by Dara Cohen and
several other sources.45
For H4b, I followed Stanton46 and used an indicator for small, concentrated rebel
constituency (rebconcen) constructed using data from Minorities at Risk.47 Constructing
this measure involved identifying rebels’ base of support in each conflict using the
Ethnic Power Relations dataset and setting the variable equal to one if a rebel group’s
ethnic base was (a) located in one region of the country, (b) 25 percent or more of the
group’s population lived in the region, and (c) the group constituted “the predominant
portion of the population” in the region.48
For punishment-related arguments, I used a dichotomous measure of whether
state forces perpetuated mass killing against civilians during the conflict, according
38 Gleditsch et al. 2002.
39 Fearon 2004.
40 Gurr and Harff.
41 Krcmaric 2018.
42 According to Högbladh et al. (2011 (March))
43 Weinstein 2006; Zhukov 2017.
44 Huang 2016, 83.
45 Since Cohen (2016)’s data only covers conflicts after 1980, I also used studies by Thomas and Bond
(2015) and Beber and Blattman (2013), which code abduction and forced recruitment by rebel groups
since the 1950s, mostly in Africa. For conflicts on which data was missing, I used case histories to
determine whether rebels engaged in forced recruitment. If the evidence was unclear, the variable was
coded as missing.
46 Stanton 2016.
47 Weidmann et al. 2010.
48 Cederman et al. 2010.
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to the Political Instability Task Force.49 Mass kill is defined as “any event in which the
actions of state agents result in the intentional death of at least 1,000 noncombatants.”
Table 4.4: Arguments, Hypotheses, and Variables
Argument Hypothesis Variable (Source)
Assortative
(Sorting)
H1a: Irregular war→ Forced relocation
Conventional war→ Cleansing
Technologies of rebellion
(Kalyvas and Balcells 2010)
H1b: Rural, peripheral insurgency→
Forced relocation
Bordconf (Multiple)
Distance (Buhaug et al. 2009)
H1c: Group-level info. unavailable→
Forced relocation; available→
Cleansing
Elections (Steele and Schubiger 2018)
Rebclaim (Cederman et al. 2010)
Assortative
(Capturing)
H2a: Civilian defense forces↔
Forced relocation
CDF (Peic 2014;
Clayton and Thomson 2016)
H2b: Multiple conflicts/rebel groups→
Forced relocation Parconf (Gleditsch et al. 2002)
Ethnic
Nationalism
H3a: Ethnic war→ Strategic displacement Ethnic war (Fearon 2004)







Rebextsupp (Högbladh et al., 2011 (March))
Rebel FR (Cohen 2016)
H4b: Concentrated rebel constituency→
Strategic displacement
Rebconcen
(Weidmann et al. 2010)
Punishment H5: Mass killing→ (More/less)Strategic displacement
Mass killing
(Ulfelder and Valentino 2008)
Controls
I controlled for the country’s level of development (GDP per capita, logged), the
size of its population (logged), and its level of democracy (Polity IV), which have all been
identified as important factors influencing wartime violence and repression.50 I also
49 Ulfelder and Valentino 2008.
50 GDP and population data were taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Polity data came from Gurr et al.
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used battle deaths per month (bdeaths) to control for conflict intensity,51 along with the
number of military personnel (milper), an indicator of incumbents’ capacity.52
Table 4.4 summarizes the hypotheses, variables, and data sources. Summary
statistics are displayed in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Cleansing (Govt) 160 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Depopulation (Govt) 160 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Relocation (Govt) 160 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Irregular 160 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
Bordconf 160 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Distance (l) 154 5.40 1.90 1.61 9.13
Land area (l) 159 6.03 1.71 1.79 9.73
Elections 160 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Rebclaim 158 0.58 0.50 0.00 1.00
CDF 160 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Parconf 160 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Ethnic war 156 1.14 0.86 0.00 2.00
Exclusionary 159 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Rebextsupp 160 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Rebel FR 153 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Rebconcen 159 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mass kill 160 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
GDP/capita (l) 159 1.54 1.33 0.05 6.24
Population (l) 160 9.70 1.61 4.28 13.67
Democracy 160 -1.44 5.44 -10.00 10.00
Bdeaths 156 525.16 790.25 3.44 3000.00
Milper 160 340.07 728.61 1.00 4015.00
4.2 Analysis
I begin by exploring the relationship between strategic wartime displacement
and military technologies of rebellion. Table 4.6 displays cross tabulations based on the
51 Estimates of battle deaths, taken from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005), vary by conflict-year. Using the
“best” estimate where available and the “low” estimate otherwise, I calculated total battle deaths
divided by the number of months the conflict lasted. Like Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), I used a variable
normalized on conflict duration because I am interested in relative rather than absolute lethality.
52 Taken from Singer et al. (1972).
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primary type of displacement employed in each conflict. The results lend strong support
to H1a, as conventional wars were more likely to experience cleansing than irregular
wars (35 percent compared to 8 percent), while irregular wars were much more likely
to experience forced relocation (53 percent) compared to conventional and SNC conflicts
(6 and 11 percent, respectively).53 The differences are highly statistically significant (p <
0.001). In total, nearly two-thirds of cleansing occurred in conventional wars, while an
overwhelming majority of forced relocations (90 percent) occurred in irregular contests.
Thus contrary to what Balcells and Steele suggest in their comparative analysis of armed
group displacement in Spain and Colombia, different kinds of civil wars appear to
experience different forms of strategic displacement.54
Table 4.6: Strategic Displacement and Technologies of Rebellion , 1945–2008
Conventional Irregular SNC Total
No Strategic Displacement 49% (25) 34% (31) 67%(12) 43% (68)
Cleansing 35% (18) 7% (8) 22%(4) 18% (29)
Depopulation 10% (5) 5% (5) 0% (0) 6% (10)
Forced Relocation 6% (3) 53% (48) 11% (2) 33% (53)
Total 32% (51) 57% (91) 11% (18) 100% (160)
χ2 = 45.31, p = 0.000***
Moving beyond bivariate analysis, I ran a series of multinomial logistic
regressions to estimate the effect of each variable on the likelihood that a specific type of
strategic displacement is employed by state forces in a given conflict. I use an unordered
multinomial logit with four outcomes: cleansing, depopulation, forced relocation, and
no strategic displacement (the reference category). Estimates using binary logit models,
in which the reference category is adjusted, are not substantially different from the
findings presented here (see Appendix F for results).
I tested each set of arguments in separate models and together in two
comprehensive models. I reported robust standard errors clustered by country in
order to address the probability that conflicts in the same country are not statistically
53 This relationship helps explain broader displacement patterns. Specifically, for all conflicts in SDCC
waged between 1975 and 2008, according to data from Marshall (2008), the median number of IDPs
produced by irregular wars (418,630) was nearly 40 percent higher than those produced by symmetric
(conventional and SNC) conflicts (305,000). Yet symmetric conflicts produced nearly four times more
refugees (median average of 124,500) than irregular wars (37,320).
54 Balcells and Steele 2016.
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independent of each other. The results are presented in Table 4.7. My analysis focuses
on the findings for cleansing and forced relocation because the number of cases of
depopulation is too small (N=12) to draw reliable conclusions. In each model, I include a
control for irregular war along with the other control variables in order to account for the
relationship between displacement type and technologies of rebellion shown in Table
4.6.
Assortative Logics
The findings from Table 4.7 lend support to the proposition that forced
relocation is associated with rural, peripheral conflicts (H1b) according to multiple
specifications – while cleansing is more common in wars fought at the center. The
coefficients for bordconf and distance are positive and highly statistically significant
for relocation, even when controlling for the size of the country, across multiple
specifications. These variables are consistently negative, however, for cleansing. In terms
of substantive effects, Figure 4.3 shows that forced relocation is nine times more likely
in border conflicts as in non-border conflicts, whereas cleansing is three times less likely
in border conflicts. It is important to recall that SDCC draws from a sample of conflicts
that excludes urban uprisings, such as the “dirty war” in Argentina, the Troubles in
Ireland, and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) in Venezuela – which
are typically coded as civil wars in other datasets. Given the lack of reports of forced
relocation in these cases, the effect of border conflict in my analysis may actually be an
underestimate.
















Distance −0.42∗ −0.58 ∗ ∗
(0.23) (0.27)




Elections 1.53 0.60 1.32 0.13
(0.94) (0.70) (1.15) (0.97)
Rebclaim 4.86 ∗ ∗∗ 3.61 ∗ ∗∗ 3.85 ∗ ∗∗ 3.12 ∗ ∗∗
(1.50) (1.18) (1.44) (1.12)
CDF 1.55 1.08 1.70 1.78 ∗ ∗
(0.84) (0.73) (0.93) (0.77)
Ethnic war 1.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.51 0.60
(0.35) (0.41) (0.52)
Exclusionary 1.55 ∗ ∗∗ 0.31 0.43
(0.50) (0.93) (0.84)
Rebextsupp 1.64 ∗ ∗ 1.35 1.55∗
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(0.69) (0.91) (0.92)
Rebel FR −0.01 −0.10 0.07
(0.62) (0.58) (0.69)
Rebconcen −0.07 −0.46 −1.06
(0.53) (0.83) (0.71)
Mass kill 1.54 ∗ ∗∗ 1.94 ∗ ∗ 1.75 ∗ ∗
(0.59) (0.97) (0.69)
Irregular −1.91 ∗ ∗∗ −1.45 ∗ ∗∗ −1.45 ∗ ∗ −1.73 ∗ ∗∗ −1.12∗ −2.73 ∗ ∗∗ −2.23 ∗ ∗∗
(0.64) (0.52) (0.63) (0.64) (0.57) (0.93) (0.72)
GDP 1.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.62 ∗ ∗∗ 0.43 ∗ ∗ 0.61 ∗ ∗∗ 0.60 ∗ ∗∗ 1.15 ∗ ∗∗ 0.66 ∗ ∗∗
(0.24) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.33) (0.23)
Population −0.50 ∗ ∗ −0.27 −0.24∗ −0.28∗ −0.22 −0.68 ∗ ∗∗ −0.43∗
(0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.23) (0.22)
Democracy 0.01 −0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08)
Bdeaths 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −3.38 −2.63 −0.84 −0.13 −0.66 −2.59 −3.21








Elections 2.37 1.88 2.17 1.44
(1.58) (1.48) (1.76) (1.11)
Rebclaim 1.77 0.61 0.20 −1.27
(1.63) (1.31) (1.76) (1.59)
CDF 1.33 0.80 0.27 0.17
(1.40) (1.09) (1.57) (1.55)
Ethnic war 1.30 ∗ ∗ 1.02 ∗ ∗ 1.28∗
(0.60) (0.51) (0.70)
Exclusionary 0.55 −0.03 0.67
(0.75) (0.74) (0.76)
Rebextsupp −0.09 −0.81 −0.44
(0.92) (1.34) (1.18)
Rebel FR 1.65 ∗ ∗ 1.91 ∗ ∗ 1.76
(0.79) (0.94) (1.15)
Rebconcen 1.99 ∗ ∗ 1.14 1.80
(0.90) (1.18) (1.69)
Mass kill 1.07 0.09 0.80
(0.95) (1.07) (1.02)
Irregular −1.76 −0.84 −0.03 −0.14 −0.09 −1.45 −0.82
(1.36) (1.03) (0.96) (1.11) (0.94) (1.29) (1.52)
GDP 1.47 ∗ ∗∗ 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ 0.75 ∗ ∗∗ 0.89 ∗ ∗∗ 0.94 ∗ ∗∗ 1.50 ∗ ∗∗ 0.79 ∗ ∗
(0.39) (0.36) (0.26) (0.34) (0.29) (0.47) (0.40)
Population −0.56 ∗ ∗ −0.28 −0.30 −0.27 −0.31∗ −0.52 −0.17
(0.28) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26) (0.19) (0.34) (0.33)
Democracy −0.00 0.00 0.04 −0.00 0.05 −0.04 −0.03
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(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −8.45 −3.65 −3.02 −3.81 −2.01 −8.28 −6.91
(5.27) (2.62) (2.20) (3.18) (2.18) (5.52) (4.95)
Relocation
Distance 1.44 ∗ ∗∗ 1.97 ∗ ∗∗
(0.40) (0.54)
Land area −0.63∗ −0.79 ∗ ∗
(0.36) (0.38)
Bordconf 2.71 ∗ ∗∗ 3.86 ∗ ∗∗
(0.78) (1.13)
Elections −0.74 −0.52 −1.56 ∗ ∗ −0.78
(0.65) (0.75) (0.70) (0.83)
Rebclaim −0.21 −1.00 −2.31 ∗ ∗ −1.65
(0.61) (0.84) (1.03) (1.22)
CDF 4.05 ∗ ∗∗ 3.11 ∗ ∗∗ 4.68 ∗ ∗∗ 3.25 ∗ ∗∗
(0.78) (0.59) (1.02) (0.75)
Ethnic war 0.28 1.35 ∗ ∗ 1.04∗
(0.26) (0.62) (0.48)
Exclusionary 0.49 −0.26 −0.72
(0.48) (0.88) (0.82)
Rebextsupp 1.01 ∗ ∗ 1.83 ∗ ∗ 0.23
(0.43) (0.83) (0.48)
Rebel FR 0.34 0.46 −0.82
(0.49) (0.78) (0.80)
Rebconcen 0.21 −0.07 −1.67∗
(0.53) (0.85) (0.86)
Mass kill 0.45 1.60 1.62 ∗ ∗
(0.46) (0.94) (0.72)
Irregular 1.23 1.83 ∗ ∗ 2.26 ∗ ∗∗ 2.27 ∗ ∗∗ 2.28 ∗ ∗∗ 2.00 ∗ ∗ 1.84∗
(0.79) (0.83) (0.76) (0.81) (0.75) (0.96) (1.09)
GDP −0.72 ∗ ∗ −0.70∗ −0.39 −0.34 −0.32 −1.14 ∗ ∗∗ −0.97 ∗ ∗
(0.32) (0.36) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.37) (0.47)
Population −0.20 −0.10 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.18 −0.27
(0.27) (0.19) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.32) (0.24)
Democracy 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Bdeaths −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −3.44 −1.35 −1.11 −1.84 −1.32 −8.11∗ −0.36
(3.51) (1.86) (1.52) (1.38) (1.54) (4.60) (2.66)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.46 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.58 0.54
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
According to Table 4.7, the coefficients for elections and rebclaim are positive for
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Probability of Strategic Wartime Displacement
Note: Mean predicted probabilities based on Model 7 in Table 4.7 with standard
errors clustered by country. Continuous variables set at mean values
and dichotomous variables at median values. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. Estimates calculated using CLARIFY (Tomz et al. 2003).
cleansing, and rebclaim is highly statistically significant across multiple specifications.55
This supports the notion that when rebels fight on behalf of a particular ethnic group,
incumbents are more likely to use ethnic affiliation as a group-level proxy for political
loyalty and target members for expulsion. In contrast, both of these variables are
negative for relocation. Nevertheless, it is possible that even non-competitive elections
reveal information about community loyalties, and could therefore provide a marker
for collective expulsion. Yet the results do not change if the elections variable in Table 4.7
is expanded to include non-competitive elections, according to the National Elections
Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) database.56 This offers evidence for
H1c by indicating that, while cleansing is more likely when group-level information
about wartime loyalties – whether revealed through electoral results or ethnic ties to
55 Elections nearly reaches statistical significant at the 0.10 level (p=.103).
56 Hyde and Marinov 2012. This finding holds even when only local elections are accounted for – an
important check because, as Steele (2017, 45) points out, national elections may not reveal the kind of
fine-grained information about political loyalties required for collective targeting because the level of
vote aggregation is too high.
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insurgents – is available, relocation is more likely in the absence of such information.
These results support my expectations regarding the form that strategic
displacement should take, and the kinds of conflicts in which it is likely to be used, if
uprooting civilians is driven by an assortative logic. But the findings are also potentially
consistent with alternative arguments that, while emphasizing different logics, still
anticipate strategic displacement where combatants are starved for information.
The results for other variables provide a better test of the assortative theory vis-à-vis
competing mechanisms. Models 1-2 and 6-7 in Table 4.7 confirm that civilian defense
forces are mobilized much more frequently in conflicts where incumbents employ forced
relocation (H2a). The coefficient for CDF is positive and highly statistically significant
for relocation, and for cleansing the coefficient is consistently positive but generally
insignificant.
Given the finding from prior studies that CDFs are often part of state efforts to
overcome asymmetric information, the relationship between forced relocation and the
formation of CDFs may be endogenous.57 In some conflicts, the creation of CDFs started
before incumbents initiated relocation; in other cases, units were not mobilized until
after civilians were relocated. This association is meant to illuminate a potential function
of relocation, rather than an underlying condition that gives rise to it. While the result
could simply reflect states “outsourcing” relocation to pro-government militias (PGMs),
I find that other PGMs – such as death squads and paramilitary forces – are less likely to
be used in conflicts with CDFs.58
Ethnic Nationalism
There is some support for ethnic nationalism in helping account for strategic
displacement – but the results are not robust. The coefficients for ethnic war (H3a) and
exclusionary ideology (H3b) are consistently positive for cleansing and forced relocation,
and while they reach statistical significance in some models, the finding is not consistent
across specifications. This indicates that ethnic conflicts, and those in which state
leaders harbor chauvinistic beliefs, may be more likely to experience state-induced
population displacement. Yet ethnic nationalism does not appear to sufficiently explain
the incidence of strategic cleansing or relocation, according to these measures.
57 Clayton and Thomson 2016.
58 61 percent of wars where CDFs were mobilized also featured other PGMs, compared to 64 percent
of wars without CDFs. A logistic regression with an indicator for otherPGM as the independent
variable (based on data from Carey et al. (2013)) found that the presence of PGMs other than CDFs
was positively and statistically significantly associated with the use of cleansing but negatively and
significantly associated with forced relocation (not shown).
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Denial
The denial mechanism is not supported for both cleansing and forced relocation,
as indicators of rebel embeddedness do not align with expectations. The sign for
external support (rebextsupp, H4a) is consistently positive in Table 4.7 and thus not in
the hypothesized direction. The results for forced recruitment by rebels (rebel FR) are
mixed, though none are statistically significant. These findings indicate that strategic
displacement is actually more likely where rebels are able to rely on support from
sources other than the local population.
But an association between displacement and a particular type of external
support – foreign sanctuaries – could still be consistent with a denial logic. If rebels
have a base in a neighboring country, an incumbent might relocate civilians to prevent
them from crossing the border and turning into “refugee warriors.”59 Alternatively, an
incumbent may engage in cleansing to purge their territories of potential “fifth column”
minority groups that ostensibly support a hostile neighbor.60 In both scenarios, strategic
displacement is driven by a need to forestall cross-border insurgencies. Yet the results
for both cleansing and forced relocation do not change when rebextsupp is replaced with
an indicator for external base in Models 4, 6, and 7 (not shown).61 Finally, concentrated
rebel constituency (rebconc, H4b) is statistically insignificant, and the coefficient is
generally negative, for both relocation and cleansing. This is notable since it differs from
Stanton, who for civil wars from 1989-2010 finds a positive and significant relationship
between concentrated rebel constituencies and government cleansing strategies.62
Punishment
Regarding the punishment mechanism, the results in Table 4.7 show that
cleansing is positively and statistically significantly associated with mass killing across
multiple specifications. Yet the relationship between mass killing and forced relocation,
while slightly significant in Model 7, is not significant in Models 5 and 6. This suggests
that cleansing, but not relocation, may serve as a complement to, or a substitute for,
punishing civilians through lethal violence.
The punishment logic also suggests a potential relationship between strategic
displacement and lethal violence. On the one hand, displacement may be more likely
in conflicts with higher levels of civilian victimization, since massacres are sometimes
used to orchestrate civilian flight. On the other hand, displacement may serve as a
substitute for – and therefore correlate negatively with – mass killing because it offers
59 Stedman and Tanner 2004; Lischer 2005.
60 Mylonas 2013.
61 To test the “fifth column” argument, in addition to external base I ran an indicator for whether the
external base was located in a rival neighboring country. Data for both variables were taken from
Salehyan (2008) and Högbladh et al. (2011 (March)).
62 Stanton 2016.
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combatants plausible deniability: they can claim people moved on their own volition,
potentially avoiding the condemnation that comes with killing civilians.63 Thus strategic
displacement should correlate either positively or negatively with state-led mass
violence against civilians in civil wars.
A substitution effect between strategies of mass killing and those of mass
displacement could also be revealed in temporal patterns. Due to the rise of norms
against killing noncombatants in wartime, it is plausible that counterinsurgents have
increasingly opted for displacement over massacres in response to pressures in the
international system and concerns over the reputational costs of slaughtering civilians.
Time trends in strategic displacement and mass killing (Figure 5.1) indicate that this
might be true for some types of displacement: the percentage of civil wars experiencing
cleansing and depopulation increased in the 1990s as the relative use of mass killing
began to wane. But the incidence of forced relocation in armed conflicts, like mass
killing, peaked in the 1980s before declining during the following decade. Much of this
decline seems to be related to the drop in irregular conflict after the Cold War: if the
sample is limited to irregular wars, mass killing surpassed forced relocation in relative
frequency in the 1970s, and then declined at a lower rate in subsequent decades (Figure
4.5). These trends further indicate a relationship between government strategies of mass
killing and mass displacement when it comes to population expulsion, but not forced
relocation.
Figure 4.4: Strategic Wartime Displacement and Mass Killing, by Decade
63 Steele 2011, 2017.
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Figure 4.5: Strategic Displacement and Mass Killing (Irregular Wars Only)
As a separate test of the punishment logic, for cases where I was able to identify
when during a conflict displacement was employed, I calculated the average number of
annual battle fatalities pre- and post-displacement. While my analysis primarily uses
battle deaths as a proxy for conflict intensity, given the high correlation between battle
deaths and civilian deaths,64 if the primary aim of displacement is to
punish, we should observe more lethal violence after these measures are
enacted. In conflicts where data was available, the results for cleansing are consistent
with this logic: the median number of fatalities skyrockets from an annual average of 422
pre-displacement to 2,629 post-displacement. For relocation, however, fatalities actually
decreased on average, from 1,500 pre-displacement to 1,155 post-displacement (Table
4.8).
Combined with the results from the main analysis, these findings provide
evidence that punishment logics can explain cleansing, but not forced relocation.
Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that cleansing is an outcome of an
identification process whereby combatants make a determination about who is desirable
(or potentially loyal) and who is undesirable (or disloyal) based on group-specific traits.
Forced relocation, meanwhile, is more likely in conflicts where authorities lack the
information to make these determinations ex ante – environments that may incentivize
the use of displacement itself as an identification process.
64 Weinstein 2006; Cohen 2016.
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 136
Table 4.8: Annual Battle Deaths Pre- and Post-Displacement (1945–2008)
N Mean Median SD Min Max
Cleansing
Pre-Displacement 11 3,056 422 6,341 20 20,284
Post-Displacement 17 9,246 2,629 12,925 379 50,000
Forced Relocation
Pre-Displacement 35 5,708 1,500 10,062 25 41,947
Post-Displacement 35 4,910 1,155 9,852 49 41,947
Additional Factors and Controls
According to Table 4.7, irregular is generally negative and statistically significant
for cleansing and positive and significant for relocation, consistent with the bivariate
results from Table 4.6. Both GDP per capita and military personnel (milper) are
consistently positive for cleansing but negative for relocation, and the results for
GDP per capita are often statistically significant. This suggests that cleansing tends
to be employed by stronger incumbents in more developed countries, and relocation
by weaker incumbents in poorer countries. Finally, bdeaths is generally positive for
cleansing but negative for relocation, indicating that the latter strategy is actually more
likely in less intense wars.
Variation in Forced Relocation in Irregular Wars
H2b posits that forced relocation may be motivated by a lack of information and
a lack of resources. This proposition can help explain variation in the use of this type
of strategic displacement within guerrilla conflicts. To test this, I re-ran the analysis
using binary logistic regression on a subsample of irregular wars (N=90) with forced
relocation as the dependent variable and the same independent and control variables
used in the primary analysis, plus the variable parconf (for H2b). I also included
a control for whether incumbents employed an alternative displacement strategy
(cleansing or depopulation) during the conflict.
The findings (Table 4.9) are consistent with the main analysis: relocation is
positively associated with distance, CDF, and bordconf, all of which are statistically
significant. As expected, relocation has not been employed in irregular wars featuring
urban revolts or insurgencies, including Algeria (1992–), Bolivia (1952), Iraq (2003–11),
Nicaragua (1978–79), Nigeria (1980–85), and Zimbabwe (1983–87). While the Indian
army has routinely relocated civilians during military operations against Maoist and
ethnic rebels in India’s northeast frontiers, these tactics were absent from its campaign
against Sikh militants in Punjab (1984–93), a largely urban rebellion. Alternative
explanations for forced relocation are also not supported (Models 3-7).
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Moreover, the coefficient for parconf is positive and statistically significant across
multiple specifications. Joint hypothesis tests for borderconf and parconf (Models 2 and 6)
were also significant. In terms of substantive effects, Figure 4.6 shows that the predicted
probability of forced relocation being employed in an irregular war increases by 65
percentage points if the war is fought along a border; if incumbents are also engaged
in a parconf, the probability increases another 20 percentage points. These results lend
support to H2b.
Finally, in Table 4.9 GDP per capita is negative across all models (and often
statistically significant), as is milper, similar to the main findings. Figure 4.7 displays
a boxplot of incumbent military personnel by type of strategic displacement. The plot
suggests that within irregular wars, states that employed forced relocation possessed
fewer personnel on average than those that employed other displacement strategies –
though more than those that employed no displacement at all. This likely reflects the
fact that a certain level of absolute capacity is needed to enact strategic displacement,
which probably explains the lack of relocation by particularly weak incumbents with
small militaries, such as Chad (1965–79; 1980–95) and Burundi (1965–69). However,
plotting incumbents’ relative capacity compared to rebels by using a measure of
troop ratio provides a compelling illustration of the fact that states with limited or
overstretched coercive resources tend to employ relocation (also Figure 4.7).65
65 To calculate troop ratio I divided military personnel by the estimated size of the rebel group(s) in each
conflict, drawn from the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013).
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Parconf 2.43 ∗ ∗∗ 1.97 ∗ ∗ 2.29 ∗ ∗∗ 2.80 ∗ ∗∗ 2.50 ∗ ∗∗ 3.36∗ 1.51∗
(0.62) (0.96) (0.65) (0.69) (0.63) (1.98) (1.00)




Bordconf 2.67 ∗ ∗∗ 5.17 ∗ ∗∗
(0.72) (1.83)
Elections 0.27 1.15 −0.58
(0.83) (1.08) (0.70)
Rebclaim −1.31 −0.62 −1.73
(0.81) (1.49) (1.40)
CDF 1.64 ∗ ∗ 1.69∗ 2.75 ∗ ∗∗
(0.71) (1.20) (0.72)
Ethnic war −0.18 0.41 0.48
(0.31) (0.53) (0.48)
Exclusionary 0.14 −0.74 −0.15
(0.58) (0.63) (0.75)
Rebextsupp 1.70 ∗ ∗∗ 1.42 ∗ ∗ 2.45 ∗ ∗
(0.54) (0.62) (1.03)
Rebel FR −0.31 −2.47 ∗ ∗ −0.47
(0.54) (1.20) (0.71)
Rebconcen −0.73 −3.54 ∗ ∗ −0.44
(0.63) (1.46) (1.19)
Mass kill 0.48 1.43 ∗ ∗ 1.35
(0.61) (0.68) (0.92)
Cleans/Depop. −0.97 −1.36 −0.89 −1.26 −1.06 −2.06 ∗ ∗ −0.86
(0.92) (1.40) (0.88) (0.84) (0.93) (0.90) (1.19)
GDP −0.36 −0.65 ∗ ∗ −0.43 −0.34 −0.35 −0.94 −0.92 ∗ ∗∗
(0.32) (0.28) (0.41) (0.31) (0.33) (0.63) (0.35)
Population −0.10 −0.09 −0.13 −0.20 −0.08 −0.42∗ −0.13
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23)
Democracy 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Bdeaths −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00∗ −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00 −0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 1.31 0.19 1.97 1.90 0.76 2.45 −6.75
(1.62) (1.98) (1.81) (1.45) (1.64) (2.82) (4.66)
Observations 88 87 85 87 88 83 80
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.47 0.27 0.33 0.26 0.60 0.53
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Figure 4.6: Predicted Probability of Forced Relocation (Irregular Wars Only)
Note: Mean predicted probabilities based on Model 6 in Table 4.9. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals. Estimates were calculated using CLARIFY (Tomz et al. 2003).
Taken together, the findings in this section provide support for the proposition
that in irregular wars, forced relocation serves as a “mid-range” strategy for incumbents
who possess enough troops to uproot communities but lack the resources to fully
occupy contested areas. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that relocating
civilians requires extensive material resources and is more likely under stronger,
wealthier regimes.66 I find that it is governments in poorer countries, and those
with more moderate capacity, that are more likely to forcibly relocate civilians in
wartime. As explained in Chapter 2, incumbents able and willing to invest in occupying
rebel-affected areas, even those on the periphery – such as Morocco in Western
Sahara (1975–91) or Senegal in Casamance (1989–99) – have, rather than uprooting
civilians, utilized penetrative counterinsurgency strategies such as “clear, hold, and
build” and cordon-and-search. But when states have faced multiple rebel threats or
committed forces to multiple military contests, constraining the resources available to
counterinsurgents – as in Burma (1960–95), Ethiopia (1974–91), India (1989–), Indonesia
66 Kalyvas 2006; Zhukov 2015.
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(1975–2005), and the Philippines (1971–92) – they have frequently resorted to population
relocation as an alternative to fully occupying their borderlands.
Figure 4.7: Incumbent Capacity (Irregular Wars Only)
Sources: Singer et al. 1972; Cunningham et al. 2013.
4.3 Robustness Checks and Additional Tests
I conducted a series of additional tests to check the robustness of the results.
First, to address collinearity and other concerns, I repeated the analysis with each of
the explanatory variables in separate models and dropped all controls except irregular.
Second, I removed conflicts with low precision rankings for strategic displacement to
exclude ambiguous cases. Third, I included regional controls. I also coded all cases of
depopulation as cleansing, and restricted the analysis to the period 1975-2008, which
dropped all colonial wars along with conflicts missing data for some independent
variables. In all instances, the main findings held.
I also separately incorporated five additional controls into the main logit
models. The first was a dummy variable for post-Cold War to account for the possibility
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that (1) geopolitical differences between the Cold War and its aftermath influences
the likelihood of strategic displacement, or (2) displacement – or reporting of it – has
become more frequent over time. The second was an indicator for secessionist war,
based on the measure of conflict aim used in section 4.1. The third was a measure of
rough terrain – the percentage of the conflict zone covered by mountains (logged). 67
Finally, I added controls for war duration (in months) and an indicator for whether rebels
engaged in strategic displacement during the conflict. The results are displayed in
Appendix F. These five additional control variables were statistically insignificant in
most specifications, and in all instances the results remained robust to their inclusion.
War duration was consistently positive and significant for both cleansing and relocation,
indicating that strategic displacement in general is more likely to be employed in longer
conflicts.
Alternative Measures of the Independent Variables
Some of the concepts under investigation are difficult to measure. In
order to mitigate concerns that my results are driven by the choice of particular
variables or data sources, I tested a series of alternative measures for each argument
for strategic displacement. Under the assortative logic, as a separate proxy for
low-information environments (H1b) I used landline coverage, a World Bank measure of
a country’s number of telephone subscriptions per 100 people.68 Poor communications
infrastructure inhibits information sharing and prevents people from easily and
anonymously reporting the identities of rebels and collaborators to authorities.
Moreover, in developing countries, where civil wars tend to occur, it was not until after
2006 that alternative communications technologies, such as mobile phones and the
Internet, became widespread. As an alternative measure of civilian instrumentalization
(H2a), I used a dichotomous measure of conscription from the Military Recruitment
Dataset, which encompasses both “legal” state conscription and “extralegal” measures,
such as press-ganging.69
For ethnic nationalism, I used a country-level measure of ethnic polarization
created by Jose Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol.70 For denial arguments, I employed
two alternate proxies. The first was an indicator for a sons-of-the-soil insurgency,
defined by Fearon and Laitin as one involving “members of a minority ethnic group
concentrated in some region of a country” who “think of their group as indigenous,
and as rightfully possessing the area as their group’s ancestral home.”71 The second,
67 From Buhaug et al. (2009).
68 The data only goes back to 1960, and is spotty for some countries between 1960 and 1975. See https:
//data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.MLT.MAIN.P2
69 Toronto 2007. Press-ganging describes instances where civilians are kidnapped or coerced into serving
without notice.
70 From Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005.
71 Fearon and Laitin 2011.
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 142
drugs, also came from Fearon and Laitin and measured whether rebels had access to
contraband or easily lootable resources (e.g., diamonds, drugs, oil), which reduces
their dependence on civilian support.72 For punishment-related explanations, I tested
an alternative measure of lethal violence, civilian victimization, from Erik Melander,
Magnus Öberg, and Jonathan Hall, which provides an ordinal scale of atrocities against
noncombatants committed by state actors.73
Tables 4.10 display multinomial logistic regression results for these alternative
measures and arguments. I control for the same potential confounders used in the main
analysis. The coefficient for landline is negative and statistically significant for forced
relocation across multiple specifications, and positive and significant for cleansing.
This provides further evidence that the former strategy, but not the latter, is more
likely in contexts where communicating with, and accessing information about, local
populations is difficult. Conscription is positively associated with both strategies, but
only forced relocation is highly statistically significant (at the 0.001 level) in Model 2 and
Model 6.














Landline 0.27 ∗ ∗∗ 0.24 ∗ ∗ 1.46 ∗ ∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.61)








Civ. victim 1.42∗ 2.16∗
(0.76) (1.18)
Irregular −1.31∗ −1.12 −1.06∗ −1.08 ∗ ∗ −1.59 ∗ ∗ −3.81∗
(0.73) (0.77) (0.61) (0.55) (0.75) (1.95)
GDP −0.04 −0.14 0.41 ∗ ∗ 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 0.68 ∗ ∗∗ −1.42∗
(0.29) (0.28) (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.73)
Population 0.14 0.16 −0.11 −0.19 −0.03 0.22
(0.21) (0.23) (0.17) (0.13) (0.18) (0.32)
Democracy −0.04 −0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.09
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
Bdeaths 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 ∗ ∗
72 Weinstein 2006.
73 Melander et al. 2009. Following Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), I transformed the authors’ 0-5 variable
into a 0-2 ordinal scale with 0 = no to low victimization, 1 = moderate victimization, and 2 = high
victimization.
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(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −2.78 −3.56 −1.64 0.06 −4.35∗ −12.80∗
(2.20) (2.22) (2.11) (1.35) (2.51) (6.71)
Depopulation




Ethpol 6.36 ∗ ∗ 25.96 ∗ ∗
(2.64) (12.22)




Civ. victim 3.61 ∗ ∗∗ 20.16 ∗ ∗∗
(1.09) (3.62)
Irregular −0.55 −0.52 −0.44 −0.26 0.27 1.32
(1.29) (1.29) (1.07) (0.98) (1.71) (1.41)
GDP 0.71∗ 0.71∗ 0.83 ∗ ∗∗ 0.97 ∗ ∗∗ 1.17 ∗ ∗∗ 1.98 ∗ ∗
(0.37) (0.40) (0.31) (0.33) (0.35) (0.95)
Population −0.53 ∗ ∗ −0.54 ∗ ∗ −0.29 −0.36∗ −0.42 ∗ ∗ −0.32
(0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.56)
Democracy −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 0.00 −0.06 −0.35 ∗ ∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13)
Bdeaths 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.67 0.75 −5.08∗ −1.43 −8.77 ∗ ∗ −65.95 ∗ ∗∗
(2.68) (3.02) (2.91) (2.17) (4.15) (12.98)
Relocation
Landline −0.93 ∗ ∗∗ −0.95 ∗ ∗∗ −1.78 ∗ ∗∗
(0.28) (0.33) (0.51)
Conscription 2.20 ∗ ∗∗ 2.84 ∗ ∗∗
(0.54) (0.88)
Ethpol −2.51 ∗ ∗ −5.65 ∗ ∗
(1.27) (2.43)




Civ. victim 0.82 0.97
(0.90) (1.00)
Irregular 1.75∗ 1.68∗ 2.31 ∗ ∗∗ 2.35 ∗ ∗∗ 1.71∗ 2.63 ∗ ∗∗
(0.91) (0.96) (0.85) (0.69) (0.90) (0.77)
GDP 0.20 −0.05 −0.12 −0.34 −0.38 0.64
(0.27) (0.40) (0.22) (0.29) (0.37) (0.60)
Population −0.19 −0.03 −0.19 −0.01 −0.02 −0.21
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.33)
Democracy 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 −0.00 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Bdeaths −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00∗
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(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.97 −1.45 1.71 −1.04 −2.00 0.58
(1.69) (1.89) (1.70) (1.63) (2.58) (4.89)
Observations 120 117 133 153 95 81
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.36 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.52
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
As in the main analysis, these findings are consistent with both the sorting and
capturing logics of my assortative theory. Another possible proxy for environments
where local populations are most “illegible” is population density. However, the only
cross-national data on population density available is at the country level, rather than
the level of the conflict zone. Yet the regional variation described in the previous section
provides some suggestive evidence for a potential link between the distribution of
the population and the use of particular displacement strategies. Recall that forced
relocation has been most common in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and least common in
Europe, while most instances of cleansing have occurred in Europe. This could reflect
a distinct feature of modern African and Asian states, particularly in comparison to
European ones: their relatively low population densities.74 In Africa, for example,
scholars such as Goran Hyden have argued that, because peasants have relied on
rain-fed agriculture rather than irrigated crops, the rural population in the region has
remained especially “uncaptured.”75
The findings in Table 4.10 offer further evidence that while alternative
arguments can explain state strategies of population cleansing, they cannot account
for forced relocation. According to Models 3 and 6, cleansing is associated with wars
in more polarized societies, and relocation with wars in less polarized societies, and
the results for the latter are statistically significant. Models 4 and 6 indicate that the
evidence for denial arguments is weak, just like in the main results. Sons of the soil is
not significantly associated with either displacement strategy. While the result for
insurgent contraband (drugs) is mixed for cleansing, Table 4.10 indicates that states are
more likely to engage in relocation when rebels have access to easily lootable resources
and are therefore less reliant on the civilian population for supplies. Finally, cleansing
is positively associated with higher levels of civilian victimization – as punishment
arguments would expect – and the results are statistically insignificant. Forced
relocation, however, is actually associated with less victimization of civilians.76
74 Herbst 2014; Scott 2010.
75 Hydén 1980, 9-18.
76 Cleansing is also positively and statistically significantly (at the 0.05 level) associated with the most
extreme form of civilian victimization: genocide, according to a country-level indicator for genocides
from Marshall et al. (2017). Forced relocation, meanwhile, is positively but very weakly associated with
genocide (results not shown).
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Other Explanations: Opportunism, Desperation, and Norms
In a final series of tests, I consider three other potential explanations for strategic
displacement in wartime: opportunism, desperation, and normative pressures. I outline
each of these arguments separately, along with the measures I use to evaluate them and
the results of a multivariate analysis, which is presented in Table 4.11.
Opportunism
It is possible that displacing civilians in wartime is driven largely by
opportunism. While I conceptually distinguish opportunistic from strategic
displacement in Chapter 1, making this distinction empirically is more challenging. A
breakdown of state institutions or an erosion of command-and-control in the military
could provide openings and even incentives for soldiers or militia members to uproot
civilians in order to loot and steal their land. Displacement that to external actors
appears to be a calculated incumbent policy could instead be the collective manifestation
of individual greed and predation.
To proxy for opportunism, I follow Dara Cohen in her study of wartime rape77
and use a measure of the magnitude of state failure (statefail), a five-point scale from
the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) that ranges from zero (no state failure) to four
(state collapse).78 According to Models 1, 6, and 7 in Table 4.11, cleansing is positively
and statistically significantly associated with higher levels of state failure. Forced
relocation, meanwhile, is negatively associated with state failure. This potentially
underscores the notion that strategies of relocation require a certain degree of
organizational capacity to carry out. Overall, there is weak evidence for opportunism
in explaining strategic displacement.
Desperation
Another alternative hypothesis posits that forced displacement, like other
strategies of civilian victimization, is a method of last resort. Governments may target
populations when the costs of conflict reach unacceptable levels, such as following
military losses or when facing the prospect of defeat on the battlefield.79 If this
proposition is correct, then we would expect strategic displacement to occur in more
intense conflicts. Yet as I show in the main analysis, battle deaths – a common measure
of conflict intensity – is positively but weakly associated with incumbent cleansing, and
negatively associated with incumbent forced relocation.
A second implication of the desperation hypothesis is that displacement
strategies will be disproportionately employed by losing counterinsurgents, particularly
77 Cohen 2016.
78 Marshall et al. 2017.
79 Downes 2008.
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since, as I outlined in the introduction, studies of the historical record suggest that these
strategies have not been particularly effective at helping governments defeat rebels.
Table 4.12 compares strategic displacement and conflict outcomes: whether the war
ended in an incumbent victory, an incumbent loss, or a draw, when the incumbent “is
forced to concede some rebel demands via a settlement and neither side obtains its
maximal aims.”80 Incumbents who lost wars were only slightly more likely to have used
forced relocation as those who won them (31 percent versus 28 percent), though they
were twice as likely to have employed cleansing (24 percent versus 12 percent). These
differences were not statistically significant, however, so overall, there does not appear
to be a significant relationship between the use of displacement in wartime and conflict
outcomes.




















Rebterrcont 0.55 ∗ ∗ 0.62 ∗ ∗
(0.26) (0.30)
Unstablereg −0.50 −0.43 −0.46
(0.52) (0.76) (0.74)




Irregular −1.54 ∗ ∗ −0.90 −0.64 −1.06 ∗ ∗ −1.86 ∗ ∗ −2.33 ∗ ∗ −0.95
(0.67) (0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.73) (0.98) (0.68)
GDP 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 0.55 ∗ ∗∗ 0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ 1.08 ∗ ∗∗ 0.53 ∗ ∗∗
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.29) (0.17)
Population −0.18 −0.13 −0.11 −0.14 −0.24 −0.31 −0.05
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17)
Democracy 0.02 −0.00 −0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Bdeaths 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −0.30 −0.25 −1.44 0.10 −3.06∗ −3.59 −1.10
(1.49) (1.39) (1.45) (1.45) (1.83) (2.84) (1.88)
Depopulation




80 According to data from Balcells and Kalyvas 2014.
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Rebterrcont 0.76 ∗ ∗ 0.93 ∗ ∗
(0.36) (0.38)






Irregular −0.44 −0.25 0.51 0.10 −0.25 −1.22 0.27
(0.93) (1.08) (1.02) (0.90) (1.23) (1.25) (0.95)
GDP 0.88 ∗ ∗∗ 0.86 ∗ ∗∗ 0.90 ∗ ∗∗ 0.87 ∗ ∗∗ 1.13 ∗ ∗∗ 1.37 ∗ ∗∗ 0.85 ∗ ∗∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.35) (0.44) (0.27)
Population −0.42 ∗ ∗ −0.27 −0.19 −0.18 −0.51 ∗ ∗∗ −0.68 ∗ ∗∗ −0.22
(0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.26) (0.19)
Democracy 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 −0.02 −0.04 −0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09)
Bdeaths 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00∗ −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −0.53 −0.15 −3.58∗ −1.90 −0.98 2.14 −3.84∗
(2.13) (3.05) (2.12) (1.92) (2.92) (4.28) (2.28)
Relocation












Irregular 2.02 ∗ ∗ 2.43 ∗ ∗∗ 2.40 ∗ ∗∗ 2.18 ∗ ∗∗ 2.72 ∗ ∗∗ 2.91 ∗ ∗ 2.34 ∗ ∗
(0.81) (0.92) (0.76) (0.79) (0.93) (1.48) (0.91)
GDP −0.32 −0.31 −0.33 −0.31 −0.21 −0.13 −0.31
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27)
Population −0.12 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.13 −0.21 −0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Democracy 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 −0.01 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Bdeaths −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.22 −0.92 −0.84 −0.40 −0.26 −0.48 0.87
(1.53) (2.00) (1.61) (1.53) (2.13) (2.57) (1.62)
Observations 139 144 146 147 132 106 127
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.27
Standard errors in parentheses
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table 4.12: Strategic Displacement and Conflict Outcomes (for Incumbent)
Loss Draw Win Total
No Strategic Displacement 40% (17) 13% (30) 51%(38) 43% (68)
Cleansing 24% (10) 23% (10) 12%(9) 18% (29)
Depopulation 5% (2) 5% (2) 8% (6) 6% (10)
Forced Relocation 31% (13) 43% (19) 28% (21) 33% (53)
Total 26% (42) 28% (44) 46% (74) 100% (160)
χ2 = 8.53, p = 0.20
A final strand of the desperation hypothesis contends that governments facing
particularly strong insurgencies are more likely to resort to extreme military tactics,
such as killing or displacing civilians.81 To explore this possibility, I examined two
variables. The first is an ordinal ranking of the strength of a rebel group relative to the
government, accounting not only for its number of fighters but also its military and
mobilizational capacities (rebstrength). The second is a measure of the extent to which
rebels controlled territory during the conflict (rebterrcont).82 Both of these variables,
which were drawn from the Non-State Actor Dataset, reflect the level of threat faced
by incumbents.83 According to Models 2 and 7 in Table 4.11, rebstrength is negatively
associated with the use of cleansing by counterinsurgents – contrary to what the
desperation argument would predict – and is positively but weakly correlated with
the use of forced relocation. Models 3 and 7 show that the more territory controlled by
rebels (rebterrcont), the more likely cleansing will occur and the less likely relocation will
81 Valentino et al. 2004. Kalyvas (2006, 168), on the other hand, makes the opposite prediction:
non-selective violence against civilians is more likely when insurgents are weak and unable to protect
the population.
82 rebterrcont takes the following values: 0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high. Testing rebel territorial
control is also important for ensuring the validity of my measures of rural, peripheral insurgency in
the main analysis. Because rural hinterlands often serve as insurgent strongholds – and combatants
are more likely to perpetuate indiscriminate violence in areas dominated by the other side (Kalyvas
2006, 419) – the distance and bordconf variables may actually reflect a tendency for states to utilize
displacement where and when rebels control territory.
83 Cunningham et al. 2013.
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occur. Overall, then, the evidence for the desperation hypothesis in explaining strategic
displacement in general, and forced relocation in particular, is relatively weak.
Normative Pressures
A third potential argument for why governments victimize civilians in wartime
– which could potentially extend to the use of strategic displacement – focuses on the
role of international norms. Jessica Stanton argues that incumbents’ relationships with
international actors shapes their incentives to deploy violence against noncombatants.84
Most governments seek to present themselves as legitimate members of the international
community eligible for political and economic assistance, and the increasing acceptance
of human rights and humanitarian norms have incentivized armed groups to restrain
themselves from targeting civilians in war. Stanton posits that governments in need of
building domestic and international support – specifically, governments with “unstable
regimes” – are more likely to exercise restraint.85
The implications of this hypothesis for the incidence of strategic displacement
depends on whether one characterizes uprooting civilians as “restraint” (compared to,
say, mass killing), or as a failure to exercise restraint. Either way, the argument suggests
an association between unstable regimes and the use of population displacement
strategies, whether positive or negative. I therefore followed Stanton and created a
variable, unstablereg, which measures whether the government experienced a change
in regime or an attempted coup within the five years prior to the start of the conflict.86
Such events also provide “critical junctures” during which, according to Straus, political
leaders can fashion founding narratives and recast the goals of the nation to create
in-groups and out-groups, raising the risk of large-scale, group selective violence
such as ethnic cleansing.87 According to Models 4, 6, and 7 in Table 4.11, there is no
statistically significant relationship between unstable regimes and the use of cleansing
or forced relocation.
A related argument suggests that governments that are more embedded in
the international system should refrain from strategic displacement. As I discussed
in Chapter 1, the post-WWII period experienced the development of relatively strong
norms against population displacement, and armed groups have not been spared from
criticism for even inadvertently driving civilians from their homes. We would therefore
expect this to discourage more internationally-embedded states from engaging in
these practices, since a higher degree of embeddedness is likely to make governments
84 Stanton 2016.
85 Stanton 2016.
86 Like Stanton, I use Polity IV’s data and definition of regime change: a three or more point shift in
polity score within a three-year period (Marshall and Jaggers 2017). Data on coups are from the Center
for Systemic Peace’s Coup D’état Events Dataset (1946–2017, see https://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscrdata.html).
87 Straus 2015.
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more sensitive to “international pressure arising from normative commitments.”88 and
raise the economic and reputational costs of norm violations. I employ two common
measures of the extent to which a government is embedded in the international system.
The first is trade openness (trade, logged), the sum of imports and exports as a share of
GDP. For this variable I relied on data from Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, who combine
information on trade from the International Monetary Fund with GDP data from the
World Bank.89 The second measure is IGO membership: the ratio of the number of
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) of which a state was a full or partial member
compared to the number of which it could have been a member, in the year the war
began.90
Models 5-7 in Table 4.11 show that, consistent with expectations, incumbents
that are less embedded in the international system through global trade are more
likely to employ strategies of cleansing, and the results are statistically significant.
The findings for IGO, while also negative, are statistically insignificant. There is no
significant relationship between the level of trade and forced relocation, and the results
for IGO are mixed. While the coefficient for IGO is statistically significant for relocation
in Model 7 (at the 0.10 level), the sign is negative and therefore not in the hypothesized
direction. Moreover, this finding is not robust to more simplified model specifications.91
Normative factors may therefore help account for the use of cleansing in wartime, but
not relocation.
4.4 Conclusion
Using original data on population displacement strategies in civil wars, this
chapter maps and analyzes cross-national variation in the use of different types of
displacement across conflicts. The quantitative analysis focuses on displacement
induced by state actors – who I show to be the primary perpetrators of these methods
– and provides compelling evidence for a central argument of this dissertation: that
different displacement strategies occur in different conflict environments and follow
different logics. Cleansing tends to be employed in conventional civil wars, where the
need to acquire or defend territory trumps other concerns. Forced relocation, which I
find to be the most common type of displacement, is predominately used in irregular
conflicts, where the primary challenge for incumbents is to effectively identify rebel
fighters and detect the loyalty of civilians.
88 Lyall and Wilson 2009, 84.
89 Lyall and Wilson 2009. The results are substantively similar if I use an alternative measure of trade
openness from the World Bank, which only goes back to the 1960s (see https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.
90 Data on IGO membership was taken from the Correlates of War (War 2007).
91 When other covariates are removed, IGO becomes positive and statistically insignificant for forced
relocation.
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Cross-national tests appear to confirm the finding from studies of individual
wars that cleansing operates through a logic of punishment: it is more likely
when territory-seeking counterinsurgents have access to group-level information
linking civilians to an insurgency, either through election results or shared identity
characteristics with rebels.92 This tactic may serve as a complement or substitute for
mass killing, but the evidence is not conclusive. There is also some evidence that ethnic
nationalism may play a role in these strategies, but the results are not robust.
Yet neither ethnic nationalism nor punishment logics explain the use of
forced relocation, the most prevalent form of strategic displacement in wartime. This
strategy is best explained by an assortative logic: states are more likely to relocate
civilians against insurgencies fought in low-information, “illegible” environments,
and where incumbents lack access to group-level indicators of loyalty and affiliation,
incentivizing them to sort the local population through the process of displacement
and resettlement. Forced relocation also tends to occur alongside counterinsurgent
efforts to mobilize civilians into local defense forces, as the capturing components of my
theory suggests. But why, then, is relocation not used in all guerrilla wars waged in a
country’s periphery? I find that another important factor is whether a state possesses
sufficient capacity to fully penetrate its frontiers. When incumbent forces lack the means
of territorial occupation – particularly because parallel military engagements divert their
attention and strain their resources – ordering civilian communities to move offers a
cheaper method of differentiating friend from foe, and an effective means of mobilizing
recruits.
My analysis also finds little support for arguments claiming that strategic
displacement is principally driven by a logic of “draining the sea.” Contrary to a key
observable implication of denial-based theories, strategic displacement in general, and
forced relocation in particular, is actually more common against rebels that are less
reliant on the local population for food, recruits, and other resources. This does not rule
out denial as a potential motivating factor in states’ decision to uproot civilians. Rather,
just as this explanation was insufficient to explain micro-level variation in strategic
displacement in Uganda, it does not seem to adequately explain macro-level patterns
in these strategies across civil wars.
One could argue that the statistical tests in this chapter do not fully distinguish
between each explanation for strategic displacement – particularly those predicated
on information asymmetries. Measuring the concepts underlying these arguments,
particularly cross-nationally, is difficult, and the proxies I employ are imperfect.
But I utilize several measures to proxy for each argument, and control for a variety
of plausible omitted variables; the results are also robust to a variety of different
specifications. I attempt to ameliorate concerns over measurement error and selection
bias by examining a diverse set of empirical implications. Moreover, I test a series of
alternative explanations to evaluate whether broader theories of why armed groups
92 Steele 2017; Balcells and Steele 2016; Hägerdal 2019.
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target civilians in wartime can account for cross-national variation in population
displacement strategies. I find some evidence for these arguments in helping explain
the use of cleansing, but not forced relocation.
Overall, my quantitative analysis lends indirect support for my assortative
theory of displacement. While the results indicate that the theory can account for
strategies of relocation, it remains unclear whether it also applies to depopulation, for
which the statistical tests were inconclusive due to the small number of cases. I explore
this possibility in Chapter 6 through an out-of-sample case study of the Syrian civil war.
First, however, in the next chapter I provide additional direct evidence for my arguments
and demonstrate the assortative logic of wartime relocation in contexts beyond Uganda.
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Chapter 5
Comparative Evidence of the Assortative
Logic: Burundi, Vietnam, and Indonesia
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The cross-national tests presented in Chapter 4 provide indirect evidence for my
arguments by demonstrating an association between the use of forced relocation – the
most common displacement strategy – “illegible” conflict environments, and civilian
instrumentalization by state forces in civil wars. Yet some of these patterns could still
be potentially consistent with alternative logics of strategic displacement, particularly
those predicated on information and identification problems. Therefore, in order
to illuminate the mechanisms driving the statistical correlations and provide direct
support for my assortative theory in a broader range of cases, in this chapter I present
three shadow case studies from my civil war sample. Because my goal in this chapter
is to evaluate evidence for the assortative logic rather than demonstrate links between
my independent and dependent variables – which was the focus of the cross-national
analysis – I select on the dependent variable.1 The purpose is to explore whether the key
ideas presented in this dissertation can shed light on other cases of wartime relocation
and apply to conflicts beyond the ones in Uganda that I examined in Chapter 3.
The three shadow case studies featured below are Burundi (1991–2006),
Vietnam (1960–75), and Indonesia (1999–2005). A shadow case, according to Hillel
David Soifer, seeks to evaluate “some element of causal process within the case
rather than just examining the values of independent and dependent variables.”2
Shadow cases are oriented to external validity, carried out through a quick survey
of the secondary literature to assess claims of generalizability.3 I therefore selected
three diverse conflicts for analysis. Burundi is a “least likely” case for my theory: an
ethnic war in a highly polarized society with a history of ethnic cleansing and mass
violence that some would classify as genocidal. Vietnam is an “influential” case of
forced relocation: the Strategic Hamlets Program implemented during the conflict is
one of the most extensively researched and discussed instances of civilian relocation
in counterinsurgency campaigns. Finally, Indonesia, like Burundi, is a least likely case
not only because it was an ethnic war, but also because it was waged by a secessionist
insurgency – a context in which territorial acquisition had significant strategic value
and thus seemed ripe for ethnic cleansing. Together, the three cases comprise a “most
different” research design that is intended to assess whether my arguments extend to a
diverse set of contexts.
In all three cases – Burundi, Vietnam, and Indonesia – I argue that forcibly
relocating civilians was driven by information and resource problems and acted as a
mechanism for sorting and capturing the population. Perpetrators used displacement
to draw inferences about the identities and allegiances of the population based on its
movements or lack of movement. They used displacement to enhance the legibility of
rural territories and their residents. And they used displacement to extract material
1 As Seawright and Gerring (2008, 295-96) argues, “given the insufficiencies of randomization as well as
the problems posed by a purely pragmatic selection of cases, the argument for some form of purposive
case selection seems strong.”
2 Soifer 2015, 4.
3 Soifer 2015, 2, Gerring 2006, 20.
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resources, including recruits, from local communities and mobilize people for the war
effort, both politically and militarily. My evidence is only exploratory, but it suggests
that the conditions, dynamics, and motivations regarding uprooting civilians present in
Uganda exist in other cases. This confirms that my theory is generalizable and that its
core mechanisms can account for the empirical associations identified in Chapter 4.
5.1 From Cleansing to Regroupment in Burundi
The civil war in Burundi (1991–2006) demonstrates that even in ethnic conflicts,
combatants have used population displacement, not just ethnic affiliation, to detect and
target potential enemies. More uniquely, in this case state forces employed strategies of
both cleansing and forced relocation. The use of the former is not surprising given the
country’s deep ethnic schisms. Like neighboring Rwanda, pre-war Burundi was largely
ruled by its Tutsi minority – which makes up some 14 percent of the population – over
the Hutu majority, which comprises around 85 percent. The country has experienced
periodic outbursts of ethnic violence since independence. For example, in response to a
Hutu uprising in 1972, the army and affiliated Tutsi militia killed an estimated 100,000
people, mostly Hutus, in what some scholars have called a “selective genocide.”4
Initially, strategic displacement in Burundi’s civil war did indeed take the
form of ethnic cleansing. After the election of Melchior Ndadaye as the country’s
first Hutu president in 1993, a group of Tutsi soldiers staged a putsch, capturing and
executing the new president along with other senior political officials. This sparked
successive waves of inter-ethnic retaliatory violence that continued in 1994 and 1995.
The Tutsi-dominated army – which operated autonomously from the surviving
members of the severely weakened Ndadaye regime – meted out violence against
Hutus, often in response to reprisal killings of Tutsi. In the capital Bujumbura, Tutsis
burned and looted Hutu homes, and Hutus responded in kind. The violence led to a
“massive urban influx of rural Tutsis” into the city, while Hutus were “chased out of
ethnically mixed but predominantly Tutsi neighborhoods.”5 Thus according to the U.S.
Committee for Refugees, forced displacement in Burundi was “no longer merely an
accidental byproduct of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of the violence.”6 And
the goal, particularly for the army and its supporters, appeared to be the permanent
expulsion of ethnic rivals. As explained by Tomas Van Acker:
“While Bujumbura became a refuge for rural Tutsi, fragmentation and segregation
also occurred within the city itself. The modest but real ethnic diversity that
existed in some of the densely populated neighborhoods completely disappeared
4 Lemarchand and Martin 1974.
5 Van Acker 2018, 315.
6 USCR 1998, 32.
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during the first years of the war, in a process that can only be described as ethnic
cleansing...most of the Hutu population vanished from previously mixed areas.”7
The State Department concurred with this characterization, reporting in 1994
that seven out of eleven districts in the capital had become “largely segregated along
ethnic lines.”8 Meanwhile, Hutu officials who fled following Ndadaye’s assassination
launched an insurgency called the National Council for the Defense of Democracy
(Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie, or CNDD).9 The CNDD established
bases among Hutu refugees in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and
remote areas of the Burundian countryside. It joined other smaller Hutu rebel groups –
including Palipehutu, the National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération,
or FNL) , and the National Liberation Front (Front pour la Libération Nationale, or Frolina)
– in launching attacks against military and civilian targets in Burundi. According
to observers, the CNDD received material and logistical support from civilians and
organized parallel political structures in the remote provinces of Karuzi, Muramvya,
Ngozi, Gitega, Kayanza, and Bubanza.10
By 1995, the civilian government had become “paralyzed” and was “los[ing]
effective control of the country.”11 Tutsi militias, with assistance from soldiers, continued
to expel Hutu from Bujumbura; the military was reportedly “actively involved in
driving the population out of predominately Hutu neighborhoods.”12 Thousands of
additional Hutus fled to the countryside as a result of military operations against the
CNDD.13 As fighting between the military and the rebels escalated, hundreds of (mostly
Hutu) civilians were killed by counterinsurgency forces during so-called “pacification”
campaigns.14
In July 1996, Major Pierre Buyoya, a former Tutsi president of Burundi, took
power in a military coup. Buyoya said that he resumed the presidency in order to avert
more ethnic killing, presenting himself as “a comparative moderate who had stepped in
to prevent more extreme Tutsi elements...from taking power.”15 During his first stint in
office (1987–93), Buyoya demonstrated political moderation by appointing a Hutu prime
minister, holding presidential and parliamentary elections, and peacefully stepping
7 Van Acker 2018, 315-16.
8 U.S. State Department 1994. Amnesty International also characterized these episodes of violent
displacement as “ethnic cleansing” (Amnesty International, 1994 (1 July)).
9 For simplicity’s sake I refer to the rebel group as CNDD, though technically CNDD is the name of its
political wing, while its armed wing is named the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Forces pour la
Défense de la Démocratie, or FDD).
10 Longman 1998, 42, Human Rights Watch 2000.
11 Longman 1998, 26.
12 Longman 1998, 42. Prunier (2008, 63) similarly claims that the army “ethnically cleansed the whole city
between March and June 1995.”
13 Van Acker 2018, 315.
14 Longman 1998, 25.
15 Longman 1998, 27.
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down after he lost the election in 1993. Early in his second term Buyoya took “firm
control over the armed forces and the administration”16 and backed up his conciliatory
rhetoric by keeping urban Tutsi militias and youth gangs “in line,” while resisting the
chauvinist impulses of some Tutsi political and military leaders.17
Under Buyoya the army adopted a new counterinsurgency measure called
“regroupment.” Civilians residing in rural areas affected by the rebellion were ordered
to assemble in designated camps. Between 1996 and 1998, villagers were regrouped in
the provinces of Bubanza, Bujumbura-Rural, Bururi, Cibitoke, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza,
Makamba, Muramvya, Muyinga, and Ruyigi. Since its inception observers characterized
regroupment as a “military strategy” in which civilian displacement was “dictated...by
the government administration and armed forces.”18 Many regroupéswere allowed to
return to their homes in 1998, but in late 1999 the government initiated a second wave
of forcible regroupment that lasted until 2002. At its peak the policy resulted in the
concentration of at least 300,000 people into some 50 camps.19
Regroupment in Burundi bore a strong resemblance to Uganda’s forced
relocation policy discussed in Chapter 3. Soldiers would arrive in rural areas “where
most people live in homes scattered across the hills” and order residents to gather at
designated sites, either immediately or within a specified timeframe.20 Most of the
regroupés ended up encamped “a few hours walk” from their villages; 90 percent were
confined within their province of origin and 70 percent within their home commune.21
The camps ranged in size from 3,000 to 22,000 occupants and generally suffered from
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.22 Since regroupment occurred at the same
time that camps for Burundian refugees were being closed in Zaire and Tanzania, many
of the displaced were unable to seek refuge outside the country. Regroupment also
received widespread criticism from the international community. Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch conducted extensive investigations and produced scathing
reports denouncing the policy, while United Nations officials called it a “gross violation”
of international humanitarian law.23 Diplomatic, humanitarian, and human rights
officials pressured the government to “halt its policy of forcing and confining people
to regroupment camps, prevent the setting up of any new camps and allow those within
existing camps to return home if they wish to do so.”24
16 Longman 1998, 31.
17 Van Acker 2018, 316.
18 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 3.
19 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July); Longman 1998.
20 Human Rights Watch 2000, 8.
21 USCR 1998, 35.
22 Longman 1998, 57.
23 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July); Longman 1998; Human Rights Watch 2000.
24 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 2.
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Identification Problems and Spatial Profiling
What was the logic behind regroupment? The evidence strongly suggests that
it was motivated by the difficulties faced by the military in identifying members of the
CNDD and other insurgent groups, which practiced guerrilla tactics and tended to
evade army patrols. As one military commander commented to journalists, “who are we
fighting? Rebels wearing civilian clothes.”25 Thus according to an army spokesman, “We
can only identify them [the rebels] when they fire on us.”26 This identification problem
was exacerbated by the topography of the countryside where the rebels operated, which
was “composed of rugged, mountainous terrain well-suited to guerrilla warfare.”27
Population relocation sought to resolve these challenges. As reported by Amnesty
International, “the government has said that regrouping the population...reduces the
possibility of confusing civilians with members of armed groups.”28
Ironically, the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the mid-1990s helped create the
conditions that made regroupment attractive to state forces. Cycles of forced expulsions
resulted in the Tutsi becoming increasingly urbanized, while most Hutu fled to rural
areas. As a consequence, Burundi became “divided territorially into almost isolated
enclaves, ethnically purified to a high degree.”29 Moreover, this division meant that
by the time Buyoya took power in 1996, “the epicenter of the [Hutu] violent resistance
shifted to the countryside.”30 Yet because the countryside had become so ethnically
homogeneous – and because Hutu comprised such a large majority of the country –
the military could not rely on ethnicity to differentiate combatants from civilians. The
regroupment policy provided an alternative method of enemy profiling. While most
residents of areas targeted for displacement were Hutu, some Tutsi were also forced to
regroup,31 and in some areas “the two ethnicities fled together and remain together.”32
The purpose of regroupment, then, was “to separate the innocent from those
who are against order,” according to one local official.33 The army hoped to make it
easier to detect insurgent fighters. As one soldier explained, “before the camps, it was
hard to tell the civilians from the rebels. The rebels would just throw down their arms.
Then they looked like any civilian.”34 In response, the government “said that people
who believed themselves innocent should assemble themselves” in camps.35 Those who
failed to move within a specified time period “would be considered a [rebel] agent and
25 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 2.
26 Longman 1998, 84.
27 Human Rights Watch 2000, 7.
28 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 2.
29 Van Acker 2018, 315-16.
30 Van Acker 2018, 316.
31 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July); Longman 1998.
32 Longman 1998, 80.
33 Longman 1998, 2.
34 Longman 1998, 40.
35 Longman 1998, 41.
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therefore treated as a legitimate military target.”36 An advisor to Buyoya told Amnesty
International that people “who refuse to go to the camps are those who are fighting the
government or who have weapons.”37 Human Rights Watch also reported that “soldiers
ordered people to go to the camp, and those who stayed at home would be treated as
rebels, according to local administrators and military officials.”38
Many complied with the orders and even “welcomed” the relative security of
the camps, which were often located near military posts.39 There were some people who
elected not to move,40 and therefore risked being tarred as rebels or collaborators and
suffering the same fate as an enemy combatant.41 Moreover, while the military imposed
strict curfews on movement outside the camps – just like the UPDF did for IDPs in
Uganda – people often snuck home to retrieve food, tend their crops, and protect their
property from theft.42 Regroupés could obtain passes that authorized them to leave the
camp, but according to the State Department, “those who are found in the hills without
a camp pass are considered to be rebels and often are shot by government soldiers,
according to a number of sources.”43 A provincial governor interviewed by Human
Rights Watch effectively captured how regroupment was supposed to help sort the local
population:
“When [the rebels] came to Bururi commune...the population fled to the cities and
to [the camps]. This was the case in Rutovu and Songa communes as well. Thus,
soldiers could easily target rebels without targeting the local population...The
situation in Burambi and Buyengero was more complicated. There was confusion.
Where people fled, the military was not confused about who the rebels were. But in
these sectors, the population did not go to the centers. There were problems there,
because the people didn’t flee...There, some people are with the [rebels].”44
For state forces, regroupment aimed to improve the legibility of Burundi’s
rebel-infested rural environs and its occupants. Camps were located on barren hilltops
and in other spaces with relatively high visibility.45 Upon arrival, regroupéswould be
“asked to denounce those who may be involved in armed opposition” and supply other
36 Longman 1998, 47.
37 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 1.
38 Human Rights Watch 2000, 8.
39 Human Rights Watch 2000, 16.
40 IDMC, 2006 (April), 59.
41 U.S. State Department 1997. According to Amnesty International, in the army’s orders to relocate to
camps, “the underlying message that to stay would mean that they [residents] would be treated as
rebels was made clearly” (Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 7).
42 IDMC, 2006 (April), 59. Agriculture was the primary source of revenue for nearly 90 percent of people
displaced into camps (IDMC, 2006 (April), 92).
43 U.S. State Department 1997.
44 Longman 1998, 85.
45 Human Rights Watch 2000, 10.
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intelligence.46 As in Uganda, these new settlements did not necessarily constitute islands
of government control in a sea of rebel territory. Rather, they represented contrived
markers of differentiation that facilitated spatial profiling. Consider the fact that many
camp residents “said that rebels continued to call on them for contributions, even within
camps situated adjacent to military posts and supposedly protected by soldiers.”47
Regroupment did not, in other words, deprive rebels of contact with and access to
civilian communities. There are numerous accounts of CNDD members and other
fighters “circulating freely in the camp sites...to visit families or friends and to seek new
supporters,” sometimes by holding public meetings.48 In some instances rebels even
launched attacks on army garrisons from within the camp.49
Subsequent patterns of violence indicate the use of spatial profiling after
state-induced regroupment: people were targeted based on their physical locations.
Following the deadline for assembling in a camp, the military launched nettoyage, or
cleanup operations, in which soldiers “systematically swept the hillsides, pillaging,
burning and destroying homes, and capturing or killing anyone they encountered”.50
According to Human Rights Watch, the prevailing view in the military was “if civilians
fail to follow government orders or if they support the rebels, it is their own fault if
they become military targets.”51 As a consequence, human rights observers found that
many of the cases of extrajudicial killings that they discovered occurred in areas where
regroupment accompanied counterinsurgency operations.52 Violence against civilians
inside the regroupment camps was limited and typically selective.53 Outside the camps,
however, “it was clear that the armed forces considered anyone...without authorization
to be a military target.”54
Extractive Elements of Regroupment
In addition to providing an approximation of potential rebel affiliation through
guilt by location, regroupment enabled government and military authorities in Burundi
to extort critical resources from the local population. In 1997, shortly after the policy
was implemented, the interior ministry levied a war tax – dubbed the Contribution
to National Solidarity – arguing that “the population needs to make an effort in this
war.”55 While the ministry claimed that regroupéswould be exempt, in practice all
46 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 10.
47 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 17.
48 Human Rights Watch 2000, 33.
49 Human Rights Watch 2000, 16.
50 Longman 1998, 48.
51 Longman 1998, 86.
52 IDMC, 2006 (April), 59.
53 Longman 1998, 62.
54 Amnesty International, 1997 (15 July), 1.
55 Longman 1998, 180.
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citizens, including the displaced, were expected to pay.56 The need for the tax was
abundantly clear. In response to the 1996 coup that returned Buyoya to power, many
international donors imposed a boycott on Burundi; removing a key source of public
financing from a state that had become heavily reliant on external aid. At the same
time, the government was fighting four different insurgent groups and had dispatched
a couple thousand soldiers to Zaire in 1996 to assist rebels engaged in the First Congo
War. Buyoya therefore had few resources to relieve his overextended and beleaguered
army. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, the former U.N. special representative in Burundi,
noted at the time that “the security forces are tired. Since October 1993 they have been
trying to hold the floodgates; they have to provide security in the country and ensure
security at the border.”57
Since the army had “insufficient troops available” to occupy the multiple
rebel-affected provinces of Burundi, regrouping the population offered a more viable
alternative.58 And for a government in need of resources for countering insurgency,
easing the ability of authorities to collect taxes from dispersed communities was not
the only extractive benefit of regroupment. The camps also provided a ready supply
of military recruits. While the Burundian army doubled in size during the initial
period of regroupment (1996–98), reaching a force strength of 40,000,59 its real force
multiplier proved to be displaced civilians. Soldiers recruited regroupés, including
children, to spy for them in camps and serve as lookouts and scouts when they scoured
the countryside for insurgents.60 In many instances, the military “made the civilians
walk in front of them so as to shield them from any ambush by the rebels.”61 The army
also ordered regrouped men to form patrol groups and militias tasked with defending
the camps. Participation was compulsory. Men were made to patrol nightly, sometimes
accompanied by armed soldiers, who took attendance to ensure everyone was present.62
When out on patrol, according to the testimonies of participants, “any unknown person
encountered is arrested and taken to military or political authorities.”63
While fighting-age men helped bolster the military’s manpower, other regroupés
were mobilized for non-combat tasks. Human rights groups reported at the time
that “the use of forced labor within the camps is a widespread practice.”64 Soldiers
required male and female residents to cultivate food, carry water, and make charcoal
for them, a process that is very labor intensive.65 Young boys would help the military
clear underbrush around army posts and regroupment camps to deny cover to rebels,
56 Longman 1998, 180.
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58 Human Rights Watch 2000, 4.
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and ferry goods and equipment for soldiers from one post to another.66 Finally,
encampment enabled local officials to subject the rural population to “re-education” or
“detoxification” programs. These largely entailed political indoctrination through, for
example, the “repetitive singing of pro-government messages.”67
Regroupment therefore proved to be a crucial vehicle through which
“government and military leaders...sought to incorporate unarmed Hutu civilians in
their war effort.”68 The idleness of camp life, greater proximity to state authorities,
and threat of sanction encouraged widespread participation. Facing limited resources
and manpower constraints, mobilizing the local population through regroupment
meant that “the military simplifies its job by enlisting Hutu to monitor themselves.”69
It appears, then, that the state often considered Hutu civilians to be an asset, not just a
threat, to its counterinsurgency operations. This is made clear in an analysis by Human
Rights Watch: “by requiring Hutu to participate in patrols and pay a special war tax,
the government and armed forces have used the Hutu population to assist in hindering
[rebel] activity in the country.”70 In many areas, utilizing the population in this way
likely would have been difficult, if not impossible, without regroupment.
One may wonder how a poorly-resourced and overstretched regime could
afford to sustain the abrupt relocation of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Despite
the post-coup boycott of Burundi by donor countries, upon initiating regroupment
in 1996, the Buyoya government told the international community that it needed
assistance building and supplying the camps with food, water, sanitation facilities,
and other services.71 U.N. agencies and NGOs responded with a “carefully calibrated”
relief program to ensure that “the most urgent, life-sustaining needs of the affected
populations were covered.”72 Authorities in Burundi attempted to shift the burden of
caring for the regroupés onto the humanitarian community:
“Non-governmental organizations are believed to have been heavily pressured to
work in the camps, and the government has made public its disapproval of those
who have been reluctant to work in the camps. The government has made it clear in
a statement issued to diplomatic representatives, nongovernmental organizations
and others that those who do not comply with its policy of coordination, including
working in the camps, ‘are at liberty to withdraw from Burundi.’”73
66 Human Rights Watch 2000, 26. When confronted with allegations of forced labor, Burundi’s Defense
Minister admitted to Human Rights Watch that regrouped civilians were providing free services
to soldiers, but claimed that “the civilians had volunteered to provide the services to show their
appreciation for the protection afforded by the soldiers” (Human Rights Watch 2000, 27).
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Still, in many regroupment camps facilities remained inadequate and services
remained poor. Some settlements received no international aid at all.74 The government
continued to try to divert responsibility for the deteriorating humanitarian situation,
as it “attempted to blame the international community for the dire conditions in the
regroupment camps.”75 Some organizations began refusing to provide assistance;
Médecins Sans Frontière, for example, suspended its activities in camps in several
provinces. Foreign governments also withheld or withdrew support, claiming “that the
creation of camps was a military strategy which the international community had no
business supporting.”76 In fact, multiple observers partly attribute the government’s
decision to begin dismantling camps in 1998 – and its eventual termination of the
program in 2002 – to international pressure.77 Without financial support from external
actors, regroupment became increasingly untenable.
Figure 5.1: Military Battles and Rebel Attacks in Burundi (1993–2006)
Source: UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Only includes data
for provinces that experienced regroupment.
Whether regrouping the population was effective in helping the government
74 Human Rights Watch 2000, 11.
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weaken the insurgency is unclear. Human Rights Watch claims that the policy “helped
reduce rebel attacks on both military and civilian targets,” though it does not explain
how or why.78 According to violent events data from the UCDP Georeferenced Event
Dataset (GED), provinces subjected to regroupment did not seem to experience much of
a decline in rebel attacks during the periods in which the policy was in place (Figure
5.1). Battles between military and insurgent forces, however, increased during the
second regroupment period, so it is possible that regroupment helped expose rebels to
counterinsurgents or forced them to engage in direct combat. Moreover, the number of
civilians killed by both rebel and government combatants spiked during regroupment
(Figure 5.2). This is potentially consistent with the idea that relocating the population
encouraged collective targeting by each side. These trends are similar if we examine
violent events in specific provinces (See Appendix H).
Figure 5.2: Civilians Deaths from Rebel and Government Attacks (1993 – 2006)
Source: UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Only includes data
for provinces that experienced regroupment.
There is little evidence, however, that regroupment effectively cut rebels off
from civilian contact, starved them of food, or deprived them of other supplies. As
discussed above, rebels frequently entered regroupment camps and continued to solicit
78 Human Rights Watch 2000, 8.
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“contributions” from regroupés. For example, members of the FNL accessed a camp
in Kavumu “to recruit and mobilize adherents as well as to collect contributions.”79
Another camp in Bubanza, which surrounded a military detach, was attacked by
fighters from the FDD, who pillaged food, weapons, and other items.80 When reporting
such incursions residents noted that the rebels typically “took only what they needed
to sustain themselves.”81 The guerrillas also benefitted from the spoils of village
evacuations:
“The rebels...helped themselves to food and other goods found in vacant homes after
the countryside had been emptied of its usual population. Many camp residents
said that when they went back to work in their fields, they often found that others
– presumably the rebels – had been living in their houses and eating their crops.”82
Conclusion for Strategic Displacement in Burundi
During the Burundian civil war, state-induced strategic displacement initially
took the form of cleansing and tended to take place in urban, ethnically mixed areas. Yet
precisely because this displacement created a more ethnically homogenous countryside,
as the conflict shifted to remote, rural areas, the Tutsi-led government could not rely
on ethnic identity to proxy for insurgent support among a local population that was
overwhelmingly Hutu. Instead, to combat the shadowy guerrillas of the CNDD, FNL,
and other groups, state forces enacted a policy of regroupment to profile people along
spatial lines. The identification problems posed by the insurgency, the government’s
limited resources, and the army’s need to confront adversaries in multiple theaters all
seemed to encourage counterinsurgents to use regroupment to delineate friend from
enemy, while extracting critical economic and military resources from the population.
Overall, the case of Burundi provides strong evidence of the assortative logic
of strategic displacement. The patterns and dynamics of regroupment shared striking
similarities to the strategy of “protected villages” employed by the government in
Uganda. This case study not only supports my propositions regarding where and
when forced relocation is likely to be employed; it also demonstrates that relocation
indeed acted as a mechanism for sorting, capturing, and converting the local population
into useful assets. Burundi is also unique because it allows us to compare the use of
cleansing and the use of forced relocation by the same state in the same conflict. In doing
so, the case study provides within-case evidence that these two displacement strategies
tend to arise in different contexts and have different objectives and motivations.
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5.2 Strategic Hamlets in Vietnam
The VietnamWar (1960–75) is a paradigmatic case of forced relocation. Moving
and reorganizing the rural population was a cornerstone of South Vietnamese and
American military strategies during the conflict, most notably through the Strategic
Hamlets Program – an initiative that is considered a key development in modern
counterinsurgency practice.83 South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem launched
the Strategic Hamlets Program in 1961 with financial and military support from the
United States.84 To combat the North Vietnam-backed communist insurgents of the
National Liberation Front (NLF) – also known as the Vietcong – the program aimed
to concentrate the rural peasantry of the south and reduce its 16,000 hamlets to 12,000
nationwide.85 Many peasants were forced to relocate, though some fled to the hamlets
voluntarily. Architects of the program intended that no resident would be moved “more
than a reasonable distance from his land, i.e. up to a maximum of three miles.”86
Strategic hamlets had three primarily objectives, according to Sir Robert
Thompson, head of the British Advisory mission to Vietnam. Thompson had served as
the British Secretary of Defense in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency (1950–60),
where he oversaw the counterinsurgency scheme that became the inspiration for the
Vietnam strategy: the resettlement of some 500,000 civilians into “New Villages.”
In Vietnam, the Strategic Hamlet Program aimed to (1) ensure the protection of the
population; (2) “unite the people and involve them in positive action on the side of the
government”; and (3) spur “development in the social, economic, and political fields.”87
Thus the purpose was much broader than constructing fortified villages. As noted
by American military officials in the Pentagon Papers, the objective of the program
“was political though the means to its realization were a mixture of military, social,
psychological, economic and political measures.”88
While the U.S. played a pivotal role in helping design and fund the strategic
hamlets, they were in many ways a continuation of a rural relocation policy enacted
in 1959 by President Diem. Known as agrovilles, the policy sought to mitigate growing
instability and communist infiltration in the countryside by moving peasants into khu
tru mat, or “closer settlement areas.” These settlements were meant to feature schools,
access to social services, and training on agricultural techniques. Created on a much
smaller scale, most agrovilleswere transformed into strategic hamlets. In 1964, not
long after Diem’s assassination in a November 1963 coup d’état, the Strategic Hamlet
Program officially ended. Before his death, Diem claimed that nearly 874,000 people had
83 Bass 2008, 236.
84 While the program was not officially adopted until April 17, 1962, it unofficially started in some
provinces in 1961.
85 In Vietnam, a hamlet is the administrative sub-unit of a village.
86 Thompson 1966, 122.
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been resettled into 8,600 completed hamlets, but U.S. officials could only confirm that
twenty percent of them met minimum standards of readiness.89 The end of the program
did not, however, mean the end of the use of forced relocation by American and South
Vietnamese forces, as I will describe below.
AWar with No Fronts and Many Enemies
The Vietcong were particularly adept at guerrilla warfare. Many of its leaders
were trained by the North Vietnamese and adhered to the precepts proposed by Mao
Zedong in China and adapted successfully by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. Only numbering
some 5,000 combatants in 1960,90 the Vietcong “assumed the role of guerrillas fighting
on their own account with unconventional strategies;” ones that privileged selective
terrorism, assassinations of local authorities, and hit-and-run assaults on government
targets.91 The insurgents “did not stand and fight, but simply melted away into the
jungle.”92 As a result, according to Bernd Greiner, “the frontline was everywhere and
nowhere.”93 Indeed, Vietnam has often been described as a war “without fronts,”94
waged in an environment characterized by an “impenetrable landscape – woods,
mountains, and marshes” where “only [the Vietcong] could read the landscape, move
about in it, identify with it and use it to their advantage.”95
For those fighting on behalf of the government, then, the conflict became
characterized by the inability to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. The
enemy was invisible yet omnipresent. Vietcong eschewed military fatigues in favor of
the traditional dress worn by all Vietnamese peasants,96 meaning that “normal men and
women” were “suspected of turning into guerrillas at night after their day’s work in the
fields.”97 Reliable intelligence on Vietcong members was also lacking. In his account
of the war, Thompson laments the “a complete failure” by the South Vietnamese “to
establish a competent internal security intelligence organization to collect and collate the
information necessary to disrupt and defeat and insurgent movement.”98 Consequently,
the intelligence services were in “no position to assess” the quality of information given
by the population.99 Thus when British and American military advisors arrived in 1961,
89 Hilsman 1967.
90 Thompson 1969, 67.
91 Greiner 2010, 29.
92 Wiesner 1988, 39.
93 Greiner 2010, 22.
94 Greiner 2010; Thayer 2016.
95 Greiner 2010, 35, 132.
96 Hunt 2018, 240.
97 Greiner 2010, 35.
98 Thompson 1969, 124.
99 Thompson 1969, 142. Even U.S. reconnaissance officers recounted that “we had no way of determining
the background of [intelligence] sources, nor their motivation for providing American units with
information...our paid sources could easily have been either provocateurs or opportunists with a score
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they found that the guerrillas were not “identifiable.”100 Yet “if the Vietcong were to be
fought, it was essential to identify and locate them.”101
Despite the primacy of insurgent identification, the South Vietnamese
government and its foreign backers lacked a basis for profiling Vietcong and their
supporters. The defining feature of the insurgency was ideology, not identity, and the
population from which it vied for support was relatively homogenous, both ethnically
and religiously. While a vast majority of South Vietnamese were Buddhists, the country
did possess a distinct Catholic minority whose members included President Diem and
other political elites. Yet many Catholics were émigrés from North Vietnam who had
fled repression and persecution by communist officials in the 1950s; as a result they
tended to be staunch anti-communists and strong supporters of the Diem regime.102 The
regime therefore did not enforce strategic hamletting in Catholic localities, since their
residents’ loyalties were generally known. According to Louis Wiesner, the government
perceived the Catholics as having already “voted with their feet” by opting to flee the
north for the south.103 But within Vietnam’s Buddhist-majority population, attempting
to classify or separate communities along tribal or ethnic lines provided little benefit
to the state’s counterinsurgency efforts. The social homogeneity of the countryside
had actually been accelerated by Diem himself. Before the war, his regime engineered
population resettlements to intermix highland tribes with the rest of Vietnamese society
in order to facilitate political assimilation and to “civilize” the tribespeople.104
In the absence of easily-observable signifiers of potential Vietcong affiliation
within the rural population, counterinsurgents in South Vietnam saw the Strategic
Hamlet Program as a way to pressure peasant communities to signal which side they
were on. Wiesner notes that when people were driven into the hamlets, it “gave Diem
the satisfaction of being voted for ‘with the feet.’”105 Territory outside the hamlets
“became a free-fire zone” where remaining dwellers were considered to be affiliated
with the guerrillas.106 Likewise, American military officers described the program “as
a response to ‘a substantial majority of the population remaining neutral’” that sought
“to isolate those ‘of doubtful sympathy’”:
“This will bring about a moment of decision for the peasant farmer. He will have to
choose if he stays alive. Until now the peasant farmer has had three alternatives: he
to settle” (Greiner 2010, 62).
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could stay put...He could move to an area under government control. Or he could
join the [Vietcong]. Now if he stays put there are additional dangers.”107
Despite the coercive nature of the hamlet program, as we observed in Uganda
and Burundi, some people did not comply with the orders to uproot. Others left
their villages but refused to settle or remain in their designated hamlet. Wiesner, for
example, observed that the hamletted population contained “significantly fewer” men
of military age, suggesting that “many managed to escape movement.”108 Some were
undoubtedly Vietcong fighters and supporters. Others, however, could simply not
bear to abandon their homes. As Greiner explains, “in the eyes of their inhabitants,
villages were much more than places to live or cultivate; they were revered as shrines,
the natural world around them was the home of the spirits they prayed to and the
graves of their ancestors were symbols of death and reincarnation. Leaving these
places was unthinkable.”109 Some of those who did move to the hamlets would return.
Just as the strategic hamlets could discourage, but not completely prevent, people
from leaving, they often did not forestall insurgent infiltration. Reports abounded of
Vietcong attacking the settlements – which they sometimes were able to “penetrate
with ease” – and “tearing down walls and fences, kidnapping young men, assassinating
hamlet officials, and in general destroying the morale and will to resist of the rural
population.”110 According to Michael Latham, “in case after case, and in province after
province, [Vietcong] infiltrated or overwhelmed hamlets.”111
This indicates that one of the primary benefits of the Strategic Hamlet Program
– and its predecessor, the agrovilles – was not that they severed ties between insurgents
and civilians.112 Rather, it was their ability to enhance the legibility of Vietnam’s
“jungle-clad and ill-defined frontiers” and their dispersed populations, which was
essential for identifying and rooting out Vietcong guerrillas and collaborators.113
According to President Diem, the motivation for the agrovilles program was the fact
that “the population...is living in such spread out manner that the government cannot
protect them...Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate this population.”114 It is no
surprise, then, that the agrovilles followed “a very legible layout” in which houses were
constructed in lined blocks all facing the same direction.115
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Just like the areas targeted for the agrovilles possessed “a high degree of
illegibility” to the South Vietnamese state,116 for the Americans, the insurgent-infested
jungles throughout the country “seemed fundamentally unassailable.”117 One U.S.
Air Force captain remarked that in the Mekong River Delta, “the villages were very
small, like a mount in a swamp...There were no names for some of them.”118 American
servicemen typically referred to the Vietnamese countryside as “Indian Country”
populated by unknown and potentially hostile communities. Thus as soon as rural
Vietnamese were moved into strategic hamlets, security officials were ordered to
“establish new identity files and family records for each house, take photographs of
each person, investigate the financial status of each family...and issue plastic covered
identification cards to the inhabitants, as soon as possible.”119 Residents were organized
into cadres and charged with gathering “detailed information on all aspects of hamlet
life.”120 These techniques, according to Nicole Sickly, “were designed to map the
political loyalties of peasants and disentangle communist from noncommunist,” making
“peasants’ political allegiances more legible to...military and state authorities.”121 The
swift implementation of the hamlet system allowed for the rapid cataloguing of the rural
population: in less than three months more than three million national identification
cards were issued.122
The Strategic Hamlet Program officially ended in 1964. However, after the U.S.
began deploying ground troops to Vietnam in 1965, the military continued to forcibly
uproot civilians as part of its counterinsurgency operations. As noted by Guenter Lewy,
“until 1968 the prevalent but uncodified policy was that of compulsory relocations and
displacement by military pressure.”123 American troops repeatedly used loud-speaker
vehicles and leaflets to warn people to flee Vietcong or contested territories, “so any
who remained were considered [rebels] and were fair game.”124 Some evacuations were
prompted by the creation of additional free fire zones that allowed the U.S. military
to attack its adversaries from the air. Since the pilots “could not distinguish ordinary
farmers from guerrillas,”125 these free fire zones made it so that “anyone who did not
want to be evacuated had forfeited the right to protection.”126
In some cases, these tactics resembled depopulation more than forced relocation
– in the sense that residents of evacuated villages were not explicitly told where to go
(though the establishment of strategic hamlets may have given them destinations to
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target). Yet the logic was the same. Those who failed to heed orders to flee, or those
who attempted to return prematurely, were manifestly guilty of enemy activity. Staying
behind was equated with supporting the Vietcong. This is evident in the testimonies
of American soldiers, commanders, and military advisors. As one advisor to the 25th
Infantry Division explained, “if [those] people want to stay there and support the
communists, then they can expect to be bombed.”127 A report from the U.S. Army
similarly stated that “friendly” civilians “had no right to be in the areas in question
and if they were, they were paying or helping the V.C. [Vietcong].”128 In other words,
according to another soldier’s account, in evacuated territories “all people – regardless
of what they are doing – are enemy.”129 For a member of a U.S. Reconnaissance Platoon,
“it didn’t matter if they were civilians. If they weren’t supposed to be in an area, we shot
them.”130
These were not simply post-hoc rationalizations for the use of capricious
violence during the war. While reporting from Vietnam, journalist Jonathan Schell
revealed a mentality, conveyed in real time by American forces, that can be best
described as a presumption of guilt by physical association. “There’s a V.C. havin’ his
supper. There shouldn’t be anyone down there. He shouldn’t be there,” Schell quotes
one soldier as saying. Another explains that “in the mountains, just about anything that
moves is considered to be V.C. No one has got any reason to be there.”131 Some were
even more blunt. According to a soldier from Charlie Company, when patrolling the free
fire zones “Any man found was shot, with little or no questions asked. It was the policy
that no one should be living in that area.”132 Even in the strategic hamlets, U.S. troops
“were instructed to shoot at anyone moving outside his house after curfew.”133 Whether
those deemed guilty actually were Vietcong affiliates was often unclear. Yet according to
Wiesner, “in the period up to late 1966, most of the Vietnamese who had an ideological
enmity to the Vietcong...left VC-controlled and contested areas as refugees.”134 Again,
we see here that combatants treated civilian flight and resettlement as a political act,
even if this was not the intent of the displaced themselves. For South Vietnamese and
American officials, “more refugees were considered indicators of increasingly successful
pacification; they were counted as having voted with their feet, even when they were
only trying to escape death.”135
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Incorporating Peasants into the ‘’Anti-Communist Struggle"
As noted at the beginning of this case study, one of the stated aims of the
Strategic Hamlet Program was to involve the population “in positive action on the side
of the government.”136 Hamletting therefore sought to facilitate both the identification
and the mobilization of the rural peasantry. While civilian relocation helped establish
distinct (if tenuous) spatial demarcations between loyalists and disloyalists, South
Vietnamese and American officials also envisioned that “loyalists relocated to the
[hamlets] could then provide friendly ‘self-defense forces.’”137 The premium placed on
incorporating the population into the conflict proved to be an important factor in the
creation of strategic hamlets:
“With increasing urgency, Diem sought ways to win not simply the passive loyalty
of peasants but their active participation in the anti-communist struggle...Nowhere
were the regime’s expectations of this popular mobilization better illustrated than
in [its] ambitious ideas about strategic hamlet defense...[The regime] evidently
expected inhabitants to wage their own guerrilla war against the Communists;
residents would assume the responsibility for hamlet security after the completion
of fortifications...and the creation of a militia. The primary responsibility for the
defense of the country would thus rest with a hamlet-based citizen militia, with the
regular army and provincial forces reduced to a supporting role.”138
Former U.S. Ambassador to VietnamWilliam Colby also saw strategic hamlets
as “one of the best forms of political mobilization”139 that was meant to “facilitate
the active participation of the rural population in the war against the [Vietcong].”140
Relocating the peasantry was not, therefore, a punitive measure. On the contrary:
it was an extractive tool by which people who had been residing outside the reach
of the central government “became wards of the state” and were consequently
subjected to taxation and conscription.141 State tax collection and repayments of
government-provided agricultural credit loans reportedly increased after the creation
of the hamlets.142 Each settlement was required to form a militia trained and armed
by government and American forces; militias that eventually supplied hundreds of
thousands of fighters for counterinsurgency operations. Hamlet residents also served
as forced labor, required “to make heavy contributions of labor, material, and money to
the construction of the hamlets.”143 Even after the Strategic Hamlets Program ended, the
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displaced continued to be seen as assets, in both a material and a symbolic sense. This
is captured in an account of displacement dynamics in Phu-Yen province from 1965 to
1966:
“the refugee migration represented a major loss to the Viet Cong and a potential gain
to the [government]...it drained an estimated 5,000 men of military age and a total of
about 21,000 from the labor force accessible to the VC, as well as reducing the tax
base...The movement of people into [government] areas offered a corresponding
potential political-psychological gain to the government...the Saigon government
pointed out that refugees were a potential asset to the national cause.”144
The impetus for population exploitation through relocation largely stemmed
from resource constraints. As Catton persuasively argues, the idea that Vietnamese
civilians needed to be mobilized in order to help “carry the burden of defeating the
nation’s enemies” was “deemed a necessity because of the government’s limited
resources.”145 In 1961 South Vietnam had no active police force stationed in rural
areas, and it lacked the security personnel to blanket the countryside with troops. U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara opined in a 1963 briefing that Saigon “is going
to be right on the ragged edge of running out of the money needed to win the war.”146
While American forces were much better resourced, according to Thompson, they “were
not trained to conduct deep penetration operations in the jungle.”147 Thus concentrating
rural inhabitants proved more attractive. An American military scholar indicated as
much at the time: “since the government does not have the capability of dispersing
and projecting its military strength to cover these remote settlements...it must bring the
inhabitants of these villages to areas which it can directly control.”148
Of course, large-scale population relocation is not cheap. But the government
of South Vietnam had a generous patron in the United States. When the Diem regime
rolled out the Strategic Hamlet Program, the U.S. government was underwriting nearly
60 percent of the state’s non-defense expenditures, and had provided a total of $1.65
billion in assistance since 1955.149 Upon entering office in 1961, the administration
of President John F. Kennedy further increased aid for Diem’s army, doubled the
number of U.S. military advisors, and embarked on what many observers have called an
“expanded nation-building program” in South Vietnam.150 The U.S. mission in Saigon
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145 Catton 1999, 927.
146 “Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam,” Honolulu, Hawaii, November 20,
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quickly became the largest in the world.151 Along with direct military support, agencies
such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded many aspects
of the strategic hamlets – providing assistance to cover the costs incurred by relocated
families, equip the hamlets with basic services, and recruit and train hamlet officials and
militias.152 The Pentagon Papers even contain accusations that the Diem regime viewed
the Strategic Hamlet Program as a way of obtaining American financial assistance to
help the government bring the countryside under its control.153
Why did the use of forced relocation dwindle around 1968? As my theory
would predict, counterinsurgents in Vietnam moved away from these strategies as
the conflict evolved into a conventional war. By 1968, the military contest was “no
longer just a struggle to defeat Vietcong insurgents” but had become “a war between
conventional North Vietnamese forces that had entered South Vietnam and American
ground forces.”154 The insurgency had also made significant inroads in urban areas.
In January 1968, as part of the Tet Offensive, the Vietcong – which had grown to 80,000
strong – launched assaults on town centers throughout South Vietnam, including 36 out
of 44 provincial capitals.155 These spectacular attacks indicated that, as Greiner puts it,
“the asymmetrical war stood at the threshold of symmetrical escalation.”156
In response, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces engaged in more pitched battles
and shifted tactics to “search-and-destroy” missions that aimed to dismantle the
leadership cadres of the Vietcong.157 These missions were in many ways enabled by
the creation of the strategic hamlets. By imposing legibility on the rural population, the
hamlets provided the access to peasant communities and the detailed information on
its members that intelligence officers needed to interrogate, infiltrate, and capture rebel
agents under the infamous Phoenix Program. Phoenix, described as a set measures that
were intended to destroy the “political infrastructure” of the insurgency, lasted from
1968 until 1972.158 The invasion of South Vietnam by 200,000 members of the North
Vietnamese Army in the Easter Offensive of 1972 completed the transformation of the
conflict into a full-fledged conventional battle.159
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Conclusion for Strategic Displacement in Vietnam
Like in Burundi, forced population relocation in Vietnam followed an
assortative logic. The strategic hamlets sought to weed out evasive guerrillas and
communist sympathizers while organizing and mobilizing rural peasants to fight on
behalf of the government. Though the program failed to achieve many of its objectives –
in large part because it was poorly coordinated and implemented far too quickly160 – the
evidence suggests that it was about much more than “draining the sea.” The Vietcong
did levy taxes on, and forcibly conscript, civilians. Yet much of the insurgency’s material
support was provided by the governments of North Vietnam and the Soviet Union
instead of by the local population.161 This case study corroborates my findings from
Burundi and Uganda and demonstrates that the logic of my theory extends to conflicts
beyond sub-Saharan Africa.
Further, the Vietnam case shows that, consistent with my argument,
counterinsurgents eschewed forced relocation as the insurgency shifted from irregular
to conventional warfare. This substantiates my within-case comparison of conflicts in
Uganda – which exploited spatial variation in war type – by demonstrating temporal
variation that conforms to my expectations. Finally, I find some preliminary evidence
suggesting that tactics of depopulation may, at least in some cases, adhere to an
assortative logic. I examine this proposition in more detail in Chapter 6.
5.3 Relocating the Acehnese in Indonesia
The Aceh conflict in Indonesia is another seemingly unlikely case of forced
relocation, not only because it was an ethnic war, but also because the rebels of the “Free
Aceh Movement” (Gerakan Aceh Merdek, or GAM) sought independence from Jakarta.
As I show in Chapter 4, in secessionist struggles and other conflicts over territory,
state-induced strategic displacement is likely to take the form of cleansing, due to the
premium placed on conquest and territorial annexation. This case study focuses on the
second phase of the Aceh conflict in my dataset (1999–2005) during which there is clear
evidence of state-induced population relocation.162
GAM formed in the Aceh region in 1976, but was quickly neutralized by the
Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) under President Suharto.
The insurgency re-emerged in 1989 and resumed attacks on local police outposts.
Through a campaign of “shock therapy,” the army responded by indiscriminately
detaining, abusing, and killing members of the local population. By the time Suharto
resigned in 1998 and Indonesia began a rapid transition from military dictatorship
160 Nagl, 135, Thompson 1969.
161 Thompson 1969, 60.
162 Indonesian forces also employed forced relocation during insurgencies in West Papua (1976–78) and
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to parliamentary democracy, GAM had garnered support from large segments of the
Acehnese population.163 After the post-Suharto administration granted Aceh autonomy
status, the rebels continued to express grievances regarding the government’s neglect
and exploitation of the province’s natural resources. GAM increased its assaults on
state security forces, emphasizing that the insurgency’s objective was to secure Aceh’s
independence. Despite its support among the population, observers estimate that
GAM’s forces did not exceed 5,000 fighters.164 TNI officers themselves recognized that
the insurgency did not come close to matching the Indonesian military in manpower or
resources.165
After peace talks collapsed in 2001, President Megawati Sukarnoputri – the
daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno – faced growing pressure to take
decisive action against GAM. When a final attempt at peace negotiations stalled in May
2003, Megawati declared martial law in Aceh and dispatched 28,000 troops and 12,000
police to the province. As part of the counterinsurgency operation, the military evicted
between 150,000 and 200,000 villagers from their homes and transported them to some
85 government-run camps spread across sixteen districts. By July, the International
Crisis Group reported “woefully inadequate” services at relocation sites, including
water, sanitation, and livelihoods assistance, and claimed that the strategy was only
“fueling support” for GAM.166 Despite reports that the evacuations were having little
effect on the military campaign, in November 2003 TNI announced that it would extend
its operation – and the relocation order – for another six months. GAM eventually
suffered a series of setbacks, prompting Indonesian officials to lift martial law in May
2004, and the two sides eventually reached a peace settlement in August 2005.
Compared to Burundi and Vietnam, there are fewer detailed accounts of the
dynamics of violence and displacement in Aceh. The Indonesian government tightly
controlled press coverage of the conflict, and after imposing martial law it significantly
restricted access to the region for local and international NGOs. Amnesty International
estimated that two dozen employees of human rights and humanitarian organizations
were arrested in Aceh between May 2003 and October 2004 alone.167 Reporting on
human rights abuses was therefore limited due to fear of retaliation by the authorities.168
Nonetheless, there was still clear evidence of forced relocation by government forces.
According to Eva-Lotta Hedman:
“While conflict and violence in the pre-martial law era also produced flows of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, forced displacement took on
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the first time the Indonesian government publicly announced plans for the mass
evacuation of civilian population to form part of counterinsurgency operations in
Aceh.”169
Ali Ramly also argues that the imposition of martial law “signaled a new round
of armed conflict in Aceh during which internal, indeed forced, displacement of civilian
populations emerged as a deliberate strategy of war.”170 Similar to the regroupment
policy in Burundi, as soon as the strategy was announced it was widely condemned
by human rights groups.171 This did not discourage the government from carrying it
out, however. The rest of this section explores the logics and dynamics underlying this
strategy of forced relocation.
‘’Who is GAM? Where is GAM?"
The Megawati administration declared that the objective of the 2003 military
operation in Aceh was to “separate GAM from the civilian population.”172 This could
be an indication of a denial logic – by uprooting the population, the government
sought to divest the rebels of their civilian supply chain. Yet according to Human
Rights Watch, the push for “separation” principally amounted to “an effort to identify
GAMmembers.”173 GAM employed classic guerrilla warfare, relying on “its superior
knowledge of Acehnese territory, its access to intelligence through links with local
communities, and its ability to retreat within Aceh’s mountainous interior to carry
out small-scale guerrilla attacks.”174 The population of Aceh had also become more
homogenous during the conflict, in part due to a concerted effort by the separatists to
purge the province of ethnic minorities. While the Indonesian state had encouraged the
“transmigration” of ethnic Javenese into Aceh since 1975, as a result of ethnic cleansing
campaigns by GAM, the government estimated that 130,000 transmigrants left between
1998 and 2005.175 Thus in a 2003 survey, nearly 83 percent of the population identified
as ethnically Acehnese.176 Similar to Burundi, the use of ethnic cleansing – this time by
the rebels – increased the homogenization of the conflict zone and precluded the use of
ethnicity as a simplifying heuristic for inferring political loyalty.
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In Aceh, the Indonesian military employed a diverse set of methods, including
patrols and “sweepings” of villages; vehicle searches and document checks; and
arbitrary arrests, detentions, and interrogations.177 Security forces continued to abuse
civilians, but as Stanton argues, they exercised far more restraint than in previous
military campaigns under Suharto.178 Post-Suharto counterinsurgency operations all
seemed to share a common goal, as argued by human rights observers: to “identify
GAMmembers and supporters.”179 For government forces, detecting the disloyal took
primacy. Acehnese interviewed by Human Rights Watch “described being interrogated
with the accusation ‘You’re GAM!’ or the questions ‘Who is GAM? Where is GAM?’”180
It is not surprising, then, that relocating villagers was also used as a tool for
rebel identification. General Endriartono Sutarto, the army chief of staff, admitted as
much when he publicly acknowledged that the military “forced people to leave their
homes...while soldiers tried to root out the rebels, who often try to blend with civilians
in their villages.”181 Hence civilians were deliberately displaced, according to a military
spokesperson, in order to “distinguish them from [GAM] rebels.”182 The spokesperson
also declared that the TNI “would regard villagers who refuse to be moved as GAM
because that means they are protecting GAM and that makes them GAMmembers or
its supporters.”183 Secretary Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then Indonesia’s minister for
political and security affairs, invoked similar logic in describing the planned relocations:
“First we will ask the women and children to leave their houses. Then, we will ask
unarmed men to do the same. The rest who stay behind must be those with arms.”184 In
practice, the forced relocation strategy reflected the rhetoric of these officials. Amnesty
International reported that Indonesian soldiers would arrive in villages and issue orders
“for immediate evacuation without allowing for any pre-departure preparations,”
telling villagers “to leave or they would be considered members of GAM.”185
Despite the threat of violence, some villagers ignored the orders to relocate,
either because they were rebel affiliates or supporters, or because – as Barter found in
his field research – of their economic, social, and cultural attachments to their homes.186
GAM associates or not, these resisters risked getting caught up in the TNI’s subsequent
sweeps of evacuated districts. While media reporting was significantly curtailed by
the government, there were multiple dispatches indicating that the military followed
through on its threats. People remaining in emptied areas were, at least in some
177 Human Rights Watch 2003, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2003 (July); Amnesty International, 2004
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instances, “assumed to be GAMmembers and shot.”187
Yet the military ascribed guilt not only whether people left, but also where they
fled. Anyone caught decamping to the mountains, which tended to be inhabited by
rebels, was “viewed as either GAM, or as a supporter bringing rice or other supplies to
the armed separatists.”188 As one displaced Acehnese reported, “If we [go into the hills]
we’ll be seen as GAM and they [the military] will shoot us.”189 The only way to avoid
condemnation was to move to the displacement camps designated by the government.
Fleeing the region was even seen as a dubious move. Human Rights Watch found that
“those who leave Aceh are more likely to be suspected as members of GAM by the
military upon their return.”190 Thus the government’s displacement tactics, instead of
forcing people out of Aceh – as would be the principal objective of ethnic or political
cleansing – sought to keep them in the province, concentrated in specific delineated
areas.
The imperative to concentrate the population emanated from the state’s
desire to render Aceh – which it “has long represented...as a wild and ungovernable
frontier”191 – legible. Located on the northern edge of Indonesia’s Sumatra Island,
the province encompassed an expansive, peripheral territory on the marginalized
hinterlands of the country and was inhabited by dispersed, agriculturally dependent
communities with a low population density. Efforts to expand the presence of the state
in the area had largely failed, and many scattered, rural villages remained difficult
to access. A report in May 2003, for example, found that local government structures
were no longer functioning in nearly 80 percent of Aceh’s 5,947 villages.192 In such an
illegible environment, forced relocation enabled Indonesian authorities to create a clear,
if artificial, distinction between “state” and “anti-state” zones. Relocated residents
were registered and monitored, so that anyone moving back into anti-state zones could
be detected and considered exactly that – against the government. When security
forces conducted searches of camps or villages, simply being absent was grounds
for suspicion, as “the presumption [was] that young men who have left...have joined
GAM.”193
How did the rebels respond to the state’s efforts to impose legibility on Aceh?
They tried to reverse them. GAM forcibly collected identification cards from villagers
– at least, those who possessed them – in order to make it “impossible for Indonesian
forces to separate...GAMmembers and supporters from other Acehnese.”194 The
government reacted in a predictable way. It announced that new identity cards would
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be issued to all Aceh residents, since without them, rebels had been able “to pass
through [military] sweepings undetected.”195 According to Human Rights Watch, an
important motivation for reissuing the cards was to “force all Acehnese to present
themselves in front of officials. Those who did not were then presumed to be members
of GAM.”196
The process of applying for new cards was an exercise in intelligence gathering;
one that complemented the cataloguing of the local population in displacement camps.
Applicants were required to provide information on family members, friends, and
their activities over the past year; pass a security check by the local police; and submit
a letter swearing allegiance to the state.197 While allowing authorities to screen the local
population, this process helped expose those who remained illegible to the government.
Such state-evading people were often equated with rebels. The governor of one Aceh
province, for example, declared that “unidentified, suspicious looking people will be
shot on sight.”198 Accounts from Aceh resident confirm this: “if we didn’t have a [new]
identity card, we were considered to be that – separatists...Lots of people became victims
like that.”199 In general, the military’s actions during counterinsurgency operations
indicate that it was less concerned with the precision of its identification practices than
with having a basis to profile and categorize the population. Consider the following
incident reported by the International Crisis Group:
“The TNI in one area...asked the local village heads and local army personnel about
residents who might be GAM. They then marked the houses of every person so
identified in black paint with the words, ‘This is a GAM house.’ Of course no one
who lived there dared go back. But that process involves blaming everyone in a
family for the activities of one member; it assumes that the data received is accurate
with no personal score-settling involved.”200
For counterinsurgents who did not hesitate to engage in collective profiling,
forced relocation was part of a larger effort to identify enemies by sorting the population
into distinct camps, and one of several tools the government used to infer disloyalty.
Mobilizing the Moved Masses
Due to access restrictions placed on journalists, NGOs, and human rights
groups, there is a general lack of information about life in Aceh’s displacement camps. It
is therefore difficult to ascertain the extent to which the government’s relocation strategy
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served as an instrument for appropriating the local population. Yet we know that the
Indonesian military, according to Rizal Sukma, has “historically made extensive use of
civilians” in repelling challenges to the state.201 One of the TNI’s most notable methods
was pagar bettis, or “fence of legs,” in which civilians were recruited to physically
encircle rebel-controlled hills. Armed with bamboo sticks and pots and pans, villagers
would stand shoulder-to-shoulder around the base of a hill and motion to military units
when rebels attempted to escape.202 As Hedman notes, the tactic, “while requiring a
good deal of intimidation and coercion to enforce, effectively minimized the manpower
needed” for counterinsurgency.203
There is evidence that civilians were also used in military operations in Aceh.
Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch received reports of villagers
being forcibly enlisted to serve as scouts and human shields.204 Security forces took
people “to the mountains to search for GAM”;205 this undoubtedly included the
displaced. But the most prevalent instance of “civilian participation in defense” in Aceh
was compulsory guard duty, or jaga malam.206 All males over the age of fifteen, including
old men, were forced to take turns guarding their communities at night. The Indonesian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the program sought “to create [a] secured and
order situation” in Aceh by “stimulat[ing] the bravery of the local society to fight against
[GAM].”207 While jaga malamwas not solely confined to IDP camps, it reportedly started
after the imposition of martial law – thus at the same time as the forced relocation of
civilians – and supposedly produced significant results, with the government claiming
in a progress report that participation in “neighborhood watch” had increased “from 0%
to 70%.”208
Besides night patrol, the military also mobilized Acehnese residents into civil
defense and militia groups. Such groups have been “integral to military operations in
the past” in Indonesia.209 In 2004, Amnesty International found that “a wide range” of
“anti-GAM civil defense-style groups” had been formed throughout Aceh.210 Equipped
with spears and swords, these militias were primarily responsible for identifying and
rooting out rebels and participating in loyalty ceremonies staged by the government.
Local leaders were tasked with selecting members for civil defense groups from their
communities, and while some people joined voluntarily, others were forced to enlist by
the military.211 Again, it is unclear whether these mobilization practices and dynamics
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differed between displaced and non-displaced villages. But the use of forced relocation
alongside widespread efforts to instrumentalize the local population in Aceh indicates
that the two could be linked. This would be consistent with other cases I have presented
throughout this dissertation, which suggest that strategies of civilian relocation are often
used to help incorporate local communities into the state’s war-fighting effort. In Aceh,
the Indonesian government certainly saw the displaced as assets – at least symbolic
ones. Barter describes how political and military officials would reference the relocation
camps in discussions with local journalists in order “to showcase GAM cruelty.”212
While the TNI had previously enlisted the civilian population to help extend
the state security apparatus in Aceh, these efforts took on a particular urgency in the
post-Suharto period. In the early 2000s Indonesia was reeling from the lingering effects
of the Asian financial crisis, which had crippled the country’s economy and precipitated
Suharto’s downfall.213 Government expenditures allocated to the military were cut in
half,214 dropping from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1997 to 0.7 percent in 2002.215 Funding
shortfalls were significant enough that soldiers were accused of monopolizing the
production of commodity resources and seeking profits from the windfalls in order
to supplement their “meager” income.216 At the same time, the military was coming
off a failed, decades-long counterinsurgency campaign in East Timor, which Indonesia
relinquished control of in 1999.217 The Megawati administration also faced growing
political pressure over its handling of GAM; in 2003 analysts observed that the president
“desperately needs a winning strategy.”218 Soon after the armed forces vowed to “crush”
GAM within a period of months – a pledge that “added to pressures on officers and
soldiers on the ground to fulfill their mission and destroy those they believe to be
members or supporters of GAM.”219
Considering alternative arguments, there is no evidence that forced relocation
in Aceh was driven by ethnic nationalism. While GAM purported to fight on behalf of
an ethnic minority, by 2003 Indonesia had transformed into a full-fledged democracy,
and the Megawati administration attempted to appeal to a broad domestic constituency.
Public support for ethnic equality was high: in a 1999 national poll, 87 percent of
participants responded positively to the question of whether “members of all ethnic
212 Barter 2016, 63.
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groups in Indonesia should have the same rights as citizens.”220 Moreover, in the
post-Suharto era authorities in Jakarta undertook a series of conciliatory measures
towards Aceh, including policy reforms giving the Acehnese greater control over
religious, educational, and cultural issues.221
I cannot rule out arguments that stress a denial logic. A desire to sever the
logistical and material support GAM obtained from the local population may have
been a contributing factor underlying the government’s relocation strategy. The
separatist movement did, after all, create a “shadow government” that taxed civilians
and businesses and adjudicated local disputes.222 Yet as we have seen in other cases,
relocating civilians in Aceh did little to starve the rebels. If anything, it had the inverse
effect: Human Rights Watch found that the displaced camps provided opportunities
for GAM “to recruit and travel among the wider community.”223 Seeking to cripple the
insurgency’s capacity through civilian relocation would have been an especially peculiar
choice in Aceh, since GAM had actually started to use “large refugee-camp situations”
to publicize the conflict and generate international pressure on the government to
negotiate with rebel leaders.224
Finally, there is little support for the notion that forced relocation was a means
of punishing the local population. Aceh was too homogenous to use ethnicity as a proxy
for insurgent support, and not every ethnic Acehnese was relocated. All accounts of
violence by counterinsurgency forces between 2001 and 2004 generally indicate that
those suspected of GAMmembership were killed or detained, not displaced. The
broader set of tactics and practices employed by the Indonesian military at the time also
demonstrated a degree of restraint that stood in contrast to the widespread repression of
the Suharto era. As Stanton argues:
“Rather than killing civilians or destroying villages suspected of aiding GAM, as was
common under Suharto, the military issued identity cards to aid in distinguishing
civilians from insurgents and forcibly relocated civilians from a number of
villages...These tactics were not without problems...but they did represent a shift
away from more direct forms of violence against civilians.”225
Conclusion for Strategic Displacement in Aceh
The characteristics of forced relocation in Aceh are consistent in several respects
with the arguments of this dissertation. First, counterinsurgents in Indonesia used
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displacement to differentiate friend from foe by forcing people to send visible clues of
their potential loyalties and affiliations. Deviation from the departure and destination
patterns dictated by authorities provided a premise for suspecting an association with
the enemy. Second, the government pursued forced relocation in an illegible frontier,
where it was preoccupied not only with the challenge of identifying guerrillas, but
also with the difficulties of accessing and cataloguing a highly dispersed population.
This explains why authorities, in uprooting local residents, attempted to keep them
in Aceh as opposed to expelling them elsewhere.226 Third, forced relocation coincided
with an intensified effort by the armed forces to instrumentalize the civilian population
for military purposes. While I cannot prove that relocating civilians was a part of this
effort, it is easy to see how relocation would have aided it. Finally, the Indonesian state
engaged in relocation at a time of relative economic and military weakness, which likely
limited its alternative strategic options and amplified the potential rapid informational
and material benefits of civilian displacement.
5.4 Conclusion
An assessment of forced relocation across the three cases shows that the
assortative logic proposed in this study can explain the statistical associations
discovered in Chapter 4. While those cross-national tests indicate that strategies of
forced relocation are driven by information and resource problems, the case studies
provide evidence of how and why such strategies attempt to surmount these problems.
The cases examined in this chapter differ significantly in historical, political, and social
aspects, along with the type of rebellion confronted by the state (ethnic versus Marxist),
the aims of insurgent groups (government overthrow versus succession) and the level
of threat they posed. Yet the cases exemplify similar patterns in the logic underlying
government-induced relocation and corroborate the findings from my in-depth study of
civil wars in Uganda. In all three countries, identification problems, human geography,
and resource constraints proved to be important factors. More importantly, the evidence
shows that state forces used relocation as an instrument to coarsely sort the population
by inferring the identities and affiliations of individuals through guilt by physical
association, and by imposing legibility on dispersed and obscure communities. In
addition to simplifying the process of identifying hostile and disloyal subjects, this
helped counterinsurgents fill resource gaps by facilitating the extraction of capital and
labor from war-affected populations.
Beyond illustrating the assortative logic of strategic displacement, each case
study offers unique within-case comparisons. Burundi is one of the few cases in
my dataset where state actors employed multiple types of strategic displacement,
specifically the two that are the focus of my cross-national analysis: cleansing
226 Indonesia could also be unique since it is an island nation, so there is no adjacent country for people to
move to (at least on foot).
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and relocation. The evidence shows that even within the same conflict, these two
strategies tend to be used in different settings – cleansing in more urbanized, socially
heterogeneous areas and relocation in rural, homogenous frontiers – and have different
aims. Vietnam is unique in that the conflict transformed over time from an irregular
war into a conventional one. Accordingly, as my theory would predict, strategies of
forced relocation dissipated. Finally, the Aceh case demonstrates how relocation can
complement broader repertoires of violence by counterinsurgents, which prioritized the
identification of elusive guerrillas in a highly illegible environment.
This chapter has therefore demonstrated that the most prevalent population
displacement strategy cannot be fully understood unless we account for the assortative
logic of displacement. While there is some evidence that a logic of denial helped
motivate forced relocation to some extent, in all three cases explaining why these
strategies were pursued, sustained, and often repeated cannot be reduced to a simple
effort to “drain the sea.” Evidence of ethnic nationalism was also lacking, and in
each instance there is little to indicate that relocating civilians served as a method
of punishment, particularly given the ways in which the displaced were themselves
armed and trusted to fight on the government’s behalf. Nor did relocation serve
as a mere substitute for mass killing, particularly since, in Burundi and Indonesia
especially, authorities were extensively criticized by both domestic and international
actors for engaging in these strategies. Together, then, these case studies illustrate that
my assortative theory applies in a number of diverse settings and is not unique to
Uganda. The question remains, however, as to whether my theory can also extend to
cases of depopulation – a proposition that the case study on Vietnam deems potentially
plausible. To address this question, in the following chapter I conduct another in-depth
case study, this time from Syria.
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“Syria is now experiencing a displacement crisis of a magnitude the world
has not seen for many years. The extent of displacement and the widespread
destructions of homes and infrastructure were not collateral damage from
the fighting, but resulted instead from the protagonists’ deliberate actions..[of]
targeting civilians with the aim of forcing them to evacuate from certain areas.”
-Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 20141
“The doctors of this neighborhood might also be informers who would consider
Abdel Latif a terrorist if they knew where he’d been these last few years –
stubbornly clinging on inside that besieged village.
Suspicions alone were enough to lead to corpses lining the streets. Suspicions
alone were enough to cause someone to disappear without a trace.”
-Khaled Khalifa, Death is Hard Work
The Syrian civil war (2011–present), an out-of-sample case study, provides an
opportunity to probe the scope conditions of my “assortative” theory and evaluate
whether it can apply to the third type of displacement strategy identified in Chapter 1:
depopulation. Syria is an especially difficult test for my theory for two reasons. First, it
is a conventional civil war, characterized by artillery battles between government and
rebel forces across clearly defined frontlines, with both sides controlling significant
swathes of territory.2 As I show in Chapter 4, strategic displacement in such contexts
should mostly take the form of cleansing, which in turn is unlikely to be motivated
by an assortative logic. Second, while multiple observers argue that the deliberate
displacement of civilians by pro-government forces has been a key aspect of the Syrian
conflict, they have almost uniformly characterized these measures as “ethno-sectarian
cleansing” or “demographic engineering” and – implicitly or explicitly – attributed them
to sectarian motivations.3
The war in Syria, when paired with the Uganda case study from Chapter 3, also
serves as a “most different” case for comparative purposes, in line with the “diverse”
case study method.4 These cases occur in different regions, different time periods, and
different cultural, historical, economic, and geo-political contexts. Unlike in Uganda,
the rebels in Syria have focused on engaging the state in military battles as opposed to
conducting predatory attacks against the civilian population. This, and the fact that
the conflict evolved out of a popular uprising, means that the Syrian insurgency has
enjoyed a substantially higher level of civilian support than the LRA or ADF ever did in
Uganda. The urbanization of the war in Syria, where large cities and towns have been
1 IDMC, 2014 (2 October), 1.
2 Balcells and Stathis Kalyvas 2013.
3 See, for example, Balanche (2015a), “Silent Sectarian Cleansing: Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions
and Population Transfers in Syria” (2015), El-Bar (2016 (3 September)), Al-Ahmad (2016 (6 April)),
Syria Institute (2017 (February)), and Eskaf (2016 (5 September)).
4 Seawright and Gerring 2008.
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the primary battlefields, stands in stark contrast to the rural, peripheral insurgencies
of northern and western Uganda. Finally, unlike in Uganda, the Syrian rebels have
presented a formidable challenge to the state, seizing and holding territory, building
oppositional governance, and posing an existential threat to the incumbent regime.
This chapter analyzes the strategies and tactics employed by the regime
of President Bashar al-Assad and its allies, which have, according to the U.N.5 and
other observers,6 embarked on a deliberate campaign to uproot civilians through
punishing airstrikes, the targeted shelling of civilian infrastructure, besiegement, and
forced evacuations. Pro-regime forces have been the primary perpetrators of strategic
displacement in Syria, which has been puzzling for two reasons.7 First, displacement
has often been induced by the state’s relentless use of use of indiscriminate violence
against civilians, which has persisted throughout the conflict despite significant changes
in territorial control – including steady gains by the regime since 2015. This runs counter
to two central claims in the literature on civil war violence. The first is Kalyvas’ assertion
that, as a conflict wears on, incumbents should shift from non-selective to selective
violence.8 The second is Balcells’ contention that, in conventional civil wars, the use of
indirect violence – namely airstrikes – should be aimed at military targets, not civilian
ones.9
Another puzzling aspect of the regime’s behavior pertains to its tactics after
its forces have reasserted control over former rebel-held territories. In many instances,
people remaining in these recaptured communities have been given a choice: either
to stay in regime-controlled territory or to relocate to areas that remain under rebel
control. This defies scholars’ general expectations about the objectives of armed actors
in wartime, which tend to presume that combatants will either aim to exert control over
the local population, or seek to expel it in order to eliminate any potential opposition.
Why has the government offered people a choice of destination?
I argue that these actions reflect a desire by the Syrian regime to sort the
population into loyal and disloyal camps, for which triggering civilian flight has served
as a critical tool of differentiation. This challenges the notion that displacement in Syria
has been intended solely, or even primarily, to achieve demographic change. I show that,
while some patterns of violence and displacement induced by pro-government forces
are consistent with cleansing, they occurred early in the conflict in religiously-mixed
and non-cosectarian enclaves. They also occurred under certain conditions: when
5 Protection and assistance to internally displaced persons: situation of internally displaced persons in the Syrian
Arab Republic 2013.
6 “Silent Sectarian Cleansing: Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions and Population Transfers in Syria” 2015;
Al-Jablawi 2016; Syria Institute, 2017 (February).
7 Other actors in the Syrian conflict, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Kurdish
People’s Protection Units (YPG), have also been accused of ethnic cleansing. But as with the rest of this
study, I only focus on displacement by state actors.
8 Kalyvas 2006, 168.
9 Balcells 2011.
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perpetrators were acquiring or consolidating control over a given territory, which
allowed them to collectively identify and remove individuals through direct, face-to-face
violence. The evidence suggests that collective targeting was often driven not by
sectarian animosity, but rather a tendency to use sectarian identity as a proxy for
political loyalty. This is consistent with the idea that cleansing follows a logic of
punishment.
Yet most state-induced displacement in Syria has taken the form of
indiscriminate depopulation. I demonstrate that, in employing these tactics, the regime
used displacement not only to “push” local populations out of specific areas, but also to
“pull” them into their territories. While the government’s cleansing campaigns seemed
designed to get rid of people, its depopulation methods had an assortative element.
Pro-government forces made inferences about people’s affiliations and allegiances
based on whether they abandoned areas targeted for displacement, and whether they
fled to regime or rebel-held territory. Moreover, I show that the regime and its allies
increasingly turned to depopulation when they faced acute information and resource
problems, in line with what my theory would predict.
These findings illustrate that even within the same conflict, strategic
displacement can take multiple forms and serve multiple purposes. It also demonstrates
that strategies of depopulation can share some of the same sorting and capturing
logics as strategies of forced relocation. The Syrian government’s efforts to depopulate
rebel-held areas was likely also motivated by a desire to deny the opposition the
civilians and infrastructure it needed to build a viable counter-state. I argue, however,
that attributing these practices to a logic of denial paints an incomplete picture of one of
the most disturbing and consequential aspects of the Syrian war.
6.1 The Syrian Civil War
In March 2011, pro-democracy protests erupted in the southern province
of Dera’a, Syria, after authorities tortured a group of teenagers caught spraying
anti-regime graffiti. Demonstrations calling for political and economic reform quickly
spread to the central, northern, and eastern parts of Syria, in addition to suburbs
surrounding the capital, Damascus. The protests were comprised largely of members of
Syria’s Sunni majority, while the regime of Bashar al-Assad is dominated by Alawites,
a sect of Shi’a Islam. But the protestors, buoyed by the Arab Spring revolts in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Libya, emphasized their democratic, non-sectarian, and largely secular
values. Syrian security forces responded to the uprising by arresting and firing on
participants, which only fueled public resentment and galvanized the opposition.10
Months of brutal suppression, coupled with only limited promises of political reform by
10 For documentation of abuses against protestors in this period, see Amnesty International (2012).
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Assad, transformed a peaceful revolution into a violent rebellion intent on overthrowing
the regime.
Armed insurgency first broke out in July 2011. A wave of resignations from
the ruling Ba’ath Party and the desertion and defection of members of the Syrian
Arab Army (SAA) supplied tens of thousands of fighters to the opposition, which
mobilized a variety of rebel brigades under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
By the end of 2011, the FSA and its affiliates were launching regular ambushes against
government and military targets around the country. In 2012, the conflict became a
conventional war as rebel factions started overrunning SAA positions and taking control
of towns and villages in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Rural Damascus, and Homs.
The war took on a sectarian character as the regime sought to portray the opposition
as foreign-backed Islamist extremists. Assad increasingly stoked fears that Alawite
and other minority communities would be subjected to violent reprisals should he be
overthrown. Meanwhile, the failure of FSA brigades to unite under a single leadership
structure provided an opening for the emergence of Salafi jihadist groups, including
Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN).
Despite the growing fractionalization of the insurgency, rebels continued to
make advances from early 2012 to mid-2013, often confronting regime forces directly
in pitched battles. External actors began to pour money, arms, and fighters into Syria, as
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the U.A.E., Turkey, and the U.S. backed the opposition, while Shi’a
fighters from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah provided
battlefield support for the Syrian government. A series of U.N.-backed peace talks and
other meditation initiatives beginning in 2014 eventually failed. Infighting and poor
coordination further weakened the FSA, and hardline groups like JAN became the
insurgency’s potent fighting forces. In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) broke away from its affiliates in JAN and seized parts of eastern Syria
and western Iraq, declaring the Syrian city of Raqqa the capital of its Islamic Caliphate.
A suspected chemical weapons attack by regime forces in the suburbs of Damascus in
August renewed calls for international military action in Syria.
As a coalition of NATO countries began launching airstrikes against ISIS
territories, the rebels made further gains, taking the provincial capital of Idlib City
in March 2015. The SAA was forced to strategically withdraw from some towns and
seemed increasingly imperiled until the Russian government, at Assad’s request,
dispatched its air force in September to help Syrian forces repel rebel advances and
retake parts of Aleppo, Homs, and Rural Damascus. The regime subsequently went
back on the offensive. In early 2016, the Syrian Kurds and its militia (the People’s
Protection Units, or YPG), who had filled the political vacuum in parts of northern Syria
by establishing its own autonomous governing areas, joined forces with Arab, Assyrian,
and Turkmen groups to form the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). With support from
an American-led coalition, the SDF began steadily pushing ISIS out of its territories
in northern and eastern Syria, recapturing Raqqa in September 2017. Alarmed by the
advances of the Kurdish units, Turkey – which continued to fight a rebellion by its
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own Kurdish separatists, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – launched Operation
Euphrates Shield, occupying parts of northern Syria to stem SDF encroachment and
fortify the Turkish border.
Meanwhile, the Syrian regime, after expelling rebels from Aleppo City in
December 2016, made steady territorial gains throughout 2017. The U.S. began to
soften its opposition to Assad. Still, after a chemical weapons attack in rebel-held
Khan Shaykhun in April 2017, American forces bombarded a Syrian air base with
59 cruise missiles. One year later, the U.S., Britain, and France responded to another
chemical attack in Rural Damascus by striking alleged chemical weapons facilities
near Damascus and Homs. These limited interventions made little difference on the
ground, however. The SAA and its allies continued to wipe out rebel strongholds
around Damascus, in southern Aleppo, and in northern Hama, prompting Russia
to announce its partial withdrawal from the conflict at the end of 2017. In June 2018,
having solidified their hold on Damascus and Homs, Syrian forces launched a successful
operation to recapture rebel-held territories in the southern provinces of Dar’a and
Quneitra. Afterwards, Turkey and Russia negotiated an agreement to enact a buffer zone
in Idlib province, the remaining rebel stronghold, beginning in October. By the end of
2018, a regime victory in the civil war appeared imminent, and the conflict had claimed
an estimated 500,000 lives.
Overall Patterns of Displacement
The high death toll of the civil war in Syria has been matched by massive
civilian displacement. Half of the country’s population has been uprooted, including
more than 5 million refugees and another 6.5-7 million internally displaced (Figure 3.1).
While many of the displaced fled spontaneously, others were deliberately forced to leave
their homes as part of a calculated strategy by parties to the conflict.
6.2 Methods and Data Sources
Studying an active civil war poses unique challenges. Except for a short research
trip to Northeast Syria, it was not feasible for me to travel to most parts of the country
and access many key informants and decision-makers, particularly on the government
side. Even if I had been able to do so, the incentives to misrepresent or obfuscate
what, how, and why certain events have transpired – not to mention the motivations
behind military strategy, tactics, and practices – would have likely resulted in data of
questionable reliability and validity. Despite these limitations, there are still plenty of
reasons to examine this case. One is its political, moral, and humanitarian significance.
In addition to being a civil war, Syria has become a proxy conflict for multiple, broader
geopolitical rivalries: between Sunni Gulf countries and Shi’a Iran waging a new
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Figure 6.1: Forced Displacement in Syria (2011–2018)
Source: UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response;11 IDMC Syria12
“Middle East Cold War,”13 between Kurdish secessionists and the government of Turkey,
and between a resurgent Russia and its American and European adversaries. The Syrian
conflict has entailed the intentional killing of thousands of civilians and the deployment
of chemical weapons with impunity, undermining the normative underpinnings of
the current world order, stirring global outrage, and creating a “moral crisis” for the
international community.14 The more than ten million Syrians driven from their homes
during the conflict has become the largest displacement crisis in a generation15 – placing
an immense burden on the country’s refugee-receiving neighbors Turkey, Lebanon, and
Jordan; straining the international humanitarian system; and contributing to a surge in
migration to Europe that has proven politically destabilizing and threatened to unravel
the global refugee regime.
Against this backdrop, there is much to be gained by examining the dynamics of
a conflict like Syria before it ends and its history has been written – in which experiences
and events are inevitably lost or distorted. Moreover, Syria is arguably the first fully
“tweeted” civil war, as it has been extensively documented in real time on social media.
As a result, there is a wealth of data available online and through various human rights
13 Gause III 2014.
14 See, for example, Tutu (2013 (25 March)).
15 AP, 2015 (9 July).
CHAPTER 6. SYRIA 193
and monitoring groups that have carefully tracked, documented, and analyzed the
conflict’s dynamics. I leverage this information in my analysis, along with news reports
and primary documents published on social media. I also supplement this data with my
own fieldwork interviews of 35 subjects, in addition to other secondary sources.
Quantitative Data
Several independent organizations have documented violence in Syria since
the onset of the conflict. The largest data collection effort has been conducted by the
Violations Documentation Centre (VDC), a network of Syrian activists who maintain
an online database of individual victims of violence, detainees, and missing people.16
While VDC researchers are affiliated with the opposition, they have documented human
rights violations by both pro-government and rebel forces, disaggregated by the date
and cause of death (shooting, shelling, airstrikes, etc.) between 2011 and 2019. An
independent analysis for the United Nations found that the VDC database contains the
most extensive and detailed identifiable records of killings in Syria.17
A limitation of the VDC data, however, is that it loses accuracy at lower levels
of analysis than the province (ADM-1). I therefore kept my analysis at the province
level to balance the value of sub-national disaggregation with data quality. I also built
a novel dataset of airstrikes in Syria from mid-2011 to mid-2017. Working with two
Syrian researchers, I triangulated deaths from aerial attacks documented by VDC with
reports from the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights, Airwars, and the Institute for the Study of War – which produces periodic maps
of airstrikes in Syria – along with videos and reports from social media to generate daily
airstrike data at the province level.18
Recall from Chapter 1 that strategies of depopulation differ from strategies of
cleansing in both the type of targeting (indiscriminate versus collective) and the type of
violence (indirect versus direct) used to induce displacement. As I explain in more detail
below, the indiscriminate and indirect nature of air attacks by pro-government forces –
which various observers have characterized as intended to uproot civilians – make them
a suitable proxy for depopulation. To capture potential episodes of cleansing, I used
data on atrocities collected by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF).19 PITF tracks
all reported massacres of civilians in Syria, with a death threshold of five people, carried
16 See http://vdc-sy.net/en/.
17 See Price et al. (2014). Two other widely-used violence data sources – the Armed Conflict Location and
Event Data Project, (Raleigh et al. 2010) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced
Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander 2013) – are either limited in temporal scope (ACLED only began
tracking Syrian violence in 2017) or exclude far too much violence in Syria to be useful (UCDP).
18 The airstrike data only denotes whether a particular location was hit by at least one airstrike on a
particular day. Precisely counting the number of airstrikes in a community on a given day was not
feasible.
19 Schrodt and Ulfelder 2009.
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out through direct and deliberate violence. Cleansing is often triggered or accompanied
by these kinds of massacres. I focus on a particular subset of killings committed by
pro-regime actors: those that, according to PITF, were 1) not categorized as collateral
damage, and 2) entailed “scorched earth” tactics – which are particularly likely to induce
displacement.
For displacement, I pulled data from several sources. For aggregate annual
flows, I relied on UNHCR, which tracks the number of registered Syrian refugees
worldwide, along with data on IDPs collected by the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (IDMC).20 I also built a subnational dataset on monthly IDP flows using data
from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).21 The
data include the origin and destination province for all recorded internal displacement
flows, by month, from January 2016 to December 2018. While the data is limited in
temporal scope and (like VDC) is only available at the province level, it is the most
fine-grained displacement data available for multiple years of the Syrian conflict.22
Finally, I incorporated data on territorial control in Syria from the Carter Center,
which analyzes social media to track changes in the control of territory by different
actors across the country.23 The Carter Center captures monthly shifts in territorial
control between January 2014 and December 2018 by four main parties to the conflict:
the Syrian government, the armed opposition, Kurdish forces, and ISIS. The data
delineate control down to the city/village/farm (ADM-4) level. In order to aggregate
it up to the province level, I calculated the percentage of communities controlled by the
regime in each province in each month. In addition to the raw percentage, I created a
scaled variable of territorial control ranging from 1 (little to no regime control) to 5 (full
to dominant regime control).24
Qualitative Data
Qualitative data from various sources during the Syrian war have been gathered
by human rights activists, scholars, journalists, humanitarian organizations, and other
observers. Many sources describe patterns and dynamics of violence and displacement,
and contain statements from perpetrators and victims – including a number of
interviews with government and rebel combatants, regime officials, community leaders,
20 For UNHCR, see https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria; for IDMC, see http://www.
internal-displacement.org/countries/syria. For IDPs, I also relied on aggregate data compiled by Doocy
et al. (2015).
21 Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/stima/idps-tracking.
22 In late 2018, UNOCHA and REACH started to track internal displacement at the sub-province level, but
it mostly focuses on one or two provinces in Syria.
23 See https://www.cartercenter.org/syria-conflict-map/. Country shapefiles were obtained directly from
Carter Center staff.
24 The specific coding was as follows: 5 = regime controls 80-100% of province, 4 = regime controls 60-79%
of province, 3 = regime controls 40-59% of province, 2 = regime controls 20-39% of province, 1 = regime
controls 0-19% of province.
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refugees, and other civilians. Some primary documents, including evacuation orders
issued by the Syrian army, were published on social media. These disparate sources
offer a substantial body of evidence for my analysis.
This case study also draws on original in-depth, semi-structured interviews
with 35 people, several of whom were interviewed multiple times, that I conducted
during fieldwork in Turkey, Germany, Lebanon, and Syria in 2016, 2017, and 2019. I
conducted the interviews in English and Arabic, with the assistance of several Syrian
translators. My subjects included Syrian activists, journalists, regime defectors, and
former combatants, along with knowledgeable experts on the war in Syria such as
humanitarian and development aid workers, local and international academics and
researchers, and former diplomats. I arranged interviews through several contacts,
including a Syrian journalist (who reports for The New York Times, among other
outlets), a group of former human rights activists, and Syrian and American staff
of humanitarian organizations active in Syria. Since I lived in Turkey for two years
(2015–17) and served as a consultant for U.S. government aid programs in Syria, I
developed an extensive network of personal and professional contacts that proved
critical for accessing informants.
Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Istanbul, Berlin, Beirut, and
several cities and villages in Northeast Syria. Most Syrian subjects were refugees or
asylum-seekers. Many of them had spent years living under regime and/or opposition
rule during the war, and they maintained constant communication with family, friends,
and colleagues inside Syria and closely monitored local developments. Some of these
individuals openly express their political views online or as part of their professional
endeavors, and have even written articles and editorials under their real names.
However, given the risks involved, I conducted all interviews on the condition of
anonymity. Ensuring confidentiality was essential as some of my respondents are
wanted by the regime or other armed groups, or they were in the midst of processing
asylum applications.
6.3 Displacement by Pro-Government Forces
As noted above, multiple observers of the Syrian conflict claim that uprooting
civilians has been a key pillar of the government’s military strategy.25 An independent
U.N. commission on Syria, for example, found that population displacement has
been “undertaken by Government forces pursuant to an organizational policy” that
constitutes “a crime against humanity and/or a war crime.”26 Yet these transgressions
tend to be described as ethno-sectarian cleansing. If this observation is correct, it
has empirical implications regarding the target of displacement (specific identity or
25 Hokayem, 2016 (24 August; Fisher, 2016 (28 September); Nahlawi 2018.
26 Protection and assistance to internally displaced persons: situation of internally displaced persons in the Syrian
Arab Republic 2013, 7.
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political groups), the form it should take (expulsion) and the results of it (ethno-sectarian
homogenization). My “assortative” theory, by contrast, suggests that targeting should be
more indiscriminate, civilians should be treated differently based on their movements,
not just their identities; and a level of social heterogeneity should be maintained.
Perpetrators should not only create push factors to drive people out; they should also
employ pull factors to entice or coerce people into their territories. I evaluate these
propositions by drawing on the variety of data sources described in the previous
section.
Targeting of Displacement
Some population displacement orchestrated by pro-government forces in Syria
has indeed been consistent with cleansing. Early in the conflict – between mid-2011
and mid-2013 – the SAA and affiliated militias systematically expelled residents of
Sunni enclaves in the Alawite-majority coastal provinces of Tartous and Latakia. These
expulsions occurred during “coordinated clearance” operations in which regime fighters
entered villages and proceeded house-to-house massacring residents and ordering
the rest to flee.27 In Damascus between June and September 2012, and in Hama in
September 2012 and May 2013, government forces razed large sections of neighborhoods
occupied by rebel fighters.28 While no one was reported injured or killed, the army
“used megaphones and told residents they had one hour to pack their things.”29
These displacements appeared to stem from a desire to punish the affected
populations. They occurred after prolonged battles in which regime forces regained or
consolidated control over the towns and neighborhoods in question. For example, the
demolitions in Damascus started after both state and opposition sources confirmed
that government forces had largely regained control of the capital.30 Expulsions
also concentrated on areas from which rebels had launched attacks, and seemed
to selectively or collectively target people based more on their political than their
sectarian affiliations – or because sect was used as a proxy for opposition affiliation.
While the evacuated areas were overwhelmingly Sunni, they had allegedly been used
by opposition fighters, and other majority Sunni neighborhoods nearby were not
targeted for demolition, such as Al-Midan, Joubar, and Al-Qadam in Damascus.31
For instance, in 2012, according to Amnesty International (AI), thousands of civilians
were forced from villages in Aleppo and Idlib after security forces destroyed 1,500
properties in “an obviously deliberate manner” that indicated “premeditation.”32 Yet AI
27 Holliday 2011, 19-20, Enders, 2012 (7 June), Human Rights Watch 2013, 1.
28 This included the neighborhoods of Tadamoun, Barze, Qaboun, and Mezzeh in Damascus, and Masha
al-Arabeen and Wadi al-Jouz in Hama. See Solvang and Neistat 2014.
29 Solvang and Neistat 2014, 17.
30 Solvang and Neistat 2014, 21.
31 Solvang and Neistat 2014.
32 Amnesty International, 2012 (4 June), 42-44.
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reported that “some, possibly many, of the homes that were burned down or otherwise
targeted belonged to [anti-regime] activists...or to people who had become fighters
with the opposition.”33 After demolishing Wadi al-Jouz in Hama in May 2013, the army
“warned residents in other neighborhoods that their houses would also be demolished
if opposition fighters attacked government forces from these neighborhoods.”34 It is
also clear that the perpetrators focused on expelling victims on a permanent basis – as
indicated by leveling their homes – and made no effort to encourage or order them to
relocate to regime territory.
Figure 6.2 shows the geographical distribution of scorched earth massacres
perpetuated by pro-regime forces in Syria, according to the PITF data. PITF identifies 30
instances of such killings between June 2011 and May 2013. As Figure 6.2 demonstrates,
they mostly occurred in ethnic or religiously mixed areas, or in Sunni enclaves in
Alawite strongholds. Investigations by human rights organizations indicate that these
massacres were intended to uproot the resident population. Those that occurred in the
provinces of Tartous and Latakia, for example, were “intended to displace a civilian
population that was perceived as supportive of the opposition from an area that a
government minister characterized as ‘very sensitive’” since it bordered the Alawite
heartland.35 Likewise, the massacres in the city of Homs largely occurred in Sunni
neighborhoods that bordered Alawite enclaves,36 and appeared “to be conducted as
part of a state policy” that was intended “to make civilians flee.”37 Similar atrocities
were carried out in al-Houla and Qubeir in in Homs province – both Sunni villages that
bordered Alawite ones.38
However, according to Eline Bostad, despite the “discriminate nature” of these
operations, “it was not their sectarian identity per se that made the Sunni population
targets.”41 Rather, in these heterogeneous territories, “sectarian identities served as
particularly potent proxies for the opposition.”42 Syrian activist Rifaie Tammas similarly
regards these acts of violence as “politicide” because they were meted out against “a
particular segment of Syrian society due to its pro-opposition affiliation.”43 Indeed,
these cleansing campaigns targeted opposition strongholds in militarily strategic
areas between Damascus and Hama, a central transport hub linking different parts of
Syria – indicating an ex-ante determination that these communities were disloyal. The
al-Bayda and Ras al-Nabe areas of Baniyas in Tartous were, for example, “notoriously
33 Amnesty International, 2012 (4 June), 42-44.
34 Solvang and Neistat 2014, 4.
35 Human Rights Watch 2013, 2-3.
36 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 30.
37 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 33.
38 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 31.
41 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 24.
42 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 24.
43 Tammas 2016, 41.
CHAPTER 6. SYRIA 198
Figure 6.2: Scorched Earth Massacres in Syria (2011–2013)
Source: Political Instability Task Force,39 Balanche 2018.40
pro-revolution,”44 while Homs and Darayya were among the first to join the Syrian
uprising; Homs was once referred to by Syrians as “the capital of the revolution.”45
The town of al-Qusayr in Homs, from which Sunnis were also expelled, had become a
well-known haven for regime defectors.46
These acts of cleansing were primarily carried out through direct violence
– including individual and mass executions, beatings, physical intimidation, and
the bulldozing of homes – and in many ways they reflected the regime’s initial
counterinsurgency strategy. Early in the conflict, Syrian forces used a cordon and search
approach, conducting one major operation at a time by moving town-to-town in a
“proactive targeting and detention campaign.”47 Instances of cleansing such as those
44 Lister 2016a, 131.
45 Ciezadlo, 2016 (5 September). Darayya, meanwhile, had according to Bostad (2018 (16 October), 31)
been “a center for protests since the beginning of the uprising, and its location, close to downtown
Damascus and the Mazzeh military airport, made it strategically important to the regime’s position in
Damascus.”
46 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 24.
47 Holliday 2011, 18.
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described above mostly occurred as part of these operations or during incursions by
pro-regime militias, and were likely part of a concerted effort to punish agitators and
root out armed opponents and their enablers.48 Executing these expulsions required
a degree of territorial control and access to the population, and they transpired, as I
mentioned above, after regime forces had either repelled a rebel advance or retook a
contested area.49
From Direct Violence to Indirect Violence
Yet the bulk of displacement during the Syrian war has been triggered not
by direct forms of violence, but rather by pro-regime forces’ use of indirect violence,
including airstrikes, barrel bombs, and heavy shelling.50 The SAA placed greater
emphasis on these methods beginning in mid-2012, when it began to regularly deploy
helicopter gunships and fighter jets.51 This came soon after the rebels opened new fronts
in Aleppo and Latakia, which were “beyond the reach of overstretched ground troops”
engaging insurgents elsewhere.52 Between January and August 2012, rebels took at least
partial control of 17 towns and cities in seven provinces.53 As the battlefield expanded,
so too did the FSA: by spring 2012 its ranks swelled to between 100,000 and 150,000
fighters spread across 33 brigades.54
The use of barrel bombs, highly imprecise and destructive explosives, was first
reported in August 2012. In the ensuing months, as the number of civilians killed by
pro-government forces through face-to-face violence – namely, shooting – plummeted,
the number killed by airstrikes and shelling increased. This produced a corresponding
spike in population displacement, as Figure 6.2 illustrates. While the figure indicates
a lag between deaths from indirect violence and displacement, this is consistent with
other research on wartime migration, which does not find a significant relationship
48 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 24.
49 In some cases, operations by Christian and Alawite militias to drive Sunnis from their homes appeared
to be idiosyncratic, opportunistic, and uncoordinated. As one analyst has argued, “observers should
be careful to distinguish cases like [these] – where local minorities engaged in ethnic cleansing out of
revenge or perceived self-preservation – from cases in which central government forces have expelled
rebel populations as part of a deliberate military strategy” (Balanche 2018, 26).
50 While opposition forces have indiscriminately shelled areas under government control, these attacks
have paled in comparison to the level of bombardment by the regime. See Human Rights Watch (2015).
51 Solvang and Neistat 2013.
52 Holliday 2013, 22.
53 These included Zabadani and Rankos in Damascus (January), Al-Houla in Homs (February), Arbin,
Douma, and Al-Marj in Rural Damascus (January, January, and June, respectively), Al-Atarib, Azaz,
Haritan, Anadan, Tal Rifa-at and Aleppo City in Aleppo (between May and August), Kafr Nobol in Idlib
(August), Qalaat al-Madiq in Hama (April) and Abu Kamal, Al-Mayadin, and Deir ez-Zor City in Deir
ez-Zor (July and August). Ma’arat al-Numan and Salqin in Idlib were also taken in October, and Kafr
Zeta in Hama was taken in December.
54 Abushakra, 2013 (11 November); Holliday 2013.
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between violence timing and displacement timing.55 The number of registered Syrian
refugees worldwide doubled from 250,000 to 500,000 between September and December
2012, then doubled again three months later, reaching almost four million by the end
of 2014. The number of Syrians reported to be internally displaced also surged to more
than seven million during this period.56
The sharp rise in displacement can be directly linked to the government’s
increased reliance on airstrikes and other forms of indirect violence, which became
“the most significant instrument in the regime’s efforts to displace populations.”57
Indeed, while 94 percent of rebel combatants killed by pro-regime fighters during the
conflict have died by shooting, airstrikes and shelling have accounted for 65 percent of
civilian casualties inflicted by the government (see Figure 6.4). Such attacks have been
widespread and indiscriminate, often reflecting the use of “imprecise and unguided
munitions with wide-area effects.”58 Pro-government forces typically targeted civilian
infrastructure – hospitals, bakeries, and schools – were typically targeted instead of
military assets. The Syrian air force has hit a range of rebel-held locations beyond the
most contested or vital strongholds, including places “where there were no reported
clashes that day, suggesting that the airstrikes were not in tactical support of Syrian
Army units fighting rebels.”59 In fact, many bombed towns and villages “had seen no
recent ground fighting at the time of the attacks,” according to Human Rights Watch.60
As Table 6.1 illustrates, not only did the incidence of airstrikes double between 2013
and 2014, the proportion of airstrikes launched by regime-aligned forces that were
accompanied by ground troops declined substantially from 58 percent in 2012 to 20
percent in 2016. Thus, rather than paving the way for subsequent ground offensives,
these aerial assaults began to replace ground offensives altogether.61
As the regime sought to confront an increasingly multi-pronged insurgency
across a growing number of frontlines, it concentrated its forces on retaking and
securing provincial capitals and other strategic population centers. Yet its use of indirect
violence persisted in areas where it lacked and made little effort to deploy the troops
necessary to capture and hold territory contested or occupied by rebels. Instead, in
these areas – particularly the northern border provinces of Aleppo and Idlib – state
55 Melander and Öberg 2006; Schon 2015, 2019.
56 According to data from UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
situations/syria) and IDMC Syria (http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria).
57 Holliday 2013, 22. Bostad (2018 (16 October), 41) also argues that “barrel bombs and aerial attacks more
generally seemed to play a role in the regime’s strategy of population displacement.”
58 Bostad, 2018 (16 October), 36. According to Human Rights Watch, “Syrian forces used means (e.g.
unguided bombs) and methods (e.g. fighter jets, helicopters) of warfare that under the circumstances
could not distinguish between civilians and combatants, and thus were indiscriminate”Solvang and
Neistat (2013, 2).
59 Holliday 2013, 23.
60 Solvang and Neistat 2013, 1.
61 A point also made by Holliday (2013, 22).
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Figure 6.3: Monthly Deaths from Violence by Pro-Regime Forces, 2012–2016
forces launched rampant and relentless air campaigns designed to trigger civilian
flight. Even as the government began to recapture towns and cities from rebels in
mid-2013, it continued to engage in pitched battles in strategic areas while relying on
airstrikes elsewhere.62 Even places considered less strategic for the regime – such as the
Hama countryside or eastern provinces like Deir ez-Zor – have not been immune from
attack. This indiscriminate violence has not just victimized members of Syria’s Sunni
population. For example, the Syrian Network for Human Rights has documented the
destruction of many Christian sites of worship by government forces in contested and
rebel-held areas. According to the group, while the Assad regime “has portrayed itself
as ‘the protector of minorities’ especially Christians...barrel bombs do not differentiate
between Christians and non-Christians,”, demonstrating that the government “is willing
to target anybody...regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliations.”63
Taken together, the data presented in this section suggests that between
mid- and late-2012, the regime altered its approach from one of direct violence
to one that prioritized indirect violence, which corresponded with (1) a massive
62 Lister 2016b, 5.
63 “Targeting Christian Places of Worship in Syria” 2015 (7 May), 1.
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Figure 6.4: Deaths due to Violence by Pro-Regime Forces, 2011 – 2018
Table 6.1: Regime Airstrikes Accompanied by Ground Forces, 2012 – 2016
Ground Forces No Ground Forces % Ground Forces Total
2012 623 454 58 1,077
2013 515 884 37 1,399
2014 810 2,011 29 2,821
2015 677 1,474 31 2,151
2016 541 2,099 20 2,640
Total 3,166 6,922 35 10,088
increase in population displacement, and (2) a seeming decline in ethnic and political
cleansing. The regime has used direct violence to penetrate and consolidate control over
contested territories. But the fact that its indirect violence has been widespread, highly
indiscriminate, and often unaccompanied by ground forces indicates that this violence
– and the massive displacement it produced – served as a substitute for territorial
occupation, at least in the short-term, rather than a means of achieving it. This shift from
direct to indirect violence, and from selective to non-selective targeting, is consistent
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with existing models of civil war violence that emphasize the relationship between
territorial control and civilian collaboration.64 The important question, however, is what
function displacement served for the Syrian government. Was it simply intended to
eliminate or punish certain segments of the population? Or did it serve another purpose
– one that differed from the logic underlying the cleansing campaigns described above?
Form of Displacement
Guilt by Location
The fact that rebel-held areas are overwhelmingly Sunni is often cited as
evidence that the depopulation tactics of Assad’s Alawite-dominated regime aim to
expel civilians along sectarian lines. But most IDPs from opposition territories have fled
to government zones.65 Early in the conflict, many of the displaced, including Sunnis,
were welcomed and even “considered regime supporters” simply because they moved
to areas under state control.66 According to one regime defector I interviewed, “the
government views all IDPs who choose to live in opposition areas as anti-regime, and
those who choose to live in its territory as loyal.”67 A member of a local opposition
council in rebel-held Idlib also told me that “the regime considers [people] to be
terrorists because they stayed in opposition areas.”68 Assad himself voiced this
sentiment in a BBC interview: “In most areas where the rebels took over, the civilians
fled and came to our areas, so in most of the areas that we encircle and attack [there]
are only militants.”69 The view that where people move indicates who they support
has not been limited to the government. A European diplomat, after observing that
most civilians were fleeing to regime areas, stated that it “probably shows where their
political preferences lie.”70
As the war has worn on, IDPs who spent longer living under the opposition
have been viewed with greater suspicion and investigated when they “defect” to regime
territory. But, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, following the government’s
takeover of rebel-held areas in Homs, Rural Damascus, and Aleppo, most residents
have been given a choice of destination: rebel-held territory, or regime-controlled
areas nearby. These evacuations have often been carried out as part of “reconciliation”
agreements or truces between the regime, rebel fighters, and community leaders. These
agreements have varied by location, however. According to Raymond Hinnebusch and
64 Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2011.
65 IDMC, 2014 (2 October); Khaddour, 2015 (8 July); Balanche 2018, Interviewee SYR028, Aid worker,
Berlin, October 2017.
66 “Coast attracts Aleppans displaced by war” 2014 (14 June).
67 Interviewee SYR015, Syrian regime defector, Istanbul, December 2016.
68 Interviewee SYR034, Local council member (Idlib), Northeast Syria, January 2019.
69 BBC, 2015 (10 February).
70 Lekic, 2016 (10 June).
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Omar Imady, “regime negotiators offered different kinds of deals in different areas;
for example those that demonstrated high resistance in fighting the regime faced total
population removal.”71 In Daraya, an early bastion of anti-government protests that
became “a platform for rebel attacks on regime-held Damascus,” the entire population
was forcibly removed, and Syrian troops razed most of the town so they could not
return.72 In contrast, the neighboring town of Moadamiyah, which “had been more
defensive in the conflict, was treated more generously” as residents were given a choice
of whether and where to move.73
This is consistent with the idea that for communities perceived as disloyal,
displacement was used for “cleansing” purposes, while for those whose allegiances
were more ambiguous, displacement was used as a sorting mechanism. The evacuations
brokered under local reconciliation deals appeared to have two objectives. The first was
to expel unrepentant disloyalists, such as rebel fighters, opposition civilian leaders,
and activists.74 The second was to identify and give neutral or loyal civilians a chance
to return to the state. Hence buses carrying evacuees to rebel-held areas have been
stopped at regime checkpoints and told by soldiers “that if any [passengers] would like
to return to the government-controlled areas, [they] would be welcomed and taken care
of.”75 Or consider the filtering logic behind the “humanitarian corridors” established
by the regime and its Russian backers during the siege of rebel-held Eastern Aleppo in
2016 – where four passageways out of the city were opened, three for civilians and one
for combatants.76 Evacuees who elect regime areas were held in government shelters,
where they were screened for rebel ties and provided aid by humanitarian agencies or
local authorities.77 Some were arrested and incorporated into the regime’s expansive
incarceration system, but most were not. Between November and December 2016, 70,000
to 100,000 IDPs fled from rebel-held eastern Aleppo to government-run western Aleppo;
two to four percent of them were reportedly detained.78 After the evacuation of Homs,
state forces screened hundreds of men, but “many...were eventually released.”79
Fleeing to rebel territory, meanwhile, has been treated as an act of defiance or
– for those wanted by the government – an admission of guilt. This was the implicit
message in the bombing of displacement camps near the Turkish border by pro-regime
71 Hinnebusch and Imady 2017, 3.
72 Hinnebusch and Imady 2017, 4. According to Human Rights Watch, Daraya “is widely acknowledged to
have been central to the Syrian uprising, and is strongly affiliated with the political opposition, having
produced prominent political activists” (Human Rights Watch 2018).
73 Hinnebusch and Imady 2017, 4.
74 Adleh and Favier 2017, 8.
75 Al-Shimale, 2017 (17 March).
76 Al-Jablawi 2016.
77 Argentieri, 2017 (3 January); Interviewee SYR016, Syrian activist, Istanbul, January 2017.
78 See Czuperski et al. 2017. 419 arrests were reported in Aleppo City during this period (January-June
2017) according to Syrian human rights groups, but a vast majority “were young men wanted for draft
dodging rather than political offenses” (Lund, 2017 (12 April)).
79 Syria Institute, 2017 (February), 28.
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forces; camps that technically fell within rebel territory but were typically miles away
from military frontlines and towns ruled by the opposition.80 Perceived guilt by
location also explains why IDPs from Homs City who resettled in the opposition-held
neighborhood of al-Waer faced more persecution from government forces than those
who moved to regime areas.81 In fact, after Homs was recaptured by Syrian forces,
the only IDPs reportedly allowed to return were those who fled to regime areas.82
Sorting the populace through physical displacement also concentrated disloyalists
in a specific area where they could be easily targeted. Idlib province, for example,
had “become a ‘dumping ground’ for Syrians still opposed to Assad,” while in small
pockets of territory between Hama and Homs and in eastern Damascus, the state
“cag[ed] up Syrians that still reject its rule.”83 As explained by a regime defector, “think
of a dumpster where you gather garbage to finally burn it.”84 A regime propagandist
invoked similar language in describing the government’s military strategy: “You collect
trash, separate it, recycle what can be recycled and bury the rest in the ground.”85
Thus in the words of one U.N. report, forced displacement and community
evacuations have allowed government forces “to categorize populations on the basis
of allegiance.”86 Or as one Syrian journalist remarked to me in an interview: “it’s like
they [the government] are trying to filter out the people who are against them.”87 This
indicates that for the Syrian regime and its allies, the strategic benefits of uprooting
civilians go beyond draining restive towns of their residents. If the regime’s ultimate
objective were punishment by expulsion or demographic engineering, authorities
would discourage or prevent IDPs from entering their territories – and would likely not
allow them to reside there unmolested. But the regime has actually employed several
methods to entice people to its territories, where many residents have benefitted from
its patronage. The SAA has inundated civilians in Homs, Aleppo, and other contested
areas with text messages announcing relief distributions and leaflets providing detailed
instructions and “passes” for entry into regime territory.88 In 2012, state authorities
urged Syrian refugees in neighboring countries to “cast away humility and hunger and
return to the homeland”89 and emphasized their “readiness” to secure aid and housing
for the displaced.90 The government has operated collective relief centers and ensured
that a disproportionate amount of international aid goes to areas it controls, since food
80 Barnard, 2016 (5 May); Porter and Jawdat, 2016 (26 May).
81 Syria Institute, 2017 (February), 30.
82 Interviewee SYR018, Syrian journalist, Istanbul, January 2017.
83 Elghossain, 2016 (22 June).
84 Interviewee SYR021, Syrian regime defector, Istanbul, December 2016.
85 Hisham and Crabapple, 2018 (September 11).
86 Sieges as Weapons of War: Encircle, starve, surrender, evacuate 2018 (29 May).
87 Interviewee SYR008, Syrian activist, Gaziantep, May 2016.
88 “Regime Drops Leaflets in Idlib” 2015 (12 October); Al-Kassir, 2016 (17 March).
89 BBC, 2013 (29 May).
90 BBC, 2013 (21 August).
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availability has been a key attraction for IDPs.91 Beyond relief assistance, the regime:
“has concentrated on delivering services from within – and mostly to – areas under
its control. Besides drawing more Syrians into areas under its control, the Assad
regime has managed to monitor them by embedding Syrian state institutions –
universities, hospitals, courts and schools – in or near buildings that house its
intelligence agencies.”92
Figure 6.5: ‘Safety Pass’ Dropped by the Syrian Army
‘’It is approved for the holder of this card to pass through the checkpoints of the Syrian
Army without any harm. The Syrian Army will provide medical help and food to
whoever holds this card. Cooperate with the army and leave for the sake of your lives."
During the war, the state remained the country’s largest employer,93 and civil
servants living under the opposition continued to receive government paychecks, which
often required traveling to regime areas. This has maintained an opening for more
91 Martinez and Eng 2015. According to one analysis, an estimated $900 million of the $1.1 billion spent
on humanitarian assistance by the U.N. in 2015 was distributed through Damascus in a process that was
“controlled to some extent by the Syrian authorities” (Hopkins and Beals, 2016 (29 August)).
92 Elghossain, 2016 (22 June).
93 Khaddour, 2015 (8 July).
CHAPTER 6. SYRIA 207
people to return to the state. According to one aid worker, the government “wants the
people back in its territory...except for fighters or activists who are not reconcilable.”94
Indeed, in depopulated areas, the procedures for return have provided further
opportunities for the state to screen and collect information from civilians. In the six
months following the depopulation of eastern Aleppo in late 2016, some 200,000 IDPs
were allowed to return provided they registered with local authorities.95 The registration
process typically requires Syrians to answer detailed questions about their role in
anti-government demonstrations and armed rebellion; provide the names, locations, and
activities of rebels operating in their areas; and sign loyalty oaths pledging allegiance
to the state. Authorities then cross-check people’s responses with other information
collected by government agents in order to assess its credibility.96 Subjecting IDPs to this
process has therefore made them more legible in the eyes of the regime, while supplying
authorities with intelligence on rebel identities and capabilities. Given that the war
significantly disrupted the state’s extensive intelligence network, the mukhabarat, these
background checks have provided critical sources of information.97
Aspiring returnees have also been required to show documentation of property
ownership to local police or security forces. In 2018, the Syrian government introduced
a new law, Act 10, that permitted the state to redevelop properties not claimed by
their owners – providing a strong incentive for residents to return to regime territory,
particularly since property claims had to be made in person. Yet according to the Syria
Institute, authorities have reportedly used these claims “as a method of vetting people
instead of vetting ownership” and consulted land registries to identify constituencies
allied with the rebels.98 These vetting procedures apply to Syrian refugees as well as
IDPs. While President Assad has publically appealed for refugees to come back to areas
of the country recaptured by the regime,99 his government has used civil registration
and property claims to screen returnees and filter out the unapologetically disloyal
and irreconcilable elements of the Syrian population.100 Such elements are therefore
discouraged or explicitly prevented from returning. The entire displacement process,
then – from the initial departure, to the move to a temporary destination, to return and
resettlement – has served as a tool for the regime to sort the population.
94 Interviewee SYR029, Aid worker, Berlin, October 2017.
95 “Syrians return to live in ravaged Aleppo – in pictures” 2017 (6 July).
96 Haid, 2018 (August).
97 For decades the mukhabarat played a pivotal role in enforcing Assad’s rule, and early in the uprising it
was instrumental in identifying members of the opposition to be arrested or assassinated. But by 2015,
the mukhabarat found itself “in turmoil” as several of its top leaders were killed or removed (Sherlock
and Malouf, 2015 (11 May)).
98 Syria Institute, 2017 (February), 42.
99 “Bashar Al-Assad calls on Syrian refugees to return to their own country” 2019 (19 February).
100 Batrawi and Uzelac, 2018 (September).
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The Extractive and Symbolic Benefits of Displacement
For the Syrian government, luring people back to the state has stemmed
from extractive needs, not just punitive ones. Civilians displaced to Tartous and
Latakia have offered capital and labor to the local economy, leading regime officials to
facilitate the entry of IDPs from Aleppo into the labor market.101 Returnees also provide
much-needed revenues to the government: upon arriving in regime-controlled Syria,
refugees returning from neighboring countries have been immediately taken to their
local municipalities to pay fees for all utilities they would have paid in the years they
were gone.102
More importantly, the displaced offer a remedy to one of the most pressing
problems the regime has faced throughout the conflict: a lack of sufficient manpower.
While the SAA claimed some 220,000 soldiers in 2011, by April 2012, 50,000 to 60,000
soldiers had deserted or defected to the opposition.103 Of the 65,000 to 75,000 troops the
regime deemed politically reliable, as many as 7,000 were killed and 30,000 wounded by
the end of 2012.104 The combination of selective deployments, defections, and battlefield
casualties greatly hindered the army’s combat power.105 In response to increasingly
acute manpower needs, the government turned to more desperate recruitment efforts
– mobilizing reservists en mass and imposing new service requirements and regulations
to prevent desertions.106 As a consequence, compulsory conscription for all men of
military service age became “rampant” in Syria.107 As the New York Times reported:
“It is impossible to live in government-controlled Syria without noticing that
there are almost no young men on the street. They are in the army, or they are
dead. Veterans must carry their military papers with them or risk on-the-spot
re-enlistment.”108
Investigations by human rights organizations are replete with reports of the
regime conscripting IDPs, often forcefully, to serve as fighters or spies.109 For instance,
over 4,000 men who fled from eastern to western Aleppo in December 2016 were
conscripted into the army and sent to the frontline with little training.110 Upon entering
101 “Coast attracts Aleppans displaced by war” 2014 (14 June).
102 Anderson, 2018 (16 July).
103 Peker and Abu-Nasr 2012.
104 Holliday 2013, 28-29.
105 Holliday 2013, 26-27.
106 Assad would eventually acknowledge the severity of these manpower shortages in a televised speech
(Samaan and Barnard 2015).
107 Adleh and Favier 2017, 1.
108 Worth, 2017 (24 May).
109 Amnesty International, 2015 (14 May); Human Rights, 2016 (9 December).
110 “Men fleeing E. Aleppo forced to fight with Assad” 2016 (12 December); Czuperski et al. 2017. In
addition to the SAA, fighting-age males can join one of the local popular committees or a paramilitary
force such as the Russia-managed Fifth Corps (Adleh and Favier 2017, 12).
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regime territory, eligible displaced men are immediately placed in a register for the
army.111 The Peace Research Institute in Oslo further describes how the regime exploits
IDPs:
“In areas under its control, the regime’s administrative apparatus – while weakened
– retains its capacity to register the displaced...Assad’s regime clearly sees those
displaced to areas under its control as part of the pool of people from which it can
recruit. The displaced...are more dependent on humanitarian aid than anybody, and
clearly, receiving aid is followed by an expectation to support the cause.”112
Finally, the displaced provide the regime with propaganda fodder. As noted by
one Western journalist, the government has “used the fact that most people had [come]
to live in regime held areas as ‘evidence’ of its popularity, arguing that it reflected
the Syrian people’s support to the regime.”113 Visits to IDP shelters by state officials,
including Assad himself, have been used to showcase the number of people seeking
sanctuary from “terrorism” and receiving assistance from the government, an attempt
to legitimize the regime to both domestic and international audiences.114 In mid-2017,
when hundreds of families decided to move from northern Syria to parts of Homs
recently retaken by the regime, it was broadcast on state media.115 In a statement,
the local governor declared that the returnees had fled “persecution and inhumane
treatment” in rebel-held areas and that their decision to return was evidence that “the
state is the only guarantor of the dignity of the Syrian citizen.”116 According to the
Beirut-based Daily Star, the return:
“was a propaganda coup for the Syrian president, who is looking to burnish his
image as Syria’s legitimate ruler. His readiness to welcome returnees stands in stark
contrast to the indifference in many other places toward the plight of displaced
Syrians...as the families disembarked from the buses, they waved placards bearing
Assad’s image. Some chanted before the cameras that they would sacrifice ‘blood
and soul’ for the president.”117
The government’s exploitation of returning citizens has led the U.N. and
other international organizations to caution countries hosting Syrian refugees against
pressuring people to go back to Syria even as the conflict reaches it final stages.118
111 Interviewee SYR028, Aid worker, Berlin, October 2017.
112 Harpviken and Onne Yogev, 2016 (June).
113 Tepperman 2015.
114 “Assad Visits Displaced Syrians Outside Damascus” 2014 (12 March).
115 See SyriaDirect (2017 (11 July), 2017 (9 May)).
116 “Families return to al-Wa’r because of inhumane treatment in the camps in the city of graves” 2017 (7
May).
117 Issa, 2017 (15 July).
118 Marks, 2019 (13 February).
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President Assad and his backers clearly see refugee return as a major boost to the
regime’s political legitimacy. Moreover, the issue of return gives the regime a bargaining
chip in its quest for international recognition and the reconstruction funds that it will
need to rebuild the country, which could exceed $250 billion.119
Quantitative Evidence
To complement the qualitative evidence provided above, I conduct an analysis
of subnational quantitative data on displacement and violence in Syria. Combining
data from VDC and UNOCHA, I created a dataset of civilian fatalities and IDP inflows
and outflows, by month, at the province level from January 2016 to December 2018.
While this time period falls within the later stages of the conflict, it still provides an
opportunity to test some of my claims more systematically, as Syria has experienced
high levels of displacement and lethal violence throughout the war.
If my argument is correct and the regime has used displacement to “pull”
people into its territories – and not just to “push” them out – then state forces should kill
fewer civilians following IDP inflows. On the other hand, IDP outflows from a province
should lead to more government killings because the regime aims to deter flight and
perceives those who flee as potential traitors who should be punished.
For the analysis, my dependent variables are the number of fatalities due to
regime violence, both combatant and civilian (regime killings (all)), and the number of
civilian fatalities only (regime killings (civilians)), as reported by VDC. The independent
variables are the number of IDP inflows into a province and the number of IDP
outflows from a province during a given month. I also controlled for the number of
within-province IDP flows (inprovflows). Finally, I included two control variables that
could influence both displacement and violence against civilians. The first is a measure
of the degree of territorial control exercised by the regime in a province during a given
month, according to the Carter Center.120 This variable equals the total percentage of
communities controlled by the government in a province, though the results are similar
if a 1-5 scaled measure of government control is used. The second control variable is the
number of combatant fatalities in a province in a given month, which is meant to proxy for
battle intensity.
119 Marks, 2019 (13 February).
120 If the level of territorial control by each actor changed little during the period under study, using a
model with fixed effects would control for it. However, because there are enough shifts in territorial
control in several provinces between 2016 and 2018, I include a control for it.
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IDPinflows −0.03 ∗ ∗∗ −0.04 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 −0.04 ∗ ∗∗ −0.04 ∗ ∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
IDPoutflows 0.05 ∗ ∗∗ 0.06 ∗ ∗∗ 0.09 ∗ ∗∗ 0.06 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 ∗ ∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Inprovflows 0.00 −0.01 −0.07 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Terrcontrol (%) −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Combfatalities 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −0.67 ∗ ∗∗ −0.80 ∗ ∗∗ −0.90 ∗ ∗ −0.92 ∗ ∗∗ −0.93 ∗ ∗∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.37) (0.18) (0.20)
Observations 498 463 390 485 450
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
I estimate panel negative binomial models with province fixed effects.121 This
allows me to isolate the effects of IDP flow patterns on violence, address the panel
structure of the data, and account for over-dispersion in the dependent variable. Table
6.2 presents the results. Controlling for the degree of territorial control and battle
intensity, I find that IDP inflows lead to a decrease in regime killings, including total
fatalities (Model 1) and civilian fatalities only (Model 2). IDP outflows, meanwhile, lead
to an increase in killings by government forces, and both results are highly statistically
significant. This is consistent with the notion that the regime has (1) discouraged
civilians from leaving its territories and punished those who have, and (2) welcomed
civilians who have entered, on average.
Of course, there is a potential endogeneity issue here. Since violence can also
affect displacement, it is possible that, in my models, it is fatalities that are leading to
more or less IDP flows, rather than the other way around. While I am reassured by
existing research finding no significant relationship between the timing of violence
121 I tested for potential problems of multicollinearity and found little cause for concern: the maximum
variance-inflation factor (VIF) for Models 1-3 is 3.24, and mean VIF is 2.53.
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and displacement,122 I take three steps to address endogeneity concerns. First, I run
the analysis with the number of civilian killings by rebel forces as the dependent
variable. If my findings simply reflect more violence against civilians producing more
displacement, then the results for regime and rebel killings should be similar. As shown
in Model 3, this is indeed the case for IDP outflows, which – as with regime killings –
are positively and statistically significantly associated with rebel killings. But the results
for IDP inflows are also positive (and insignificant) and therefore diverge from the
findings for regime-induced fatalities.
Second, I lag the main dependent variables by one month, and find similar
results (Models 4 and 5 in Table 6.2).123 However, including lagged dependent variables
in count models can be problematic, since it assumes that the data grows at an
exponential rate.124 Therefore, as a final step, I estimate panel vector autoregressions
(VAR) and conduct Granger causality tests. Granger tests, along with cointegration tests
in VAR models – which treat all variables as endogenous and interdependent – helps
identify whether a particular variable precedes another. This offers a way to determine
whether, or to what extent, IDP flows follow violence or violence follows IDP flows.
The results for the Granger tests are presented in Table 6.3. I provide the
p-value (statistical significance level) for each possible temporal order of my primary
dependent and independent variables. If the p-value is statistically significant, it
indicates support for the order specified in a given row – e.g., if X→ Y is significant, we
then have reason to believe that X antecedes Y. In other words, statistical significance
specifies the temporal relationship between two variables rather than the magnitude
of the relationship. Because cointegration tests found that IDP flows and violence are
contemporaneously correlated, in the VAR models I took the first difference of each
variable.125
Unfortunately, the results in Table 6.3 do little to resolve concerns about
endogeneity. None of the temporal relationships investigated are statistically significant,
and it is therefore unclear whether IDP flows precede regime violence or vice versa.
This could be a consequence of the limitations of the data, which only capture monthly
trends in fatalities and displacement. Violent responses to IDP flows may happen within
the same month, but Granger causality tests would not be able to detect these patterns.
Overall, an analysis of subnational data on violence and displacement in Syria
finds some evidence that government forces tend to kill fewer people following the
inflow of IDPs into a province and more people following the outflow of IDPs from a
122 Melander and Öberg 2006; Schon 2015, 2019.
123 Lagging the independent variable is not appropriate since my argument presumes a lag between
displacement and subsequent violence, as opposed to violence and subsequent displacement.
124 Brandt et al. 2000, 824-25.
125 One issue with Granger tests is they assume that time series data is stationary: shifts in time do not
change the shape of the distribution (Hamilton 1994; Nelson and Kang 1981). This would produce a
model that is biased, since most real-world datasets are not stationary (Thomson 1994). I therefore used
first-differences of the data to correct for cointegration of my variables.
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Table 6.3: VAR Granger Test Results for IDP Flow-Violence Relationship
Unit P-value(first difference)
IDP inflows→ Regime killings (all) 0.983
IDP outflows→ Regime killings (all) 0.435
Regime killings (all)→ IDP inflows 0.209
Regime killings (all)→ IDP outflows 0.509
IDP inflows→ Regime killings (civilians) 0.881
IDP outflows→ Regime killings (civilians) 0.568
Regime killings (civilians)→ IDP inflows 0.277
Regime killings (civilians)→ IDP outflows 0.274
province. These results hold even when accounting for the intensity of fighting and the
extent of territorial control exercised by the regime. I use several measures to address
endogeneity concerns, but Granger causality tests fail to confirm antecedence in the
displacement-violence relationship. As such, these findings should be met with caution.
But the quantitative evidence, while limited, is consistent with the qualitative evidence
presented above: the government has seemingly welcomed displaced civilians moving
to its territories and inflicted violence on those who have left to other parts of Syria.
This aligns with what we would expect if state-induced displacement has served an
assortative function during the conflict.
Results of Displacement: Mixing or Unmixing?
If the regime’s displacement tactics amounted to sectarian cleansing, we would
expect them to result in a significant “unmixing” of the population by sect, with Sunnis
comprising the bulk of residents in rebel-held areas and non-Sunnis comprising the
majority of the population in regime-held territory. Before the conflict, Arab Sunnis
made up approximately 65 percent of the Syrian population; by 2017 that number
had declined modestly to 61 percent.126 Likewise, the share of Alawites in Syria, the
sect to which the Assad family belongs, has increased from 10 percent to 13 percent
during the war. Therefore, despite the fact that Syria has hemorrhaged a substantial
number of refugees, any purported effort to drain the country of its Sunni population
has seemingly not been very effective.
126 Balanche 2018.
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Figure 6.6: Population in Syria by Sect
Source: Balanche 2018
In fact, in areas controlled by the regime, population displacement has increased
their level of social heterogeneity. Fabrice Balanche estimates that, as of June 2017,
Sunnis constituted at least 58 percent of those living in regime territory.127 The influx
of IDPs into government strongholds has in many instances led to an intermixing of
the population. In Latakia, the proportion of Sunnis increased from 40 percent before
the conflict to 50 percent in 2013.128 Tartous, which was reportedly 90 percent Alawite
at the start of the uprising – and where thousands of regime loyalists marched in
2011 to chants of “Assad, or we burn the country” – fell to 60 percent Alawite by late
127 Balanche 2018.
128 Balanche 2015b.
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summer 2012,129 and, by 2014, IDPs made up 52 percent of its population.130 As a result,
regime areas have “the most diverse sectarian mix in Syria, welcoming IDPs from all
denominations.”131 So when Assad declares, as he did in a 2017 speech, that Syria has
gained “a healthier and more homogenous society” during the war,132 he appears to be
extolling homogeneity along political lines – not sectarian ones.
Movements and Loyalties: Perception vs. Reality
There is compelling evidence that pro-government forces have drawn inferences
about the allegiances of the population based on their flight decisions. But have people’s
movements actually reflected their true loyalties or affiliations? It is difficult to answer
this question definitively. Studies of civilian flight in Syria have found that IDPs tend
to go “where there are people with similar political or ethnic characteristics” as those
“supporting the regime generally go to [government] areas” while those opposing
the regime “tend to move to opposition-held areas.”133 Several people I interviewed
in a displacement camp in Northeast Syria said that when rebels took over a town or
village, residents who stayed typically had “a relationship with” the rebels, while those
who were “not with” them left.134 A survey of Syrian refugees in Turkey, meanwhile,
indicated that those who fled the conflict zone withdrew support from all warring
parties and refused to pick a side.135
Those who remain in Syria, however, have faced strong pressure to pick a side.
The evacuation deals described above are a case in point. After regime forces captured
rebel-controlled parts of Eastern Ghouta in Rural Damascus in 2018, local insurgent
groups forged such an agreement with the government. As part of the deal, up to 13,000
people opted to leave for rebel-held Idlib province – most of whom were fighters and
their families, local civil society figures, and humanitarian workers.136 In interviews, aid
workers told me that evacuees who selected Idlib as their preferred destination tended
to be combatants, activists, and other people “in opposition to the government.”137 This
explains why the regime, according to one media report, “has treated [Idlib] province as
a dumping ground for those it does not want in its territory.”138
For many of the displaced, fleeing to government areas has likely been
motivated more by expediency and survival than by a strong political preference.
129 Paul 2013; O’Bagy 2013.
130 Doocy et al. 2015.
131 Balanche 2018.
132 RT 2017.
133 HTAU, 2015 (December), 27.
134 Interviewees SYR031, SYR032, and SYR033, IDPs, Al-Hasakeh, Syria, January 2019.
135 Fabbe et al. 2017.
136 Mercy Corps, Situation Report: Southern Syria Reconciliation Agreement Update, March 31, 2019,
Humanitarian Access Team.
137 Interviewee SYR029, Aid worker, Berlin, October 2017.
138 Barnard and Saad, 2018 (31 March).
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Indeed, IDPs surveyed in Syria tend to cite safety and security as the primary factors
influencing their flight.139 Yet seeking sanctuary with the state still amounts to a
symbolic act of obedience to a regime that built its authority on outward signs of
passive compliance from citizens instead of by cultivating “true believers”; what
Lisa Wedeen calls the “politics of ‘as if.’”140 In the eyes of the regime, the element of
“choice” exercised by residents of opposition territories likely mitigated the potential
that its depopulation tactics would backfire. This is evidenced in the terminology used
by Syrian state media, which according to one study has eschewed the Arabic word
for “refugees” (al-laji’een) in favor of ones that “translate to ‘those who have fled’ or
‘Syrian migrants’ [muhajirah], euphemisms that place the agency for flight solely on the
[displaced] themselves.”141 Thus a civilian who is neither dedicated to the opposition
nor guilty of anti-regime activity should, all else equal, eventually flee rebel areas
when incentivized to do so. Moreover, (s)he should move to government territories
given the promise of greater security, livelihood opportunities, relief aid, and other
incentives created by the state to attract new arrivals. Failing to take these steps is quite
costly unless one is affiliated with, or dedicated to, the opposition. From the regime’s
standpoint, displacing the population is not driving people into the arms of the rebels; it
is simply forcing them to choose between the rebels and the government.
Summary
Early in the Syrian civil war, strategic displacement by pro-regime forces
focused on expelling members of the opposition and their perceived sympathizers.
Sectarian identity was sometimes used as a proxy for disloyalty, providing a basis for
the collective expulsion of Sunni populations. These expulsions helped the government
conquer key territories, primarily Sunni enclaves in Alawite strongholds and religiously
mixed cities and towns. Such acts of cleansing were carried out through direct methods
of violence – summary executions, threats, or destruction of property – and occurred as
the perpetrators solidified control over strategic areas.
But as the battlefield expanded, the number of rebel groups proliferated, and
the regime began to suffer from troop shortages, it increasingly relied on indirect
violence. As a result, targeted “cleansing” operations declined in favor of more
widespread and indiscriminate campaigns to depopulate rebel-held areas. In the shift
from direct to indirect violence, the strategic logic of forced displacement also changed.
A measure initially intended to penalize and deter the regime’s enemies became a
method for helping it figure out who its most dedicated enemies were. Decisions over
whether and where to go were seen as increasingly political, with the refusal to relocate
to government areas considered a costly act of noncompliance and thus an indicator of
139 HTAU, 2015 (December).
140 Wedeen (1998). To reinforce its authority, the Assad regime for decades required not that Syrians
believed in the power or sanctity of the regime, but merely that they talked and acted “as if” they did.
141 Batrawi and Uzelac, 2018 (September), 3.
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disloyalty. At the same time, displacement enabled the government to access and exploit
a larger segment of the population for both instrumental and symbolic purposes.
Taken together, then, the available evidence suggests that the regime’s
displacement tactics (1) have been motivated much more by political concerns over
loyalty than demographic concerns regarding sect, and (2) are in many cases consistent
with a campaign to sort and capture the civilian population, not just to expel it. This
“assortative” logic does not account for every case of regime-directed displacement.
But it explains why there was a more concerted effort to massively uproot civilians
beginning in mid- to late-2012, when the government began to face multiple battlefronts,
a lack of manpower, and the deterioration of the once-robust mukhabarat.
6.4 Alternative Explanations
Ethnic Nationalism
By challenging the characterization of regime-induced displacement in Syria
as a uniform strategy of sectarian cleansing, the evidence presented in this chapter
casts doubt on explanations that emphasize ethnic nationalism. Even those episodes
that can be described as cleansing appear to have stemmed from the use of religious
sect as an indicator of potential rebel affiliation, as opposed to some deep-seated
animosity toward Sunni Arabs. The Assad regime has certainly stoked sectarian
tensions during the conflict in order to galvanize support among Syria’s minority
communities. But religious sect is only one of many other fault lines in the conflict,
along with class, ideology, and tribe; a fact that has caused observers to classify the war
as “semi-sectarian.”142
Moreover, while the regime has long privileged Alawites – appointing a
disproportionate number to senior government positions – Sunnis remain fixtures of
the country’s economy and security apparatus.143 Before the war, Bashar al-Assad, who
took over the presidency from his father Hafez in 2000, offered significant opportunities
to Syria’s Sunni majority. According to Charles Lister, the younger Assad “presided over
a partial revival of Sunni Islam within state-accepted circles” and established “friendly
and eventually rather cosy relationships with moderate Sunni leaders, who were duly
installed in positions of authority.”144 This resulted in a “gradual integration of Sunni
Muslims into the spheres of officialdom.”145 Cultivating support across religious sects
and tribes in Syria has been a vital governing strategy for the regime; one that has
helped ensure its survival.146
142 Phillips 2015.
143 Holliday 2013, 18, Cambanis, 2015 (5 November).
144 Lister 2016b, 28.
145 Lister 2016b, 28.
146 Cambanis, 2015 (5 November).
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The war has done little to change that. As explained by Thanassis Cambanis,
“many rich Sunni industrialists serve as pillars of the regime,” which “still relies on
Sunnis to fill its fighting ranks. There are Sunni Muslim Syrians fighting on the front
line for Assad even today.”147 Kheder Khaddour similarly points out that, as I noted
earlier in this section, Sunni merchants who relocated to Tartous and Latakia “have
generally been warmly welcomed and are often allowed to shift their business and
employees to new sites in the market.”148 Since the early days of the uprising, the
primary cleavage in the Syrian conflict has been political, not sectarian, as Syrian activist
Rifaie Tammas stresses:
“The Syrian population became divided mainly along one political line, in
terms of their stance towards the Syrian uprising. Syrians were labeled as either
pro-regime or pro-revolution, and this label sometimes meant the difference
between life and death. Political entrepreneurs...also played a large role in defining
the new identities and the narratives attached to them and in drawing the lines
separating the boundaries among these identities. Within the new pro-Assad versus
pro-revolution division, people greatly differed on the extent of their support of
Assad or the opposition, depending on the person’s ideology, ethnicity, and religious
background.”149
Denial
Another possible explanation for the Syrian government’s depopulation strategy
is denial: displacing civilians was part of a counterinsurgency measure to deprive
rebels of the resources they needed to be politically and militarily successful. José Ciro
Martínez and Brent Eng, for example, argue that the regime’s strategic use of aerial
bombardment has sought to disrupt the governing capabilities of the opposition by
crippling key infrastructure, sowing divisions between rebel groups and the local
population, and sabotaging efforts to build an effective counter-state.150 Likewise,
draining contested and opposition-held areas of their populations may have aimed to
deny Syrian rebels supplies and recruits furnished by civilian residents.151
While I acknowledge that this denial logic may have been part of the regime’s
calculus, it only tells part of the story – as it does not account for those who resisted
displacement or for what transpired after people fled their communities. Moreover,
this argument suffers from two important weaknesses when applied to the Syria case.
First, driving civilians out from under the writ of rebel forces likely benefitted the
147 Cambanis, 2015 (5 November).
148 Khaddour 2016.
149 Tammas 2016, 32.
150 Martínez and Eng 2018.
151 Bick 2017.
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Syrian opposition, at least in some cases, as much as it hurt it. Local governing councils
(LCs) established by opposition groups in rebel-held areas have struggled throughout
the war to provide services and meet the needs of local residents. Rapid population
increases in these areas have therefore risked overwhelming LCs and fracturing the
opposition. According to a report on rebel governing bodies in Syria by the Swiss
Peace Foundation, civilians “generally have high expectations of the [LCs] and other
institutions engaged in service delivery” and put “enormous pressure” on them.152 As
the LCs have limited capacity, influxes of IDPs into opposition territories have “led to
a considerable growth in population and in needs that could not be met...The limited
services can thus often not cover the needs of newly arriving or returning people.”153
Thus the partial depopulation of rebel territories reduced the number of civilians who
needed to be cared for, easing the opposition’s burden in many instances.
Second, the Syrian opposition has not been exclusively reliant on the local
population for resources. Syria has become one of the most internationalized civil wars
in decades, and the rebels have received substantial assistance from external sources.
Arab countries began forming ties with the FSA in early 2012, and the governments
of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and the U.S. have funneled
hundreds of millions of dollars to the insurgency, including weapons, food, and
humanitarian aid.154 In 2013 and 2014, the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), a Syrian
NGO that coordinates international aid to the opposition, received $49 million from
Qatar, $77.2 million from Saudi Arabia, $19.6 million from the UAE, $43.1 million from
the U.S., and $3.2 million from France.155
Likewise, Salafi rebel factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN)156 have received
most of their funding and resources from conservative private backers in the Gulf and
elsewhere.157 Local and provincial councils governing opposition-held areas have been
propped up by international donors, diaspora communities, and other transnational
groups.158 Syria has also attracted an unprecedented number of foreign fighters,159
which were estimated to be in the tens of thousands by 2014.160 JAN, for example, one of
the insurgency’s most formidable military factions, has enlisted a “substantial number”
of foreign fighters, which comprise up to 20-30 percent of its forces.161
152 Gharibah et al. 2017, 14.
153 Gharibah et al. 2017, 7, 15.
154 Jenkins 2014, 11.
155 Assistance Coordination Unit 2013, 2014.
156 It is worth noting that for many Syrians who participated in the initial uprising, JAN is not considered
part of the opposition, and is seen as having “hijacked” the revolution. But this position has become
more difficult to defend with time, as more and more Syrians have joined JAN’s ranks during the war.
157 Jenkins 2014, 11.
158 Arfeh, 2016 (4 August).
159 Hegghammer 2013.
160 Barrett et al. 2015 These include at least 1,200 Saudis who heeded the call from Sunni clerics for people
to volunteer to fight and “support their Muslim brothers in Syria...by all means” Zelin 2013.
161 Zelin et al., 2013 (June).
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6.5 Conclusion
Contrary to conventional wisdom, strategic population displacement in the
Syrian civil war has gone well beyond instances of ethno-sectarian “cleansing.” I have
drawn on a broad range of qualitative and quantitative evidence to demonstrate that,
in many instances during the conflict, forced displacement has been employed by
the government in order to sort and capture the civilian population – not to expel or
eliminate it. This is not intended to overlook the conflict’s sectarian dynamics, or how
certain regime backers, namely Iran, have encouraged the Syrian government to alter the
demographics of some areas by providing citizenship and housing to Shi’a foreigners,
including militiamen.162 But displacement has served a broader function in Syria than
demographic change.
The Assad regime and its allies have attempted not only to “push”
noncombatants out of particular localities, but also to “pull” them into areas they
control. Pro-government forces have treated people differently based on their
movements, not just their religious or ethnic identities; profiling that relies on “guilt
by location” and perceives those who flee to – or remain in – rebel areas as traitors.
Employing weapons that are inherently indiscriminate, the regime has induced
displacement to separate and differentiate the loyal from the disloyal, improve the
“legibility” of local communities, and extract much-needed revenues and military
recruits from the population. And it has used the arrival of IDPs into its areas as
propaganda and a source of legitimization. In many instances, population displacement
has therefore increased the social heterogeneity of certain provinces, including
government strongholds. These findings are more consistent with an assortative logic
of strategic displacement than one that is eliminative or punitive. And they suggest that
motivations related to a logic of “denial,” while potentially playing a partial role in the
regime’s depopulation strategy, are an insufficient explanation within themselves.
My argument helps account for two core puzzles of the Syrian war: why the
regime has persisted in its use of widespread and relentless indiscriminate violence, and
why it has given people in recaptured territories a choice of where to move. In offering
answers to these puzzles, I have shown that strategies of depopulation can also exhibit
the assortative logic of forced displacement, similar to tactics of forced relocation. This
finding offers some insight into how broadly the argument proposed in this dissertation
applies, which I return to in the concluding chapter.
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“We are witnessing a paradigm change,
an unchecked slide into an era in which
the scale of global forced displacement
as well as the response required is now
clearly dwarfing anything seen before.”
-Antonio Guterres
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015
“Call ye this Ferdinand ‘wise’ –
he who depopulates his own dominions
in order to enrich mine?”
-Ottoman Sultan Bajezet, 1492
7.1 The Politics of Wartime Displacement
In this dissertation I have demonstrated the extent to which combatants, not
conflicts, “make” migrations. Strategic population displacement by armed groups has
been more common in contemporary civil wars than previously known, and it has gone
well beyond the much-publicized use of ethnic cleansing. Forced relocation – strategic
displacement with an inward or “pull” orientation – has been more prevalent than
cleansing or depopulation – which have an outward or “push” orientation. In addition,
forced relocation has been regularly employed in both ethnic and non-ethnic wars.
This variation in and of itself questions arguments claiming that combatants displace
because of ethnic nationalism or other ideological factors. How, then, can we explain
this puzzling variation in wartime displacement strategies?
To answer this question, I argue that forced displacement is an assortative
strategy, not just an eliminative or punitive one: it is often employed to sort, capture,
and instrumentalize the local population. While existing studies attribute the
use of displacement to a key problem combatants face in civil wars – a lack of
information needed to identify and target opponents – they often conflate different
displacement strategies and lump together distinctive theoretical mechanisms, each
with different underlying logics. To address these shortcomings, I provide a typology
that distinguishes between different forms of strategic displacement. I then explicate
three possible logics that explain why combatants would displace civilians due to poor
information: denial, punishment, and an “assortative” logic. In doing so, I develop
a new theory and show that different displacement strategies constitute different
responses to information and identification problems, which is pivotal to understanding
cross-national variation.
Combatants often possess insufficient information about individual allegiances
in wartime. If an armed group is primarily concerned with conquering territory –
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as is typical in conventional civil wars – and has access to group-level indicators it
can use as a simplifying heuristic to infer the loyalties of the population, then it is
likely to pursue cleansing against those communities or groups it deems disloyal. This
indicates that cleansing is driven by a logic of collective punishment, and confirms
findings from previous micro-level studies at the macro level of analysis. On the
other hand, if an armed group is primarily concerned with identifying enemies – the
primary challenge faced by counterinsurgents in irregular wars – and lacks group-level
indicators of civilians’ loyalties, it is more likely to engage in forced relocation in order
to infer the identities and sympathies of the population through “guilt by location.”
By ordering people to evacuate their homes and concentrate in a designated location
nearby, combatants can easily observe those who do not comply. Since noncompliance
is costly, it can serve as a credible signal of enemy affiliation, allowing perpetrators
to rapidly (if crudely) distinguish the potentially disloyal. Relocating the population
also makes communities more accessible and “legible.” This allows combatants to
use human mobility as a continuous proxy for loyalty and helps them compensate for
resource limitations by providing a ready source of economic rents, military recruits,
and propaganda fodder.
The analysis in this dissertation focuses on displacement by state actors, who I
find to be the primary perpetrators. My assortative theory of displacement, developed
in Chapter 2, draws on a core insight of the forced migration literature: that civilians
in war zones have agency, and they exercise it when deciding to move or stay in the
midst of violence. Will Moore and Stephen Shellman put it well in their study of
wartime migration: “For all those who flee, others stay behind, some choosing to take
up weapons, others simply believing that they can ‘ride out the storm.’ When faced
with extraordinary circumstances, people still make choices.”1 The coercion directed
at populations to induce their flight can make noncompliance costly – and thus for
combatants, provide grounds for suspicion – but ultimately civilians have some sort
of say in whether they leave and where they go. Of course, this does not mean that
people’s movements in wartime always reflect their actual political loyalties. Simplifying
heuristics are by definition “quick and dirty” approximations of reality and are therefore
not always correct. “Guilt by location” is no different. But the cognitive demands
imposed on individual soldiers by the fog of war, coupled with the organizational
challenges of collecting, vetting and disseminating intelligence, often compel armed
groups to deploy information shortcuts to tell friend from foe. Just as this leads
combatants to sometimes engage in ethnic, racial, or religious profiling, I argue that it
can also encourage the use of spatial profiling.
Beyond helping explain variation in strategic wartime displacement, this
argument resolves other key puzzles. Namely, why do combatants continue to employ
displacement, particularly forced relocation, despite the costs? Why do they uproot
civilians instead of killing them? In short, because displacement provides benefits
1 Moore and Shellman 2006, 599.
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that mass killing does not: it allows armed actors to map the sea, as opposed to simply
draining it. My theory suggests that the very aspects of relocating civilians that typically
impose significant humanitarian and even political costs – physical concentration,
regulations on mobility, idleness, dependency on the state or aid agencies – are the
same ones that yield military and governing advantages for perpetrators. Concentrating
communities in a highly illegible area can create what James Scott calls the “ideal type of
military space,” a “a flat, open terrain...along a major road, surrounded by a registered,
relocated civilian population” that can serve as “a source of labor, cash, and foodstuffs.”2
Islands of human squalor consequently become enclaves of appropriation. Thus for
armed groups unable or unwilling to penetrate contested territories, rearranging
the human terrain through forced displacement provides an attractive alternative to
occupation, and fulfills combatants’ need to categorize and enhance the legibility of
conflict-affected populations. Because such arrangements also make these populations
more legible to the global aid industry, perpetrators are often able to oﬄoad the material
costs of displacement onto other actors.
The assortative logic of forced displacement therefore offers an explanation
for the puzzling persistence of its use as a method of counterinsurgency despite its
frequent failure to cut ties between rebels and civilians and starve insurgent groups.
Strategic displacement, at least when it takes certain forms, provides unique solutions to
information and resource problems for armed actors by acting as a sorting mechanism
and a force multiplier. As such, this theory suggests that while some displacement
strategies – cleansing – aim to punish and get rid of disloyal elements of the population,
others – relocation, and potentially depopulation – attempt to identify those elements.
The argument also produces two potentially counterintuitive conclusions. First, contrary
to conventional wisdom, some displacement strategies are used to mobilize, not just
demobilize, the targeted population. Second, rather than requiring extensive resources
to employ, displacement is often utilized to help incumbents overcome resource
limitations.
Chapter 3 explores the implications of the argument in a detailed case study of
civil wars in Uganda. A comparison of government strategies against multiple rebellions
waged between 1986 and 2006 demonstrates that forced relocation by state forces served
a much broader purpose than “draining the sea.” This strategy helped state forces
make inferences about people’s identities and loyalties, impose legibility on frontier
communities, and extract local recruits when and where information and manpower
deficiencies demanded it. This explains why Ugandan forces relocated groups in
response to some insurgencies – ones that employed guerrilla tactics – but not others
– ones who fought conventionally – even though the latter posed a more serious and
immediate threat to the regime.
Chapter 4 probes the external validity of my arguments and provides what
is to my knowledge the first ever cross-national test of different explanations for
2 Scott 2010, 180.
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strategic displacement in wartime. An analysis of civil wars between 1945 and 2008
suggests that different state-induced displacement strategies seem to follow different
logics. This macro-level analysis helps address a glaring weakness of existing research
on strategic displacement: the fact that it has largely relied on studies of individual
conflicts and has yet to scale up its insights to the global level. I use proxies to test
different arguments, based on the notion that, if certain displacement strategies follow a
particular logic (based on different explanations for why they are used) then we should
see them employed, at least by state actors, in particular contexts and under certain
conditions. My proxies attempt to capture these conditions, and in doing so, follow
other cross-national studies of wartime violence.3 While one can quibble with some of
the variables used, in most cases I rely on multiple measures to capture the empirical
implications of each argument.4
The results of my statistical analysis show that cleansing follows a logic of
punishment: it is more likely in conventional wars where state forces have access to
group-level identifiers that link civilians to an armed group. The findings for forced
relocation, meanwhile, suggest an assortative logic. These strategies are more likely
in irregular wars waged in “illegible” territories, and tend to be employed (1) by
under-resourced incumbents engaged in multiple conflicts, and (2) alongside state
efforts to mobilize the population into civilian defense forces. The latter result not
only provides evidence for my argument; it also runs counter to punishment-related
explanations, since perpetrators are unlikely to arm the very people who they seek
to punish. But the tests in Chapter 4 are just as important for their null findings as
they are for those that substantiate hypotheses. The evidence does not support the
predictions of many other arguments about why combatants displace, including those
that emphasize logics of ethnic nationalism, denial, opportunism, and even desperation.
While these cross-national tests are imperfect – they only provide indirect evidence for
my assortative theory – they are essential. Without a clear comparative understanding
of where different population displacement strategies are used, it is difficult to draw
defensible conclusions.
In order to demonstrate that the empirical relationships identified in the
cross-national analysis can be attributed to my assortative theory, in Chapter 5, I
turn back to individual conflicts and analyze detailed micro-level implications of the
argument in Burundi, Vietnam, and Indonesia. While the Uganda case study in Chapter
3 revealed the explanatory power of the theory in a limited setting, examining the
logics underlying forced relocation by state forces in three shorter case studies suggest
3 e.g., see Cohen (2016) and Stanton (2016). While many of these proxies reflect specific conflict
characteristics, as much of the literature on civil wars has shown, these characteristics shape the
incentives and constraints armed groups face and thus their strategic and tactical choices, including the
use of violence (e.g., Balcells 2017; Cohen 2016; Fjelde and Hultman 2014; Kalyvas 2006; Stanton 2016;
Steele 2017.)
4 In testing different explanations for strategic displacement that have been offered by scholars, for some
arguments I use variables and measures that they themselves have explicitly proposed.
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wider plausibility. In each case, the evidence lends support to the claim that relocating
civilians was meant not to eliminate or punish “undesirables” but to figure out who the
undesirables were. Counterinsurgents also consistently used relocation to augment their
forces and address resource constraints by incorporating civilians into the fight.
My analysis of the Syrian civil war in Chapter 6 illustrates that this assortative
logic of triggering and managing civilian displacement can extend to more difficult cases
– such as wars fought conventionally and along ethno-sectarian lines. While the regime
of Bashar al-Assad did not implement a wholesale resettlement campaign, it went to
significant lengths to attract Syrians who it had uprooted to government areas and
appeared to interpret people’s departures and choices of destination as an indication
of whether they sided with the regime or with the opposition. This suggests that my
assortative theory can apply to strategies of depopulation in addition to those of forced
relocation, at least in some instances. Further research is required to verify or invalidate
this proposition. But other cases of depopulation speak to its plausibility, such as the
use of “rubbleization” by the Soviet Union during the Soviet-Afghan war (1978–92).
According to Benjamin Valentino, Soviet forces fighting the mujahideen “generally lacked
the information necessary to identify guerrilla supporters on an individual basis,” and
manpower was limited because the number of Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan
was “relatively modest.”5 As forced displacement became a “significant part of Soviet
counterinsurgency strategy,” there was some evidence of an assortative logic.6 The
Soviets established “free-fire zones” in depopulated areas, “permitting Soviet troops
to shoot anything that moved.”7 Though Valentino found that Moscow “did not seem
to have an organized plan for relocating refugees within Afghanistan,” he surmises
that “the Soviets – lacking the resources necessary to provide for domestic relocation
programs or to seal off the long border with Pakistan – simply hoped that refugees
would relocate to government-controlled areas within Afghanistan, especially in and
around the major cities.”8
It is possible, then, that the key difference between punitive and assortative
displacement is revealed in the type of targeting that is used to perpetuate population
flight. Displacement based on collective targeting – e.g., cleansing – suggests a
predetermination that a particular identity group is threatening, subversive, or
unwanted. In such instances, as Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín and Elisabeth Wood point
out, “organizations may target some groups of civilians based on information about
their identity, not because they lack such information.”9 In contrast, displacement
based on indiscriminate targeting – e.g., forced relocation and depopulation – is truly
non-selective, implying a certain degree of uncertainty over who is potentially (or
actually) guilty. These displacements may therefore share a common goal of seeking to
5 Valentino 2013, 221.
6 Valentino 2013, 223.
7 Valentino 2013, 223.
8 Valentino 2013, 223-24.
9 Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017, 22.
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initiate a process of identification that perpetrators use to force the population to choose
sides and reveal their enemies. The question then becomes whether the distinction
between relocation and depopulation is a matter of degree rather than type.
Overall, the findings of this dissertation have implications for the study of
forced migration, armed conflict, and political violence, which I discuss below. I
also note the limitations of this study and propose pathways for future research.
After all, this dissertation does not purport to explain every instance of state-induced
displacement in civil war. Nor does it look at strategic displacement by rebel groups,
and it says little about the ultimate effectiveness of uprooting civilians in helping
perpetrators win wars.
7.2 Scholarly Implications
Implications for the Forced Migration Literature
The frequency with which population displacement has been employed as a
weapon of war indicates that, in order to fully understand the drivers and dynamics
of forced migration, scholars must reorient their focus from why people flee conflict to
why conflict parties uproot them. By systematically examining variation in strategic
displacement across conflicts and countries, this dissertation helps explain some
broader trends in wartime displacement. The tendency for symmetric conflicts to
experience strategies of expulsion, and for asymmetric conflicts to experience strategies
of relocation, can account for why the former produce more external displacement
– cross-border refugee flows – while the latter produce more internal displacement.
For all civil wars in the SDCC dataset for which displacement data was available, the
median average number of refugees (124,500) generated by symmetric (conventional and
symmetric non-conventional) conflicts was nearly four times higher than the number
produced by irregular wars (37,320). Yet irregular wars generated nearly 40 percent
more IDPs (median average of 418,630) than symmetric wars (305,000).10
In recent years, research in refugee and forced migration studies has
increasingly emphasized the need to identify the “root causes” of displacement.11
My findings suggest both root causes of state-induced civilian flight (the capacity
and military commitments of state forces, the type and location of the insurgency,
the social composition and “legibility” of the local population) and proximate causes
(lack of information on individual or group-level loyalties). Moreover, my theoretical
contribution indicates that political preferences and commitments, in addition to
security, economic opportunities, and social networks can help explain why some
people flee conflict and others do not. Approaches that incorporate both the motivations
10 According to data from Marshall (2008). To ensure data reliability, the sample only includes post-1975
civil wars (N = 99).
11 Martin et al. 2005; Castles and Van Hear 2011.
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of civilians and those of combatants offer a promising pathway for better understanding
the causes of wartime migration.
Doing so, however, requires differentiating between different types of strategic
displacement. This dissertation developed and tested a theory that strategies of
relocation are systematically different from strategies of cleansing. The findings
suggest that, indeed, these two strategies differ in where and when they occur and
in the logics underlying them. This should caution against the tendency in forced
migration studies to treat all “conflict-induced” displacement as essentially the same.
The conceptual distinction between spontaneous, opportunistic, and multiple forms of
strategic displacement discussed in Chapter 1 provides a foundation for thinking more
systematically about how we can describe, and thus explain, population flight patterns
in a more fine-grained way. Recent research on patterns of civilian resettlement in civil
wars illustrates the utility of taking a more nuanced approach.12 Because much of the
forced migration literature is normative and policy-oriented, there remains significant
conceptual and theoretical work to be done on the dynamics of displacement. This
dissertation lays some crucial groundwork.
Implications for the Conflict and Violence Literature
By focusing on displacement, this research also bears important implications for
the study of conflict and political violence. First, it sheds insight into the strategic use of
nonlethal violence against civilians in wartime, which is far less understood than the use
of lethal violence.13 I constructed a novel dataset of population displacement strategies
that will be useful for future studies of civil war violence, counterinsurgency, and
civilian victimization. Contrary to what prior research suggests,14 the data demonstrate
that different types of civil wars exhibit different forms of strategic displacement. This
finding confirms that the incentives armed groups face vary by warfare type and,
consequently, violence follows different empirical patterns depending on whether a
conflict is conventional or irregular.15 When it comes to strategies of displacement, I
provide a new theory that helps explain why this is the case. My argument can also
account for the unique utility of displacement as a weapon of war – why, in other words,
combatants would prefer these measures over alternative strategies. Unlike lethal
violence, displacement is often used not to deter defection and demobilize the local
population, but rather to mobilize it and weed out its most disloyal elements.
12 Steele 2019.
13 Cohen 2016, 194. As with other types of nonlethal violence (rape, torture, etc.) displacement can
certainly have lethal outcomes for victims – particularly given its humanitarian consequences – but as
I discussed in Chapter 1, what distinguishes displacement from killing is that its primary objective is to
expel or uproot, rather than execute, victims.
14 Balcells and Steele 2016.
15 Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017.
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Second, the assortative logic proposed in this dissertation offers a plausible
mechanism for explaining a key puzzle in the conflict literature: the indiscriminate
targeting of civilians in civil wars. The use of non-selective violence continues to be
poorly understood, despite its prevalence.16 While scholars have previously attributed
indiscriminate targeting to information and resource problems, they have struggled
to explain how it actually helps resolve these problems, and why perpetrators employ
different repertoires of violence.17 To the extent that non-selective targeting is intended
to displace, as opposed to eliminate, a population, my theory provides a positive logic
of indiscriminate violence. Yet further research is required to evaluate this proposition.
More fine-grained data on displacement strategies is needed to further compare their
relative frequency and magnitude within and across conflicts, along with additional
case studies of depopulation and instances of rebel-induced displacement to see
how broadly my arguments may apply. Comparing the use of mass killing and mass
displacement is another promising line of inquiry. Additionally, future studies should
evaluate the outcomes of different strategies and the conditions under which they are
effective. Are there types of forced relocation (or even depopulation) that are more
sophisticated and thus more effective at correctly distinguishing combatants from
noncombatants, and loyal civilians from disloyal ones? If so, why don’t all armed
groups use these more sophisticated forms?
Third, the findings of this study offer new avenues for thinking about
motivations for violence and the different ways that combatants may respond to
information scarcity through the use of simplifying heuristics and collective profiling.
Despite the centrality of information to the conduct of warfare, there has been relatively
little work on how exactly armed groups obtain information about civilians’ affiliations
and loyalties through means other than service provision. By showing that combatants
sometimes rely on costly signals and visible cues, such as people’s movements, to
infer their allegiances, I highlight unexplored ways in which civil war actors attempt
to overcome information and identification problems. This can shed light on broader
patterns of civilian victimization in war. As Ceren Belge points out, “understanding
the way a government categorizes its population and associates particular profiles
with support for insurgency is critical to explaining why civilians who don’t actively
participate in an insurgency still experience state violence and coercion.”18 Indeed,
anecdotes from conflict zones indicate that state forces in particular tend to use a myriad
of traits to infer civilian loyalties in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.
Consider a recent dispatch from the American-led military campaign to purge Iraq of
the Islamic State (ISIS):
“To many members of the Iraqi security forces, all civilians who hadn’t fled ISIS were
16 A point made by Berman and Matanock (2015) in their review of the conflict literature; whereas Kalyvas
(2006) provides a compelling theory of selective violence.
17 Schutte 2017; Metelits 2009.
18 Belge 2016, 302.
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suspicious. Some soldiers regarded beards as a marker of affiliation, even though the
jihadis had punished men who shaved. Others, by contrast, singled out men who
had recently shaved or cut their hair, believing that the men were trying to evade
detection. Injuries, too, attracted accusations of complicity; how could anyone know
whether people who had barely survived shelling and air strikes were targets or
merely collateral?”19
Accounts like these exemplify just how fluid the distinction between combatants
and noncombatants often becomes in civil wars. A report by the Center for Civilians
in Conflict (CIVIC) captures the tenuous nature of the “civilian” category, and is worth
quoting at length:
“for people who have lived through conflict, there is no fixed, universal definition
of the ‘civilian.’ Instead, interviewees offered many different interpretations of
what it means to be a civilian, and these interpretations varied by conflict and by
interviewee...several people identified civilians on the basis of gender and age...other
Bosnians stressed that civilians are those who did not participate in the conflict...in
Libya, interviewees offered different interpretations of medani, the Arabic translation
of the word civilian. First, many interviewees described civilians as those who were
peaceful...Second, according to a young man from a suburb of Tripoli, age was a
determining factor for status: a civilian was anyone under the age of 16, since, at that
age, all Libyans would undergo military training in high school.”20
One is therefore left to wonder whether profiling along spatial lines – or
ethnicity, or religion, or another characteristic – is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If people
believe that they have already been branded as an enemy, they may be less likely to
comply with orders or respond to threats in ways desired by armed groups. Violence in
such instances is more likely to generate rather than reveal disloyalty. It could be, then,
that in some cases uprooting civilians becomes a process by which combatants, instead
of identifying enemies, creates them. Bernd Greiner notes that in the later stages of the
VietnamWar, the dropping of leaflets by American troops warning civilians to evacuate
the countryside mostly seemed to fulfill one purpose: “to give their own soldiers the
feeling that when in doubt they had in fact killed the right people.”21 What are the
conditions under which displacement is likely to have this kind of effect? How does it
influence processes of learning – by both perpetrators and victims of displacement – as a
conflict goes on? These questions merit further exploration.
Finally, this dissertation demonstrates the extent to which capturing
populations, as opposed to territory, is central to the goals of armed groups in civil
war. Some conflict scholars portray this as a somewhat recent phenomenon; a feature
19 Taub 2018.
20 “The People’s Perspectives: Civilian Involvement in Armed Conflict” 2015, 25-26.
21 Greiner 2010, 73.
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unique to “modern” counterinsurgency warfare22 or to the “new” wars of the post-Cold
War era.23 But internal conflicts throughout history have tended to place a premium
on population control. Clifford Geertz, for example, characterized political rivalries in
ancient Bali as “a struggle more for men than for land,”24 while James Scott argues that
violent state-making in premodern Southeast Asia “was less a grab for distant territory
than a quest for captives who could be resettled at the core.”25 Not only should this
continue to inform our understanding of the dynamics of civil wars; it can also deepen
our knowledge regarding the effects of these conflicts, particularly in contemporary
non-Western contexts. Scholars have generally argued that the processes by which wars
helped “make” modern states in Western Europe26 – through more efficient taxation and
bureaucratic consolidation – are not applicable to developing countries today.27
If rendering the population more “legible” is an important motivating
factor behind strategies of wartime displacement, then these measures, and civilian
displacement more broadly, may serve as a vehicle by which civil wars contribute to
state-building. As Rogers Brubaker has argued, “massive movements of people have
regularly accompanied – as consequence and sometimes also as cause – the expansion,
contraction, and reconfiguration of political space.”28 Future work should therefore
explore the medium- and long-term effects of strategic displacement on broader
processes of political, institutional, and social development. Different strategies are
likely to have different state-building implications. Cleansing by design typically
transforms heterogeneous areas into more homogenous ones, while forced relocation,
also by design, usually generates greater social heterogeneity in places that were
traditionally more homogenous.29 These population shifts have likely downstream
effects, and could challenge traditional characterizations of modern state-building –
which has often been portrayed as “the unmixing of peoples.”30
7.3 Policy Implications
This research also has implications for policy efforts to prevent, mitigate, and
respond to wartime displacement. As a scholar with experience in the policy world, I
appreciate the difficulty of transforming findings from academic research into specific
22 Berman et al. 2018.
23 Kaldor 1999.
24 Geertz 1980, 24.
25 Scott 2010, 67.
26 Tilly 1990; Tilly and Ardant 1975.
27 Herbst 2014; Centeno 2002; Acemoglu et al. 2001.
28 Brubaker 1995, 189.
29 For example, in Mizoram, the Indian government’s regroupment of villages during counterinsurgency
resulted “in the transformation of relatively undifferentiated, homogeneous village communities to
relatively differentiated, heterogeneous village communities” (Samaddar 2016, 63).
30 Brubaker 1995.
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recommendations on what policymakers should do about it. For political scientists,
the pressure to draw generalizable conclusions often conflicts with the approach of
practitioners, who appreciate that every situation is different and are often required
to deal with the idiosyncrasies of each case that we scholars tend to dismiss as mere
“noise.” That said, the results of this dissertation can offer guidance in five policy areas:
(1) displacement early warning, (2) accountability for perpetrators, (3) humanitarian
assistance, (4) post-conflict peacebuilding, and (5) refugee resettlement and asylum.
Early Warning
The development of early warning and monitoring systems for armed conflict
and political violence are a growing focus for researchers and government agencies,
including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other foreign
assistance donors.31 Similarly, there are several ongoing efforts to forecast population
displacement and migration using predictive analytics and other simulation tools.32
Yet these diagnostics often overlook the strategic dimension of displacement in conflict
settings. As a result, they omit important variables that may indicate an increased risk
of combatant-induced displacement, which could help researchers, policymakers, and
practitioners alike better anticipate refugee and IDP flows.
This dissertation highlights several risk factors that can be incorporated into
these early warning initiatives. To anticipate whether and how civilian displacement
will be induced by armed groups, analysts should focus on the technology of rebellion,
the location and identity of the insurgency, and the capacity and military commitments
of the state. Moreover, as discussed in section 7.2, these factors can help predict broader
patterns of wartime displacement. Conventional civil wars fought at the center by
rebels that claim to represent a specific subnational group pose a heightened risk of
state-induced cleansing. In this scenario we should therefore expect large refugee flows.
A case in point: the current civil war in South Sudan, which exhibits all of these risk
factors, has produced some 2.4 million refugees – the third largest refugee emergency
in the world – in part because of widespread reports of ethnic cleansing committed by
pro-government forces.33
Meanwhile, irregular wars fought on a country’s periphery between guerrillas
who do not claim to represent a specific group and incumbents engaged in multiple
military campaigns are prone to experience government-induced population relocation.
This scenario is likely to produce large IDP flows. An example can be found in northern
Nigeria, where the Boko Haram insurgency has prompted the government to forcibly
relocate rural villagers into “garrison towns.” As expected, the Nigerian conflict has
31 Defontaine 2019.
32 See “Forecasting the Break,” at https://isim.georgetown.edu/forecasting, and Kaplan and Morgan
2018.
33 Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan 2017 (March).
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resulted in the displacement of nearly two million IDPs, compared to only 250,000
refugees.34
Looking forward, two trends suggest that strategies of cleansing may become
more prevalent. The first is the growing proportion of civil wars that are fought either
conventionally or primitively between poorly equipped and trained militias.35 The
relative decline in asymmetric conflicts and guerrilla insurgencies since the end of
the Cold War has, accordingly, meant a decrease in the use of forced relocation in
counterinsurgency warfare. The second trend is growing urbanization in the developing
world; as countries become more urbanized, so too do the wars that are waged within
them. I have shown that such settings are more likely to experience forced expulsion.
This does not, however, imply less relevance of assortative displacement – as my case
study of Syria illustrates, even in conventional, urban conflicts uprooting civilians can
still act as a mechanism for population sorting and capture.
Accountability
Another avenue for preventing the weaponization of population displacement
is to hold perpetrators accountable and create a legal deterrent to its use in future
wars. This dissertation finds that uprooting civilians is part of a regular repertoire of
counterinsurgency violence. By documenting strategies of forced displacement and how
they vary in form and frequency, this research can inform growing international efforts
to prosecute displacement as a war crime. While the International Criminal Tribunal
of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicated the potential criminality of ethnic cleansing
under international law, it also noted that ethnic cleansing is not a legal term.36 Thus as
James Simeon argues, “there is an overriding and pressing need for the criminalization
of all forms of ’mass forced displacement’ through international criminal law,” which
could help “address the root causes of the ‘mass production of forced displacement’
as an instrument of modern warfare.”37 Yet the prosecution of war crimes and crimes
against humanity depends on careful documentation and evidence demonstrating
the culpability of armed groups in particular acts of violence and the intentionality of
provoking civilian flight.
My research therefore provides a further empirical basis for criminalizing
deliberate civilian displacement in wartime. It also encourages jurists and other policy
experts to recognize that criminal displacement can take different forms and have
different motivations and, as such, must not be defined too narrowly. Ongoing attempts
by European courts to hold the Assad regime accountable for war crimes in Syria,
34 See IDMC’s Nigeria Country Page, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/nigeria.
35 Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.
36 Simeon, 2018 (3 July).
37 Simeon, 2018 (3 July).
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including displacement, may provide a litmus test.38 Prosecutors should not, however,
focus only on the most egregious cases, such as ethnic cleansing. In most cases, the use
of other types of strategic displacement is no less criminal and no less consequential.
Beyond prosecuting perpetrators, documenting and analyzing these transgressions is
critical to the work of truth and reconciliation commissions, museums, and other efforts
to memorialize and disseminate conflict histories. This work will help ensure that the
experience of displacement victims is properly acknowledged and assist activists in
pushing for restitution and compensation.
Ensuring accountability for displacement will require human rights groups
to better publicize why civilians flee conflict (or not) and to inform armed actors that
these decisions do not necessarily reflect people’s political allegiances. This dissertation
provides a conceptual and empirical framework for differentiating between spontaneous
civilian flight and intentional, combatant-induced population displacement. The
fact that state actors tend to be the ones who perpetuate displacement presents an
opportunity for policymakers and activists to change behavior through “naming and
shaming.” Multiple studies have demonstrated that states may alter their conduct in
response to public information campaigns aimed at calling out a government’s human
rights violations.39 When it comes to displacement, the cases examined in this study
suggest that the prospects for deterring perpetrators through public shaming are
mixed. In Uganda, Indonesia, and Syria, criticism of government policies of civilian
displacement did not cause authorities to scale down or end these practices. On the
other hand, in Burundi international pressure and the threat to withdraw humanitarian
aid was a clear factor in the state’s decision to abandon the regroupment program,
at least temporarily. Establishing a clear legal precedent for the prosecution of those
responsible for displacement could give policymakers, diplomats, and activists greater
leverage moving forward. After all, if there are any displacements that the international
community should be able to prevent, it is those that are deliberately created by states.
Humanitarian Assistance
The recent uptick in global displacement means that aid agencies are currently
assisting more people than at any point in history.40 While the 1951 Refugee Convention
initially limited international assistance and protection for the displaced to those
who crossed a state border, over time UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations
selectively expanded their operations to include IDPs. By the end of the twentieth
century – after the creation of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
established “IDP” as a sui generis legal category – internal displacement became a
38 For a summary of these efforts, see “Accountability for the Syrian Regime: An Overview,” on the Lawfare
blog (https://www.lawfareblog.com/accountability-syrian-regime-overview.
39 Krain 2012; DeMeritt 2012; Hendrix and Wong 2013; Kelley and Simmons 2015.
40 UNOCHA 2018.
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“fundamental problem of international concern.”41 This led to the emergence of an
“international IDP protection regime,”42 under which the U.N. and other international
organizations came to play a central role in addressing the humanitarian needs of
populations displaced both within and across borders. These organizations typically
set up and manage displacement camps; provide food, shelter, healthcare, education,
and other services; advocate on behalf of the displaced; and help governments adopt
domestic policies on displacement-related issues.43 Across the globe, displacement has
proven to be big business for the “humanitarian-industrial complex”: the annual budget
of UNHCR alone grew from $1 billion in the early 1990s to $7.7 billion in 2017.44
One implication of the increased willingness of international agencies to
intervene on behalf of displaced populations is that, where armed groups find
displacement to be an attractive strategy, the involvement of external actors could
provide perverse incentives for combatants to adopt these measures in the first place. It
is one thing for the international community to assist those who flee to another country
in order to alleviate the strain on refugee-hosting governments. It is quite another for
external actors to shoulder the burden of displacement within a country on behalf of
a government that happens to be directly responsible for the displacement in the first
place. Therefore – particularly when it comes to strategies of forced relocation – if
humanitarian agencies signal a willingness to ease the costs of displacement by helping
states manage and supply IDP camps, they could inadvertently encourage the very
outcomes they are seeking to prevent. As I discussed in Chapter 2 and in my analysis
of the Uganda case in Chapter 3, there are a number of instances where international
aid, while providing crucial life-saving assistance, has also enabled states to sustain or
expand policies of forced relocation. Such dilemmas have been highlighted by a recent
literature contending that humanitarian interventions often produce moral hazards.45
The arguments advanced in this dissertation underscore the need for
humanitarian actors to understand that for combatants, uprooting civilians can serve
purposes other than eradicating or deporting populations. In addition to covering the
costs and containing the consequences of displacement, aid organizations can help make
the displaced more “legible” to perpetrators by encamping, registering, and cataloguing
them as part of relief distribution. International actors must be willing to make tough
41 UNHCR 2006.
42 Orchard 2018. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is a non-binding agreement that
establishes the rights and needs of the internally displaced.
43 In 2005, the U.N. implemented a comprehensive relief management structure for IDPs, known as the
“cluster approach,” which clarified the roles of various agencies in IDP protection and assistance. This,
along with greater attention towards IDPs through advocacy and research, broad acceptance of the
Guiding Principles, and more elaborate operational responses to displacement from humanitarian and
development organizations – even those that had been historically averse to IDP protection – reflected
greater international involvement in situations of internal displacement (Mooney 2010).
44 See UNHCR, “Figures at a Glance,” available online at https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
figures-at-a-glance.html.
45 Kuperman 2008; Kydd and Straus 2013; Wood and Sullivan 2015.
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choices if they hope to avoid moral hazard. In situations of internal displacement, if
there is evidence that displacement has been orchestrated by armed groups, donors
and NGOs should threaten to withdraw aid unless combatants are meeting their
humanitarian obligations and providing sufficient food, shelter, and other basic
assistance to the uprooted. This will force perpetrators to incur the costs of displacing
civilians and may encourage them to reconsider. The case study of Burundi analyzed
in Chapter 5 illustrates the influence that international actors can have in pressuring
governments to abandon campaigns of forced displacement by refusing to care for
the victims. Such a choice can be an excruciating one, particularly for organizations
dedicated to saving lives. To be clear, this is in no way meant to discourage assistance
for war-affected populations or to minimize their plight. But in order to adhere to the
humanitarian principle of “do no harm,” aid agencies must ensure they are conducting
their operations without inadvertently incentivizing armed groups to adopt policies that
contribute to further violence.
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
There is a mounting consensus in policymaking circles that addressing
displacement-related concerns is integral to post-conflict peace and reconciliation
programs.46 The return of refugees and IDPs to their homes has been called a “central
pillar of peace processes” and a “powerful symbol of the end of conflict and a return
to normalcy.”47 While return has become the preferred policy solution to wartime
displacement, it tends to be treated as a humanitarian or a logistical issue as opposed to
a political one.48 This dissertation should prompt policymakers to give greater attention
to the politics of displacement in civil wars when devising initiatives to build and
sustain peace after conflicts end.
Just as the process of displacement can act as a mechanism for sorting the
population and filtering out the disloyal, so too can processes of return. Look no
further than Syria. As the civil war currently enters its final phase, Syrian refugees have
faced growing pressure to go home both by authorities in Damascus and by Syria’s
neighbors, who are eager to oﬄoad the burden of hosting some 5.2 million refugees.49
In December the U.N. estimated that 250,000 refugees could return in 2019.50 While the
Assad regime sees refugee return as a boost to its legitimacy and a bargaining chip in its
quest for international recognition and reconstruction funds, as I mentioned in Chapter
6, regime officials have used civil registration, property claims, and other administrative
procedures to screen potential returnees. This has allowed the Syrian government to
46 See Koser 2007; Shilue and Fagen 2014; Wassel 2014.
47 Black and Gent 2006, 31.
48 Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018.
49 Marks, 2019 (13 February).
50 “UN says 250,000 refugees could return to Syria in 2019” 2018.
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control who can go back, and when.51 It also reflects the suspicion, and even resentment,
with which the regime views those who opted to flee the country rather than to stay
and fight for it. Issam Zahreddine, a top commander in the Syrian Republican Guard,
expressed this sentiment in 2017: “to those who fled Syria to another country, I beg you
don’t ever return, because even if the government forgives you, we will never forgive or
forget.”52
These dynamics demonstrate that issues surrounding the repatriation and
resettlement of displaced people cannot be decoupled from broader peacebuilding
processes. Conflict resolution and reconciliation activities must be included in programs
to return refugees and IDPs. If combatants compelled people to flee during the
conflict, then victims will likely need greater security assurances to return than if
they were spontaneously displaced, particularly if perpetrators remain in power once
hostilities end. The temptation for domestic actors to politicize return will also require
incorporating clear and equitable procedures into peace processes when it comes
to land and property restitution, public service provision, aid eligibility, and other
issues. Moreover, local reconciliation efforts should consider the political dimensions
of civilian flight during the war and how they may have exacerbated tensions within
the population. Combatants are not the only ones who indulge in guilt by location.
Civilians may also consider people’s movements in war to be a political act. A common
refrain I heard in Syria, directed at residents who fled rebel-held communities but
hoped to return, was one of bitterness and even distrust – “where were you when we
were being besieged?”, according to a Syrian aid worker I interviewed.53 Or as reported
by one civilian who decided to return to government areas from a rebel-held town in
2017:
“Some people now accuse me of being some sort of traitor for returning to the Syrian
regime. All that doesn’t matter to me now...I’m living in a spacious house which has
basic services. I think that life here will be better...even though the Syrian regime is
in control”54
The grievances generated by these micro-politics of displacement in wartime –
and the stigma that different communities may attach to being a “leaver” or a “stayer”
– can linger after a conflict ends. In Iraq, civilians who continued to live in ISIS areas
instead of escaping remain objects of suspicion, with many still imprisoned eighteen
months after ISIS was expelled from its territories by the U.S.-backed Iraqi security
forces.55 Similarly, Simon Turner finds that in post-genocide Rwanda, different social
groups were placed into different citizen categories based in part on their histories
51 Batrawi and Uzelac, 2018 (September).
52 “Syrian general apologises after apparently warning refugees against return” 2017 (12 September).
53 Interview with Syrian humanitarian organization, Beirut, January 2019.
54 SyriaDirect, 2017 (8 May).
55 Taub 2018.
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of mobility and displacement.56 These cases exemplify the need for practitioners
to consider the societal divisions resulting from processes of displacement when
seeking to strengthen intercommunal relations and foster meaningful reconciliation.
To be effective, conflict resolution initiatives must be inclusive of both displaced and
non-displaced populations.
Refugee Resettlement and Asylum
While the findings of this dissertation should caution international actors
about the potentially perverse consequences of humanitarian assistance to displaced
populations – particularly those who are deliberately uprooted within their countries
by armed groups – they also point to the significance of the global refugee and asylum
regime. Improving exit options for civilians in war zones is of political, and not just
humanitarian, import. If people are given the ability to escape countries ravaged
by conflict, then they may not be compelled to passively choose a side through
their movements, and armed groups would be deprived of vulnerable recruits and
propaganda pawns. Combatants may still interpret their exit as treachery, but at least
crossing the border would put civilians beyond the writ of warring parties and make
them eligible for international protection. This highlights the strategic imperative for
enacting more generous asylum policies. It also underscores the need to create reliable
humanitarian corridors out of conflict-affected countries. Civilians are valuable assets in
civil wars, and limiting their exit options only stands to embolden armed groups, while
forcing people to decide between two (or more) bad options.
Unfortunately, we seem to be trending in that direction. The Syrian
displacement crisis has contributed to a strong backlash against refugees in Western
nations. Governments from the United States to Australia have adopted more restrictive
immigration and asylum policies. Rising populism, particularly in Europe, continues
to stoke hostility towards migrants of all kinds. Most countries are now resettling
fewer refugees; while for decades refugee resettlement has struggled to keep pace
with the growing number of people displaced globally, it has dropped significantly
since 2017 (Figure 7.1). Consequentially, the international asylum system finds itself
increasingly under siege. The U.S., which has historically resettled more refugees than
any other country, recently placed a historically low cap on refugee entry;57 as a result,
the number of Syrian refugees allowed into the country plummeted from 12,587 in
2016 to 62 in 2018.58 And research shows that states around the world are constructing
border walls and other physical boundaries at an accelerating rate, regardless of whether
they suffer from high levels of migration, crime, or terrorism.59 In the U.S., the Trump
56 Turner 2015.
57 Cepla, 2019 (25 January); Davis, 2018 (28 September).
58 Zezima, 2019 (7 May).
59 Hassner and Wittenberg 2015.
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Administration’s pledge to “build the wall” along the southern border has become a
potent political rallying cry.
Figure 7.1: Third-Country Resettlements of Refugees, 1985-2017
Source:
UNHCR Population Data;60
Against this backdrop, in late 2018 the U.N. celebrated the affirmation of the
Global Compact on Refugees, an international non-binding agreement intended to
enhance global cooperation on refugee response and promote “burden sharing” among
states. A potentially grand gesture, the compact does little to address the increasing
reluctance of governments to accept refugees. Most likely it will simply coax wealthy
nations into increasing financial assistance to refugee-hosting states – many of which
are among the world’s poorest countries – in exchange for those states keeping refugees
within their borders.61 Such arrangements are nothing new. For years the European
Union has outsourced (or “externalized”) border control and asylum processing to
host or transit countries in Africa and the Middle East.62 In 2016, the E.U. brokered a
61 Countries hosting the largest number of refugees per capita include Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Jordan,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda (UNHCR 2017).
62 See, for example, Menjívar 2014, Akkerman, 2018 (May).
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deal with Turkey to stem the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe; more recently it has
attempted to induce transit countries in North Africa and the Sahel to shut their borders
to migrants bound for Europe. The U.S. has undertaken similar measures by forcing
asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while they are processed. In general, the prospects for
expanding exit opportunities for war-affected populations look bleak.
Yet this dissertation illustrates the strategic benefits of acquiring or admitting
displaced populations. While it focuses on the context of civil war, some of its insights
could apply to interstate conflict or the realm of foreign policy more broadly. As
evidenced by the quote from Sultan Bajezet featured at the beginning of this chapter,
political leaders throughout history have recognized the advantage of absorbing
refugees expelled from other states. According to Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher,
“population was usually viewed as wealth, both in economic terms and as the
foundation of military power.”63 In the modern period, governments have seen the
symbolic value of accepting refugees; as I explained in Chapter 2, during the Cold War
the U.S. considered Soviet émigrés to be a “prized asset” because they signaled the
discontents of communism to the world.64
Today, however, any proposal to improve national or international responses
to refugees is typically shrouded in the ethos of humanitarianism. There has been
scant discussion of the strategic benefits of resettling refugees from the Middle East
or elsewhere. Going forward, scholars and policymakers alike should place greater
emphasis on articulating and promoting these benefits, some of which can be found in
this volume.65 For the U.S. and its allies, the global “war on terror” has been replete with
missed opportunities. Take the international campaign against ISIS. If the fight against
the purveyors of the self-declared Islamic caliphate was partly an ideological one,
then refugees fleeing ISIS-held areas in Iraq and Syria could have served as important
legitimizers of Western efforts and evidence of the group’s barbarity and unpopularity.
After all, ISIS was keen to offer sanctuary to displaced people from around the region –
and made sure to broadcast these efforts on the group’s propaganda channels.
Instead, many of the countries seeking to eradicate ISIS probably helped its
cause by portraying those fleeing from the caliphate as menacing or undesirable.
When in 2017 the Trump Administration issued a temporary ban barring refugees and
citizens from seven predominately Muslim countries from entering the U.S., it raised
widespread concerns that ISIS and other Islamic terrorist organizations would use the
ban as a recruiting tool.66 This indicates a growing recognition that encouraging and
enabling people to “vote with their feet” can be a powerful and relatively cost-effective
way to combat the transnational jihadist threat.67 As this threat persists, policymakers
in the U.S. and Europe need to revive Cold War-era approaches to refugee resettlement
63 Dowty and Loescher 1996, 58.
64 Roberts 2011, 215.
65 For an excellent example of the kind of case that needs to be made, see Salehyan (2018).
66 Nichols, 2017 (January 29).
67 This came to me in a dream.
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and once again treat it as an instrument of soft power that can be utilized to undermine
ideological adversaries. This would actually serve, rather than jeopardize, these
countries’ national security interests. As The Economist recently argued in a report on
jihadist groups in the African Sahel: “Like the Cold War before it, the struggle against
those who take up arms in pursuit of an imaginary Islamist Utopia will probably last for
decades. And as in the struggle against communism, winning hearts and minds will be
the key to victory.”68
7.4 Concluding Thoughts
This dissertation investigated a devastating but quotidian aspect of modern
conflict and an increasingly salient issue in world politics. While scholars and
policymakers have recognized that population displacement is often a strategy –
rather than a byproduct – of civil wars, there has been little cross-national comparative
research on how, where, and why armed groups deliberately uproot civilians. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, I argued that combatants displace not only to get rid of the
civilian population, but also to sort and capture it. Using new data, I have shown that
strategic displacement has been more frequent, more multi-dimensional, and served
broader functions in wartime than is commonly assumed. My findings demonstrate that
civilian flight is often considered to be a political act, which can have significant, if often
overlooked, consequences for individuals and communities.
As the most comprehensive study on the topic to date, the dissertation
provides new conceptual, theoretical, and empirical insights into the different types
of displacement orchestrated by combatants, the distinct motivations underlying
them, and where they are likely to be employed. These contributions are essential
both for enhancing scholarly understanding of mass population movements and for
improving policies to address them. This has implications for international security and
for improving the well-being of some of the most vulnerable members of society: the
uprooted and the war-affected. This is increasingly important today as the frequency,
severity, and consequences of wartime displacement continue to grow.
68 Economist, 2019 (4 May), 12.
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Figure A.1: Total Annual Net Official Development Assistance (ODA), 1960-2016
Figure A.2: Total Annual Humanitarian Aid, 1970-2016
Source: OECD, https://data.oecd.org (2015 U.S. constant dollars)
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ID Location Date of Interview Respondent Description
UG001 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Female, Member of Parliament, Lira District
UG002 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, Deputy Prime Minister, GoU
UG003 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, Chief of Internal Security Organization
UG004 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, MP, Gulu District
UG005 Kitgum, Uganda April 2017 Male, Internal Security Officer
UG006 Lira, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPDA and RDC member
UG007 Lira, Uganda April 2017 Male, Sub-county security officer
UG008 Kampala, Uganda April 2017 Male, former MP, Gulu District
UG009 Cwero, Uganda April 2017 Male, Sub-county security officer
UG010 Kampala, Uganda April 2017 Male, former MP, Lira District
UG011 Kampala, Uganda April 2017 Male, former MP and militia commander
UG012 Barr, Uganda April 2017 Female, LC1, Lira District
UG013 Barr, Uganda April 2017 Male, GISO, Lira District
UG014 Barlonyo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former IDP camp leader, Lira District
UG015 Ogur, Uganda April 2017 Male, former IDP camp leader, Lira District
UG016 Ogur, Uganda April 2017 Male, LCI, Lira District
UG017 Adekokwak, Uganda April 2017 Female, LCI, Lira District
UG018 Adekokwak, Uganda April 2017 Male, LCII, Lira District
UG019 Ngetta, Uganda April 2017 Female, LCII, Lira District
UG020 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, GISO, Gulu District
UG021 Ngetta, Uganda April 2017 Male, former IDP camp leader, Lira District
UG022 Barr, Uganda April 2017 Male, former IDP camp leader, Lira District
UG023 Gulu, Uganda April 2017 Male, GISO, Gulu District
UG024 Palaro, Uganda February 2016 Male, former IDP camp leader
UG025 Lamogi, Uganda February 2016 Male, former district defense secretary
UG026 Kal, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Kitgum District
UG027 Lawiye Oduny, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LC1, Kitgum District
UG028 Lalal, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Agago District
UG029 Labwa, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Agago District
UG030 Atiak, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Amuru District
UG031 Labworomor, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Gulu District
UG032 Pakwelo, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Gulu District
UG033 Lokwi, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Gulu District
UG034 Awach, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Gulu District
UG035 Patiko, Uganda February 2016 Male, local researcher/former IDP
UG036 Gulu, Uganda March 2016 Male, human rights activist
UG037 Gulu, Uganda March 2016 Male, local researcher/former IDP
UG038 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Male, human rights activist
UG039 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Male, journalist
UG040 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Female, former IDP camp aid worker
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UG041 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, journalist
UG042 Gulu, Uganda March 2017 Male, civil society leader
UG043 Gulu, Uganda March 2017 Male, civil society leader
UG044 Lira, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPA fighter
UG045 Lira, Uganda April 2017 Male, journalist
UG046 Palaro, Uganda Feb. 2016 Male, former LRA combatant
UG047 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Female, former LRA combatant
UG048 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, former LRA commander
UG049 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, former LRA combatant
UG050 Bungatira, Uganda April 2017 Female, former LRA combatant
UG051 Kampala, Uganda February 2016 Male, former UPDF intelligence officer
UG052 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Male, UPDF Chief of Doctrine
UG053 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Male, former UPDF Chief of Defense Forces
UG054 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Male, UPDF platoon commander
UG055 Kampala, Uganda October 2016 Male, UPDF public relations officer
UG056 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF public relations officer
UG057 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, Former senior UPDF commander
UG058 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF intelligence officer
UG059 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF senior commander
UG060 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF colonel
UG061 Kampala, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF senior commander
UG062 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF infantry veteran
UG063 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, Homeguard commander
UG064 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF veteran
UG065 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, UPDF senior commander
UG066 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, former LDU commander
UG067 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Female, former UPDF commander
UG068 Gulu, Uganda November 2016 Male, former LRA rebel and UPDF veteran
UG069 Lalogi, Uganda December 2016 Male, former UPDF political commissar
UG070 Gulu Uganda December 2016 Male, former UPDF political commissar
UG071 Purongo, Uganda December 2016 Male, UPDF veteran
UG072 Palenga, Uganda December 2016 Male, UPDF veteran
UG073 Palenga, Uganda December 2016 Male, UPDF veteran
UG074 Gulu, Uganda December 2016 Male, former LDU commander
UG075 Lalogi, Uganda December 2016 Male, UPDF commanding officer
UG076 Gulu, Uganda March 2017 Male, UPDF intelligence officer
UG077 Palaro, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG078 Cwero, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG079 Cwero, Uganda April 2017 Male, LDU and UPDF veteran
UG080 Palaro, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG081 Patiko, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF senior commander
UG082 Patiko, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
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UG083 Ngetta, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG084 Ngetta, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF and Amuka veteran
UG085 Ogur, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG086 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF commander
UG087 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG088 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG089 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG090 Lira, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF public relations officer
UG091 Lira, Uganda April 2017 Male, Senior UPDF officer
UG092 Achol Pii, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPDF battalion commander
UG093 Achol Pii, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPDF commander
UG094 Achol Pii, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF intelligence officer
UG095 Achol Pii, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPDF platoon commander
UG096 Achol Pii, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF logistics and operations officer
UG097 Patiko, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF intelligence officer
UG098 Patiko, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG099 Mbarara, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF commander
UG100 Bungatira, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG101 Lawiye-Oduny, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG102 Lawiye-Oduny, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG103 Adilang, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG104 Awach, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG105 Pabbo, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG106 Bungatira, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG107 Ngetta, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG108 Barr, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG109 Barr, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG110 Barr, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG111 Barlonyo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former LDU/Amuka
UG112 Ogur, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG113 Aler, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG114 Aler, Uganda April 2017 Male, former LDU/Amuka
UG115 Abonyo Tingera, Uganda April 2017 Male, former LDU/Amuka
UG116 Abonyo Tingera, Uganda April 2017 Male, former Amuka
UG117 Bungatira, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG118 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG119 Pabwo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG120 Paicho, Uganda April 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG121 Kal, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG122 Lawiye-Oduny, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG123 Adilang, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG124 Bobi, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
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UG125 Parwech, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG126 Coopil, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG127 Palaro, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG128 Kasese, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF intelligence operative
UG129 Katwe, Uganda April 2017 Male, District Councilor, Kasese
UG130 Bundibugyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, IDP camp leader
UG131 Bundibugyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC5 Chairman, Bundibugyo District
UG132 Bundibugyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, Chairman of Bukonzo Community
UG133 Bugoye, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG134 Kyondo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former IDP camp leader
UG135 Kyondo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former IDP camp leader
UG136 Kyondo, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1 and former LDU, Kasese District
UG137 Kihyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG138 Karambi, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG139 Bikone, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG140 Kabatunda, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG141 Isule, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG142 Mbondwe, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG143 Nganji, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG144 Muhambo, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG145 Kihoko, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG146 Buhuma, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG147 Nyabirongo, Uganda April 2017 Male, parish security officer
UG148 Kanyatsi, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG149 Nyabirongo, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1, Kasese District
UG150 Kikyo, Uganda April 2017 Male, LC1 Kasese District
UG150 Bukonzo, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG151 Bukonzo, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG152 Busunga, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG153 Harugali, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1 Bundibugyo District
UG154 Kakuka, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG155 Kakuka, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG156 Ntotoro, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG157 Mantoroba, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Bundibugyo District,
UG158 Kikyo, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG159 Kyondo, Uganda May 2017 Male, LC1, Ntoroko District
UG160 Ntotoro, Uganda May 2017 Female, LC1, Bundibugyo District
UG161 Bupomboli, Uganda May 2017 Male LC1 and former IDP camp leader
UG162 Kasese, Uganda April 2017 Male, human rights activist
UG163 Kampala, Uganda February 2016 Male, human rights activist
UG164 Ihbimbo, Uganda April 2017 Male, resident, Kasese District
UG165 Bundibugyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former IDP, Bundibugyo District
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UG166 Nyabirongo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former ADF commander
UG167 Mbata, Uganda May 2017 Male, former ADF commander
UG168 Nyangorongo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former ADF combatant
UG169 Kakone, Uganda May 2017 Male, former ADF combatant
UG170 Kasese, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG171 Kasese, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF intelligence officer
UG172 Kisingi, Uganda April 2017 Male, town chairman/UPDF veteran
UG173 Ibanda, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG174 Mpondwe, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPDF intelligence officer
UG175 Mpondwe, Uganda April 2017 Male, former UPDF platoon commander
UG176 Bundibugyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former UPDF brigade commander
UG177 Kirumya, Uganda May 2017 Male, former UPDF intelligence officer
UG178 Mbarara, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF platoon commander
UG179 Kyambogho, Uganda April 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG180 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG181 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, UPDF veteran
UG182 Bundibugyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG183 Kirumya, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG184 Ibanda, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG185 Katiri, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG186 Bikone, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG187 Kitswamba, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG188 Buhuma, Uganda April 2017 Male, former LDU
UG189 Muhambo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG190 Isule, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG191 Mbunga, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG192 Kikyo, Uganda April 2017 Male, former LDU
UG193 Karambi, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG194 Nganji, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG195 Kabatunda, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG196 Kitholhu, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG197 Kihyo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG198 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG199 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG200 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG201 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG202 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG203 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG204 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG205 Buigha, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG206 Kakuka, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG207 Kakuka, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
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UG208 Bukonzo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG209 Bukonzo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG210 Harugali, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG211 Harugali, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG212 Karuguto Town, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG213 Karuguto Town, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG214 Katswaba, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG215 Kyondo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG216 Kyondo, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG217 Ngamba, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG218 Ngamba, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG219 Ntotoro Town, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG220 Katswaba, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG221 Kyamuteme, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG222 Karugutu, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG223 Kyamuteme, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG224 Kyiko, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG225 Kyiko, Uganda May 2017 Male, former LDU
UG226 Kyiko, Uganda May 2017 Male, former homeguard
UG227 Karambi, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG228 Kitholhu, Uganda April 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG229 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
UG230 Karangura, Uganda May 2017 Male, former vigilante
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Region District (1991) District (2002) District (2016) Sub-County
North Kitgum Pader Agago Lira Palwo
North Kitgum Pader Agago Adilang
North Kitgum Pader Agago Wol
North Gulu Gulu Amuru Amuru
North Gulu Gulu Amuru Pabo
North Gulu Gulu Amuru Atiak
North Gulu Gulu Gulu Awach
North Gulu Gulu Gulu Bungatira
North Gulu Gulu Gulu Palaro
North Gulu Gulu Gulu Unyama
North Kitgum Kitgum Kitgum Mucwini
North Kitgum Kitgum Kitgum Lobongo-Layamo
North Kitgum Kitgum Kitgum Namukura
North Kitgum Kitgum Lamwo Madi Opei
North Kitgum Kitgum Lamwo Palabek Kal
North Gulu Gulu Nwoya Alero
North Gulu Gulu Nwoya Koch Goma
North Kitgum Pader Pader Pajule
North Kitgum Pader Pader Puranga
North Gulu Gulu Omoro Odek
North Gulu Gulu Omoro Lalogi
North Gulu Gulu Omoro Bobi
North Lira Lira Lira Adekokwak
North Lira Lira Lira Barr
North Lira Lira Lira Ogur
North Lira Lira Lira Ngetta
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Kisinga
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Kyondo
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Kitholu
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Bugoye
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Karambi
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Kitswamba
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Kyabarungira
West Kasese Kasese Kasese Kasese Town
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bukonzo
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Harugale
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Sindila
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bubukwanga
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Bubandi
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Ntoroko Ngamba
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West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Ntoroko Ntotoro
West Bundibugyo Bundibugyo Ntoroko Karugutu
290
Appendix D
Violent Events Data in Uganda
APPENDIX D. VIOLENT EVENTS IN UGANDA 291
D.1 ACLED Data, by Region (Raleigh et al. 2010 and
Author)
The black dashed vertical lines in Figures D.1 and D.2 denote when displacement was ordered by
Ugandan forces in northern and western Uganda.
Figure D.1: LRA Violence in Uganda (1990-2008), by District
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Figure D.2: ADF Violence in Uganda (1995-2003), By District
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D.2 UCDP GED Data (Sundberg and Melander 2013)
Figure D.3: Rebel Attacks on Civilians in Uganda (1989-2008)
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Figure D.4: Civilians Deaths from Rebel Attacks (1989-2006)
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Figure D.5: LRA Violence in Uganda (1990-2008)
Figure D.6: ADF Violence in Uganda (1995-2006)
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Figure D.7: LRA Attacks on Civilians, by District (1989-2008)
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This appendix describes previous data collection efforts on strategic
displacement, along with further detail on the procedures used for coding strategic
displacement in civil wars and explicates a number of coding decisions.
E.1 Previous Data Collection Efforts
One of the most extensive lists of strategic wartime displacement to date
has been compiled by Yuri Zhukov,1 who identifies instances of “forced population
resettlement” in counterinsurgency campaigns (COIN) between 1812 and 2006, drawn
from Lyall and Wilson’s counterinsurgency dataset.2 Yet the sourcing of cases is unclear,
and his typology is not systematic or exhaustive: for example, it includes several
instances of “forced refugee return.” Zhukov’s dataset is also not comprehensive: SDCC
identifies an additional 40 cases between 1945-2004 that were omitted from his list.
Alex Downes and Kelly Greenhill build on Zhukov’s list to develop a dataset of
“population relocation in counterinsurgency operations.”3 While their study constitutes
a valiant effort, their typology is confusing: they have a category for “expulsion,” yet
the dataset excludes important instances of ethnic or political cleansing; moreover, they
code some cases as “deportation,” which usually refers to the forcible expulsion from
a country, not to other areas within it. Finally, the dataset is not comprehensive: the
authors only include irregular wars, and even within irregular wars, SDCC identifies
an additional 28 cases omitted from their data. For those cases the authors did include,
there is close agreement with SDCC.
Another project that collected data on strategic displacement is a study on
counterinsurgency from the RAND Corporation, which denotes instances where
counterinsurgency forces “resettled/removed civilian populations for population
control.”4 However, the study only includes a select group of post-World War
II counterinsurgency campaigns. The authors found evidence that population
resettlement/removal was used in 25 cases, all but one of which are included in SDCC.
Other scholars have collected data on particular types of strategic wartime
displacement, or on instances of displacement for shorter periods of time. H. Zeynep
Bulutgil compiled cases of 20th century ethnic cleansing, defined as “an event in which
a state kills or forcefully and permanently deports at least 20% of an ethnic group on its
territory from their current location to another one within three years.”5 Many of her
cases occurred during inter-state conflicts in Europe, but all 11 cases that took place
during civil wars are included in SDCC. Phil Orchard provides a qualitative dataset of
what he calls “regime-induced displacement,” which includes episodes from 1991-2006
1 Zhukov 2015.
2 Lyall and Wilson 2009.
3 Downes and Greenhill 2015.
4 Paul et al. 2010.
5 Bulutgil 2016.
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where “government or government-sponsored actors deliberately use coercive tactics
to directly or indirectly cause large numbers of their own citizens to flee their homes.”6
Orchard identifies cases during both wartime and peacetime, using some of the same
sources as SDCC. All but four of his wartime cases are captured in SDCC.7
Jessica Stanton codes multiple forms of rebel and government strategies of
violence in civil wars from 1989-2010.8 While she uses the UCDP/PRIO definition
of armed conflict to define her universe of cases, two main strategies in her dataset
are of interest. The first is government- and rebel-induced “cleansing,” defined as
instances where combatants “forcibly expelled civilians from a particular ethnic or
religious group from contested territory and also used scorched earth tactics and/or
massacres”. The second is state “high-casualty terrorism,” defined as “cases in which
the government engaged in intentional bombing and shelling of populated civilian
targets.” All 14 cases of government cleansing, 10 cases of rebel cleansing, and 13 cases
of state high-casualty terrorism identified by Stanton are included in SDCC.9
6 Orchard 2010.
7 Out of a total of 28 wartime cases. The four cases coded as “no strategic displacement” in SDCC are
Congo (1997-99); Cote d’Ivoire (2002-06); Djibouti (1993); and Sierra Leone (1999-00). For these conflicts,
we could find no reliable evidence of state-induced expulsion or relocation in reviewing primary and
secondary sources. With the exception of Sierra Leone, no other data collection efforts have identified
these wars as experiencing strategic displacement.
8 Stanton 2016.
9 Seven of Stanton’s cases experienced both government cleansing and government terrorism. She also
identified eight conflicts where the government employed scorched earth tactics or forced expulsion, but
not both, six of which are included in SDCC.
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E.2 SDCC Coding Procedure
A four-person research team identified cases of strategic displacement from the
following sources:
• Case histories for each individual conflict.
• Country reports from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.10 While
IDMC reports only go back to 2003, many contain descriptions of wartime
displacement in the country’s history.
• Case studies on forced displacement from Robert Cohen and Francis M. Deng’s
seminal volume on internal displacement.11
• For conflicts between 1975-2004, we consulted annual human rights reports from
the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International (AI), and Human Rights Watch
(HRW). The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are
published annually, and AI and HRW both publish annual reports by country and
periodic special reports by country and/or human rights issue. These sources
are widely considered trustworthy and reliable sources of data on human rights
violations.12 We used the Human Rights Text Data Repository (HRTDR) to conduct
simple keyword searches of all reports for all years in countries experiencing active
conflict.13
• Newspaper reports from LexisNexis Academic.
Keywoods used to identify potential cases included the following: Burn* Ho*;
Burn* Vill*; Displace*; Evict*; (Forced) Reloc*; (Forced/forcible) Resettle*; Expel*;
Expul*; Evac*; Scorch*; Protected Vill*; Hamlet; Concentra*; Concentration Camp;
Regroupment; Cleansing; Population Removal; Population Movement; Scorched;
Demol*. The terms we used were generated through an extensive examination of
anecdotal evidence and case studies.
For each case, the following details were coded:
• Perpetrator. The party or parties responsible for displacement: government/military;
pro-government militia; rebel group; or military and militia. Cases of rebel- and
government-induced displacement were therefore coded separately.
• Location. Details on the region, district, or general area where people were
displaced from, to the greatest level of specificity possible.
10 http://www.internal-displacement.org/).
11 Cohen and Deng 2010.
12 Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Stanton 2016.
13 Fariss et al. 2015.
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• Victim. Information on the population targeted for displacement. This could be
a specific ethnic, religious, social, or political group, or it could refer to multiple
groups or a general class of people living in an area (e.g., rural peasants).
• Timing. Details on the year and/or month that strategic displacement was first
enacted, and when it was reported to have ended, where such information was
available.
• Type. Each instance of strategic displacement was coded by type, so a conflict
could experience multiple strategies.
“Cleansing” describes the forced, permanent expulsion of a particular political,
ethnic, or religious group. We therefore looked for evidence that victims were
members of an identifiable group and that they were targeted due to this
affiliation, and that displacement was intended to be permanent. One telltale
sign of this is whether government forces encouraged or incentivized co-ethics or
political supporters to move to and settle in the evacuated territories.
“Depopulation” describes the temporary or permanent removal of all inhabitants
from a designated area. Unlike cleansing, depopulation means that combatants
made little effort to differentiate between particular groups; targeting was
indiscriminate rather than collective. Depopulation is usually carried out
through indirect violence, such as sustained bombing or shelling reported to be
intentionally directed at populated civilian areas. Finally, there is little effort on
behalf of perpetrators to resettle the displaced population.
“Forced Relocation” describes the physical concentration of communities or the
transplanting of populations to new settlements. These cases entailed a concerted
and ongoing effort by perpetrators to “pull” the population into its domain. Rather
than expelling people to distant areas, combatants concentrated them within the
conflict zone or a nearby location. The coding team therefore evaluated the extent
to which perpetrators attempted to influence the destinations of the displaced, and
how far destinations were to victims’ places of origin.
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F.1 Binary Logit Results
The operationalization of my dependent variable in the multinomial logit
models is imperfect. I therefore adopt two other strategies. First, I run two individual
logit models (one for cleansing and one for forced relocation) with the same reference
category of no strategic displacement. For example, in the forced relocation model, the
dependent variable takes the value 1 if the country has experienced forced relocation
– no matter if it has also endured cleansing or depopulation – and 0 if it has been free
from strategic displacement. Cases in which a country has experienced either cleansing
or depopulation but not forced relocation are omitted from the relocation model, which
is similar to the way multinomial models are estimated. These results are presented in
Tables F.1 and F.2.
Second, I run three sets of “regular” logit models but control for whether
the conflict also experienced the two other displacement strategies. For example, in
the cleansing model, I include control variables for whether depopulation or forced
relocation was employed by state forces during the same conflict. Tables F.3 and F.4
provide results for cleansing and forced relocation on the full sample of civil wars.
APPENDIX F. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 305















Distance −0.46 ∗ ∗ −0.71 ∗ ∗
(0.22) (0.30)




Elections 1.33 0.57 0.85 −0.07
(0.83) (0.59) (1.35) (1.01)
Rebclaim 4.61 ∗ ∗∗ 3.63 ∗ ∗∗ 4.79 ∗ ∗∗ 3.63 ∗ ∗∗
(1.32) (1.18) (1.49) (1.20)
CDF 1.46 1.15 2.41∗ 1.99∗
(1.33) (1.05) (1.43) (1.10)
Ethnic war 1.05 ∗ ∗∗ 0.23 0.48
(0.32) (0.50) (0.53)
Exclusionary 1.50 ∗ ∗∗ −0.87 −0.15
(0.52) (0.95) (0.76)
Rebextsupp 1.83 ∗ ∗∗ 1.29 1.25
(0.70) (0.95) (0.98)
Rebel FR 0.22 0.01 0.10
(0.57) (0.73) (0.81)
Rebconcen −0.49 −0.85 −1.08∗
(0.52) (0.67) (0.64)
Mass kill 1.63 ∗ ∗∗ 2.81 ∗ ∗ 2.34 ∗ ∗∗
(0.59) (1.33) (0.74)
Irregular −1.16 −1.05 −1.05 ∗ ∗ −0.90∗ −0.73 −1.85 −1.84∗
(0.88) (0.71) (0.48) (0.53) (0.46) (1.27) (1.03)
GDP 0.83 ∗ ∗∗ 0.52 ∗ ∗ 0.35∗ 0.62 ∗ ∗∗ 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 1.03 ∗ ∗ 0.64 ∗ ∗∗
(0.26) (0.23) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.42) (0.24)
Population −0.43 −0.26 −0.23 −0.33 −0.21 −0.80 ∗ ∗ −0.52∗
(0.28) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.16) (0.36) (0.30)
Democracy −0.01 −0.04 0.04 −0.03 −0.01 −0.11 −0.12
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.09)
Bdeaths 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −3.07 −2.60 −0.78 0.19 −0.83 −1.40 −2.63
(2.78) (2.35) (1.61) (1.79) (1.52) (3.17) (2.88)
Observations 93 97 94 90 98 82 85
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.32 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.52 0.46
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Distance 1.22 ∗ ∗∗ 2.23 ∗ ∗∗
(0.40) (0.71)
Land area −0.48 −0.71∗
(0.37) (0.41)
Bordconf 3.23 ∗ ∗∗ 4.37 ∗ ∗∗
(0.94) (1.30)
Elections −0.75 −0.01 −1.80 ∗ ∗ −0.29
(0.68) (0.74) (0.87) (0.83)
Rebclaim −0.50 −1.82∗ −2.19 ∗ ∗ −1.89
(0.58) (1.09) (0.87) (1.51)
CDF 3.56 ∗ ∗∗ 3.14 ∗ ∗∗ 4.70 ∗ ∗∗ 3.29 ∗ ∗∗
(0.62) (0.61) (1.12) (0.86)
Ethnic war 0.23 1.19 ∗ ∗ 1.18 ∗ ∗
(0.26) (0.57) (0.56)
Exclusionary 0.34 0.06 −0.72
(0.48) (0.90) (0.84)
Rebextsupp 1.00 ∗ ∗ 2.48 ∗ ∗ 0.18
(0.46) (1.00) (0.51)
Rebel FR 0.35 0.50 −0.49
(0.53) (0.75) (0.93)
Rebconcen 0.20 −0.86 −2.33 ∗ ∗
(0.56) (0.90) (1.18)
Mass killing 0.42 1.89∗ 1.65
(0.47) (1.05) (0.96)
Irregular 1.39∗ 1.90 ∗ ∗∗ 2.28 ∗ ∗∗ 2.37 ∗ ∗∗ 2.26 ∗ ∗∗ 2.30 ∗ ∗ 2.47 ∗ ∗
(0.73) (0.71) (0.74) (0.78) (0.71) (0.91) (1.17)
GDP −0.75 ∗ ∗ −0.86 ∗ ∗∗ −0.39 −0.33 −0.30 −1.22 ∗ ∗∗ −1.02 ∗ ∗
(0.32) (0.33) (0.28) (0.24) (0.26) (0.44) (0.49)
Population −0.09 −0.06 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.01 −0.24
(0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.28) (0.27)
Democracy 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Bdeaths −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −3.98 −1.80 −1.30 −2.15 −1.32 −12.15 ∗ ∗ −1.56
(3.31) (1.93) (1.52) (1.38) (1.50) (5.73) (3.30)
Observations 115 119 115 112 120 103 106
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.60 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.61 0.65
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Elections 1.19 0.73 0.93 0.16
(0.73) (0.58) (1.04) (0.89)
Rebclaim 4.17 ∗ ∗∗ 3.64 ∗ ∗∗ 4.61 ∗ ∗∗ 4.04 ∗ ∗∗
(1.09) (1.09) (1.43) (1.41)
CDF 2.03 1.57 3.44 ∗ ∗ 2.77 ∗ ∗∗
(1.04) (0.88) (1.40) (0.85)
Ethnic war 1.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.09 0.41
(0.32) (0.48) (0.53)
Exclusionary 1.38 ∗ ∗∗ −0.36 0.06
(0.48) (0.85) (0.76)
Rebextsupp 1.77 ∗ ∗∗ 2.17 ∗ ∗ 2.01∗
(0.61) (0.92) (1.03)
Rebel FR 0.31 0.81 0.72
(0.53) (0.76) (0.71)
Rebconcen −0.52 −1.12 −1.63 ∗ ∗
(0.51) (0.79) (0.81)
Mass kill 1.51 ∗ ∗∗ 2.19 ∗ ∗ 2.06 ∗ ∗∗
(0.56) (1.07) (0.74)
Reloc/Depop. −3.26 ∗ ∗ −2.87 ∗ ∗∗ −2.75 ∗ ∗∗ −2.68 ∗ ∗∗ −2.54 ∗ ∗ −4.71 ∗ ∗∗ −4.03 ∗ ∗∗
(1.29) (1.08) (1.03) (1.01) (1.03) (1.28) (1.06)
Irregular −1.45 ∗ ∗ −1.36 ∗ ∗∗ −1.18 ∗ ∗∗ −1.11 ∗ ∗ −0.83∗ −2.37 ∗ ∗∗ −2.22 ∗ ∗∗
(0.59) (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.79) (0.74)
GDP 0.61 ∗ ∗∗ 0.41 ∗ ∗ 0.29∗ 0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.46 ∗ ∗∗ 0.92 ∗ ∗∗ 0.66 ∗ ∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.32) (0.24)
Population −0.44∗ −0.31 −0.23 −0.29∗ −0.21 −0.97 ∗ ∗∗ −0.71 ∗ ∗
(0.26) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.35) (0.30)
Democracy −0.02 −0.04 0.05 −0.02 −0.00 −0.10 −0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09)
Bdeaths 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −1.17 −2.01 −0.61 0.11 −0.55 1.64 −1.53
(2.34) (2.18) (1.45) (1.53) (1.33) (1.94) (2.33)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.59 0.55
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Distance 1.31 ∗ ∗∗ 1.77 ∗ ∗∗
(0.35) (0.50)
Land area −0.55 −0.61
(0.34) (0.37)
Bordconf 2.95 ∗ ∗∗ 4.23 ∗ ∗∗
(0.77) (1.30)
Elections −0.88 −0.33 −1.43 ∗ ∗ −0.36
(0.62) (0.72) (0.64) (0.74)
Rebclaim −0.64 −1.41 −2.19 ∗ ∗ −1.97
(0.56) (0.88) (0.93) (1.33)
CDF 3.69 ∗ ∗∗ 2.92 ∗ ∗∗ 4.11 ∗ ∗∗ 3.07 ∗ ∗∗
(0.62) (0.61) (0.75) (0.77)
Ethnic war 0.20 1.08 ∗ ∗ 1.08 ∗ ∗
(0.27) (0.52) (0.52)
Exclusionary 0.30 −0.23 −0.77
(0.46) (0.77) (0.68)
Rebextsupp 1.08 ∗ ∗ 1.88 ∗ ∗ 0.41
(0.47) (0.73) (0.48)
Rebel FR 0.37 0.15 −0.87
(0.52) (0.68) (0.93)
Rebconcen 0.14 −0.37 −1.93 ∗ ∗
(0.54) (0.82) (0.90)
Mass kill 0.37 1.32 1.55 ∗ ∗
(0.46) (0.82) (0.73)
Cleans/Depop. −0.44 −1.74 −1.52 ∗ ∗ −1.76 ∗ ∗∗ −1.40 ∗ ∗ −1.16 −2.77 ∗ ∗∗
(1.07) (1.08) (0.70) (0.58) (0.66) (1.30) (1.03)
Irregular 1.48∗ 2.12 ∗ ∗∗ 2.45 ∗ ∗∗ 2.61 ∗ ∗∗ 2.42 ∗ ∗∗ 2.47 ∗ ∗ 2.96 ∗ ∗
(0.80) (0.78) (0.75) (0.82) (0.73) (0.97) (1.29)
GDP −0.91 ∗ ∗∗ −0.91 ∗ ∗∗ −0.51∗ −0.46∗ −0.44∗ −1.22 ∗ ∗∗ −1.12 ∗ ∗
(0.33) (0.30) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.35) (0.49)
Population −0.08 −0.10 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.06 −0.35
(0.25) (0.19) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.25) (0.28)
Democracy 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Bdeaths −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −3.93 −1.26 −1.16 −2.09 −1.25 −8.59 ∗ ∗ −0.36
(3.29) (2.00) (1.50) (1.38) (1.55) (4.27) (3.13)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.59 0.61 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.64 0.66
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Additional Control Variables






















Elections 1.55 0.58 1.50 0.24
(1.03) (0.71) (1.31) (0.94)
Rebel claim 4.82 ∗ ∗∗ 3.62 ∗ ∗∗ 3.79 ∗ ∗ 3.04 ∗ ∗∗
(1.50) (1.18) (1.50) (1.10)
CDF 1.58∗ 1.07 1.76∗ 1.77 ∗ ∗
(0.83) (0.71) (1.02) (0.77)
Ethnic war 1.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.55 0.63
(0.36) (0.41) (0.52)
Exclusionary 1.63 ∗ ∗∗ 0.33 0.42
(0.51) (0.92) (0.85)
Rebextsupp 1.64 ∗ ∗ 1.43 1.54∗
(0.68) (0.96) (0.89)
Rebel FR −0.06 −0.03 0.03
(0.65) (0.61) (0.71)
Rebconcen −0.13 −0.28 −1.06
(0.51) (0.89) (0.70)
Mass kill 1.54 ∗ ∗∗ 1.91∗ 1.73 ∗ ∗
(0.59) (0.98) (0.68)
Irregular −1.89 ∗ ∗ −1.42 ∗ ∗∗ −1.36 ∗ ∗ −1.67 ∗ ∗ −0.94 −2.91 ∗ ∗∗ −2.25 ∗ ∗∗
(0.76) (0.55) (0.64) (0.73) (0.64) (1.08) (0.75)
GDP 1.01 ∗ ∗∗ 0.63 ∗ ∗∗ 0.43 ∗ ∗ 0.60 ∗ ∗∗ 0.59 ∗ ∗∗ 1.12 ∗ ∗∗ 0.64 ∗ ∗∗
(0.24) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.34) (0.23)
Population −0.50 ∗ ∗ −0.27 −0.26∗ −0.27∗ −0.22 −0.63 ∗ ∗ −0.42∗
(0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.26) (0.24)
Democracy 0.00 −0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08)
Bdeaths 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-CW 0.03 0.08 0.47 0.25 0.50 −0.38 0.17
(0.63) (0.52) (0.59) (0.63) (0.56) (0.77) (0.70)
Constant −3.43 −2.63 −1.08 −0.39 −1.04 −2.92 −3.48




Land area 0.67∗ 0.12
(0.39) (0.54)
Bordconf 1.17 −0.47
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(0.98) (1.20)
Elections 2.49 1.77 2.29 1.47
(1.78) (1.46) (1.59) (1.17)
Rebel claim 1.83 0.57 0.06 −1.75
(1.59) (1.31) (1.59) (1.70)
CDF 1.46 0.68 0.66 0.34
(1.56) (1.18) (1.53) (1.54)
Ethnic war 1.27 ∗ ∗ 0.81∗ 1.24∗
(0.59) (0.45) (0.65)
Exclusionary 0.62 0.03 0.54
(0.78) (0.98) (0.70)
Rebextsupp −0.32 −1.37 −0.59
(0.93) (1.82) (1.24)
Rebel FR 2.03 ∗ ∗∗ 2.87 ∗ ∗∗ 2.35 ∗ ∗∗
(0.64) (0.78) (0.91)
Rebconcen 2.45 ∗ ∗∗ 1.98 2.87
(0.86) (1.23) (2.10)
Mass kill 1.01 0.46 0.93
(0.90) (1.01) (0.96)
Irregular −2.07 −0.66 0.07 −0.81 0.17 −2.83 −1.38
(1.79) (1.32) (1.16) (1.58) (1.21) (1.75) (1.89)
GDP 1.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.97 ∗ ∗∗ 0.75 ∗ ∗∗ 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ 0.92 ∗ ∗∗ 1.91 ∗ ∗∗ 0.95 ∗ ∗∗
(0.42) (0.34) (0.26) (0.36) (0.27) (0.55) (0.36)
Population −0.59 ∗ ∗ −0.25 −0.30 −0.32 −0.28 −0.73 −0.25
(0.30) (0.28) (0.20) (0.32) (0.20) (0.54) (0.38)
Democracy 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 −0.01 −0.00
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-CW −0.64 0.51 0.47 −1.34 0.76 −2.54∗ −1.88
(1.19) (1.37) (1.19) (1.30) (1.12) (1.35) (1.20)
Constant −8.14 −4.17 −3.31 −3.04 −2.72 −6.43 −5.81
(5.35) (3.38) (2.82) (3.70) (3.06) (7.45) (5.40)
Relocation
Distance 1.44 ∗ ∗∗ 1.93 ∗ ∗∗
(0.41) (0.58)
Land area −0.63∗ −0.76 ∗ ∗
(0.37) (0.39)
Bordconf 2.70 ∗ ∗∗ 3.76 ∗ ∗∗
(0.77) (1.11)
Elections −0.74 −0.50 −1.57 ∗ ∗ −0.82
(0.66) (0.75) (0.71) (0.83)
Rebclaim −0.19 −0.96 −2.27 ∗ ∗ −1.63
(0.60) (0.84) (1.07) (1.21)
CDF 4.05 ∗ ∗∗ 3.18 ∗ ∗∗ 4.67 ∗ ∗∗ 3.42 ∗ ∗∗
(0.76) (0.55) (1.00) (0.67)
Ethnic war 0.31 1.34 ∗ ∗ 1.11 ∗ ∗
(0.26) (0.67) (0.53)
Exclusionary 0.48 −0.22 −0.73
(0.48) (0.90) (0.78)
Rebextsupp 1.00 ∗ ∗ 1.86 ∗ ∗ 0.20
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(0.43) (0.85) (0.47)
Rebel FR 0.36 0.48 −0.78
(0.49) (0.80) (0.81)
Rebconcen 0.26 −0.05 −1.63∗
(0.54) (1.00) (0.86)
Mass kill 0.44 1.54 1.51 ∗ ∗
(0.49) (1.00) (0.65)
Irregular 1.23 1.60∗ 2.18 ∗ ∗∗ 2.15 ∗ ∗∗ 2.27 ∗ ∗∗ 1.94∗ 1.68
(1.01) (0.97) (0.74) (0.81) (0.72) (1.16) (1.11)
GDP −0.71 ∗ ∗ −0.72∗ −0.39 −0.34 −0.31 −1.14 ∗ ∗∗ −1.02 ∗ ∗
(0.32) (0.37) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.36) (0.49)
Population −0.20 −0.07 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.17 −0.27
(0.27) (0.19) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.33) (0.25)
Democracy 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Bdeaths −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-CW −0.01 −0.41 −0.28 −0.28 −0.02 −0.21 −0.52
(0.85) (0.73) (0.55) (0.50) (0.56) (1.51) (0.76)
Constant −3.42 −1.27 −1.08 −1.74 −1.32 −7.91 0.04
(3.50) (1.92) (1.53) (1.38) (1.55) (4.98) (2.64)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.46 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.59 0.55
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Elections 1.44 0.55 1.26 0.14
(0.91) (0.68) (1.11) (0.95)
Rebclaim 4.59 ∗ ∗∗ 3.46 ∗ ∗∗ 3.78 ∗ ∗∗ 3.24 ∗ ∗∗
(1.49) (1.12) (1.31) (1.18)
CDF 1.53∗ 1.09 1.77∗ 1.82 ∗ ∗
(0.86) (0.71) (1.04) (0.72)
Ethnic war 0.91 ∗ ∗ 0.53 0.63
(0.37) (0.44) (0.49)
Exclusionary 1.43 ∗ ∗∗ 0.34 0.55
(0.48) (0.93) (0.89)
Rebextsupp 1.43 ∗ ∗ 1.22 1.62∗
(0.68) (0.90) (0.84)
Rebel FR 0.19 0.11 0.04
(0.65) (0.67) (0.63)
Rebconcen −0.20 −0.50 −0.99
(0.54) (0.88) (0.75)
Mass kill 1.47 ∗ ∗ 1.91∗ 1.89 ∗ ∗∗
(0.60) (0.99) (0.69)
Irregular −1.97 ∗ ∗∗ −1.45 ∗ ∗∗ −1.58 ∗ ∗ −1.77 ∗ ∗∗ −1.31 ∗ ∗ −2.74 ∗ ∗∗ −2.29 ∗ ∗∗
(0.68) (0.53) (0.64) (0.65) (0.55) (0.96) (0.70)
GDP 0.92 ∗ ∗∗ 0.58 ∗ ∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.48 ∗ ∗∗ 0.44 ∗ ∗∗ 1.08 ∗ ∗∗ 0.74 ∗ ∗∗
(0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30) (0.26)
Population −0.51 ∗ ∗∗ −0.26 −0.23 −0.24 −0.20 −0.69 ∗ ∗∗ −0.45 ∗ ∗
(0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.24) (0.22)
Democracy −0.01 −0.04 0.04 −0.02 −0.01 0.01 −0.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
Bdeaths 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Successionist 0.90 0.42 1.13∗ 1.18∗ 1.62 ∗ ∗∗ 0.46 −0.43
(0.92) (0.63) (0.62) (0.64) (0.55) (1.19) (0.82)
Constant −2.79 −2.63 −1.03 −0.59 −1.10 −2.26 −3.31








Elections 2.46 1.90 2.21 1.51
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(1.61) (1.50) (1.82) (1.14)
Rebclaim 1.93 0.81 0.36 −0.93
(1.72) (1.42) (1.71) (1.18)
CDF 1.36 0.76 0.54 0.31
(1.49) (1.27) (1.59) (1.50)
Ethnic war 1.35 ∗ ∗ 1.00 1.32∗
(0.63) (0.62) (0.70)
Exclusionary 0.70 −0.19 0.75
(0.76) (0.79) (0.73)
Rebextsupp −0.03 −0.72 −0.18
(0.78) (1.30) (1.07)
Rebel FR 1.63 ∗ ∗ 1.78∗ 1.54
(0.82) (1.00) (1.11)
Rebconcen 1.97∗ 0.97 1.73
(1.11) (1.24) (1.58)
Mass kill 1.14 0.11 0.95
(0.98) (1.06) (1.09)
Irregular −1.64 −0.82 −0.04 −0.14 −0.19 −1.41 −0.91
(1.50) (1.20) (1.00) (1.30) (0.98) (1.48) (1.55)
GDP 1.49 ∗ ∗∗ 1.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.79 ∗ ∗∗ 0.87 ∗ ∗∗ 0.91 ∗ ∗∗ 1.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.91 ∗ ∗
(0.38) (0.39) (0.29) (0.33) (0.30) (0.50) (0.42)
Population −0.55∗ −0.29 −0.35∗ −0.28 −0.32∗ −0.59∗ −0.24
(0.30) (0.25) (0.19) (0.24) (0.18) (0.34) (0.30)
Democracy 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 −0.04 −0.02
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Successionist −0.69 −0.41 −0.41 0.05 0.35 −0.45 −0.88
(1.36) (1.54) (1.28) (1.52) (1.13) (1.46) (1.84)
Constant −8.35 −3.57 −2.62 −3.65 −1.90 −7.59 −6.55
(5.46) (2.57) (2.01) (2.92) (2.07) (4.80) (4.63)
Relocation
Distance 1.71 ∗ ∗∗ 2.32 ∗ ∗∗
(0.53) (0.81)
Land area −0.68∗ −0.82 ∗ ∗
(0.39) (0.40)
Bordconf 2.74 ∗ ∗∗ 4.24 ∗ ∗∗
(0.74) (1.04)
Elections −0.85 −0.42 −1.44 ∗ ∗ −0.71
(0.63) (0.81) (0.63) (0.92)
Rebclaim 0.24 −1.39 ∗ ∗ −1.91∗ −2.07 ∗ ∗
(0.73) (0.57) (1.08) (0.84)
CDF 4.01 ∗ ∗∗ 3.33 ∗ ∗∗ 4.74 ∗ ∗∗ 3.75 ∗ ∗∗
(0.79) (0.65) (1.12) (1.08)
Ethnic war 0.21 1.66 ∗ ∗ 0.92∗
(0.28) (0.79) (0.48)
Exclusionary 0.49 −0.42 −0.92
(0.47) (0.87) (0.73)
Rebextsupp 1.01 ∗ ∗ 1.90 ∗ ∗ 0.27
(0.43) (0.76) (0.45)
Rebel FR 0.47 −0.01 −0.61
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(0.49) (0.84) (0.78)
Rebconcen 0.09 −0.38 −2.05 ∗ ∗
(0.57) (1.05) (0.99)
Mass kill 0.53 1.22 2.00 ∗ ∗∗
(0.48) (0.82) (0.64)
Irregular 1.38∗ 1.56∗ 2.17 ∗ ∗∗ 2.18 ∗ ∗∗ 2.16 ∗ ∗∗ 2.66 ∗ ∗ 1.42
(0.76) (0.85) (0.73) (0.80) (0.74) (1.25) (1.09)
GDP −0.66∗ −0.77 ∗ ∗ −0.42 −0.37 −0.35 −1.08 ∗ ∗∗ −1.14 ∗ ∗
(0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29) (0.40) (0.54)
Population −0.16 −0.17 −0.04 −0.02 −0.01 −0.12 −0.45
(0.26) (0.21) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.29) (0.31)
Democracy 0.07 −0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Bdeaths −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Successionist −1.14 1.16 0.59 0.61 0.71 −2.01 1.89∗
(1.01) (0.79) (0.53) (0.49) (0.47) (1.82) (1.11)
Constant −5.11 −0.72 −0.97 −1.91 −1.45 −10.41 ∗ ∗ 1.08
(3.69) (2.00) (1.49) (1.38) (1.56) (4.92) (3.21)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.59 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Distance −0.68 ∗ ∗ −0.74∗
(0.32) (0.39)




Elections 1.26 0.41 1.06 −0.12
(1.13) (0.91) (1.36) (1.04)
Rebclaim 3.83 ∗ ∗∗ 3.15 ∗ ∗∗ 2.54 ∗ ∗∗ 2.04 ∗ ∗
(0.98) (1.15) (0.81) (0.84)
CDF 1.10 0.81 1.02 0.99
(0.93) (0.83) (0.99) (0.97)
Ethnic war 0.85 ∗ ∗ 0.57 0.62
(0.35) (0.42) (0.47)
Exclusionary 1.38 ∗ ∗ 0.28 0.59
(0.67) (1.24) (1.10)
Rebextsupp 1.74 ∗ ∗ 0.87 0.80
(0.80) (0.94) (0.78)
Rebel FR −0.03 −0.02 0.36
(0.68) (0.70) (0.69)
Rebel concen 0.49 −0.06 −0.20
(0.63) (0.91) (0.71)
Mass kill 2.07 ∗ ∗ 1.97 2.10 ∗ ∗
(0.85) (1.20) (0.89)
Irregular −2.03 ∗ ∗∗ −1.63 ∗ ∗ −1.86 ∗ ∗ −2.54 ∗ ∗∗ −1.90 ∗ ∗∗ −3.21 ∗ ∗ −2.85 ∗ ∗∗
(0.75) (0.64) (0.74) (0.78) (0.64) (1.25) (1.02)
GDP 1.45 ∗ ∗∗ 1.05 ∗ ∗∗ 0.76 ∗ ∗∗ 0.98 ∗ ∗∗ 0.98 ∗ ∗∗ 1.62 ∗ ∗ 1.05 ∗ ∗∗
(0.34) (0.23) (0.17) (0.20) (0.23) (0.63) (0.30)
Population −0.35 −0.21 −0.18 −0.35 −0.19 −0.49 ∗ ∗ −0.34
(0.22) (0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.17) (0.24) (0.23)
Democracy −0.06 −0.05 0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.06 −0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10)
Bdeaths 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mountains −0.30 −0.16 −0.05 0.47∗ 0.15 −0.07 0.19
(0.26) (0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.33) (0.24)
Constant −3.02 −2.63 −1.23 −1.76 −2.20 −3.69 −4.19




Land area 0.80 0.46
(0.53) (0.51)
Bordconflict 1.50 ∗ ∗ 0.91
(0.72) (0.74)
Elections 2.83 2.78 2.55 2.10
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(2.68) (2.45) (2.36) (1.72)
Rebel claim 1.58 1.48 0.12 −0.31
(1.72) (1.63) (1.60) (2.18)
CDF 1.12 1.08 −0.30 0.01
(1.51) (1.17) (1.64) (1.70)
Ethnic war 1.14 0.99∗ 0.87∗
(0.70) (0.51) (0.46)
Exclusionary 0.49 −0.20 0.23
(0.83) (0.92) (0.84)
Rebextsupp −0.02 −1.04 −0.95
(1.06) (1.45) (1.09)
Rebel FR 1.94∗ 1.77∗ 1.88
(1.00) (0.98) (1.14)
Rebel concen 2.05 ∗ ∗ 0.92 1.50
(0.91) (1.17) (1.45)
Mass kill 1.44 −0.24 0.33
(1.26) (0.97) (1.12)
Irregular −1.61 −1.05 −0.18 −0.64 −0.64 −1.43 −1.34
(1.35) (1.21) (0.92) (1.26) (0.97) (1.67) (1.37)
GDP 1.67 ∗ ∗∗ 1.44 ∗ ∗∗ 1.00 ∗ ∗∗ 1.40 ∗ ∗∗ 1.30 ∗ ∗∗ 1.65 ∗ ∗ 1.32 ∗ ∗∗
(0.51) (0.47) (0.30) (0.33) (0.41) (0.66) (0.45)
Population −0.53 ∗ ∗ −0.58 ∗ ∗ −0.47 ∗ ∗ −0.70 ∗ ∗∗ −0.56 ∗ ∗∗ −0.47 −0.59 ∗ ∗
(0.26) (0.23) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.32) (0.25)
Democracy −0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 −0.04 0.02
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mountains −0.02 −0.34 −0.02 0.31 0.10 0.13 0.00
(0.39) (0.32) (0.26) (0.31) (0.25) (0.47) (0.52)
Constant −9.24 −2.44 −1.37 −1.96 −0.71 −9.33 −3.56
(5.80) (2.81) (2.30) (2.98) (2.65) (6.08) (3.25)
Relocation
Distance 1.44 ∗ ∗∗ 2.00 ∗ ∗∗
(0.49) (0.60)
Land area −0.64∗ −0.84 ∗ ∗
(0.38) (0.43)
Bordconf 2.90 ∗ ∗∗ 3.53 ∗ ∗∗
(0.85) (1.02)
Elections −1.00 −0.11 −1.60∗ −0.30
(0.78) (0.85) (0.82) (1.12)
Rebel claim −0.45 −0.74 −2.50 ∗ ∗ −1.82
(0.65) (0.92) (1.03) (1.45)
CDF 3.90 ∗ ∗∗ 2.80 ∗ ∗∗ 4.41 ∗ ∗∗ 3.04 ∗ ∗∗
(0.73) (0.71) (0.87) (1.11)
Ethnic war 0.69 ∗ ∗ 1.24 ∗ ∗ 1.41 ∗ ∗
(0.33) (0.62) (0.58)
Exclusionary 0.24 0.07 −0.67
(0.55) (0.83) (1.01)
Rebextsupp 1.06∗ 1.62∗ 0.07
(0.62) (0.86) (0.57)
Rebel FR 0.31 0.45 −0.55
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(0.65) (0.72) (0.93)
Rebconcen 0.61 0.06 −0.94
(0.70) (0.91) (0.99)
Mass kill 0.47 1.55∗ 1.16
(0.57) (0.94) (0.74)
Irregular war 1.50∗ 1.55∗ 2.32 ∗ ∗∗ 2.05 ∗ ∗ 2.07 ∗ ∗ 1.91 ∗ ∗ 2.11
(0.90) (0.91) (0.82) (0.93) (0.81) (0.95) (1.33)
GDP −0.68∗ −0.41 −0.26 −0.16 −0.17 −1.09 ∗ ∗∗ −0.76
(0.37) (0.41) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37) (0.51)
Population −0.08 −0.12 0.01 −0.07 0.01 −0.05 −0.33
(0.32) (0.23) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.32) (0.35)
Democracy 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Bdeaths −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mountains −0.10 −0.02 0.02 0.13 −0.02 −0.06 0.08
(0.29) (0.23) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.36) (0.43)
Constant −4.15 −1.55 −1.75 −1.91 −1.32 −8.60∗ −0.94
(4.15) (2.09) (1.61) (1.45) (1.54) (4.95) (3.72)
Observations 125 126 122 119 126 115 115
Pseudo R2 0.50 0.48 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.56 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Distance −0.55 ∗ ∗ −0.89 ∗ ∗
(0.27) (0.40)




Elections 1.25 0.40 0.92 −0.03
(0.91) (0.69) (1.04) (1.00)
Rebclaim 5.10 ∗ ∗∗ 3.52 ∗ ∗∗ 5.46 ∗ ∗∗ 3.36 ∗ ∗∗
(1.42) (1.19) (1.87) (1.15)
CDF 0.82 1.14 0.20 1.57∗
(0.79) (0.86) (1.15) (0.90)
Ethnic war 0.96 ∗ ∗∗ 0.22 0.42
(0.37) (0.47) (0.53)
Exclusionary 1.28 ∗ ∗ 0.04 0.34
(0.55) (0.98) (0.91)
Rebextsupp 1.19 1.93 ∗ ∗ 1.60 ∗ ∗
(0.74) (0.83) (0.80)
Rebel FR −0.86 −1.20 −0.61
(0.63) (0.76) (0.75)
Rebconcen −0.22 −0.25 −1.17
(0.56) (0.98) (0.73)
Mass kill 1.44 ∗ ∗ 2.20 ∗ ∗ 1.84 ∗ ∗∗
(0.60) (0.87) (0.62)
Irregular −2.43 ∗ ∗∗ −1.95 ∗ ∗∗ −2.06 ∗ ∗∗ −2.64 ∗ ∗∗ −1.69 ∗ ∗∗ −3.46 ∗ ∗∗ −2.83 ∗ ∗∗
(0.83) (0.68) (0.67) (0.82) (0.61) (0.95) (0.92)
GDP 1.17 ∗ ∗∗ 0.72 ∗ ∗∗ 0.55 ∗ ∗∗ 0.68 ∗ ∗∗ 0.68 ∗ ∗∗ 1.62 ∗ ∗∗ 0.82 ∗ ∗∗
(0.28) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.48) (0.30)
Population −0.41 ∗ ∗ −0.30∗ −0.24 −0.26 −0.23∗ −0.61 ∗ ∗ −0.51∗
(0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.26) (0.27)
Democracy −0.03 −0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 −0.05 −0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wardur 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.03 ∗ ∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −4.49 −2.96 −1.76 −0.63 −1.49 −4.87 ∗ ∗ −3.18








Elections 2.07 1.75 2.50 1.44
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(1.61) (1.53) (2.35) (1.09)
Rebclaim 1.83 0.51 −0.48 −1.61
(2.28) (1.36) (2.06) (1.57)
CDF 0.71 0.64 −0.55 −0.01
(1.48) (1.12) (1.76) (1.53)
Ethnic war 1.29 ∗ ∗ 1.86 ∗ ∗ 1.36∗
(0.62) (0.90) (0.81)
Exclusionary 0.22 −0.01 0.76
(0.76) (1.35) (0.85)
Rebextsupp −0.66 −1.55 −0.74
(0.77) (1.49) (1.17)
Rebel FR 0.80 1.08 1.14
(0.96) (1.72) (1.36)
Rebconcen 2.07 ∗ ∗ 2.05 2.23
(0.82) (1.42) (1.76)
Mass kill 1.04 0.20 0.78
(1.05) (1.68) (1.02)
Irregular −2.54 −1.21 −0.57 −0.91 −0.67 −2.66 −1.47
(1.93) (1.28) (1.05) (1.39) (1.10) (1.97) (1.74)
GDP 1.60 ∗ ∗∗ 1.05 ∗ ∗∗ 0.88 ∗ ∗∗ 0.96 ∗ ∗∗ 1.03 ∗ ∗∗ 1.78 ∗ ∗∗ 0.90 ∗ ∗
(0.52) (0.38) (0.30) (0.35) (0.33) (0.64) (0.40)
Population −0.46 −0.28 −0.31 −0.26 −0.35 −0.48 −0.25
(0.32) (0.28) (0.22) (0.28) (0.22) (0.45) (0.36)
Democracy −0.05 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 −0.14 −0.03
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wardur 0.02∗ 0.01 0.02 ∗ ∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗ 0.03 ∗ ∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant −10.15∗ −4.11 −3.97 −4.44 −2.62 −11.23 −6.91
(5.88) (2.74) (2.52) (3.47) (2.28) (7.81) (5.76)
Relocation
Distance 1.70 ∗ ∗∗ 2.86 ∗ ∗∗
(0.49) (0.72)
Land area −0.88 ∗ ∗ −1.87 ∗ ∗∗
(0.43) (0.65)
Bordconf 2.43 ∗ ∗∗ 4.16 ∗ ∗∗
(0.78) (1.12)
Elections −1.44∗ −1.08 −2.23 ∗ ∗ −1.15
(0.74) (0.88) (0.94) (1.17)
Rebclaim −0.49 −1.30 −3.94 ∗ ∗∗ −2.06
(0.67) (1.05) (1.43) (1.38)
CDF 3.75 ∗ ∗∗ 2.86 ∗ ∗∗ 5.47 ∗ ∗∗ 3.19 ∗ ∗∗
(0.87) (0.62) (1.39) (0.92)
Ethnic war 0.33 2.04 ∗ ∗ 1.08 ∗ ∗
(0.31) (0.96) (0.48)
Exclusionary −0.18 −0.54 −1.30
(0.66) (1.48) (0.94)
Rebextsupp 0.33 1.21 −0.16
(0.58) (0.86) (0.66)
Rebel FR −0.73 −1.20 −2.06 ∗ ∗
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(0.60) (1.26) (0.84)
Rebconcen 0.08 1.07 −1.60∗
(0.59) (1.34) (0.89)
Mass kill 0.28 2.47 ∗ ∗ 1.90 ∗ ∗
(0.56) (1.11) (0.84)
Irregular 0.70 1.39 1.49∗ 1.09 1.50∗ 1.87 1.18
(0.89) (0.90) (0.82) (0.85) (0.79) (1.52) (1.23)
GDP −0.84 ∗ ∗ −0.78∗ −0.19 −0.24 −0.21 −1.41 ∗ ∗∗ −0.88
(0.36) (0.44) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.43) (0.65)
Population −0.23 −0.09 −0.05 −0.07 −0.03 −0.49 −0.45
(0.24) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.36) (0.28)
Democracy 0.05 −0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.09)
Bdeaths −0.00 −0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wardur 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗ 0.03 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 ∗ ∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −3.67 −1.47 −2.30 −1.48 −2.35 −6.17 0.83
(3.35) (1.68) (1.71) (1.51) (1.57) (4.65) (2.93)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.49 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.64 0.59
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Distance −0.57 ∗ ∗ −0.71 ∗ ∗∗
(0.25) (0.26)




Elections 1.44∗ 0.34 0.86 −0.23
(0.82) (0.63) (1.00) (0.98)
Rebclaim 5.37 ∗ ∗∗ 3.63 ∗ ∗∗ 5.57 ∗ ∗∗ 3.83 ∗ ∗∗
(1.25) (1.16) (1.46) (1.15)
CDF 1.55 0.78 1.89∗ 1.55 ∗ ∗
(0.96) (0.69) (1.06) (0.75)
Ethnic war 0.89 ∗ ∗ 0.15 0.37
(0.37) (0.61) (0.62)
Exclusionary 1.60 ∗ ∗∗ 0.54 0.71
(0.49) (1.09) (0.94)
Rebextsupp 1.57 ∗ ∗ 1.35 1.25
(0.70) (0.84) (0.94)
Rebel FR −0.32 −0.66 −0.38
(0.69) (0.81) (0.70)
Rebconcen −0.14 −1.05 −1.34∗
(0.57) (1.05) (0.77)
Mass kill 1.57 ∗ ∗∗ 2.43 ∗ ∗∗ 2.34 ∗ ∗∗
(0.56) (0.83) (0.77)
Irregular −1.67 ∗ ∗ −1.11∗ −1.26∗ −1.47 ∗ ∗ −0.85 −2.68 ∗ ∗ −2.11 ∗ ∗
(0.77) (0.60) (0.67) (0.71) (0.62) (1.10) (0.94)
GDP 0.97 ∗ ∗∗ 0.56 ∗ ∗∗ 0.37 ∗ ∗ 0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.52 ∗ ∗∗ 1.20 ∗ ∗∗ 0.60 ∗ ∗
(0.26) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.34) (0.25)
Population −0.54 ∗ ∗ −0.27 −0.24∗ −0.28∗ −0.22 −0.82 ∗ ∗∗ −0.46∗
(0.22) (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.28) (0.25)
Democracy −0.05 −0.05 0.04 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02 −0.04
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel SD 2.88 ∗ ∗∗ 1.62 ∗ ∗ 1.37∗ 1.42∗ 1.69 ∗ ∗ 3.39 ∗ ∗∗ 2.01∗
(0.82) (0.81) (0.76) (0.77) (0.74) (1.30) (1.12)
Constant −4.43 −2.82 −1.05 −0.25 −1.07 −3.69 −3.40
(2.82) (2.28) (1.48) (1.71) (1.45) (2.74) (2.66)
Depopulation
Distance 0.30 0.59 ∗ ∗
(0.31) (0.29)




Elections 2.21 1.91 2.47 1.70
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(1.73) (1.55) (1.93) (1.12)
Rebclaim 2.01 0.66 0.27 −1.09
(1.99) (1.31) (2.08) (1.32)
CDF 1.35 0.95 0.58 0.66
(1.51) (1.05) (1.65) (1.20)
Ethnic war 1.28 ∗ ∗ 1.28 ∗ ∗ 1.40 ∗ ∗
(0.60) (0.50) (0.60)
Exclusionary 0.49 −0.02 0.55
(0.75) (0.74) (0.71)
Rebextsupp −0.16 −1.34 −0.59
(0.98) (1.38) (1.28)
Rebel FR 1.77 ∗ ∗ 2.18∗ 2.09∗
(0.86) (1.19) (1.17)
Rebconcen 1.85 ∗ ∗ 0.51 1.37
(0.87) (1.15) (1.26)
Mass kill 1.01 0.14 0.60
(0.89) (1.21) (0.92)
Irregular −1.77 −0.95 −0.02 −0.25 −0.01 −2.11∗ −1.49
(1.47) (1.01) (0.90) (0.92) (0.87) (1.27) (1.00)
GDP 1.46 ∗ ∗∗ 0.98 ∗ ∗∗ 0.72 ∗ ∗∗ 0.88 ∗ ∗∗ 0.89 ∗ ∗∗ 1.62 ∗ ∗∗ 0.87 ∗ ∗
(0.41) (0.33) (0.25) (0.30) (0.28) (0.52) (0.42)
Population −0.63 ∗ ∗ −0.30 −0.30 −0.26 −0.31∗ −0.71 ∗ ∗ −0.20
(0.28) (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.19) (0.35) (0.25)
Democracy −0.01 0.00 0.03 −0.00 0.04 −0.05 −0.03
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Bdeaths 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 ∗ ∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel SD 1.59 0.03 0.27 −0.26 0.71 0.04 −1.42
(1.33) (1.57) (1.34) (1.74) (1.29) (1.99) (2.60)
Constant −7.82∗ −3.47 −2.98 −3.63 −1.91 −6.11∗ −6.59
(4.11) (2.43) (2.15) (2.86) (2.02) (3.52) (4.18)
Relocation
Distance 1.52 ∗ ∗∗ 2.27 ∗ ∗∗
(0.44) (0.69)
Land area −0.73∗ −1.05 ∗ ∗
(0.40) (0.42)
Bordconf 2.71 ∗ ∗∗ 3.92 ∗ ∗∗
(0.79) (1.16)
Elections −0.96 −0.58 −1.94 ∗ ∗ −0.79
(0.68) (0.75) (0.79) (0.82)
Rebclaim −0.08 −0.99 −2.16∗ −1.61
(0.58) (0.84) (1.22) (1.24)
CDF 4.01 ∗ ∗∗ 3.05 ∗ ∗∗ 5.14 ∗ ∗∗ 3.23 ∗ ∗∗
(0.86) (0.61) (1.24) (0.80)
Ethnic war 0.24 1.56 ∗ ∗ 1.02 ∗ ∗
(0.25) (0.68) (0.49)
Exclusionary 0.51 −0.12 −0.70
(0.50) (0.96) (0.81)
Rebextsupp 0.99 ∗ ∗ 2.15 ∗ ∗ 0.27
(0.42) (0.94) (0.51)
Rebel FR 0.23 −0.08 −0.88
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(0.46) (0.83) (0.83)
Rebconcen 0.16 −0.50 −1.77 ∗ ∗
(0.51) (1.10) (0.86)
Mass kill 0.40 1.62 1.55 ∗ ∗
(0.49) (1.03) (0.71)
Irregular 1.72 ∗ ∗ 2.00 ∗ ∗ 2.43 ∗ ∗∗ 2.47 ∗ ∗∗ 2.52 ∗ ∗∗ 3.28 ∗ ∗∗ 2.14 ∗ ∗
(0.79) (0.79) (0.66) (0.69) (0.63) (1.25) (1.08)
GDP −0.81 ∗ ∗ −0.73 ∗ ∗ −0.47 −0.40 −0.39 −1.41 ∗ ∗∗ −1.02 ∗ ∗
(0.36) (0.36) (0.32) (0.27) (0.28) (0.47) (0.48)
Population −0.20 −0.09 −0.02 −0.02 −0.00 −0.26 −0.27
(0.26) (0.19) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.33) (0.25)
Democracy 0.04 −0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Bdeaths −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ∗ ∗ −0.00 ∗ ∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Milper −0.00 −0.00 −0.00∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rebel SD 1.78 ∗ ∗ 0.60 1.22 1.17 1.47 2.70 ∗ ∗ 0.62
(0.72) (0.75) (0.93) (0.96) (0.99) (1.07) (0.79)
Constant −3.66 −1.48 −1.33 −1.91 −1.56 −8.57∗ −0.47
(3.43) (1.86) (1.48) (1.40) (1.47) (5.07) (2.73)
Observations 149 154 150 147 155 137 141
Pseudo R2 0.53 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.61 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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List of Interviews in Syria
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G.1 List of Interviews in Syria
ID Location Date of Interview Respondent Description
SYR001 Gaziantep, Turkey January 2016 Male, Syrian human rights activist
SYR002 Gaziantep, Turkey January 2016 Female, Syrian journalist
SYR003 Gaziantep, Turkey January 2016 Male, Syrian aid worker
SYR004 Gaziantep, Turkey March 2016 Male, Syrian opposition official
SYR005 Gaziantep, Turkey March 2016 Male, U.N. aid worker
SYR006 Gaziantep, Turkey March 2016 Female, Syrian activist
SYR007 Gaziantep, Turkey May 2016 Male, Syrian journalist
SYR008 Gaziantep, Turkey May 2016 Male, Syrian activist
SYR009 Gaziantep, Turkey May 2016 Male, former rebel combatant
SYR010 Gaziantep, Turkey June 2016 Male, Syrian NGO official
SYR011 Gaziantep, Turkey June 2016 Male, former government official
SYR012 Gaziantep, Turkey June 2016 Male, former local councilman, Aleppo
SYR013 Gaziantep, Turkey June 2016 Male, former local councilman, Idlib
SYR014 Gaziantep, Turkey June 2016 Male, former rebel combatant
SYR015 Istanbul, Turkey December 2016 Male, regime defector
SYR016 Istanbul, Turkey January 2017 Male, Syrian activist
SYR017 Istanbul, Turkey January 2017 Male, regime defector
SYR018 Istanbul, Turkey January 2017 Male, Syrian journalist
SYR019 Istanbul, Turkey January 2017 Male, regime defector/rebel commander
SYR020 Istanbul, Turkey January 2017 Male, Syrian opposition official
SYR021 Istanbul, Turkey January 2017 Female, Syrian human rights activist
SYR022 Istanbul, Turkey June 2017 Male, Provincial council official
SYR023 Istanbul, Turkey June 2017 Female, Syrian researcher
SYR024 Istanbul, Turkey July 2017 Male, Syrian analyst
SYR025 Istanbul, Turkey July 2017 Male, Syrian NGO leader
SYR026 Berlin, Germany October 2017 Male, Syrian activist
SYR027 Berlin, Germany October 2017 Male, Syrian journalist
SYR028 Berlin, Germany October 2017 Male, Syrian aid worker
SYR029 Berlin, Germany October 2017 Male, Aid worker/SARC advisor
SYR030 Beirut, Lebanon January 2019 Male, Syrian aid worker
SYR031 Al-Hasakeh, Syria January 2019 Male, IDP, Roj Camp
SYR032 Al-Hasakeh, Syria January 2019 Male, IDP, Roj Camp
SYR033 Al-Hasakeh, Syria January 2019 Male, IDP, Roj Camp
SYR034 Ein Issa, Syria January 2019 Male, Local council member, Idlib province
SYR035 Ein Issa, Syria January 2019 Female, Syrian aid worker
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Appendix H
Violent Events Data in Burundi
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Figure H.1: Military Battles and Rebel Attacks in Bubanza Province
Source: UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013).
Figure H.2: Civilians Deaths from Rebel and Government Attacks in Bubanza Province
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Figure H.3: Military Battles and Rebel Attacks in Bujumbura-Rural Province
Figure H.4: Civilians Deaths from Rebel and Government Attacks in Bujumbura-Rural
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Figure H.5: Military Battles and Rebel Attacks in Bururi Province
Figure H.6: Civilians Deaths from Rebel and Government Attacks in Bururi Province
